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ABSTRACT	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation aims to show how the relationship between reification and music 
discloses problems in modern philosophy and critical musicology. In chapter one, I 
attempt to articulate the relationship between reification and music in order to put 
forward a vision for a non-reified engagement with musical praxis. Accordingly, I 
suggest that once we distance ourselves from theoretical attempts to characterise the 
object ‘music’ in analytic aesthetics, instead, seeking to make sense of concrete 
musical events within the varying contexts of our everyday practices, then music can 
be conceived as an inherently meaningful phenomena that discloses the worlds in 
which it is created, performed and received.  
The following two chapters explore problems surrounding the interpretation 
of musical praxis in relation to the world-disclosive vision of music offered in chapter 
one. By looking at the debates surrounding Richard Wagner’s works, chapter two 
explains how interpretive difference is a hermeneutic problem, one which allows us 
to accept the musical work as something that can ‘change in itself’, thus dissolving a 
number of problems associated with classical conceptions of musical meaning.  
It is in the light of these traditional approaches to the issue of aesthetic 
meaning that the third chapter seeks to consider how the philosophy of music brings 
about the reification of musical praxis. By situating the philosophy of music in 
relation to the world-disclosive vision of musical engagement articulated in previous 
chapters, I demonstrate how musical meaning can be understood in the context of 
socially- and culturally-cultivated tacit norms and practices.  
Subsequently, following discussions of the philosophical problems 
surrounding the association between music and reification, the fourth chapter 
examines the relationship in the context of critical musicology. Specifically, I attempt 
to show how music analysis, in an age where ‘postmodern’ New Musicology has 
largely given way to a critical musicology that is willing to accept and work with 
  
aspects of its ‘modernist’ past, can be included within a world-disclosive conception 
of music. The issue remains, however, that although critical musicology attempts to 
understand music in the context of everyday practices, it has simultaneously opened 
itself up to the charge of having condoned relativism.  
It follows that chapter five seeks to address the ethical and political problems 
that arise in ‘postmodern’ musicology as a result of the pressures of cultural 
relativism. I argue that in order to avoid ‘postmodernising’ itself out of existence, 
critical musicology, if it is to continue to give the institutional go-ahead for the 
interactions between ‘modernisms’ and ‘postmodernisms’, must face up to the 
questions of intersubjective legitimacy which maintain it as an institution and which 
presuppose its very existence. By turning to trans-cultural and trans-historical basis of 
interpretive validity, the future of critical musicology becomes entangled in 
contemporary philosophical debates surrounding the emergence, maintenance and 
transcendence of socio-cultural norms. 
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INTRODUCTION	  
 
PHILOSOPHY AND MUSICOLOGY  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the German Middle Ages too, singing and dancing crowds, ever increasing in number, whirled 
themselves from place to place under this same Dionysian impulse…There are some who, from 
obtuseness or lack of experience, turn away from such phenomena as from “folk-diseases” with 
contempt or pity born of the consciousness of their own “healthy mindedness”. But of course such 
poor wretches have no idea how corpselike and ghostly their so-called “health-mindedness” looks 
when the glowing life of the Dionysian revellers roars past them. 
(Nietzsche 1967, 36-37) 
 
 
This dissertation aims to show how the relationship between reification and music 
discloses problems in modern philosophy and critical musicology. 1  Although 
philosophical engagement with music is nothing new, some may find my use of 
reification – as a common factor in the debates between critical musicology and 
contemporary philosophy – obscure. The issue, to a certain extent, is that the term 
‘reification’ is intimately entwined with Western Marxism and its focus on 
emancipatory class politics and social ontology. In order to accept the relevance of 
reification for current debates within and between musicology and philosophy, we 
must, to a certain degree, free the term from its place in Marxist theory in order to 
show why music should be linked at all to the notion. This process of emancipation is 
helped by the fact that even within what could broadly be defined as the Western 
Marxist tradition, which emerged with the rise of the New Left and included Georg 
Lukács, some of the members of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt 
(otherwise known as the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory) and such theorists as 
                                                
1 The dialogue between philosophy and musicology has been assisted since 2011 by well-attended 
annual conferences at King’s College, London organised by the Royal Musical Association’s Music 
and Philosophy Study Group and the American Musicological Society’s Music and Philosophy Study 
Group. I’d like to thank the committee of the RMA Music and Philosophy Study Group for giving me 
the opportunity to present parts of this dissertation at its conferences and workshops. 
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Joseph Gabel, Lucien Goldmann and Karel Kosik, there also exists a problematic 
relationship between reification and aesthetics, a relationship that paves the way for 
discussions concerning the connection between music and reification in this study. 
But what do I mean by reification? Although the term might crudely be 
referred to as both the process by which a non-thing becomes a thing as well as the 
result of that process, it has different senses depending on the contexts in which it is 
employed; a particularity and heterogeneity that, ironically, reifying thought tries to 
suppress. In the context of music, the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries have seen 
the emergence and development of methods of musical enquiry that attempt to 
philosophically demystify the ‘nature’ of music; its being, its meaning and its value. 
The rise of analytic aesthetics in Anglo-American philosophy, which, when it comes 
to music, seems to have followed in the footsteps of nineteenth-century formalist 
aesthetics and related projects that have brought about and affirmed the primacy of 
music’s autonomy and the work concept, has been accompanied by efforts to 
theoretically characterise musical works. The typical issues that have concerned 
analytic aestheticians have included the nature of music, the location and character of 
musical meaning, the nature of the relationship between music and emotion and the 
ontology of the work. Such questions have resulted in the production of philosophical 
theories that attempt to account for the ontology, meaning and value of artworks. But 
what have been shouldered out in attempts to definitively characterise works of art 
are the specific questions of why art concerns us, why it matters to us as part of our 
daily lives. In other words, in attempting to explain the ‘nature’ of aesthetic 
experience or the ‘nature’ of art itself, what remains unarticulated by analytic 
aestheticians are the qualities of our specific aesthetic experiences – those particular 
and individual experiences which happen when we are around art. Ultimately, 
analytic aesthetics is a form of artistic engagement that is concerned with prizing 
theory production over and above attempts to explain aesthetic praxis in terms of its 
everyday meaningfulness. Indeed, it is largely on the basis that much of what is 
understood about art in analytical aesthetics is, as Adorno states in his unpublished 
lectures on aesthetics, ‘abstractly’ and ‘mechanically’ derived from ‘pre-given 
philosophical theories’ that ‘theoretical aesthetics’ has fallen. Of course, we have to 
remember that such a fall can only be understood as a ‘fall’ when compared with the 
constitution of aesthetics as a philosophical subject in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. Indeed, as we see time and time again in the works of, for 
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example, F. W. J. Schelling, J. C. F. von Schiller, F. D. E. Schleiermacher and K. W. 
F. von Schlegel, the critical and hermeneutic dimensions of post-Kantian German 
Romanticism arise form what is seen to be art’s ability to articulate and express our 
relations to ourselves and the world in ever new ways rather than conform to the rules 
as laid out in some philosophical theory. As we shall see, theory construction and 
attempts to account for the characteristics of music, by failing to take account of the 
meaningfulness of our specific experiences with musical praxis, are, I will argue, 
forms of reification. Indeed, although the term ‘reification’, in the specific sense that I 
shall make clear, might seem to be most applicable to analytic aesthetics, we shall 
also see how musicology, through its concerns with, for example, formalism, musical 
autonomy and the meaning-determining nature of an artist’s intentions, has also been 
tied up with concept. 
Even from these briefest of sketches, how I intend to use the term ‘reification’ 
seems to bear little resemblance to those class redemptive projects that once were 
sustained by and, simultaneously, renewed the Marxist conceptual apparatus of 
reification. But although the fading of the New Left has been accompanied by the 
demise of reification as a tool for radical political and social critique, my 
appropriation of the term, as a means of coming to terms with philosophical and 
musicological enquiry, cannot be entirely divorced from the orthodox Marxist 
movements from which it emerged.2  Indeed, my use of the term hinges upon 
Theodor W. Adorno’s account of reification as ‘identity-thinking’, which is also one 
of the starting points for Axel Honneth’s recent book on the topic.3  However, the 
                                                
2  Honneth acknowledges that Lukács put forward an account of reification as objectification. 
However, the former also observes that Lukács proposed a second ‘unofficial’ explanation for his 
recourse to a true, undistorted form of human praxis. In this second version, Lukács ‘judges the defect 
of reifying agency against an ideal of praxis characterised by empathetic and existential engagement’ 
(Honneth 2008, 29). Such an interpretation forms the basis for Honneth’s own account of reification. 
3 Commentators have sought to challenge Honneth’s reformulation of the term, a challenge that has 
coincided with a revisionist approach towards Lukács’ reification essay. For example, Timothy Hall 
has recently suggested that while Honneth is right to seek to broaden the debate in contemporary social 
and political thought by returning to Lukács’ concept of reification, ‘he misses the opportunity to 
broaden this debate still further by underestimating the crisis of political subjectivity that Lukács 
foresaw’ (Hall 2011, 197). Lukács’ concept of reification has a wider application and suggests a path 
towards the general transformation of modernity and the emergence of a new form of social rationality. 
The complex relationships between Western capitalism, technology, instrumental reason and reified 
consciousness that were discussed during the heyday of the Frankfurt School, which, as Andrew 
Feenberg (1981) has observed, were prefigured by Lukács’ sociological broadening of Marxism 
through Weberian sociology and philosophical deepening of Marxism through Hegelian idealism, are 
only hinted at in Honneth’s analysis by means of a brief nod to Adorno’s idea of ‘identity-thinking’. 
For Feenberg, ‘the social pathology that concerns Lukács is not the lack of recognition, important 
though that may be, but rather the overwhelming predominance of rational structures that distort and 
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applicability of Honneth’s account of the concept ‘reification’ to aesthetics is 
problematic due to its ties to philosophically inspired social criticism as informed by 
Lukács’ study of social ontology in History and Class Consciousness (1923).4 
Adorno’s account of reification, which is intimately entwined with his critique of the 
nature of philosophy late in his career, suffers from no such problem. Indeed, as well 
as using the term as the basis for his critique of metaphysics, it also surfaces in his 
studies on aesthetics, epistemology, ethics and moral philosophy. As shall be 
observed, it is with Adorno and Martin Heidegger that the aesthetic relevance of 
reification is articulated, specifically, the notion that artworks protest against 
reification, yet they also rely upon something like reification to exist.  
The tension between a non-reified engagement with artworks and the 
‘reification’ that allows us to comprehend aesthetic praxis can be observed today in 
the contrasting approaches to art that separate Anglo-American analytical philosophy 
from more European/Continental philosophical traditions. Although it is doubtful 
whether we can draw any genuine line between the two philosophical enterprises, 
                                                                                                                                      
oppress the human lives they contain’ (Feenberg 2011b, 101). The revisionists have attempted to read 
Lukács’ essay along the lines of the second ‘unofficial’ analysis of reification, which Honneth draws 
upon. According to this account, Lukács was not antagonistic to objectivity and detachment but 
pointed towards a specific mode of objectivity and detachment attributed to reified thought. Hall and 
Feenberg both agree that Lukács, like Adorno, was searching for forms of thought and action that do 
not suppress the qualitative content of our conceptual schemes. ‘In Lukács the proletariat appears as 
the “object” repressed by its reified “concept.” The proletariat overflows its concept almost literally in 
rejecting its own commodification. Its revolt is not motivated by an allergy to reification as Adorno 
charges but by the restriction of its life process, by unemployment, hunger, and injustice 
comprehended as consequences of the commodity form of labor. Revolution in Lukács is Adornian 
nonidentity with a vengeance. It fulfills Adorno’s demand for respect for the dignity of the concrete’ 
(Feenberg 2011a, 190). 
4 There are some problems with Honneth’s account when it comes to the relationship between 
reification and aesthetics. Honneth admits that he uses the term ‘reification’ in a direct sense only 
when referring to our relations with other persons (Honneth 2008, 63). He claims that he hardly sees 
any support for the strong hypothesis that an ‘objectification of nature could in any way harm the 
primacy of care or qualitative experience’ (ibid., 61). As Honneth explains, ‘we may regard the 
possibility of interactive, recognitional dealings with animals, plants and even things to be ethically 
desirable, but this normative preference cannot provide any sound arguments for claiming that society 
cannot go beyond these forms of interaction’ (ibid., 61-62). Nevertheless, Honneth does propose that 
our relation to nature can be called reified only in an indirect or derivative sense when we lose sight of 
the multiplicity of ways in which the world has significance for those we have recognised. It follows 
that Honneth introduces the idea of the intersubjective mode of engagement with the natural world as 
the basis for his account of the reification of other things besides human beings. For example, by 
chopping down a tree on which you and your first love scrawled each other’s names, I, in effect, have 
failed to recognise the ways in which that tree holds special significance or existential meaning for 
you. Such an act, because it violates my recognitional dealings with other beings, is, for Honneth, the 
reification of nature. The problem is that when it comes to dealing with works of art, Honneth cannot 
simply claim that ‘we can take up a reifying stance toward the objective world without losing the 
possibility of cognitively disclosing it’ (ibid., 64). We cannot say that we do not violate any practical 
preconditions of our cognitive relationship to artworks when we take up an objectifying stance toward 
them. 
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they, as Lee Braver observes, can be seen to diverge ‘significantly on such basic 
matters as what is means to philosophise, which topics are philosophically important, 
and what counts as a legitimate reason or argument’ (Braver 2012, 2). 5  The 
divergence between analytic positions and others formed within European traditions 
is something Andrew Bowie also discerns, arguing that ‘there might seem to be an 
unbridgeable distance between, on the one hand, analytical positions which seek 
answers to supposedly perennial questions about truth, meaning, and rationality and, 
on the other, positions deriving from Nietzsche and others in the European tradition 
which seek to show that rationality is a manifestation of the attempt to exercise power 
over the Other’ (Bowie 2013, 4). Simon Critchley affirms Bowie’s characterisation of 
analytic philosophy whilst acknowledging those thinkers that have adopted a critical 
stance towards Anglo-American ways of doing from within those same traditions. For 
Critchley, philosophical scientism as a common feature of analytical approaches to 
the world, based on the beliefs that the procedures of the natural sciences can and 
should provide a model for philosophical method and that the natural sciences 
provide our primary or most significant access to the world, ‘fails to see the role that 
science and technology play in the alienation of human beings from the world 
through the latter’s objectification into a causally determined realm of nature or, more 
egregiously, into a reified realm of commodities manipulated by an instrumental 
rationality’ (Critchley 1998, 13). Indeed, as Critchley claims, the problem of 
rationality in modernity is such that Continental traditions can be contrasted with 
analytic traditions of philosophy though their focus on practice. He goes on to argue 
that ‘it is this touchstone of practice that leads philosophy towards a critique of 
present conditions, as conditions not amenable to freedom, and to the Utopian 
demand that things be otherwise, the demand for a transformative practice of 
philosophy, art, poetry and thinking’ (ibid., 12). In the respective cases of Braver and 
Bowie, both thinkers go on to show how the divide between analytical philosophy 
and Continental/European philosophy can be traversed and, indeed, called into 
question by prominent figures in both traditions. 
                                                
5  Braver goes on to show that Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, two principal 
representatives of either side of the analytic-Continental divide, made similar arguments for similar 
views on a wide range of fundamental issues. Braver proposes that ‘if a load-bearing bridge can be 
built between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, perhaps this will facilitate dialogue between analytic and 
continental thinkers in general, making the traditions intelligible to each other, thus allowing a fruitful 
crosspollination’ (Braver 2012, 2). 
  6 
What I want to show throughout this thesis is that in some quarters of analytic 
philosophy, a certain type of rational or cognitive engagement with music, an 
engagement derived from what Braver calls ‘disengaged contemplation’ of the nature 
and characteristics of music, its meaning and its value, brings about the reification of 
music and musical works. Indeed, it is precisely because certain thinkers within more 
European traditions of philosophy call into question the position accorded theoretical 
reflection in Western modernity that they can open up alternative spaces of possibility 
for a non-reified engagement with music.  
Peter Kivy, for example, illustrates his allegiance to the former camp. For 
Kivy, the so-called philosophy of music is founded on ‘a system of precepts and 
propositions, perhaps, on first reflection, vacuous truisms not worthy of being made 
explicit, but, on reflection, richly illuminating the practices they underlie’ (Kivy 
2002, 12). Aaron Ridley suggests that the philosophical analysis of concepts, which 
Kivy is proposing and which Ridley admits he used to subscribe to, as a suitable 
means for understanding music entails separating music off ‘as much as possible 
from everything else and to investigate it in what might be called its “pure state”’ 
(Ridley 2004, 2). In other words, to attempt conceptual analysis of music-related 
concepts is to ‘isolate music entirely, to try to leech or prise out of its context-laden 
character, and indeed the very nature of one’s own context-laden engagement with it’ 
(ibid., 3). Although we will explore why analytic aesthetics – of which the philosophy 
of music is a specialised branch of study – has been attracted to this ‘pure state’ 
conception of music in chapter one, what can be observed at this early stage is how 
analytic aesthetics of the kind advocated by Kivy, by suggesting that the analysis of 
‘precepts and propositions’ can illuminate musical praxis, can come under Adorno’s 
critique of reification as identity-thinking.  
For Adorno, a particular type of reifying thought – amongst other forms of 
identity-thinking which include Hegel’s idealism and Marx’s materialism – can be 
attributed to philosophical metaphysics, which, ‘to cut a long story short’, he claimed, 
‘is simply reason asserting itself absolutely; that is to say, reason which regards its 
own use as the warranty of truth, quite independently of the materials it has to work 
on’ (Adorno 2001, 38). In other words, ‘metaphysics is all knowledge that owes its 
existence to pure speculation’ – ‘a form of knowledge that is acquired purely by the 
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application of reason’ (ibid., 48).6 More importantly, metaphysics, by reason alone, 
aims for an account of the ahistorical truths of world that, in a way, function as the 
foundation on which the contingent world of everyday existence is based. 
Metaphysics, therefore, as Adorno observed, is concerned with a particular idea of 
truth, mainly that ‘truth is always what remains when you eliminate the apparently 
ephemeral, transitory and historical’ (ibid., 41). Metaphysics, Adorno went on to 
claim, brings about a theoretical context in which ‘this terribly impoverished and 
deprived’ conception of truth becomes ‘the entire substance of philosophy’. In other 
words, philosophy assumes that its propositions ‘do not refer to changing contents, 
but instead make[s] the claim that they are absolutely valid for all time’ (ibid., 46).  
Within this context where the goal of philosophical enquiry is the discovery of 
acultural and ahistorical truths, metaphysical thought – resting on ‘mere concepts’ 
(Kant CPR, B xiv) – does not derive ‘any sustenance or limits or anything non-
identical from experience’ [italics added] (Adorno 2001, 48). Because it ‘rigidly 
severs all links between the concept and any possible experience, any possible 
content’ (ibid., 49), metaphysics assumes that a concept is identical to its object, that 
concept and reality are aligned, thus bringing ‘all concepts in the world to a standstill 
simultaneously and to fetishize them’ (Adorno 2008, 24). Generalising the problem of 
identity in metaphysical thought to include what he called ‘traditional thought in 
general’ (ibid. 20), Adorno claimed that ‘in philosophy we are obliged to make use of 
concepts to talk about concepts, And this means that what we are concerned with in 
philosophy – namely the non-conceptual, that which concepts refer to – is excluded 
from philosophy from the outset’ (ibid., 62) In other words, metaphysics ‘is actually 
nothing but form which misapprehends itself as content’ (Adorno 2001, 50). 
However, even though, according to Adorno, the separation of metaphysics and 
experience ‘is taken to be self-evident’, that is not to say that ‘the contents of every 
concretely available or even conceivable metaphysics’ would be possible without 
matters of experience (ibid., 53). This is, according to Albrecht Wellmer, the ‘truth’ 
about metaphysics that Adorno observes at the moment of its ‘fall’.7 As Adorno went 
on to observe, ‘if I were to rely on existing metaphysics in the way in which Kant 
                                                
6 For Adorno, the meaning of the term ‘metaphysics’ is distinctly Kantian in origin. Indeed, in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claimed that metaphysics is ‘a wholly isolated speculative cognition of 
reason that elevates itself entirely above all instruction from experience’ (Kant CPR, B xiv). 
7 See Wellmer 1993, 204-223. 
  8 
thinks he can rely on the natural sciences in the Critique of Pure Reason, we would 
discover that this rigid dichotomy of experience and reason does not exist in the form 
he imagines’ (ibid.). Ultimately, the delusion of metaphysics, that is, that ‘pure 
speculation’ can be separated from experience, emerges as a result of what Adorno 
called the ‘mania for foundations’ [Fundierungswahn] – ‘the idea that no piece of 
knowledge can be understood simply within the framework in which it just happens 
to be located. I can only be satisfied with it once I have pursued it back to infinity, to 
the point where nothing further can happen’ (ibid., 52). It is this ‘mania for 
foundations’ which, for Adorno, ‘actually implies that there is a match between the 
knowing mind and the objects of possible knowledge that allows us to reduce every 
object of cognition to such an absolute’ (ibid.).  
Using metaphysics as an example, we can see that, for Adorno, reification is 
considered to be an act of identity-thinking whereby the subsumption of reality under 
a philosophical theory – an ‘intellectual narcissism’ (Adorno 2008, 25) – fails to 
account for the existence of ‘non-conceptual’ ‘individuals’, ‘particulars’ and 
‘heterogeneities’ that are specific to certain social, cultural and historical practices. 
Thus, what Adorno meant by reification ‘is that concepts…are no longer measured 
against their contents, but instead are taken in isolation’ (ibid., 23-24). In other words, 
the mind ‘makes absolutes of the things it has created. And it achieves this by tearing 
them from their context and then ceasing to think of them further’ (ibid., 24).8 In the 
case of the type of musical engagement advocated by Kivy, what is clear in the light 
of Adorno’s critique of identity-thinking is that by analysing music-related concepts, 
what remains unacknowledged are those ‘ephemeral, transitory and historical’ 
moments of musical praxis which constitute our everyday engagement with music. 
Nevertheless, as Adorno was also aware, because concepts are needed to bring things 
we encounter in the world into the inferential sphere, to communicate, to articulate 
meaning and purpose, to avoid falling into complete incomprehensibility, something 
like reification is also a necessary part of humanity ‘not merely as condition from 
which liberation is possible but also positively, as the form in which, however brittle 
                                                
8 Adorno also noted that concepts can also be more than the particular thing that is included under it, 
thus allowing for certain aspects of reality to be kept alive despite the fact that these aspects may be 
unacknowledged or unrealised when it comes to our current understanding of the object. We will come 
to this in chapter four. 
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and inadequate it may be, subjective impulses are realised, but only by being 
objectified’ (Adorno GS 10.1, 108).9  
The reification that arises through what Kivy calls a ‘reflection’ on music-
related concepts makes it difficult to understand the important roles music and 
musical praxis play in our everyday existence. Why did my father choose to play 
Bobby McFerrin’s ‘Don’t Worry, Be Happy’ at my grandfather’s funeral? Why was 
the last movement of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 and Samuel Barber’s Adagio for 
Strings performed at the ‘Last Night of the Proms’ days after 11 September 2001? 
Why does spiritual status or divine intercession determine an individual’s ability to 
perform art music in North India? It is doubtful whether such questions can be 
answered by analysis of music-related concepts such as ‘meaning’, ‘expression’, 
‘work’ and ‘value’ with no regard for actual performances and the events surrounding 
them. This begs the question whether these concepts really do, as Kivy claims, 
illuminate the practice they underlie. Indeed, it is, at times, hard to see what is at 
stake in attempts to analyse music-related concepts. As Bowie claims, ‘analytical 
aesthetics rarely if at all addresses the question of why art matters’ (Bowie 2013, 
136). Part of the problem is that the questions of music’s ontology, meaning and 
value overlap with or are seen as germane to wider problems in analytic philosophy. 
Thus, Kathleen Stock claims that ‘musical works are thought to present special 
ontological problems, and are often of interest as such to the metaphysician; the issue 
of what it is to experience music as expressive tends to interest those working on 
issues in the philosophy of emotion; the question of musical meaning tends to attract 
those active in the philosophy of language; and so on’ (Stock 2007, 1). The danger 
with this approach is that whatever problems exist in the method of philosophising 
about language, metaphysics and emotion are, subsequently, transplanted onto music. 
It seems presumptuous to believe that metaphysicians, philosophers of language and 
philosophers of emotion have their own theoretical shop in order such that they can 
fully disenchant music, especially, as Bowie observes, when ‘the ever-growing 
                                                
9 Peter Dews (1994) observes that Adorno’s critique of identity-thinking offers a challenge to post-
structuralist thought that, in the face of deceptive identity, demands an engagement with ineffably 
singular points of immediacy. For Adorno, according to Dews, post-structuralist solutions to the 
problem of identity were largely mistaken – ‘pure singularity is itself an abstraction, the waste-product 
of identity-thinking’ (Dews 1994, 57). By acknowledging that reification is a necessary condition for 
society, Adorno realised that what is thought of as immediacy is, in fact, highly mediated. As Dews 
explains, ‘if every moment is prized purely for its uniqueness, without reference to a purpose or a 
meaning, to a before or an after, without a reference to anything which goes beyond itself, then what is 
enjoyed in each moment becomes paradoxically and monotonously the same’ (ibid.). 
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volume of incompatible theories in such areas suggests that something is awry with 
seeing philosophy predominantly in terms of theory construction based on the 
“analysis” of concepts’ (Bowie 2013, 3). 
Although some philosophers schooled in analytic traditions of philosophy, 
such as Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom and John McDowell, have 
made a concerted effort to engage with the work of Continental philosophers, the two 
branches, Braver argues, ‘have grown so far apart that many who are educated in one 
know little about the other (beyond the fact that it isn’t worth wasting time on)’ 
(Braver 2012, 2). It is from this position that Braver offers a challenge to analytic 
philosophy in particular by showing how the two traditions can be brought into 
dialogue. Indeed, it is because Braver offers this challenge in part response to the 
work of Heidegger that his account of Anglo-American philosophy becomes a 
valuable source of critique for these current discussions surrounding reification. 
Earlier I mentioned that both Adorno and Heidegger had addressed the 
relationship between reification and aesthetics. Although this may seem obvious in 
the case of Adorno, the link between Heidegger and reification is anything but clear 
owing to the briefest of references to the term in the latter’s works. However, as 
Lucien Goldmann argues, for those that espy the few references to Verdinglichung in 
Being and Time or ponder the discussions of the ‘thingliness’ of the artwork in the 
1936 lectures on ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, ‘the problem of reification’ can be 
seen to be ‘a central problem of the discussion for Heidegger’ (Goldmann 1977, 28). 
So, Goldmann argues, ‘Heidegger…will only tell us that the spontaneous 
consciousness tends to understand “Being-there” [Dasein] on the basis of the world 
as Vorhanden [present-at-hand], which is none other than the Marxist and Lukácsian 
analysis which tells us that, in reification, human reality and social facts are 
understood as things’ (ibid., 12-13). Goldmann argues that the perception of the 
world as ‘present-at-hand’ is ‘found at the basis of every objectivist interpretation and 
especially, all metaphysics as theory of being’ (ibid., 12). In the light of Goldmann’s 
interpretation of reification, we can see that Braver is accusing certain quarters of 
analytic philosophy of making ‘objectivist interpretations’ that yield ‘present-at-hand 
objects’. Such interpretations are what Braver calls ‘Retrospective Rational 
Reconstructions’ (‘RRRs’). He argues that both Heidegger and Wittgenstein ‘locate 
the fundamental problem in the way philosophising suspends our engaged behaviour 
in the world, with its tacit knowledge of how to use words and interact appropriately 
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with different types of entities, to take up a disengaged theoretical stance’ (Braver 
2012, 10). Part of the issue with contemplative theorising, Braver claims, is that such 
ways of making sense fail to account for the fact that our concepts are ‘tunnelled 
through with vagueness’, a vagueness which defies explicit articulation or 
philosophical analysis but which does not hinder our tacit mastery of language use. It 
is this vagueness that, according to Braver, philosophy qua disengaged, 
contemplative thought seeks to distil through reifying theory construction. It seems, 
therefore, that the detached contemplation of objects, which Braver accuses Anglo-
American analytic philosophy of upholding, is a specific manifestation of reification 
whereby ‘upon halting an activity to stare, the richly meaningful, interconnected 
world we live and act in recedes, leaving behind beached inert, present-at-hand 
objects’ (ibid., 31). As Honneth explains, ‘the subject is no longer empathetically 
engaged in interaction with his surroundings, but is instead placed in the perspective 
of a neutral observer, psychically and existentially untouched by his surroundings’ 
(Honneth 2008, 24). Indeed, Lukács, along these lines, referred to an individual who 
takes up such a reifying stance towards the world as an ‘unchanged observer’ (Lukács 
1971, 142). Thus, Honneth suggests that Lukács ‘understands “reification” to be a 
habit of mere contemplation and observation, in which one’s natural surroundings, 
social environment, and personal characteristics come to be apprehended in a 
detached and emotionless manner – in short, as things’ (Honneth 2008, 25). 
Ultimately, according to Braver, the ‘search for a definitive knowledge that 
allows us to glimpse the innermost, crystalline structure of logic, language, existence, 
and thought all at once – this desire to peel back the skin of the world to take measure 
of its organs and bones – this is philosophy’s origin and, from one perspective, its 
original sin’ (Braver 2012, 224). Theory construction, as an attempt to peel back the 
skin of world and take measure of what is inside, leaves phenomena diluted rather 
than distilled - ‘really lumps of inert stuff’ onto which we project meaning. Such an 
act of disengaged ‘staring’, which sounds suspiciously like the kind of theoretical 
enterprise labelled by Adorno as ‘metaphysics’, falls prey to the charge of reification 
for failing to account for those non-conceptual particulars, individuals and 
heterogeneities of experience that can only be understood, if at all, within certain 
social, cultural and historical practices.  
 Braver provides a critique of the kind of contemplative, ‘armchair’ 
philosophy found in analytic aesthetics. He argues that ‘explicitly thinking’ about an 
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object of thought, what Adorno termed ‘pure speculation’, shoulders out the far more 
common mode of how that ‘object’ forms part of our everyday practices. Braver 
problematises any act of philosophising whereby our ongoing engaged behaviour in 
the world is suspended in order to take up a disengaged theoretical stance. Having 
said that, the act of theory construction need not just entail conceptual analysis. 
Indeed, some analytic aestheticians may argue that, unlike Kivy, they are no longer 
concerned with a definition of aesthetic- or music-related terms. As Nick Zangwill 
claims, ‘conceptual analysis is not a satisfactory approach to philosophical reflection 
on art: either it makes questionable assumptions or else it is too limited’ [italics 
added] (Zangwill 2007, 5). Nevertheless, even if he rules out conceptual analysis, 
Zangwill still defends the idea of being able to ‘philosophically reflect on art’ by 
‘fashion[ing] concepts’ (ibid., 8). Ultimately, as we shall see in chapter one, Zangwill 
aims to produce a ‘good rational explanatory story’ to account for the ‘nature’ of art 
and artworks. Such a story leaves Zangwill open to the charge of reifying art and 
artworks because he admits to coming up with a ‘theoretically reconstructed concept 
of art’ derived from reason alone. The consequences of attempting to produce a ‘good 
rational explanatory story’ of art leaves Zangwill open to Braver’s criticisms of 
disengaged, contemplative theory construction as well as Adorno’s criticisms of 
metaphysics qua pure speculation.  
In short, whether searching for the separately necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions of music-related concepts or attempting to construct theories that will 
provide answers to the questions of music’s ontology, meaning and value, what is 
still being prized is a form of philosophical engagement with music that precludes an 
understanding of musical praxis and why it matters to everyday practices. For 
example, by defining music as ‘intentionally organised sound’, Gordon Graham 
(2007) questions whether electro-sonic art works of Varèse and Lutoslawski can be 
thought of as music ‘properly so called’. As shall be explored in greater detail in 
chapters one and three, such theoretical attempts to draw distinctions between music 
and non-music on the basis of a definition of the former creates a problem that does 
not exist to ordinary participants in musical praxis. Such disengaged contemplation of 
a philosophical pseudo-problem ignores the question of why avant-garde music 
matters in the context of twenty- and twenty-first-century modernity. Ultimately, it 
does not address the contexts and practices in which such music was both produced 
and received. Consequently, the issue is such that Bowie claims that ‘anyone wishing 
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to reflect on…the meanings of modern art, questions of ethics after the Holocaust, or 
why epistemology became so dominant in modern philosophy, is these days unlikely 
to make their first port of call theories by analytic philosophers of art, ethics, or 
epistemology’ (Bowie 2013, 2-3).  
Both conceptual analysis and philosophical theory construction, which, as 
Ridley observes, invariably regard music as an object removed from its place in 
everyday practices, are problematic for those who, like musicologists, are concerned 
with musical production, performance or reception. However, music does not 
preclude the use of concepts that attempt to make sense of aesthetic experiences and 
that articulate the meaningfulness of musical events. The seemingly unresolvable 
tension surrounding reification – between an articulation of musical praxis for the 
purpose of communication and comprehensibility and what Adorno called 
‘metaphysical propositions’ that attempt to characterise the ‘object’ – is a problem 
when it comes to engaging with musical works. How do we talk about musical works 
without damaging their irreducibility? How, in other words, do we avoid making 
deaestheticising judgments that strip musical works of what makes them music in the 
first place? Furthermore, and similarly related, how do we make claims regarding 
manifestations of musical praxis that preserve their heterogeneity and capaciousness?  
 One of the reasons to engage with more European/Continental traditions of 
philosophy might be, as Bowie and Braver illustrate, to show how thinkers within 
these traditions develop powerful critiques of traditional philosophical theories as 
well as provide plausible alternatives. In the case of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, 
Braver illustrates how traditional problems within philosophy of the kind that involve 
contemplative theory construction can be dissolved when we acknowledge how we 
actually cope with the world in everyday situations – a skilful, practical coping that 
does not necessarily require us to make such coping explicit. For Bowie, the irony is 
that the present way of theorising in certain quarters of Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy results in an ever-expanding body of contradictory theories the likes of 
which such philosophers aim to resolve.10 Through the work of Adorno, Bowie 
demonstrates how the experience of contradiction is vital to day-to-day living; we go 
through life confronting and working with personal, social, cultural and political 
                                                
10 Gary Gutting (2009) has recently shown that despite the perception that philosophy consists of 
fundamental disagreements about the central philosophical questions, ideas put forward by the likes of 
Quine, Kripke, Gettier, Lewis, Kuhn, Rawls and Rorty have generated a substantive body of 
knowledge with great cultural significance. 
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contradictions that are never definitively resolved. Indeed, for Adorno, as Bowie 
explains, ‘contradictions become the very content of our self-understanding’ (Bowie 
2013, 7). It would seem, therefore, that for those such as Bowie and Braver, who look 
to bring opposing philosophical traditions into dialogue with one another, Continental 
philosophy provides more opportunities to turn accepted ideas inside out rather than 
looking to develop them towards a resolution of contradictions. Bowie even suggests 
that ‘this situation is one source of the interest in the work of European/Continental 
philosophers elsewhere in the humanities, arts, and social sciences’ (ibid., 3). 
It is doubtful whether the ‘turn’ towards theory in the general sense in 
musicology of the early 1990s was inspired directly by the problems of disengaged, 
contemplative theorising in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. However, it seems 
to be the case that some of the principles and goals of analytic philosophy as 
discussed by Bowie and Braver, such as the supreme authority of reason in human 
affairs, the centred subject, the authority of the natural sciences and the 
demystification of life, which Robert B. Pippin (1991) sees as aspects of a distinctly 
‘modern sensibility’, can be worked into the rather reductive narrative surrounding 
the development of both ‘New Musicology’ and ‘critical musicology’.  
Musicologists, when discussing the history of twentieth-century musicology, 
generally, albeit crudely, distinguish an ‘old’, ‘modern’, fact-governed musicology 
and ‘formalistic’ music analysis from what was to be a ‘postmodern’ New 
Musicology, which tends to be seen as having commenced in the early 1990s. As will 
be explored in greater detail in chapter four, the turn from a historical musicology that 
had been perceived to be about the articulation of so-called musical facts and the 
analysis of autonomous, canonic works to New Musicology led to what Alastair 
Williams calls ‘a set of postmodernist beliefs that are sometimes as dogmatic as their 
purportedly outmoded predecessors’ (Williams 2000, 386). What emerged through 
this ‘postmodern’ turn was – despite the frequent debates about how such theoretical 
positions should be put into practice – a musicology that asserted the existence of a 
plurality of interpretive and evaluative styles of description and explanation, that 
defended the contingency of claims to knowledge, that affirmed an open-ended 
approach to the character of music’s meaning and ontology and that seemingly 
advocated cultural relativism. Furthermore, with the development of what Lawrence 
Kramer characterises as ‘critical musicology’, which adopted the gains made by the 
New Musicology without completely rejecting its ‘modernist’ past, it became clear 
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that the opportunities for ‘postmodern’ Continental theory had not been exhausted by 
the New Musicology. 
The turn towards ‘postmodernist’ ways of doing and thinking in musicology 
is generally perceived to be a move brought about because of the dissatisfactions with 
what were thought of to be outmoded, ‘modern’ musicological positions, sensibilities 
and methodologies. As Giles Hooper observes: 
 
The more crude, reductionist account of this development is sometimes presented in the 
manner of a quasi-redemptive narrative: once upon a time scholars laboured under outmoded, 
ideologically tainted, patriarchal, hegemonic, imperialistic, Western, positivist, formalist – in 
short, ‘modernist’ – presumption(s); until, some time around 1990, a handful of ‘new’ (mostly 
US) musicologists, armed with a battery of ‘postmodern’ and other literary or cultural 
theoretical devices, came forth to save musicology from itself (Hooper 2006, 5). 
 
Although musicologists seem to enjoy calling into question this quasi-redemptive 
narrative with reference to various historiographical particulars that do not affirm the 
general trend, it seems likely that the paradigm shift in musicology in the early 1990s 
would not have created the furore it did if there was not an element of truth to the 
story.  
Although interest in postmodernism has generated a diverse and fragmented 
body of issues in-keeping with its own aims, there are, according to Pippin, 
‘sufficiently representative themes (or “traces” of themes) in the general debate 
inspired by such radical hermeneutical styles’ (Pippin 1991, 158). Wellmer, for 
example, sees the concept of postmodernism as belonging to a network of ‘postist’ 
concepts, all of which seem to be articulating the experience of the ‘death of reason’ 
for cultural modernism, the European Enlightenment and, indeed, the entire span of 
Western civilisation (Wellmer 1985, 48). So, Ihab Hassan claims: 
 
It [postmodernism] is an antinomian moment that assumes a vast unmaking in the Western 
mind – what Michel Foucault might call a postmodern épistème. I say “unmaking” though 
other terms are now de rigeur: for instance, deconstruction, decentering, disappearance, 
dissemination, demystification, discontinuity, difference, dispersion, etc. Such terms express an 
ontological rejection of the traditional full subject, the cogito of Western philosophy. They 
express, too, an epistemological obsession with fragments or fractures, and a corresponding 
ideological commitment to minorities in politics, sex, and language (Hassan 1977, 19).  
 
 
Some of the themes or ‘traces of themes’ that we see surrounding the notion of the 
‘death of reason’ are manifested in (New and critical) musicological ways of doing. 
For example, Pippin claims that with postmodernism ‘there is, on the one hand, a 
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continuing Nietzschean suspicion about the intractable resistance of the “other”, 
difference, or becoming to any rule or function, any ordering principle’ (Pippin 1991, 
158). For Pippin, such ‘ordering’ is a will to power, a subjugation of the Other – 
‘totality, or holistic (and so “terroristic”) thinking of all forms is the enemy’ (ibid., 
159). Instead, ‘a “pagan polytheism” [is] is the new hero’ (ibid.). He goes on to state 
that ‘we must respect instead the absolute (the new “absolute”) primacy of difference, 
the heterogeneity of language games, and so accept an “agnostics”, a permanently 
unreconciled “play” of opposition’ (ibid.). Alternatively, if such a view appears too 
fragmentary and potentially conservative, that is, respecting the Other by 
benevolently leaving him or her to their own impoverished games, Pippin suggests 
we might prefer what Rorty termed a ‘de-theoreticised sense of community’ – a 
‘Deweyan attempt to make concrete concerns with the daily problems of one’s 
community’ without bothering to provide a theory that ‘grounds’ that community 
(Rorty 1991a, 175). Pippin, however, acknowledges that such (anti-)theoretical 
positions do not bring about a resolution of any of the problems encountered in early 
critiques of modernity nor do they offer an advance beyond the dialectical 
programme suggested by Hegel in response to those early critiques. For example, 
Pippin shows how Jacques Derrida’s efforts at deconstruction are merely a return to 
some of the unresolved issues in Heidegger’s works, mainly that both Derrida and 
Heidegger wish to invoke ‘an autonomous arche’. 11  For Pippin, Derrida and 
Heidegger appeal to the notion of the unconditioned condition as a way of grounding 
our actions, beliefs and justifications. Such a notion evokes the Kantian aporia 
whereby if we impose a principle on ourselves, then presumably we must have a 
reason to do so; but, if there was an antecedent reason to adopt that principle, then 
that reason would not itself be self-imposed; yet for it to be binding on us, it had to be 
self-imposed.12 It follows that Heidegger and Derrida are, according to Pippin, neither 
removed from the problems that plagued ‘modern’, post-Kantian philosophy nor 
‘postmodernists’ according to the ‘traces of themes’ he discerns.13  
                                                
11 For a similar critique of Heidegger and Derrida, see Rorty 1982, 90-109. 
12 See Pippin 1991, 160-164. 
13 Too often, Björn Heile contends, has ‘postmodernism’, in the context of music and musicology, 
been ‘reduced to either a simple chronological successor to modernism…or a crude antithesis to it’ 
(Heile 2009, 1-2). It is because of an inability to clearly separate modernism from postmodernism that, 
in what follows, when referring to ‘postmodern’ musicology, inverted commas or ‘scare quotes’ will 
be used. This, I hope, will serve to remind the reader that some of the ways of doing and thinking 
which characterise ‘postmodern’ musicology are, despite, as Pippin observes, being commonly thought 
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 These latter claims leave us in danger of heading into a detailed discussion of 
Kantian metaphysics and the history of two hundred years’ worth of philosophical 
thought. Suffice it to say, however, that without the availability of some 
unconditioned condition which, as Rorty claims, ‘will serve as a criterion for the 
judging the transitory products of our transitory needs and interests’ (Rorty 1999, xvi) 
and with ‘the great Nietzschean emphasis on the contingency of interpretive 
schemata, on power, the agon of competing interpretations, the attack on unity or the 
“violence” of ordering systems, all in favour of difference, the Other, the body, etc.’ 
(Pippin 1991, 158), postmodern themes tend to articulate ways of doing and thinking 
that affirm cultural relativism. Under postmodernism, Pippin proposes, ‘we require, 
in legitimating what we do, only the “local” narratives of heterogeneous language 
games’ (ibid., 159). The main issue, however, and it is one that we will keep coming 
back to in this thesis, is that if we are only to justify our actions within a framework 
of ‘local narratives’, ‘we still don’t know what could count as the unity or success of 
such narratives, or what Nietzsche called more honestly the “legislation” of values. 
We don’t know what counts as one game, as opposed to others, or why playing it is 
any less hegemonistic or “terrorist” than a “grander” game’ (ibid.). Ultimately, Pippin 
suggests, ‘if we just happen to be playing it, recognise that, and continue playing it, 
then questions of power and validity have been grossly confused without any 
motivation’ (ibid.). 
A not uncontested term, relativism, for Rorty, is, at its simplest level, that 
‘which will beset us if we give up our attachment to objectivity, and to the idea of 
rationality as obedience to criteria’ (Rorty 1991b, 38). As shall be explored in greater 
detail in chapter five, relativism can be seen as existing in tension with objectivity, 
that is, in tension with such contrasting notions as what Thomas Nagel calls the ‘view 
from nowhere’, what Hilary Putnam refers to as the ‘God’s-eye point of view’, 
pragmatic, neo-Hegelian accounts of truth qua norms and what Rorty refers to as 
‘unforced agreement’ or ‘solidarity’ (ibid.). When it comes to musicology, support 
                                                                                                                                      
of as typically ‘postmodern’ ideas and forms of practice, actually fundamental problems in Western 
modernity. Jonathan D. Kramer echoes such claims with regards to postmodern music, that is, music 
‘that is understood in a postmodern manner, that calls forth postmodern listening strategies, that 
provides postmodern listening experiences, or that exhibits postmodern compositional practices’ (J. 
Kramer 2002, 16). He proposes that postmodern music ‘is not simply a repudiation of modernism or its 
continuation, but has aspects of both a break and an extension’ (ibid.). Echoing Kramer, Heile 
proposes that rather than regarding postmodernism as ‘a period with a distinctive style’, it could be 
viewed as a ‘particular aspect in the ongoing history of musical modernity, an aspect that is connected 
to a specific phase but not necessarily restricted to it’ (Heile 2013, 119). 
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for the relativity of truth and meaning tends to find its basis, as Judy Lochhead 
suggests, in Jean-François Lyotard’s and Donna Haraway’s respective accounts of 
postmodernism. For Lochhead, the ‘postmodern’ musicologist conceives of 
knowledge as ‘situated’ as opposed to ‘absolute’ and eschews ‘grand narratives’ by 
embracing instead ‘local stories of understanding’ (Lochhead 2002, 6). It is in this 
‘postmodern’ context that musicology, according to Hooper, emphasises ‘the 
provisionality of its readings, the unavoidable plurality of interpretation or the 
contingent “situatedness” of its multiple subject positions’ (Hooper 2006, 39). 
Nevertheless, some or all of these ‘postmodern’ themes could also be the results of 
Derridean deconstruction, Adornian negative dialectics, Lacanian psychoanalytic 
evaluations and hermeneutic readings.14 As we shall see in chapter five, a relativized 
concept of truth is what seems to distinguish Lyotard’s postmodernism from these 
other specific critiques of modernity. 
Hooper claims that ‘unease with the status of knowledge sees avowedly 
“postmodern” protagonists battling with one another to prove their own brand of 
knowledge more reflective, more knowingly problematic and more absolutely non-
absolute than any other’ [italics added] (ibid.). Ultimately, for Hooper, musicology is 
concerned with an epistemological relativism, specifically, that ‘no mode of 
knowledge is ever to be privileged over any other’ (ibid.). As Lochhead proposes, ‘if 
all knowledge reflects the cultural and historical place and time of the one who 
knows, then no single perspectival knowledge is privileged and hence no particular 
way of understanding the world is true in any absolute sense’ (Lochhead 2002, 6).15 
                                                
14 Wellmer demonstrates how postmodernism, as existing only within the context of a dialectical 
relationship with modernism, can, to a certain degree, be seen as a ‘critique of modernity’ rather than 
just an outright refutation of the latter. So, Wellmer argues, ‘what I want to say is that 
postmodernism…participates in an ambiguity which is deeply rooted in social phenomena themselves. 
It is the ambiguity of a critique of modernity – and by “critique” I mean not only theoretically 
articulated criticism, but also a social transformation involving change of attitudes and orientations – in 
which we might detect a self-transcendence of modernity in the direction of a truly “open” society just 
as much as a break with the “project of modernity” (Habermas) – and this should not be confused with 
a refutation of the steely electronic casing of the modern world – i.e. a transformation of enlightenment 
into cynicism, irrationalism and particularism’ (Wellmer 1985, 57). It is in this sense that the 
postmodern movement can be seen, to a certain degree, to be performing a similar function to the types 
of philosophical practice that explicitly set themselves up in a critical position to the social, 
philosophical, cultural, aesthetic and political problems surrounding modernity. 
15 From a philosophical point of view, relativism – of the kind that every belief is as good as every 
other – is self-refuting. As Putnam knowingly asks, ‘after all, is it not obviously contradictory to hold a 
point of view while at the same time holding that no point of view is more justified or right than any 
other?’ (Putnam 1981, 119). For Putnam, relativism is based on the idea ‘that every person (or, in a 
modern “sociological” formulation, every culture, or sometimes every “discourse”) has his (its) own 
views, standards, presuppositions, and that truth (and also justification) are relative to these’ (ibid., 
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But such self-refuting concern for the ‘absolutely, non-absolute’ status of knowledge 
claims, as Hooper notes, and as Lochhead illustrates, also, and perhaps more 
importantly, has a relativizing impact on musicology’s treatment of truth. For 
example, as we shall go on to observe in chapter four, Gary Tomlinson puts forward a 
particular brand of ‘postmodern’ musicology that focuses on ‘contextualism’, which 
‘will aim to describe a local set of meanings in as full a volume as possible. It will 
not pose as a reconstruction of some putative and unitary “original” situation the 
music inhabited but will recognise the myriad situations we as historians might 
construct around a musical utterance and the plurality of meanings the music might 
thus engage’ [italics added] (Tomlinson 1993, 22). Granted Tomlinson does not 
explicitly condone relativism, but by espousing a brand of ‘postmodern’ musicology 
that aims to articulate locally developed meanings, the question that remains is, as 
Mark Everist asks, ‘how are we to judge the value of one interpretation over that of 
another?’ (Everist 2001, 400). The same question can be asked in response to 
Jonathan D. Kramer’s subjectivist claim that postmodern music ‘locates meaning and 
even structure in listeners, more than in scores, performances, or composers’ [italics 
added] (J. Kramer 2002, 17). Similarly, the problem haunts Björn Heile’s recent 
claim that ‘questions of canon and taste are obviously subjective and contentious’ 
[italics added] (Heile 2013, 118). The fact that Everist addresses the above question 
as the ‘problem of relativism’ demonstrates that the notion of legitimacy is vital to 
understanding some of the central issues in reception history and canonic discourse. I 
want to take Everist’s idea a step further and claim that what Braver calls the 
‘groundless grounds’ of interpretive validity is something the institution of 
musicology must address if it is to affirm what Tomlinson calls the ‘plurality of 
meanings’ that surround a musical event. 
Although meaning pluralism comes with any hermeneutic enterprise, it does 
not follow that no particular reading should be considered to be more legitimate than 
any other. In terms of musicology, relativism is, as Everist observes, a problem 
because, as Williams proposes, ‘diversity as an end in itself would attribute to the 
most patriarchal and exclusive reading of music the same validity as any other’ 
                                                                                                                                      
121). The problem is that ‘if statements of the form “X is true (justified) relative to person P” are 
themselves true or false absolutely, then there is, after all, an absolute notion of truth (or of 
justification) and only of truth-for-me, truth-for-Nozick, truth-for-you etc. A total relativist would have 
to say that whether or not X is true relative to P is itself relative’ (ibid.). As Putnam observes, ‘the 
relativist cannot understand talk about truth in terms of objective justification-conditions’ (ibid., 123). 
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(Williams 2001, 120). One of the issues, as Pippin observes, is that, with 
postmodernism, ‘fragmentation and anomie, the Zerissung of culture long ago 
identified by Hegel as the chief effect of modernisation, are simply to be accepted as 
some sort of (ironically) “grand” and final resolution of history, and the issue of a 
possible relation between the “actual” and the “possible”, the concrete need for, and 
potentiality of, forms of reconciliation is, as it were, “transcendentally” ruled out of 
court’ (Pippin 1991, 159). In the words of Jonathan Kramer, ‘Fragmentation. 
Discontinuity. Lack of connection. Lack of linear logic. Postmodernism’ (J. Kramer 
2002, 20).  
If ‘New’ and ‘critical’ musicologies have given a voice to those subcultures 
and minorities that had previously been excluded from ‘modernist’ musicology, it 
seems counter-intuitive to deny those voices the right to make claims to legitimacy in 
a trans-cultural and trans-historical political sphere of evaluation, justification and 
critique. If relativizing approaches to truth call into question the notion of legitimate 
musical interpretations, they do so, in part, because what has been forgotten or 
ignored is the idea that historical development has allowed for the validation of 
certain meanings, values and truths whilst denying the validity of morally repugnant 
positions. Racism, sexism and homophobia, for example, are parts of our everyday 
practices, but to accord racist, sexist and homophobic readings of musical praxis 
validity is no longer morally permissible. The relativist’s problem, as Williams 
observes, is that ‘to think that multiple narratives have replaced meta-narratives is to 
assume that large-scale historical processes are largely fictitious and can countenance 
no internal differentiation. Such a claim would have to argue, against all the evidence, 
that there are no discernible characteristics of global integration’ (Williams 2001, 
119). Rorty goes some way to clarifying the issue. He believes that conceptions of 
truth based on what Putnam calls ‘local cultural norms’ or what Tomlinson calls 
‘locally developed meanings’ have ‘offensively parochial overtones’ (Rorty 1991b, 
26). As we shall see in this study through the respective ideas of Heidegger and 
Gadamer, to call into question ideas that support the relativity of truth does not just 
require us to justify our beliefs to those that belong to our own culture, whatever that 
may be, but to debate, contest and justify norms within a shared political sphere of 
contrasting, trans-cultural and trans-historical worldviews, which, après Wittgenstein, 
we may call a ‘form of life’. Rorty, ultimately, affirms the notion of the intercultural 
exchange and ‘testing’ of locally developed norms. In terms of dealing with the 
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validity of judgements – a matter that is vital to understanding not just musical 
reception history but also how moral and ethical life functions and develops over time 
– he suggests that ‘beliefs suggested by another culture must be tested by trying to 
weave them together with beliefs we already have’ (ibid., 30).16 That is, locally 
developed norms and meanings do not operate independently from norms developed 
in other cultures. Different cultures and their norms come together all the time, 
whether in the sphere of global politics or the global media, through human 
migration, through social media, through the trading of goods, through finance 
capitalism or through the distribution of cultural artefacts and symbols. For Rorty, 
‘alternative cultures are not to be thought of on the model of alternative geometries’ 
(ibid.). As he explains, ‘alternative geometries are irreconcilable because they have 
axiomatic structures, and contradictory axioms. They are designed to be 
irreconcilable. Cultures are not so designed, and do not have axiomatic structures’ 
(ibid.).  
Although musicology has, by appealing to ‘postmodern’ ways of doing and 
thinking, distanced itself from reifying theory construction associated with analytic 
aesthetics, it can articulate the individuality or contingency of meaningfulness only 
up until a certain point before such assertions begin to undermine the validity of the 
very institution to which they belong. Rorty, for example, in defending himself from 
the charge of being a relativist, proposed that those trying to deflect such a charge by 
appealing to the tropes of ‘making knowledge’, ‘inventing knowledge’ or the 
‘subjectivity of claims to knowledge’ are ‘being merely whimsical’ (Rorty 1999, 
xviii). For Rorty, to claim that we have ‘invented’ truths, morals, meanings and 
knowledge is to question whether anybody should take us seriously. In order to avoid 
‘postmodernising’ itself out of existence, which could happen if the structures of 
power on which the institution of musicology relies were to find out that 
musicologists invent subjective truths – something that few contemporary 
musicologists would wish to condone let alone admit – critical musicology must 
articulate its awareness of Rorty’s idea that to advocate cultural relativism is to 
acknowledge that one is ‘irrational’. Indeed, Rorty, like Pippin, suggests that certain 
post-Nietzschean European philosophers that have found their way into the 
                                                
16 Such claims are, arguably, undermined when Rorty suggests that we must be ‘ethnocentric’, 
whereby ‘to be ethnocentric is to divide the human race into people to whom one must justify one’s 
beliefs and the others’ (Rorty 1991b, 30). 
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theoretical handbook of ‘postmodern’ musicology, including Heidegger, Sartre, 
Gadamer, Derrida and Foucault, are neither relativists nor postmodernists.  
Rorty argues that ‘our opponents [those opponents of post-Nietzschean 
European philosophy and American pragmatism] like to suggest that to abandon that 
vocabulary [the vocabulary of Plato and Aristotle] is to abandon rationality – that to 
be rational consists precisely in respecting the distinctions between the absolute and 
the relative, the found and the made, object and subject, nature and convention, 
reality and appearance’ (Rorty 1999, xviii-xix). Rorty claims that if we conceive of 
rationality in this way, then those that advocate relativism are, indeed, irrationalists. 
Ultimately, the point Rorty is making is that if we conceive of rationality in terms of a 
‘neutral ground illuminated only by the natural light of reason’, then the idea ‘that 
“true” means something different in different societies’ starts to make sense (Rorty 
1991b, 25). For Rorty, the terms of the debate between what he calls realists and 
relativists revolve around whether ‘knowledge, man, and nature have real essences 
which are relevant to the problem at hand’ (ibid., 24). As he claims, ‘for only such a 
person could imagine that there was anything to pick out to which one might make 
“true” relative’ [italics added] (ibid., 25). Rorty gives the following example: ‘only if 
one shares the logical positivists’ idea that we all carry around things called “rules of 
language” which regulate what we say, will one suggest that there is no way to break 
out of one’s culture’ (ibid., 25-26). However, if we deny that knowledge, language, 
truth, man and nature have some sort of ‘intrinsic natures’ to which our views and 
ideas must correspond and if we deny that we can come up with some self-refuting, 
‘positive theory which says that something is relative to something else’ – that, for 
example, ‘truth is simply the contemporary opinion of a chosen individual or group’ – 
then the pragmatist can be seen ‘as a partisan of solidarity, his account of the value of 
cooperative human enquiry has only an ethical base, not an epistemological or 
metaphysical one’ (ibid., 24). The crux of the matter, for Rorty, is that ‘not having 
any epistemology, a fortiori he [the pragmatist] does not have a relativistic one’ 
(ibid.). Rorty, therefore, with reference to his own pragmatist position, shrugs off 
charges that he is either a ‘relativist’ or an ‘irrationalist’ ‘by saying that these charges 
presuppose precisely the distinctions we reject’ (Rorty 1999, xix). That is not to say 
that Rorty rejects conceptual distinctions – between ‘good Xs and the bad non-Xs’ – 
but he is against a certain specific set of distinctions, ‘the Platonic distinctions’.  
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Part of this study will be concerned with demonstrating how musicology, in 
defying the reifying impulses of analytic aesthetics, can continue to affirm the gains 
made by Continental theory in its ethical approach to the Other only by relinquishing 
the Platonic and Kantian distinctions as the bases for thinking about the world. If, as 
Rorty claims, accusations of relativism only make sense within a framework of the 
traditional philosophical distinctions between ‘subject’ and ‘object’, ‘rationality’ and 
‘irrationality’, ‘means’ and ‘ends’, ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’, ‘reality’ and 
‘appearance’ and ‘nature’ and ‘convention’, then part of musicology’s role will be to 
engage with those philosophical traditions that aim to dissolve the problems that arise 
when these distinctions are made. As I will demonstrate in chapters one, two and 
three, the secrets to a non-reified engagement with music and musical praxis that 
avoid the charges of relativism are to be found in more phenomenological and 
hermeneutic traditions of modern philosophy. In chapter five I will also argue that in 
order for the institution of musicology to throw off the ‘postmodern’ label it seems to 
have inherited from the New Musicology it will need to recognise, as certain areas of 
analytic philosophy have done following Brandom’s work, that a plurality of 
worldviews and multiple claims to legitimacy can only be understood within a trans-
cultural and trans-historical sphere of norms, normalisation and norm-transcendence. 
It is because of the fundamental differences between analytic philosophy and 
contemporary musicology in their respective engagements with music that this thesis 
is conceived as an intervention, one which attempts to articulate the principles and 
presuppositions of both disciplines and to make each discipline aware of the other’s 
strengths, difficulties and failings. As an intervention this study should not be thought 
of as either a strictly philosophical treatise on music or a purely musicological 
articulation of certain forms of musical praxis. There will be, in the eyes of the 
philosopher, contentious theoretical issues put forward which perhaps do not pay 
sufficient attention to the conceptual complexities or genealogies of certain positions. 
For this, I can only seek forgiveness. Similarly, a musicologist may feel that my 
intense engagement with the theoretical questions of musical ontology, meaning and 
value at the expense of critical accounts of texts and events, ignores the 
historiographical particulars of musical praxis and casts doubt on the philosophical 
conclusions arrived at. As a reply I argue that where I discuss musical works and their 
contexts, I do so not to provide a purely critical treatment of the musical events 
themselves but in order to call into doubt dogmatic philosophical positions.  
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Trying to bring about discourse between separate disciplines is no easy task. 
For one, each discipline comes with its own theories, fields and frames cultivated 
within specific traditions that defy casual understanding, instead demanding 
continuous, practical engagement over the course of a lifetime. The task becomes 
even more complex when we consider that disciplines are not monolithic entities 
comprised of a single methodology, terminology or subject matter. What constitutes 
‘analytic philosophy’ seems like an ever-reconfiguring constellation of what are 
thought to be contextually independent problems and ways of doing but with little or 
no agreement on where the boundaries of the discipline begin and end.17 Indeed, as 
Critchley observes, any attempt to draw a distinction between analytic and 
Continental traditions of philosophy in terms of superficial differences between 
proper names, philosophical problems, geography, methodologies and prominent 
figures does not really get to the nub of the issue – mainly that, for Critchley, 
Continental philosophy has something like an ‘emancipatory intent’ not found in 
analytic philosophy (Critchley 1998, 10-13). Similarly, to understand the meaning of 
‘music analysis’ in a disciplinary climate where intradisciplinary divides are 
becoming increasingly blurred is to envisage some idea whose material particulars 
continuously call into question the existence of some stable concept. It follows that as 
well as being challenged by a seemingly alien body of knowledge and ways of doing, 
someone seeking to engage with another discipline will not be able to know for 
certain whether what they are engaged with can neatly be subsumed under the 
concepts of ‘musicology’, ‘music analysis’, ‘ethnomusicology’, ‘music theory’, 
‘aesthetics’, ‘Continental philosophy’, ‘analytic philosophy’ and so on. Furthermore, 
interdisciplinary dialogue is also a hermeneutic problem. How do those who wish to 
participate in interdisciplinary discourse allow the other discipline to be wholly 
Other, to be different to the discipline in which one would place oneself whilst still 
trying to understand that discipline, its subject matters, methods of doing and ways of 
thinking, from the standpoint of one’s own disciplinary situatedness? In attempting to 
bring about a dialogue between critical musicology and contemporary philosophy 
based upon a common issue of the reification of music and musical praxis, this study 
will attempt to show how contemporary philosophy, particularly analytic aesthetics, 
can learn much from the study of music by musicologists, broadly construed, as well 
                                                
17 See, for example, Biletzki and Matar ed. 1998 and Glock 2008. 
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as from musical praxis itself. However, I will also demonstrate that the musicologist 
can also learn from ideas that have developed in analytic circles but which, as we 
shall see, are in many ways more appropriate to the study of music than those 
currently posited in analytic aesthetics or the so-called philosophy of music. In other 
words, I think there are reasons to believe that certain aspects of analytic philosophy 
can assist musicologists in ethical and political problems currently facing the 
discipline, problems of normativity that challenge the relativizing impulses of 
‘postmodern’ musicology.  
In chapter one I develop my account of the relationship between reification 
and aesthetics through the work of Heidegger and Adorno in order to offer a vision 
for a non-reified engagement with musical praxis. Accordingly, by focusing my 
theoretical discussions on Karlheinz Stockhausen and Pierre Schaeffer’s respective 
analyses of their own works, I expose the problems surrounding recent debates on the 
ontology of the artwork in analytic aesthetics. Subsequently, I demonstrate how once 
we distance ourselves from theoretical attempts to characterise the object ‘music’ in 
analytic aesthetics and start to understand music within the context of our everyday 
practices, then music can be conceived as an inherently meaningful phenomena that 
discloses the world’s in which it is created, performed and received. Through recent 
analytical research on Heidegger, I show how musical practices relate to a normative 
framework for understanding how we come to make sense of the world. I conclude by 
illustrating how a world-disclosive vision for artworks, in terms of their ability to 
shed light on how things in the world hang together, to make sense of how 
communities make sense of the world and to create new sense, can be seen as crucial 
to philosophical metaphysics. 
 The following two chapters explore problems surrounding the interpretation of 
musical praxis in relation to the world-disclosive vision of music offered in chapter 
one. By looking at the debates surrounding Richard Wagner’s music dramas, chapter 
two illustrates how an understanding of aesthetic meaning in the context of social 
norms can challenge some of the classic conceptions of meaning in analytic 
aesthetics. By examining recurring interpretations of Wagner’s works and by drawing 
on the work of Adorno, Heidegger and Gadamer, as well as what I see to be related 
ideas in the work of Wittgenstein, Wellmer, Brandom and Huw Price, what this 
chapter seeks to clarify is the idea that interpretations of aesthetic experiences – 
experiences that take place when we are actually engaging with musical praxis rather 
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than merely thinking about music – shed light on both the artwork’s and the 
interpreter’s situatedness in social and cultural practices. With reference to 
Wittgenstein’s discussions on rules, it follows that, in the absence of metaphysical 
anchors with which rule-following can terminate, our interpretations of musical 
praxis can either articulate norms developed through communal practices or go 
against them. I conclude that radical practices can themselves become normalized 
through the historical changes that they helped initiate.   
 Having attempted to make sense of the normative basis of musical meaning in 
chapter two, the third chapter considers how the philosophy of music is related to the 
concept of reification by drawing upon more traditional theories of meaning as 
developed in analytic aesthetics. The basis for linking the philosophy of music to 
reification is the idea that the philosophical theorising of Stephen Davies, Peter Kivy, 
R. A. Sharpe and Robert Stecker both presupposes and affirms what Samuel C. 
Wheeler III (2000) (writing on the relationship between Donald Davidson and 
Jacques Derrida) calls a ‘presence’ account of aesthetic meaning, that is, what 
empiricist theories of meaning rely on, specifically what W. V. O. Quine (1980) 
referred to as ‘obscure intermediary entities’. I attempt to show how a ‘presence’ 
conception of meaning is entwined with the notion of meaning realism whereby the 
meaning that is present to us forces us to take it in exactly one way, and which means 
itself – ‘a direct and unmediated presence of sense’ (Wheeler 2000, 16). I provide a 
challenge to such a way of thinking about aesthetic meaning by drawing upon Quine 
and Davidson’s respective critiques of the ‘dogmas of empiricism’ in the context of 
the Anglo-American philosophy of language. Turning to recent discussions on the 
disclosive aspects of language in the work of David Cooper (2003) and Charles 
Taylor (2011), I demonstrate how similar ideas can be found in Heidegger’s output. 
Through recent analytical work on Heidegger by Mark Wrathall (2011) and Steven 
Crowell (2013), the chapter concludes by both affirming and expanding upon the 
relationship of aesthetic meaning to socially- and culturally-cultivated norms.
 Following discussions of the philosophical problems surrounding the 
association between aesthetics and reification, the fourth chapter examines the 
relationship in the context of critical musicology. The first section will attempt to take 
a snapshot of current musicology using the ideas of some of its leading proponents, 
whilst, at the same time, attempting to situate this snapshot within a ‘story’ of 
twentieth-century musicology. This rather reductive story concerns the emancipation 
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of musicology and music analysis from the bonds of text-based, ‘positivistic’ research 
and ‘formalist’ analysis, the rise of the ‘New Musicology’ followed by its overdue 
confrontation with an alienated sibling – music analysis. Within the context of this 
widespread narrative, I clarify how contemporary musicology can be seen to 
overcome the reifying impulses of its ‘modernist’ past. Subsequently, I discuss how 
music analysis can be appropriately included within the world-disclosive vision for 
music articulated in the previous chapters. Such a vision can be seen to challenge 
some of the most emphatic claims made by Carolyn Abbate (2004) and Leo Treitler 
(2001). The chapter concludes by highlighting the problem that although musicology 
has opened itself up to postmodern theory it has simultaneously articulated a 
relativized conception of truth, thus presenting itself with a disciplinary dilemma.  
 It follows that chapter five addresses and expands upon the idea concerning the 
devaluation of truth in contemporary musicology. It situates this specific disciplinary 
issue within the context of postmodern thought in general. Through concrete 
examples drawn from the work of Kenneth Gloag (2012), Jonathan D. Kramer 
(2002), Lawrence Kramer (2011), Judy Lochhead (2002) and Derek B. Scott (2001), I 
illustrate how the ‘postmodern’ turn in musicology can be understood in the wider 
theoretical context of twentieth-century European philosophy. I also present detailed 
arguments for how Rorty’s critique of cultural relativism can be seen to apply to 
contemporary musicology. Consequently, the chapter calls into doubt the more 
emphatic ideas generated in postmodern thought by illustrating, through Manfred 
Frank (1988) and Wellmer’s (1993) critiques of Lyotard, how relativizing 
conceptions of truth present a performative contradiction. Through both the work of 
Gadamer and related ideas from Rorty, Davidson, McDowell, Taylor and Price, I 
demonstrate how the world-disclosive vision for music articulated in the previous 
chapters can provide a critique of cultural relativism by illustrating how certain 
meanings can transcend cultural, historical and geographical boundaries as a result of 
being bound up with structures of power. Subsequently, by focussing on the artistic 
practices of Schaeffer, Stockhausen, Richard Strauss, Jamaican soundsystem and 
contemporary noise artists, I argue that after reifying and relativizing approaches to 
aesthetic practice and aesthetic meaning what is to be valued about artistic practices 
are their ability to create new ways of making sense that provide an opportunity for 
critical engagement with aesthetic, social and philosophical norms. Because it avoids 
being reified, I argue that aesthetic praxis not only (when it really matters) aims to 
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challenge certain aesthetic norms, such as stylistic, formal and interpretive 
conventions, but also, as a result of being embedded in social and cultural practices, 
can be an important means of questioning what we consider to be philosophically and 
socially true. I conclude that art is both world-disclosive and, at the same time, 
critical. 
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REIFYING MUSIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the introduction I briefly discussed the tension that exists between music and 
reification. Music defies attempts to be characterised or theorised about through 
disengaged contemplation but yet requires articulation in conceptual terms in order to 
be made comprehensible. The issue is that by explicitly thinking about what kind of 
object music is, and thereby attempting to provide a theory for its meaning, ontology 
and value, what is ignored is the important role specific manifestations of musical 
praxis play in everyday life. However, in order to bring music into the inferential 
sphere of the giving of and asking for reasons, in order that we can discuss and debate 
musical interpretations, we need to be able to articulate musical praxis in linguistic 
terms. Indeed, as liner notes, reviews and musicological articles illustrate, the 
discussion of musical utterances is vitally important to the illumination of music in 
general. Nevertheless, for some, the uncertainty that surrounds the nature of the 
‘object’ music can lead, as Richard Bernstein (1983) observes, to the search for 
foundationalist refuge in realism or idealism. On the one hand, for example, formalist 
attitudes are based on a conception of music as purely an object of perception, an 
object whose autonomy and untranslatability ensure that if it is a language, it is its 
own language, incapable of being permeated by thought. Similarly, under the sway of 
musical autonomy and a conception of music as substance with properties, certain 
philosophers look to turn music into some kind of abstract ideal, to remove it from all 
contingencies, and, subsequently, to create theories that will account for the meaning, 
value and ontology of each musical utterance. We will encounter both types of 
musical engagement in our discussions of contemporary analytic aesthetics and 
formalist music analysis – the latter to be investigated in chapter four. I will 
demonstrate how both disciplines struggle with the idea of music’s embeddedness in 
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social and cultural practices because, in order to engage with music in the ways they 
do, music must be isolated from the ephemeral, the transitory and the historical. On 
the other hand, commentators may choose to discuss the material conditions that 
surround the creation of specific works, focusing on matters such as patronage, 
publishing, living conditions, social context, cultural norms and political institutions, 
but with little or no regard for the music itself. The problem with musical engagement 
that avoids reference to manifestations of specifically musical praxis is that it 
becomes difficult to distinguish between music and other world-disclosive 
phenomena such as other forms of art, gestures and images, symbolic forms, language 
and philosophy. The tension between music and reification demands that we consider 
the issue of how to discuss musical works in conceptual terms without damaging their 
irreducibility as music. In other words, we need to consider how to avoid making 
objectifications that attempt to characterise music but still allow for concepts to 
illuminate musical praxis. 
Music is to some degree an object of perception consisting of socially and 
culturally formative styles and sonic norms without which it would be 
incomprehensible. However, music is more than its sonic configuration. Music is 
composed, practiced, performed, received and commented upon, it has changing 
social functions, it plays a role in political and cultural transformations, it is 
historically, socially and culturally contingent, it discloses the worlds we live in and 
is also something we use for entertainment, spiritual, subversive and cathartic 
purposes. It follows that the frame for this chapter is to explore the consequences of a 
non-reified musical engagement, that is to say, a post-metaphysical understanding of 
music and its place in the world. Such a post-metaphysical conception of music 
demands that we distance ourselves from analytic aesthetics and its attempts to 
account for the real nature of music through theories of meaning, ontology and value. 
The starting point for a non-reified engagement with music is to understand it as an 
inherently meaningful part of our everyday practices – as something that matters to 
us. Music that is understood as embedded in socio-cultural practices and that cannot 
be abstracted away from the specific experiences we have with it can be considered in 
world-disclosive terms – as a form of meaningful articulation that can be illuminated 
through and, indeed, cannot be isolated from interpretation, analysis and criticism. 
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Internal Negativity as a Challenge to Reification 
 
Adorno’s account of reification as identity-thinking, as discussed in the introduction, 
rests upon the idea that there is a divergence – a non-identity – between our concepts 
and the reality we subsume beneath them. With metaphysics, which Adorno 
associated with ‘pure speculation’, with ‘reason asserting itself absolutely’, the 
unreconciled state of concept and object, which he also referred to as the ‘non-
conceptual substance of concepts’, ‘particularity’, ‘heterogeneity’, ‘individuality’ and 
‘matter’, is overcome such that objects are likened to our concepts. As he claimed, 
‘philosophy acquires its identity only by conjuring away the non-conceptual from the 
very outset’ (Adorno 2008, 62). Indeed, Adorno saw identity-thinking as vital for the 
metaphysician whose goal it is to disclose truths stripped of all that is ‘ephemeral, 
transitory and historical’. In making the acquisition of acultural and ahistorical truths 
‘the entire substance of philosophy’, whereby metaphysics is propelled towards what 
Nagel calls the ‘view from nowhere’ or what Putnam refers to as the ‘God’s-eye point 
of view’, what is denied, even though, as Adorno demonstrated, metaphysical ideas 
would be empty without them, is the important role our experiences of objects play in 
coming to understand them. In other words, identity-thinking, of which metaphysics 
is just one manifestation, is, for Adorno, a form of conceptual imperialism that 
impoverishes our experience of phenomena because diversity becomes reduced to 
unity and homogenous form becomes misapprehended as content. Thus, in relation to 
‘philosophy’ – ‘traditional thought in general’, Hegel’s ‘idealism’ ‘metaphysics’ and 
even Marx’s ‘materialism’, all of which he considered to be more or less concerned 
with ‘speculative concepts’ – Adorno claimed that ‘by virtue of its own methodology 
[a methodology that makes “use of concepts to talk about concepts”] philosophy bars 
its own way to what it wishes to achieve. Namely to be in a position to judge matters 
that are not itself, that are not concepts’ (ibid.) In this sense, identity-thinking, which, 
for Adorno, determines the nature of traditional philosophical ways of doing, is 
considered to be an instrumental form of reason based on the ‘principle of mastery’ – 
‘the mastery of nature, which spreads its influence, which continues in the mastery of 
men by other men and which finds its mental reflex in the principle of identity’ (ibid., 
9). It follows that the key to understanding Adorno’s meta-philosophical ideas on 
negative dialectics is to be found in the opening lines of his inaugural lecture; 
specifically, that philosophy must ‘reject the illusion that earlier philosophical 
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enterprises began with: that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of 
the real’ (Adorno GS 1, 325). 
Adorno’s critique of identity-thinking is, to a certain extent, reprised in 
Braver’s account of Retrospective Rational Reconstructions (‘RRRs’) whereby 
experience is retrospectively reinterpreted according to the demands of particular 
theories one is committed to. In advancing his notion of ‘original finitude’ – the idea 
that our ways of thinking cannot outgrow their dependence on society, nature and our 
own human nature – Braver affirms the idea that metaphysics tries to transcend our 
experience of common life by retrospectively reinterpreting familiar words and things 
and placing them into contexts where we cannot rely on our usual understanding. 
Quoting James C. Edwards, Braver argues that metaphysics constitutes ‘a denial of 
the animal in favour of the godlike’ (Braver 2012, 226). Detached contemplation of 
reality yields ‘present-at-hand objects’ which, by definition, are ‘unchanging 
entities…unaffected by their surroundings’ (ibid., 10). As Braver goes on to claim, 
‘we endeavour to examine reality as it really is by eliminating all disruptive 
distractions and prejudices, but…the very attempt to study the subject undisturbed 
produces a profound transformation in it, making the present-at-hand object the 
metaphysical model for everything’ (ibid., 66). Because, for Braver, metaphysics 
focuses on ‘unvarying features’ and ‘the atemporal in general’, thus stripping a 
phenomenon of those aspects that come from locating it in the context of socio-
cultural practices, he argues that we must wean ourselves off such metaphysical 
aspirations of the view from nowhere or the God’s eye view of the world.1 It follows 
                                                
1 Braver’s interpretation of Retrospective Rational Constructions depends upon the work of both the 
later Wittgenstein and the ‘pre-turn’ Heidegger. For Heidegger, objectivity is a consequence of 
metaphysics, understood as ‘the oblivion of being’ (Heidegger 1973, 85). According to Heidegger, in 
the works of the metaphysical thinkers the understanding of being is divided into ‘thatness’ and 
‘whatness’, a division between existentia and essentia, between ‘actuality’, ‘reality’, ‘objectivity’ and 
‘existence’, on the one hand, and ‘idea’, ‘thing-in-itself’ and ‘representation’, on the other. According 
to Heidegger, when the Greek word ‘οὐσία’, broadly construed as presence and grounded in 
unconcealment [αληθεια], developed along various paths into the concepts of energeia, actualitas, 
substantia and existentia – what suffices for reality and constancy – the gradual emergence of 
subiectum, ego cogito, subjectivity and I-ness ensured that what was real and constant was 
inconceivable without a subject ‘which already lies present in all representing and for all representing, 
and is what is constant and standing in the sphere of indubitable representational thinking’ (Heidegger 
1973, 28). It follows that ‘only when man becomes subject, that is, where the subject becomes the ego 
and the ego becomes the ego cogito, only where this cogitare is understood in its essence as “original 
synthetic unity of transcendental apperception,” only where the culmination for “logic” is 
reached…only there is the essence of the object revealed in its objectivity’ (ibid., 60). For Heidegger, 
it is objectivity that testifies to the essence of being in metaphysical thought. According to Heidegger, 
metaphysics became, with Kant, the ‘metaphysics of the object, that is, of beings as object, of the 
object for the subject’ (ibid., 89). The problem is that when it comes to those thinkers that still deal 
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that for both Braver and Adorno, metaphysics, as a form of disengaged 
contemplation, sacrifices those aspects of phenomena that emerge with our 
experience of them in everyday circumstances. For Adorno, the result is that objects 
are reduced to concepts, whereas, for Braver, inherently meaningful phenomena are 
relegated to decontextualized, unchanging entities. In both cases something about the 
object of thought is considered to be missing, namely, our inherently meaningful 
experiences of such a phenomenon – what Adorno called ‘particulars’, 
‘heterogeneities’ and ‘individuals’ – remain unaccounted for as a result of our pure 
speculation or disengaged contemplation. The key methodological point here, which 
calls into question philosophy’s attempts to demystify art and artworks, is that 
philosophical understanding of art itself depends on the prior sense made by specific, 
concrete aesthetic practices for those engaged in them, and this dependence cannot be 
reversed, because the substance of that sense would be lost in the process. As a result, 
the reifying impulses of metaphysics and of what Adorno called ‘traditional thought 
in general’ led him to suggest that ‘the assertion of the identity of being and thought, 
                                                                                                                                      
with the world as subjects in relation to objects, they, according to Heidegger, work out of an 
understanding of being that characterises the age but which is, for them, unquestionable. As Heidegger 
explained, ‘the manner of human representation which is metaphysically characterised finds 
everywhere only the metaphysically constructed world’ (ibid., 87). In other words, according to 
Wrathall, ‘because metaphysicians do not understand that there is a background, which is not itself an 
entity, that constitutes the foreground as what it is, they interpret the unity of the foreground in terms 
of some uniform thing or feature in virtue of which everything is what it is’ (Wrathall 2011, 181).  
For Heidegger, ‘we must return to the being and think about it itself in its being. At the same 
time, however, we must allow it to rest in its own nature’ (Heidegger 2003, 16). To see a hammer as a 
piece of equipment is to see it as part of a world in which it is significant. The hammer refers to other 
entities in the workshop resulting in a significant whole rather than just a random collection of entities. 
However, the workshop is not a self-enclosed world, but one that constantly refers beyond itself to the 
worlds of those that occupy the workshop, that depend upon the workshop or that allow the workshop 
to be in the first place. If we reject accounts of the world as full of just isolable, extended entities, then 
we become committed to a different view of being. As Hubert Dreyfus and Wrathall observe, 
‘Heidegger argues that traditional treatments of being have failed to distinguish two different kinds of 
questions we can ask: the ontic question that asks about the properties of beings, and the ontological 
question that asks about ways or modes of being’ (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2005, 3). It follows that 
Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics comes from the observation that the ontological mode of being 
cannot be reduced to what we discover in ontic inquiry. Being, so Heidegger believed, had been 
misconstrued when it had been considered in the past to be some sort of predicate or entity. Rather 
than looking at the properties of beings, therefore, Heidegger looked to produce an account of the 
structures that make being possible in the first place, an account that ‘lay[s] out the structure of our 
access to entities and account[s] for our ability to make sense of making sense’ (Dreyfus 1991, 11). 
Ultimately, Heidegger’s concern was to locate being within the world and to show how it is that being 
is intimately bound up with the world. In the case of the hammer, we first encounter the hammer as 
available, as involved with nails and wood and as significant within the world of the workshop rather 
than as a causally delineated and meaningless entity. Thus, according to Dreyfus and Wrathall, 
‘worldly things…have a different mode of being than the causally delineated entities that make up the 
universe and which are the concern of the natural sciences. To understand worldly entities – entities, in 
other words, that are inherently meaningfully constituted – requires a hermeneutic approach’ (Dreyfus 
and Wrathall 2005, 4). 
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which stands behind the entire philosophical tradition, has succumbed irrevocably to 
the protests against it’ – ‘philosophy in its highest form hitherto, and that was 
Hegelian philosophy with its attempt to comprehend the non-identical, albeit to 
comprehend it by identifying with it – this philosophy is beyond redemption’ (Adorno 
2008, 59). For Adorno, philosophy, ‘particularly when measured against its thesis of 
the identity of thinking and being, is shaken to the core by the historical experience of 
their separation’ (ibid.). Both Braver and Adorno’s critiques of metaphysics, of 
reason alone attempting to comprehend reality by identifying with it, as we shall see, 
have a direct bearing on how we understand the engagement with music and musical 
works that takes place in analytic aesthetics. 
Despite Adorno’s critique of identity-thinking, he was not a naïve realist who 
entertained ‘the notion of a sphere of objectivity that is independent of thought’ (ibid., 
8). Conceptual thinking is needed to bring things we encounter in the world into the 
inferential sphere, to communicate, to articulate meaning and purpose, to avoid 
falling into complete incomprehensibility. This relationship between the intelligible 
realm and experience is, according to Adorno, what is ignored by metaphysical 
projects based on transcendental ideas. As Wellmer suggests, ‘on the one hand he 
[Adorno] shows that the “fall” of metaphysical ideas is irreversible; on the other he 
argues that the truth of metaphysics can only be grasped at the moment of its fall’ 
(Wellmer 1993, 204). For Adorno, the whole point is that that the transcendental 
ideas of metaphysics would be empty if they were not understood from the standpoint 
of possible experience. But, as Adorno was aware, that is not to say that any of these 
transcendental ideas were knowable. Indeed, Wellmer even suggests that the 
transcendent impulse of metaphysics and thought in general is not aimed at a realm 
beyond the world in which we find ourselves, but rather at an altered state of this 
world. The issue for Adorno is that metaphysics is a constellation of both immanence 
and transcendence, of both non-conceptual and conceptual, which is both necessary 
and yet inconceivable. It is on the basis of this intricate dialectical relationship 
between reason and experience that, as Wellmer illustrates, Adorno, to a certain 
degree, attempts to dispel the aporia through his ideas concerning a materialistically 
modified concept of transcendence, one that takes us beyond the realm of purely 
sensuous experiences. As Honneth suggests, after the ‘fall’ of metaphysics, the object 
‘can no longer be intellectually subsumed under a single “scheme” or categorically 
tailored to a particular standpoint but, rather, when possible, registered in as many of 
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its aspects and qualities as the indispensable “medium of conceptual reflection” 
allows’ (Honneth 2009, 79). Adorno went on to claim that what he was striving for 
‘includes a salvaging of empiricism, albeit in a somewhat convoluted, dialectical 
fashion. That means that cognition always proceeds in principle from below to above, 
and not from top down; it is concerned with leaving things to themselves and not with 
a process of deduction’ (Adorno 2008, 82). Negative dialectics does not abolish 
conceptuality or replace it with knowledge of an altogether different sort, nor does it 
merely reflect on reality, but reflects on the impossibility of having the type of 
knowledge of things that forms the goal of metaphysics. As Adorno claimed, 
‘negative dialectics as critique means above all criticism of precisely this claim to 
identity’ (ibid., 20). Rather than accept ‘the identity of concept and thing’ as the ‘vital 
nerve’ of metaphysical thought, idealist thought, Marx’s materialism ‘and indeed 
thought in general’ (ibid.), Adorno proposed that ‘philosophy should seek its contents 
in the unlimited diversity of its objects. It should become fully receptive to them 
without looking to any system of coordinates or its so-called postulates for backing. It 
must not use its objects as the mirrors from which it constantly reads its own image 
and it must not confuse its own reflection with the true object of cognition’ (ibid., 81-
82). If there can be anything like a succinct statement for Adorno’s project, a positive 
side to his negative dialectics, then it would be something like: ‘the utopia of 
knowledge would be to open up the non-conceptual with concepts without making it 
their equal’ (Adorno GS 6, 21). Suffice it to say that he still demanded that we make 
identifications even if there is a tendency for identifications to fail to capture those 
qualitative ‘particulars’, ‘individuals’ and ‘heterogeneities’ of objects that come from 
engaging with them in everyday experiences. 
Adorno proposed that this materialistically modified relationship between the 
conceptual and the non-conceptual, between the subject and the object, between 
reason and experience, plays a vital role in the creation and reception of works of art. 
Adorno’s anti-realist claim that objectivity is mediated – that there is no ultimate 
separation of subject from object – manifests itself, for example, in the critical 
relationship between the composer and the stylistic norms with which they work. 
Through the composer’s critical engagement with the handed-down musical materials 
of history – genres, formal types and tonal schemata – together with the new material 
that arises from such an engagement, individual creativity enters the work and 
becomes visible;  ‘expression, objectivated in the work and objective in itself, enters 
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as a subjective impulse; form, if it is not to have a mechanical relationship to what is 
formed, must be produced subjectively according to the demands of the object’ 
(Adorno 2004, 218-219). The subjective mediation of objective material can be 
perceived in the immanent workings of the artwork. For example, Adorno argued that 
the force of subjectivity in late Beethoven ‘breaks through the roundedness of form 
for the sake of expression’ leaving behind conventional ‘splinters, derelict and 
abandoned’. When we listen to the first movement of Beethoven’s Quartet in A 
minor, Op. 132, for example, we are aware of this fragmentary landscape whereby, as 
Joseph Kerman observes, ‘contrast is not rationalised but endured; more than any 
other experience, frustration sets the mood’ (Kerman 1966, 243). Whether it is 
through the use of abrupt silence (the development section of the first movement of 
Op. 132), the manipulation of traditional sonata-form structure, the repetition of 
motifs (‘Muss es sein?’ in Op. 135) or the lack of any extended development such as 
we find in the first movement of the Fifth Symphony, ‘contrast’, as Kerman observes, 
‘has been pressed to the brink’ (ibid.). For Adorno, ‘the fragmented landscape is 
objective, while the light in which it alone it glows is subjective. He [Beethoven] 
does not bring about their harmonious synthesis’ (Adorno 1998, 126). It follows that 
this dialectical interaction between subjective and objective forces forms the basis of 
Adorno’s sociology of music, whereby the products of artistic creation offer a model 
of what an emancipated manipulation of socially and culturally cultivated material 
might look like outside the realm of art and artworks. In the case of late Beethoven, 
Adorno argued that the fragmented and stark musical landscape sheds light on the 
contradiction between the would-be reconciled musical work and ‘the actual 
unreconciled object in the outside world’ (Adorno GS 11, 261). He argued that, 
‘paradoxically, art must testify to the unreconciled and at the same time envision its 
reconciliation’ (Adorno 2004, 221). It is because the artwork resists against the 
tendency to be used as what Wellmer calls the ‘lubricant for social reproduction’ that 
it comes to be viewed as critical of reality (Wellmer 2004, 117). Adorno suggested 
that we might speak of the contradiction between the artwork and social reality as 
‘aesthetic difference’ and it was ‘only by virtue of this difference, and not by denying 
it, does the work of art become both work of art and correct consciousness’ (Adorno 
GS 11, 261). Modern autonomous art, then, according to Adorno, allows for the 
experience of societal contradictions by being immanently social as opposed to 
immediately social: ‘Art becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies 
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this position as autonomous art. By crystallising in itself as something unique to 
itself, rather than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as “socially 
useful”, it criticises society by merely existing’ [italics added] (Adorno 2004, 296).2  
Despite the problems with Adorno’s sociology of music, which have been 
well documented,3 it can be seen that the goal of the subjective mediation of the 
objective musical material is, in terms of the music, to explore new sounds and 
sound-relationships and to give new content to worn-out conventions. In short, to 
discover new musical terrain by transcending stylistic and formative norms and by 
unburdening musical listening from the clichés of the culture industry. Subjectivity 
becomes objective in the work of art through the ‘subjective mediation of all its 
elements’ (Adorno 2004, 21) – the manipulation of the historical, artistic materials, 
self-alienation and concealment. It is through this prior act of objectification that the 
artwork, according to Adorno, becomes an object of perception. As he explained, ‘the 
insight of the critique of knowledge that subjectivity and reification are correlative 
receives unparalleled confirmation in aesthetics’ (ibid., 221-222). Modern 
autonomous art, therefore, provides a model for how the non-conceptual can interact 
with the conceptual in new ways as a result of the creative potential of the subject 
without being entirely subsumed by the subject. Thus, in late Beethoven, the creative 
                                                
2 Adorno’s aesthetic theory can only be understood in the context of a developed, specifically Western, 
capitalist society, a position that can no longer be acceptable in a world of transnational capitalism and 
neoliberal politics. This would explain why Adorno is so bad at doing justice to jazz and composers 
like Richard Strauss, Sibelius and Stravinsky, whose style and ways of composing cannot be 
reconciled with Adorno’s historicist approach to the musical material or understood in terms of those 
aspects of modernism that Adorno used to criticise them. Indeed, Adorno’s championing of the 
advanced state of the artistic material poses some problematic questions when it comes to claims 
suggesting that art fulfils its social function more precisely through the manipulation of artistic forms 
and structures. For example, how does Adorno’s account explain why a Western piece of pop music, 
which might not be the most stylistically ‘advanced’ work, can be highly critical of state authority with 
emancipatory possibilities in other parts of the world? Who is to say that social critique must emerge 
from the artwork’s formal structures? Do not performance techniques, recording processes, distribution 
means, packaging and branding and the interaction of music and public image also speak about a 
certain piece of music’s relationship to society? Furthermore, Adorno’s position fails to account for 
those works that were central to Adorno’s Occidentalist account of the advanced state of the musical 
material but have since fallen into the hands of the culture industry. His culture industry theory now 
looks decidedly dated since, for example, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner, Schoenberg and Ligeti all 
became part of Hollywood filmmaking. We also need to question whether we respond to music the 
way Adorno analyses it. For Adorno, we can comprehend and analyse subjective responses to music 
by reading determinable content off the work’s formal structures. But, as Adorno was also aware, the 
question of whether the content that was revealed by music analysis was also grasped by the listener, 
was only a matter that could be proven empirically. As Bowie observes, ‘if there is no connection 
between subjective responses and the objective material, many of Adorno’s insights in the work on 
musical reproduction and elsewhere into how the subjective is formed by the objective, and vice versa, 
become impossible to defend’ (Bowie 2007, 344-345). 
3 See, for example, Bowie 2003b, 234-244, Bowie 2004, 248-278 and Bowie 2007, 309-375. 
  38 
act whereby the object is mediated through the artist’s manipulation of the formative 
norms of musical composition still leaves visible the traditional stylistic conventions 
that have been handed down through history – the use of sonata form, tonal harmony, 
short sections of motivic development, and so on. In other words, stylistic and 
formative norms have not been renounced or overcome in late Beethoven; the non-
conceptual, objective conventions still remain although manipulated and criticised 
through Beethoven’s engagement with them.  
It is the subjective mediation of the non-conceptual, objective musical 
materials that Adorno equated with the ‘thingly’ aspects of works. Indeed, just as he 
argued that an artwork achieves ‘opposition only through identification with that 
against which it remonstrates’ (Adorno 2004, 176), Adorno also claimed that ‘only as 
things do artworks become antithesis of the reified monstrosity’ (ibid., 220). In other 
words, artworks only surpass the world of things by what is thing-like in them, ‘their 
artificial objectivation’. The fact that Adorno referred to this form of objectivity as 
‘artificial’ implies that that there is more to artworks than what is thing-like in them. 
Indeed, according to Adorno, it is essential that an artwork negates its own status as a 
thing because a ‘totally objectivated work would congeal into a mere thing’ (ibid., 
230). Nevertheless, if a work evaded objectification altogether ‘it would regress to an 
impotently powerless subjective impulse and flounder in the empirical world’ (ibid.). 
Here we reach the crux of the matter. For Adorno, artworks can neither be completely 
objective such that the enquiring subject can look upon the object of enquiry from a 
standpoint of disengaged contemplation nor can what is considered to be ‘artificially 
objective’ or ‘thing-like’ about a work of art be entirely renounced through 
interaction with a subject. Furthermore, artworks cannot be completely free from 
subjective interference because such interference is necessary in order to create 
artworks as well as to talk about artworks and shed led on their meaningfulness.  
Moving away from the production of musical works to their reception, when 
we articulate the meaningfulness of the work it is arguable that we have already 
moved beyond the conception of music as an object of perception because, as both 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein suggest, it is the meaningful aspects of the work that we 
first encounter in everyday life. Braver, for example, argues that ‘the richly 
meaningful is the first layer of experience, whereas seeing it as merely data requires a 
discrete and rather sophisticated act of abstraction…We don’t infuse grey stuff with 
significance but immediately grasp a meaningful world, as Heidegger repeatedly 
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lectures Husserl under the mask of Descartes. Bare perception and its interpretation 
only come apart in detached contemplation’ (Braver 2012, 141-142). The worldliness 
of the artwork – those aspects of specific works which are entwined with and 
inseparable from our experiences with them – demands, according to Braver’s line of 
thought, that the work of art is already tunnelled through with meaning when we first 
perceive it as a result of us inhabiting a shared world, one that, amongst other things, 
is made up of concrete aesthetic practices. Nevertheless, what Wellmer calls the 
‘object quality’ of the artwork is still a vital part of our inherently meaningful 
aesthetic experiences. The object quality of the artwork is the basis for the 
worldliness of the work whilst, itself, reliant upon our aesthetic experiences to exist. 
The fact is, however, that as soon as we begin to talk about the worldliness of the 
artwork or the work of art as dependent upon inherently meaningful aesthetic 
experiences, we come to see that artworks are more than just things; that they are 
more than what is presented to the senses. This idea that works of art are more than 
just their ‘object quality’, that they are more than just objects of perception, is what 
Wellmer refers to as art’s ‘internal negativity’.  
For Wellmer, the fact that artworks contradict their supposedly objective 
existence is enough to suggest that ‘works of art are what they are, in the way that 
they are, only as objective correlates of an aesthetic experience. This aesthetic 
experience is a fundamental aspect of the works themselves’ [italics added] (Wellmer 
2004, 111). To understand musical works as ‘objective correlates of an aesthetic 
experience’ is vital to making sense of the relationship between music and reification. 
As we have seen, to subsume musical works of art beneath a theoretical, 
contemplative gaze is to discount the experienced significance of a work. Detached 
contemplation of inherently meaningful phenomena yields ‘things’ or ‘present-at-
hand objects’ stripped of their particularity and individuality. This non-conceptual 
substance of the concept of music cannot, by definition, be captured by detached 
contemplation of the object ‘music’ for the reason that, in ways that will become clear 
throughout the course of this study, it is ontologically and logically required in order 
for us to recognise that something is musically significant. In other words, the non-
conceptual are those ways of making sense ‘flowing through our behaviour which 
evaporate under the light of theoretical reason’ (Braver 2012, 27). Nevertheless, that 
is not to say that what we are referring to as music’s meaningfulness – how it matters 
to our everyday lives – should be allowed to regress to what Adorno called an 
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‘impotently powerless subjective impulse’ (Adorno 2004, 230). For Wellmer, 
aesthetic experiences expand ‘our faculty of perception, conceptualisation and 
communication’, that is, ‘the work of art breaks through the bonds of our accustomed 
ways of perceiving and thinking, and opens up a new dimension of meaning for us in 
doing so; only by shocking us, touching emotionally, or setting us in motion, can it 
communicate to us’ (Wellmer 1985, 65). The point to realise here is that, for 
Wellmer, we cannot consign art to a world beyond signification or representational 
depiction. ‘Art’, as Wellmer claims, ‘is not the Other of reason or of meaning, nor is 
it unadulterated pure meaning or reason in its truest shape’ (ibid., 69). Indeed, ‘an art 
that was purified of the last vestige of signification, of representation, of meaning, 
would be indistinguishable from pleasant ornament, senseless noise, or technical 
construction’ (ibid.). In fact, our aesthetic experiences of musical praxis, as Wellmer 
argues, are already bound up with concepts as well as the intersubjective realm of 
communication. Wellmer, here, discusses aesthetic experience as based on an 
‘interrelationship between semiotic and energetic moments’ (ibid., 67-68). Indeed, he 
claims that to understand artworks is to understand aesthetic experience as tied to the 
communicative practices of interpretation, analysis and critique. If musical works are 
nothing more than objective correlates of aesthetic experience, then it is necessary for 
us to bring about the mediation of music’s ‘object quality’ in order to bring the work 
into existence. Without this mediation, as we observed with Adorno’s discussion of 
how musical works are composed, there is no music as we understand it in the 
context of our everyday practices. Consequently, to see musical works as objective 
correlates of aesthetic experience is to see our conceptualisations and communication 
of these aesthetic experiences as vital to the existence and illumination of music in 
general.  
 
Internal Negativity and the Limitations of Analytic Aesthetics 
 
In stark contrast to the position just outlined, Roger Scruton argues that ‘the first step 
towards understanding music…is to understand sounds as objects of perception’ 
(Scruton 2009, 5). It follows that, for Scruton, in order to think about music as an 
object of perception, then we must engage with the ‘organisation that can be 
perceived in sound itself, without reference to context or to semantic conventions’ 
(ibid.). Scruton conceives of music as an ‘object’ with ‘properties’ (ibid). Although 
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he does not discount the role the listener plays in his characterisation of music, he 
does attribute to musical works a content that ‘can be heard in them’ (ibid.). This 
conception of music as a substance with properties does not just hold for Scruton but 
presupposes the practice of analytic aesthetics in general. Aaron Ridley, for example, 
acknowledges that to ‘get at the truth about music’, it must be insulated from 
extraneous influence and, thus, fashioned into an ‘object of enquiry’. So, he argues, ‘I 
used to think, at clear variance with the banalities set out above [that music is 
embedded and historical], although not obviously at variance with prevailing 
philosophical practice, that the best way to get at the truth about music must, in 
effect, be to separate it off as much as possible from everything else and to 
investigate it in what might be called its “pure state”’ (Ridley 2004, 2). As Ridley 
goes on to explain, ‘the methodological attraction derives from a particular way of 
taking a particular model of intellectual enquiry, and hence from a particular 
conception of objectivity. The model itself is broadly scientific’ (ibid., 3-4). If we do 
not wish to go as far as to accuse analytic aesthetics of scientism, we can still, as we 
saw with Braver’s comments on Retrospective Rational Reconstructions, 
acknowledge that the act of theoretical contemplation of phenomena brings into 
existence and is, in turn, determined by the existence of what are perceived to be 
present-at-hand objects, entities that are unchanging and that are, by definition, 
removed from extraneous influence. Thus, for a form of musical engagement that 
prizes theoretical contemplation of music’s character above articulations of actual 
musical praxis, music is taken purely as an object of perception, isolated from the rich 
and meaningful world in which it is embedded. Objectification and the narrowing of 
reason to exclude the disclosive, culturally varied domain of the human meanings of 
things are, according to Charles Taylor, the sine qua non of the natural sciences. It is 
this objectifying impulse that Taylor sees as dominant in large areas of contemporary 
philosophy, whereby the ‘narrowed realm of reason can suffice to decide all the 
inescapable issues of human life’ (Taylor 2011, 46). We see the beginnings of this in 
modern philosophy when Gottlob Frege claimed that ‘the question of truth would 
cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific investigation’ (Frege 
2003, 42) – an issue that will be considered in detail in chapter three. 
Ridley also suggests that although a ‘pure-state’ conception of music as an 
‘object of enquiry’ is, in part, determined by a methodological attraction to the natural 
sciences, it is also believed to be theoretically justified. So, Ridley argues, music is 
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construed as the ‘self-contained art par excellence’ – ‘it doesn’t trouble with the 
world outside itself: it doesn’t depict or say things or bother itself with psychology; 
its proper subject matter is, simply, itself – and its glories are the glories of form, 
design and structure, unsullied by any content not wholly its own’ (Ridley 2004, 7-8). 
Ridley’s criticism of analytic aesthetics, of which he considers himself to be a former 
practitioner, is that as well as being attracted to the methodological purity of the 
natural sciences, it misapprehends the entwined aesthetic projects of formalism and 
autonomy – both historically-specific ways of thinking about music – and, instead, 
proclaims them to be transcendent. We, therefore, see that the notion of musical 
purism is connected to a second idea – formalism. For Eduard Hanslick, ‘music 
consists of tonal sequences, tonal forms; these have no other content than themselves’ 
(Hanslick 1986, 78). The idea that music ‘speaks only tones’ coincides with the 
notion that what music expresses, if it is to be an idea of any sort, is a purely musical 
idea, a ‘self-sufficient beauty’ that ‘is an end in itself, and it is in no way primarily a 
medium or material for the representation of feelings or thoughts’ (ibid., 28).  
Ridley observes how formalist and purist worldviews have become 
fundamental to the practice of much of the philosophy of music. He discusses how, in 
the eyes of certain commentators, song is seen as different to pure, instrumental 
music, in that, by including sung words, somehow the purity of the music has been 
diluted.4 Ridley criticises the approach that holds that ‘with purely instrumental music 
one appears to have hit a kind of bed-rock, a form of music that has been pared down 
to its bare essentials’ (ibid., 91-92). Indeed, he argues that ‘it is a smallish-seeming 
step from this thought that one has run up against the essence of music (“as such”)’ 
(ibid.). For Ridley, Hanslick’s idea that ‘whatever can be asserted of instrumental 
music holds good for all music as such’ is exemplary of a purist attitude of what the 
former calls ‘autonomania’. Having not realised, or worse, ignored the fact that the 
autonomy of music is a historically specific manifestation of musical engagement as 
opposed to some inherent aspect of its nature, many philosophers of music, Ridley 
argues, still treat music’s autonomy as ‘a more or less holy cow’ (ibid., 10). For 
philosophers of music, ‘music is essentially autonomous’ (ibid., 12). Ridley claims 
that such a view clearly creates difficulties for those who attempt to reconcile 
essential features with extra-musical relations. 
                                                
4 See Ridley 2004, 76-92. 
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The methodological point to return to is the idea that philosophical 
understanding of music depends on particular experiences of actual musical practices, 
which cannot be ignored if philosophy is not to produce a distorted picture of music 
and musical works. Without the ability to move from a conception of music as an 
‘object of enquiry’, that is, as an ‘object of perception’ or an ‘object with properties’, 
to the level of context, we would not be able to understand what music is or 
determine whether what we are engaged with is music. For example, Karlheinz 
Stockhausen, on the topic of Elektronische Musik being developed at the 
Westdeutscher Rundfunk studios in Cologne in the 1950s, recounted that ‘when 
visitors come to the Cologne studio to hear electronic music, they very quickly get 
over the shock caused by the unfamiliar sounds and ask why there is no rhythm (they 
of course mean regular meters with bars having three or four beats), why no 
melodies, no repetitions, etc. And so the discussion usually doesn’t deal at all with 
electronic music as such, but rather with the manner in which it is composed – the 
language’ (Stockhausen 2005, 372). Similarly, although he distanced himself from 
Elektronische Musik, Pierre Schaeffer stressed how Musique Concrète demanded new 
ways of making sense of novel forms of music making. Thus, in relation to his 
Symphonie pour un homme seul (1949-50), Schaeffer explained that, although it 
returned to the ‘rules of music’ from time to time, ‘the words theme, development, 
apart from suggesting a disarming facility of tempo, give this musical literature 
advantages that concrete music is very far from possessing’ (Schaeffer 2012, 56-57). 
As Schaeffer claimed in response to the question posed by a ‘specialist in Greek 
philosophy’ of whether Musique Concrète was music, ‘classical music, it appears, 
abstracts forms from all matter. Concrete music, on the contrary, turns its back on 
these pure forms and, while it revitalises matters, it also presents itself as a sort of 
deterioration’ (ibid., 65). Ultimately, according to Schaeffer, to impose the traditional 
vocabulary of Western art music on Musique Concrète was to distort the ‘laws of 
concrete music’ and the message that such music was aiming to articulate, a message 
that called into question or demanded the ‘deterioration’ of established and dominant 
norms of Western ‘classical’ music. Similarly, what Stockhausen observed was that 
the audience’s attempt to understand what they were listening to according to the 
stylistic rules of Western tonal composition led to a failure to comprehend 
Elektronische Musik as music. Only by understanding music within a context of 
concrete aesthetic practices can we provide an explanation for the audience’s initial 
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reaction to Stockhausen’s work as well as Schaeffer’s fears of having his music 
tarnished or controlled by dominant musical discourses. In the respective cases of 
both Schaeffer and Stockhausen, there is a need to engage with the sense made within 
a specific series of contexts in order for their creative outputs to be intelligible qua 
music, specifically, as music that, to a certain degree, calls into question ossified 
stylistic, formal and interpretive norms. 
The issue is that holding in tension music’s objective aspects and its 
worldliness, its materiality and inherently meaningful aesthetic experiences, not only 
makes the ontological status of the musical work unclear, but it also defies attempts to 
theorise about music from a standpoint of disengaged contemplation. As has already 
been pointed out, to provide theories of music’s ontology, value and meaning requires 
music – to a greater or lesser extent – to be isolated from its place in everyday 
practices and fashioned into what Ridley calls ‘objects of enquiry’ or what Braver 
calls ‘present-at-hand objects’; objects that are distilled to their ‘pure state’. As we 
have seen, to deprive music of its non-conceptuality in the name of an extorted 
reconciliation between concept and object, general and particular, is to bring about 
the reification of music, that is, to ignore those meanings that emerge through our 
interactions with actual musical practices and which vanish under the light of 
philosophical theory construction. The fact that something is considered to be lost 
from view when a stance of disengaged contemplation is taken up means that those 
modes of philosophical doing that attempt to account for the nature of art and 
artworks are faced with certain unavoidable and irresolvable problems. These issues 
can be found in recent debates surrounding musical ontology, for example.  
In response to the idea that the musical work can be identified with an original 
score, Julian Dodd (2000, 2007), Peter Kivy (1993) and Jerrold Levinson (1990) 
claim that all musical works are ‘abstract objects’ which, as Dodd suggests, ‘have 
sound-sequence-occurrences as instances’ (Dodd 2000, 424). Levinson holds to the 
type/token theory of music ontology that challenges the ‘simple’ and ‘intuitive’ 
conception held by Kivy and Dodd that musical works are ‘pure sound structures’, 
whereby a work is ‘a structure, sequence or pattern of sounds, pure and simple’ 
(Levinson 1990, 64). Levinson, in challenging the ‘simple view’ of musical works as 
‘pure sound structures’, argues that the work is a complex type – ‘a contextually 
qualified person-and-time-tethered abstract object’ (Levinson 1990, 216). Despite 
denying Levinson’s claim that an essential feature of a musical work is its being 
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created, Dodd, referring to himself as a ‘sensible Platonist’ (Dodd 2000, 428), 
advocates the type/token theory of musical ontology whereby ‘works of music are 
types whose tokens are sound sequence-events: datable, locatable patterns of sound’ 
(Dodd 2007, 23). Works, therefore, in terms of the type/token theory, are ‘eternal 
existents’ (Dodd 2000, 435). As Dodd claims, ‘the identity of a type…is fixed by the 
condition which a token must meet in order to be a token of that type’ (ibid.). It 
follows that according to the type/token theory of musical ontology the condition 
which a token must meet ‘is, of course, a property; so it follows that a type’s identity 
is determined by the property a token must have in order to be a token of that type’ 
(ibid.). Dodd then goes on to claim that works of music are, to be more specific, 
‘norm-types’ – ‘types that admit of properly and improperly formed tokens’ (Dodd 
2007, 24). According to Dodd, if a musical work (W) has a set (∑) of ‘properties 
normative within W’, which he takes to be purely ‘acoustic in character’, then a token 
will be a ‘properly formed token’ if and only if it contains every member or every 
property of the set (∑) (ibid.). Works, according to such metaphysical accounts, are, 
ultimately, rule-governed, abstract entities that are what they are on account of their 
non-contingent and non-inferential, present properties.  
On the surface, the discussion of musical performances (‘tokens’ in Dodd’s 
theory) in normative terms doesn’t seem to be that problematic. Interpretations of 
performances are, whether in liner notes or reviews, frequently perceived as being 
either bad or good. Indeed, when it comes to musical performance, there is a 
common-sense need to ‘get the notes right’. Despite the fact that rightness or 
wrongness of a particular performance is, in many cases, a transient matter, there 
must, as Bowie observes, ‘for the issue of interpretation to be controversial, be some 
underlying agreement on the aim of getting it right’ (Bowie 2007, 324). For Bowie, 
what is important when it comes to musical performance is the relationship between 
the norms that govern agreements and the norms invoked in contingent 
disagreements. Bowie claims that the idea of a right interpretation seems to be 
inescapable but yet also goes against the idea that norms are, at least we hope, 
continuously transformed by aesthetic practice. The issue, therefore, with theories of 
musical ontology is that, by appealing to the idea that musical works contain 
properties that performances must, in turn, contain in order to deliver ‘proper’ 
interpretations, they fail to account for those aspects of musical praxis that attempt to 
transform the norms. Some of the most inspiring and influential interpretations have 
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been those ‘improper’ performances that have eventually become normalised through 
historical changes in musical performance and reception that they helped initiate. A 
type/token theory of music’s ontology would need to be able to explain how 
‘normative properties’ can be reconciled with the process of norm-transcendence that 
is an inherent part of aesthetic practice. For example, how does a set of properties 
normative within a work, which Dodd argues is fixed, square with the process of 
norm-transcendence and the subsequent normalisation of innovative and paradigm-
changing interpretations? Norms rise and fall, come and go, within socio-cultural 
practices. So how is it that they can be intelligibly described as being properties of 
music? 
The issue is that supposedly objective accounts of eternal, abstract musical 
works ignore the human element involved in determining whether a manifestation of 
musical praxis is good or bad, right or wrong. Whether a performance of a piece of 
music matches up to our expectations for that work is, arguably, not down to some 
unchanging, properties of an abstract object but whether we, as a community of music 
listeners, can accept a specific performance of, for example, Mahler’s Fourth 
Symphony as being a performance of that particular symphony composed by Mahler, 
‘presenced’ in one form as a musical score, premiered in Munich on 25 November 
1901 and performed and commented upon in a variety of different ways since its 
conception. As Bowie claims, the problem is that those that attempt to create theories 
about music’s ontology, meaning and value obscure ‘the differences between primary 
meanings of the life-world in which the mode of existence of things involves their 
relationships to a subject and is often inherently connected to subjective feelings, and 
forms of description used in the sciences, which attempt to establish the existence of 
properties independently of subjective apprehensions of them’ (Bowie 2007, 21). For 
Bowie, the notion of aesthetic properties is empty, because there can be no reason to 
not believe that the norms of musical praxis depend on context and everyday 
practices as on the object (ibid., 22). The wider issue on which this talk of musical 
ontology hinges is the idea, mentioned earlier, that to treat music as an object of 
enquiry or a present-at-hand object, isolated from the context in which it created, 
performed and received, is to ignore the fact that music is inherently meaningful as a 
result of its being part of one’s world. Theories of musical ontology, in order to take 
up a stance of disengaged contemplation towards music as an object, require music to 
be stripped of its worldly, context-laden aspects that make it a meaningful part of our 
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everyday practices because those non-conceptual particulars and heterogeneities of 
musical praxis, as Adorno observed, cannot be captured within a theory. If what 
Wellmer refers to as the ‘internal negativity’ of the artwork leads to a crisis of 
objectivity when it comes to art, then the crisis in art is similar to the crisis in 
philosophy after the end of metaphysics when it becomes apparent that how the world 
appears to us, and how we make sense of the world cannot be detached from the 
individual, particular and heterogeneous experiences we have with it. Indeed, as 
Wellmer claims, ‘philosophy and art—so it seems—can only survive together and 
perish together’ (Wellmer 2004, 123).  
Adorno recognised the problems surrounding the internal negativity of 
artworks in his comments on the role of aesthetics. He argued that although artworks 
require philosophy in order give shape to their ‘spirit’, they do not need ‘an aesthetics 
that will prescribe norms where it finds itself in difficulty’ (Adorno 2004, 432-433). 
For Adorno, the ‘aura’ and the ‘spirit’ of works of art are, ultimately, one and the 
same thing, which, as Wellmer claims, share the same meaning as ‘content’ [Inhalt]. 
According to Wellmer, ‘the works’ “spirit” is that which exceeds their material or 
sonic configuration, their object quality’ (Wellmer 2004, 106). In other words, the 
‘spirit’ of a piece of music is that aspect of music that is intimately entwined with our 
inherently meaningful aesthetic experiences, which, according to Wellmer, demand 
articulation through interpretation, analysis and criticism – even if, due to the internal 
negativity of the musical work, ‘the experience of meaningful music commonly 
renders us initially speechless’ (ibid., 107). For Wellmer, in order to bring the 
‘nebulously experienced meaningfulness…into the light of consciousness’, we need a 
‘productive lingualisation thereof’ (ibid.). In other words, words written or spoken in 
books and music reviews are vital contributions to our understanding of music. 
Indeed, as Wellmer claims, ‘an element of reflection thus forms an important part of 
music-making or listening, an attempt to grasp contexts and details within the context. 
And through this, language and concepts always come into play’ (ibid., 102).  
Wellmer’s claims regarding the need to articulate the inherent meaningfulness 
of aesthetic experience was prefigured by Adorno, who argued that ‘art must embody 
reflection and take it to the point where it no longer remains external and foreign to it; 
this would be the role of aesthetics today’ (Adorno 2004, 434). Once we think that 
works are objective correlates of an aesthetic experience, we, therefore, cannot isolate 
them from interpretation, criticism and analysis. Conceptual and reflexive dimensions 
  48 
can be considered to form a vital part of musical production and reception. Therefore, 
just as our standards of belief, action and appreciation are, in part, determined by how 
we make sense of the world in social and cultural practices, musical works can 
neither be exhausted by – what we saw Kivy arguing for in the introduction – an 
enumeration of the various ‘precepts and propositions’ that ‘richly illuminate’ the 
practice of music nor can they be characterised from a stance of disengaged 
contemplation that we see as germane to the practice of analytic aesthetics as 
exemplified by Dodd, Kivy and Levinson. 
 
Music as a Challenge to Metaphysics as Reification 
 
The entwinement of reification and the disengaged contemplation of music as an 
object of enquiry is germane to metaphysical approaches to music. Adorno, as we 
have seen, makes the link between reification and metaphysics explicit claiming that 
metaphysical thought aims to disclose truths stripped of all that is ‘ephemeral, 
transitory and historical’. With metaphysical accounts of musical ontology, 
identifications that strip music of what gives it its transitory and social nature in 
favour of an objective account of its supposed properties have a tendency to 
deaestheticize music, extracting from it that part of the internal negativity of artworks 
that makes works of art dependent upon interpretation, analysis and criticism. To 
theoretically comprehend reality by identifying with it, to inflate the particular to the 
general without taking into account the specificity of the non-conceptual, is to ignore 
those aspects of the object that cannot be subsumed under philosophical theories 
because such aspects are, as I have already mentioned, dependent upon a degree of 
human interaction that can be articulated only within concrete situations. It is this link 
between reification as identity-thinking and metaphysics that led Adorno to refer to 
‘resurrected metaphysical systems’ as ‘metaphysics of death’, ‘which one would 
probably need to destroy to be free to reflect on these matters without ideology’ – the 
ideology that reassures people about ‘certain essentialities which, precisely, have 
become problematic’ (Adorno 2000, 133). 
Although metaphysics qua identity-thinking is implied in the respective 
approaches to musical ontology put forward by Dodd, Kivy and Levinson, Zangwill 
is explicit in demanding a ‘metaphysical theory’ for ‘the consumption and production 
of art, and perhaps also the sustenance of works of art’ (Zangwill 2007, 6). For 
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Zangwill, ‘to understand an artefact is to understand why someone might want to 
make it and use it’ (ibid., 7). So, Zangwill argues, we need to come up with a ‘theory 
of art’ that ‘should itself provide this explanation or else it provides the basis for such 
an explanation’ (ibid.). Ultimately, ‘views about the nature of art should be a by-
product of a good rational explanatory story’ (ibid.). Zangwill is concerned about 
accounting for the ‘nature of art’, that is, an account which determines what is 
‘essential to its being the particular work of art that it is’ (ibid., 99). Therefore, 
Zangwill’s approach can be described as metaphysical because he is concerned with 
producing a ‘rational explanatory story’ or ‘theory of art’ that can account for art’s 
‘identity or survival’ – its true nature of being. However, in contrast to Kivy, who 
uses conceptual analysis as the means to philosophically reflect upon on art and 
artworks, Zangwill suggests that we ‘reform’ our ordinary concepts ‘for an 
explanatory gain’ (ibid., 8). In other words, ‘we want an explanatory theory of our 
mental life as far as it involves works of art. And we should fashion concepts that 
allow us to attain that’ [italics added] (ibid.). The problem is that in attempting to 
produce ‘a theoretically reconstructed concept of art’ (ibid., 13), Zangwill admits that 
although such a theory can apply to a ‘great majority of art and art-activities 
throughout the world in the last few millennia’, it cannot, by implication, apply in all 
particular instances (ibid., 11). Throughout his work, Zangwill cites avant-garde art as 
being particularly problematic when it comes to being subsumed under a ‘theory of 
art’ precisely because, as Stockhausen and Schaeffer respectively observed, it cannot 
be considered under the same rules that held for more traditional artworks. But rather 
than give up on the idea of theoretically reconstructing a concept of art due to the 
inadequacy of that new concept to account for all particular manifestations of what 
we understand to be art, Zangwill, instead, questions the position accorded avant-
garde art in the ‘evangelical ambitions’ of those that aim to challenge aesthetic 
theories such as his: ‘It is difficult to see why fitting the contemporary art-scene 
should have special weight in constructing a theory of art…Thus we should strive to 
avoid concentrating too much on recent art in our theorising about art’ (ibid., 61-62).  
Zangwill goes on to claim that he is aiming to produce a theoretically 
reconstructed concept of art on the basis of the subject’s behaviours involving and 
beliefs about objective, ‘aesthetic properties’ – facts of art that can be read off the 
concept of art itself. As he explains, the idea is that ‘a good theory about the nature of 
X things would be a set of claims about X things that yields a good explanation of 
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properties that we independently believe X things to possess’ [italics added] 
(Zangwill 2007, 19). For Zangwill, ‘aesthetic properties may be verdictive or 
evaluative properties, such as beauty and ugliness, or aesthetic merit and demerit, if 
indeed these are different from beauty and ugliness. Aesthetic properties also include 
substantive aesthetic properties, such as elegance, daintiness, balance or frenzy’ 
(ibid., 37). It follows, according to Zangwill, that ‘something is art only if a person 
intended to make a thing possess certain aesthetic properties by giving it certain 
nonaesthetic properties [including physical properties, such as shape and size, and 
secondary qualities, such as colours and sounds] and it does in fact have those 
aesthetic properties because it has nonaesthetic properties’ (ibid., 40). In stark 
contrast with Wellmer’s claim that works are nothing but objective correlates of 
aesthetic experience, art, according to Zangwilll, therefore, ‘has nothing essential to 
do with the audience’ (ibid., 127).  
The problem in accounting for art based on a causal relation between aesthetic 
properties and an artist’s intentions is that such a theory obscures the differences 
between the musical work whose meanings and existence are dependent upon an 
interpreting individual or group of individuals and a form of scientific objectivity 
which attempts to establish entities and properties outside of human engagement with 
them. In doing so, metaphysical engagement with music ignores the fact that the 
(tacit) understanding of what constitutes a musical work depends upon a series of 
contexts, without which encountering these objects as musically significant would be 
impossible. If we did not already have a practical, pre-linguistic engagement with 
what we could refer to as art as part of our everyday dealings in the world, we would 
struggle to ascribe aesthetic properties to something we understand to be a musical 
work. We do not start with musical works as objects out there in the world; we, after 
Wittgenstein, ‘act, without reasons’ (Wittgenstein PI, §211) to certain sonic 
configurations, recognising such configurations as music. It follows that what leads 
us to ‘blindly’ (ibid., §219) arrive at the understanding of something as being music 
can come from both object and subject, such that new creative and interpretive 
contexts can give rise to new things that we previously may not have been able to 
classify as music. If subjects are thought of as already in the world, then subjects can 
use objects to articulate their worlds, which, inevitably, can bring about a change in 
the status of objects as well as a change to what was previously thought to be the 
‘essence’ of objects. To collapse the divide between the artwork and the audience, 
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between subject and object, which is what happens when we consider artworks to be 
objective correlates of aesthetic experience, is something Zangwill does not want to 
do because it precludes any ‘rational explanatory story’ or ‘theory of art’ that 
attempts to definitively characterise art as an object of enquiry. As Zangwill admits, 
‘we need to maintain the gap between art and audience if we are to appeal to one in 
order to explain the other; and if we collapse the gap, no explanation is possible’ 
(Zangwill 2007, 135). That is, ‘until we say something about the properties of a work 
of art onto which an audience’s experience is directed, we fail to have anything that 
provides a basis for an explanation of why an audience might be interested in art’ 
(ibid., 136). 
If we return to the idea of the artwork’s internal negativity – the notion that 
artworks are supposedly objective but at the same time more than what is presented to 
the senses – we can see how such an antinomy can only emerge when the divide 
between subject and object is dissolved. Take the relation between musical score and 
performance, for example. Nelson Goodman believed the musical score to be the 
‘authoritative identification of a work from performance to performance’ such that, as 
a result of pitches and durations, ‘all and only performances that comply with the 
score be performances of the work’ (Goodman 1968, 128). The notion that the 
determinable location of any musical work is the score and that everything needed for 
a ‘complying’ performance is objectively specified in the score, not only ignores the 
importance of that which is not notated, yet nonetheless defined by performance 
traditions, it, at the same time, as Anthony Gritten (2006b) observes with regards to 
his study of performances as ‘events’, disregards the fundamental aspect of 
‘performing’ in the sonic realisation of the written music. Indeed, as Adorno 
observed, ‘the musical document [score] is after all the expression of a musical idea 
that it standardises, reifies, and changes, so to speak, and which must be brought back 
to life and re-created through an “interlinear version”’ (Adorno 2006, 140). Adorno 
went on to say that musical interpretation ‘reverses the notation’ (ibid.).5  The 
important thing to realise is that although music in some cases does depend upon the 
existence of a score, interpretations do not merely manifest the objective features of a 
score in sound, but, more importantly, bring the life experiences of a creative and 
historically, socially and culturally mediated individual to bear on what is contained 
                                                
5 For a discussion of how musical interpretation links to Adorno’s relationship between the mimetic 
and the analytical, see Bowie 2007, 332-339. 
  52 
within the score, thus, as Gritten suggests, allowing for the ‘freedom and spontaneity 
of action and thought on the part of the performer’ to challenge the seemingly 
irrefutable ‘laws’ that enshrine the work concept. As we observed with Dodd’s 
account of musical works as ‘sound structures’ comprising of normative properties, to 
view the musical work as purely a site of normative properties is to fail to account for 
those aspects of the musical praxis that attempt to transform the norms. But if we 
were to hold to the idea of aesthetic properties, we would not be able to do anything 
but register as artworks those objects that contained the aesthetic properties we had 
been able to catalogue at that point in time. As we have seen with Zangwill and the 
problems he faces in accounting for the contemporary art-scene, it would be 
impossible for us to characterise anything that transcended the normative properties 
of artworks as an artwork. Why can there not be an indefinite number of things in the 
world or that will materialise in the future that we might regard as being art? As 
Bowie claims, ‘once one drops the idea of a subject confronted called music, and see 
the issue in such a way that subjects are affected by their relations to the object, and 
vice versa, this whole debate starts to look redundant’ (Bowie 2007, 24). In other 
words, the whole debate regarding theories of musical ontology, value and meaning 
start to look like Wittgensteinian pseudo-problems – but more on this in chapter 
three. 
When it comes to understanding the relation between metaphysics and 
reification we need to make a distinction between what Bowie refers to as 
‘metaphysics1’ and ‘metaphysics2’. According to Bowie, metaphysics1 ‘is the attempt 
to map out the place of humankind in the universe by giving an account of the true 
nature of being’ (Bowie 2007, 33). It finds its basis in the idea that ‘we ourselves, qua 
thinking subjects, are the foundation of the true account, an idea occasioned not least 
by the growing success of scientific activity in arriving at more reliable descriptions 
of the world’ (ibid.). The end result of metaphysics1, according to Bowie, is that it 
becomes a modern science, ‘which increasingly determines the fate of humankind by 
objectifying nature in the name of predictive laws that enable us to control it’ (ibid.).  
For Bowie, then, metaphysics1 is a matter of objectifying descriptions and self-
descriptions. However, his brief reference to the entwinement of metaphysics1 and 
‘thinking subjects’ points us in the direction of Adorno’s and Braver’s respective 
critiques of metaphysics as a form of disengaged contemplation or pure speculation 
that construes inherently meaningful and capacious phenomena as homogenous, inert 
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objects stripped of their non-conceptual, context-laden aspects. Metaphysics1, 
therefore, becomes the term for what I have been referring to as those types of 
engagement with phenomena that discount the experienced significance of particular 
manifestations of phenomena in favour of reifying identity-thinking or Retrospective 
Rational Reconstructions that aim for objectifying characterisations and descriptions.  
In contrast to metaphysics1, and despite what Bowie refers to as ‘the 
contingency of our existence in the world’, rationality, as we have seen, still has a 
part to play in order to ‘articulate our responses to things that we cannot control 
which still demand our rational engagement with them’ (Bowie 2007, 34). It seems, 
therefore, that Bowie agrees with Adorno that concepts can still be used, as we saw, 
in order to ‘open up the non-conceptual…without making it their equal’. For Bowie, 
metaphysics2 is a synonym for what Herbert Schnädelbach refers to as ‘negative 
metaphysics’ – ‘what resists being conceptualised in the manner that we 
conceptualise what can be objectively known’ (ibid., 40). Metaphysics2, can, 
therefore, be considered as a benign account of metaphysics, emerging from the idea 
that we can still articulate involvements with and experiences of phenomena. In this 
sense, metaphysics2 can be considered to be what A. W. Moore (2012) has recently 
referred to both as ‘the most general attempt to make sense of things’ and making 
sense of making sense. Such an account of metaphysics seems to take its cue from 
Wilfred Sellars, who argued that ‘the aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to 
understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the 
broadest possible sense of the term’ (Sellars 2007, 369) and, indeed, Bernard 
Williams, who claimed that philosophy is ‘part of a more general attempt to make the 
best sense of our life’ (Williams 2006, 182), Of course, it almost goes without saying 
that the ‘most general attempt to make sense of things’ would not be confined to 
philosophy. For if metaphysics2 is concerned with the fact that our engagement with 
the world is firstly meaningful, then other ways of revealing the world’s 
meaningfulness besides philosophy, including non-discursive means such as music, 
gestures and images, can be just as significant. That the result of such sense-making 
cannot be encapsulated in a definitive theory of the kind that is sought in analytic 
aesthetics is precisely the point that I argue should lead to the philosophical 
revaluation of aesthetic responses to our understanding of musical practices. 
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Unreified Music as Metaphysics2 
 
One way of overcoming the deficiencies in approaches to music in analytic aesthetics 
is by using the idea that music can be understood in terms of what it can evoke or 
disclose. The idea that music is disclosive is nonsense without the idea of an 
interpreting subject engaging with the material we would commonly refer to as 
music. Under such circumstances, no clear distinction could be made between what 
comes from the subjective side of the interpretation and the objective side. Rather 
than being beautiful, ugly, dainty, dumpy, elegant, powerful, garish, delicate, 
balanced, warm, passionate, brooding, awkward or sad, that is, rather than being 
properties of the work in question, music could be said to evoke certain 
manifestations of these concepts and, therefore, become an important site of what 
Bowie refers to as metaphysics2, a site that makes sense of how we make sense of the 
world.  
Robin Holloway, for example, charts the growing stylistic decadence of 
certain traditions in nineteenth-century Teutonic music. With regards to the 
‘demigods’ of Mahler, Strauss, Wolf, Reger and Schoenberg, Holloway claims that 
‘these composers, heirs to a wealth of resources used with complete technical 
mastery, tend towards excess in all things – length, performing forces, volume (and 
later, exaggerated brevity, barely audible dynamics from a tiny group of players 
inside or without an enormous orchestra)…head and heart alike are liable to explode 
with approaching over-celebration and overkill’ (Holloway 2003, 329). But what is 
evoked in the music of these ‘demigods’? It is difficult not to interpret the stylistic 
excesses of the post-Wagner generation of composers (those of Neue Sachlichkeit and 
similar movements excluded) as, in part, evoking an increasingly decadent, fin-de-
siècle Europe as it heads towards war. The bombastic musical forces, the 
manipulation of new and overbearing expressive means, the emancipation of the 
dissonance and the growing, degenerative chromatic excesses that result coincide 
with the decay of a more Apollonian musical unity as we find, for example, in the 
first movement of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. Although it is difficult not to reify 
the musical developments of the nineteenth century, the move from harmonious form 
and content towards stylistic norms that prized the dissonance over the consonance, 
the fragmentary over the holistic and subjective expression over form highlights, as 
Stephen Downes observes, the ‘decadent’ characteristics of late nineteenth-century 
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and early twentieth-century music. As Downes goes on to illustrate, these stylistic 
norms ‘invoke the perceived modern decline and disunity of expressive media, the 
polarities of organic growth and decay, unity and fragment, esotericism and 
exotericism, the delights of ambiguity and harmonic “vagrancy”’ (Downes 2010, 7) 
This interpretation of the degeneration of musical unity seemingly meshes with 
Benedetto Croce’s assessment of moral unity in 1911 Italy. For Croce, ‘the great 
words that expressed this unity: King, Fatherland, City, Nation, Church, and 
Humanity have become cold and rhetorical’ and with the ‘disuse of those words goes 
a general decadence of the feeling of social discipline’ (Affron and Antliff ed. 1997, 
30). As he went on to say, ‘the individual no longer feels bound to a great whole, part 
of a great whole, subject to it, cooperating in it, drawing value from the work they 
accomplish in the whole’ (ibid.).  
What is more is that we can chart the attempted or wished for regeneration of 
degenerative, post-war European societies in those works that aimed to stem the 
stylistic, instrumental and formative excesses that had infected pre-war musical 
modernism. For example, as Scott Messing observes, ‘the definitions for nouveau 
classicisme and néoclassicisme invariably contained a common vocabulary: abstract, 
absolute, architectural, pure, concise, direct, and objective’ (Messing 1996, 88). As 
Messing claims, these ‘apparently sane and health tendencies’ were contrasted with 
those characteristics deemed more common to the pre-war era: ‘illustrative, 
metaphysical, sentimental, symbolic, prolix, vague, and subjective’ (ibid.). According 
to Messing, ‘Stravinsky used this rhetoric as often as any of his contemporaries; its 
increasing frequency in his writings after Le sacre du printemps reflects his shifting 
personal allegiances as much as his gradually changing compositional style’ (ibid.). 
Stravinsky’s Apollonian rhetoric was, as Messing observes, ‘appropriated into the 
term neoclassicism in connection with [his] later pieces of the 1920s’ (ibid., 112).  
But that is not to say that all music is good for is providing some sort of 
historical record for the way other people at different times have both lived their lives 
and thought about the world. As we have already seen, truth in music is not wholly a 
cognitive issue. When writing about music – even in disclosive terms – we obviously 
cannot capture the moment of musical performance. When music is performed, as we 
have seen, cognition does play a valuable role, but there are parts of music that cannot 
be grasped in terms of concepts. We must, therefore, as Adorno claimed, look also to 
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the mimetic aspect of music for the manifestation of sounds in music performance.6 
The extra-linguistic relationship of the musician to her instrument, in the sense of 
what is more than purely conceptual as opposed to what is outside of language 
altogether, points towards relationships between people and things that cannot be 
articulated purely in discursive terms. Indeed, music invokes the dilemma of the need 
to lay conceptual claim to things for the purpose of comprehensibility whilst, at the 
same time, demanding that we incorporate the particular mimetic moment without 
which we cannot base our linguistic interpretations – this dilemma will be explored 
further in chapter four in relation to music analysis. 
What gives strength to the notion that music can be considered to be a 
particular manifestation of metaphysics2 is Heidegger’s idea that, as Hubert Dreyfus 
illustrates, the question of being is about making sense of how we make sense of 
things (Dreyfus 1991, 10). In contrast to subject/object epistemology, Heidegger 
believed that there is, ultimately, a more fundamental way of how we make sense of 
things; ‘a background of everyday practices into which we are socialised but that we 
do not represent in our minds’ (ibid., 3). According to Heidegger, these everyday 
practices provide the conditions by which we pick out objects, by which we 
understand ourselves as subjects and by which we come to make sense of the world. 
For example, Mark Johnson shows that even though infants are not engaged in full-
blown conceptual thinking, that is, in his terms, they ‘aren’t little proposition-
processing machines’, they are still learning to grasp the meaning of things, people 
and events. This is achieved, as Johnson observes, through bodily interactions and 
feelings. Indeed, in contrast to the idea that we are solitary, thinking subjects 
representing the world in our minds, pre-propositional sense-making takes place 
intersubjectively.7 The important point to be aware of – and it is a point that draws us 
close to Adorno’s claims regarding our mimetic relationships to the world – is that 
these everyday practices that determine our meaning-making cannot be accessible to 
an explanatory theory, that is, they cannot be definitively accounted for through 
disengaged contemplation. In other words, in being-in-the-world, I understand in 
terms of practical contexts and practical involvements in an organised and meaningful 
way how things relate to each other and to me – that is to say, I understand in the 
                                                
6 Adorno discussed music as the ‘separation…into text and interpretation [which] is itself not 
fortuitous, but rather an expression of its dual character as mime and language. Being mimic, it cannot 
be purely read, and being lingual, it cannot be purely imitated’ (Adorno 2006, 215). 
7 See Johnson 2007, 33-51. 
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sense of ‘knowing how’ things in the world hang together – rather than displaying a 
cognitive mastery of roles and concepts. Indeed, as both Heidegger and Wittgenstein 
argued in their own respective ways, it is only when we take up an attitude of 
detached contemplation to the world that the matters of present-at-hand and 
philosophical pseudo-problems emerge, matters that did not occur to us or were not 
considered problematic whilst we went about our everyday practices.8 Therefore, if 
our understanding of being human is ‘the result of being socialised into practices that 
contain an interpretation not exhaustively contained in the mental states of 
individuals’ (Dreyfus 1991, 17), as well as Heideggerian ‘involvements’, sense-
making can just as easily emerge from feelings, impulses, revelations, intuitions, 
relationships and moods. All of these can be articulated in discursive terms, but might 
just as effectively be evoked through musical praxis.  Therefore, it is in the context of 
our practical, emotional, intuitive, impulsive, revelatory and relational making-sense-
of-the-world that musical praxis plays a vital role, leading Heidegger to claim that 
once we socialise artworks into our everyday practices, then, ‘art is the becoming and 
happening of truth’ (Heidegger 2003, 59).9 
 It is in the context of our tacit understanding of the meaningfulness of the 
world that Dreyfus argues that the artwork ‘manifests, articulates or reconfigures the 
                                                
8 See Braver 2012. 
9 To understand what Heidegger means by the idea of art as the ‘becoming and happening of truth’, 
and, thus, the roles played by works of art in metaphysics2, we need to understand that truth as 
correspondence or coherence can only be understood by acknowledging that disclosive aspects of 
language are ontologically and logically prior to its semantically determinable aspects. Propositional 
truth as correspondence is, according to Heidegger, founded on an ontic or material dimension of truth 
that implies the notion of a right attitude or right perspective from which to view things, and vice 
versa. It is this view of truth as correspondence or correctness that Heidegger locates within the 
metaphysical tradition. According to Heidegger, for the Greeks, truth was οµοιωσις as conforming 
oneself to an entity; for the Christian medievalists, truth was adaequatio as measuring up to or fitting 
the truth; for the moderns, true attitudes are those in which we achieve certainty. However, Heidegger 
does not have a problem with truth as certainty. As he explained, ‘what makes each of these 
propositions true? Just this: that what they say corresponds with the facts about which they say 
something. Therefore the being-true of the proposition means such correspondence. What then is truth? 
Truth is correspondence. Such correspondence obtains because the proposition is directed to the facts 
and state of affairs about which it says something. Truth is correctness [Richtigkeit]’ (Heidegger 1997, 
2). Nevertheless, in all instances, from the Greek age through the modern, what underlies the 
respective accounts of truth as a sort of correspondence is, according to Heidegger, a network of 
background assumptions. It follows that, as Mark Wrathall illustrates, accounts of propositional truth 
as correspondence or coherence require, in order not to presuppose truth in trying to define it, pre-
propositional, disclosive accounts of the conditions of truth in order to fill the gap between a primitive, 
causal account of human behaviour in the world and an intentional account of propositional states that 
leaves out the stage where intentional content – that that which is intended in an assertion – becomes 
fixed (Wrathall 2011, 49-52). It follows that Wrathall agrees with Heidegger in that propositional truth 
is presupposed by ‘unconcealment’ [Unverborgenheit] from the very beginning, a notion that relies on 
entities being discovered in pre-propositional but nevertheless intentional contexts. In other words, 
unconcealment is an essential condition of there being truth, in this narrower, philosophical sense.  
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style of a culture from within the world of that culture’ (Dreyfus 2005, 407). ‘World’ 
is, as Dreyfus observes, ‘the whole context of shared equipment, roles and practices 
on the basis of which one can encounter entities and other people as intelligible’ 
(Dreyfus 2005, 407). In other words, as Julian Young observes, ‘world’ ‘is the 
background, and usually unnoticed understanding which determines for the members 
of an historical culture what, for them, fundamentally, there is. It constitutes, as it 
were, the entry conditions, the ground plan, the “being of beings”, which something 
must satisfy in order to show up as a being in the world in question’ (Young 2001, 
23). For Dreyfus, if our communal practices determine the way we talk about the 
world, then the way that beings are revealed as what they are through such practices 
is ‘the style of that world’ (ibid.). It is the particular communal style that encapsulates 
the way in which certain historical and transitory groups make sense of the world that 
the artwork articulates. Young, for example, quotes Heidegger, who, in discussing 
Rainer Maria Rilke, asks us to notice ‘“in how elemental a way the world – being-in-
the-world – Rilke calls it life – leaps towards us from the things” that the poet 
describes’ (Young 21, 33). As Young goes on to explain, ‘the point here concerns, as 
Being and Time’s discussion of “world” puts it, “thematising”…The cobbler knows 
world implicitly since he knows what shoes are. But he does not know that he knows. 
It takes the “original” eye of the artist to “thematise”, to render “expressly visible”, 
that of which we are, in our “average everydayness”, unaware’ (ibid.). It follows that 
the artwork is not a form of what Young calls ‘Promethean creation’ but a 
‘thematising’, a making visible of the normally implicit practices that constitute the 
particular style of a world. As sites of metaphysics2, sites which, simultaneously, defy 
the reifying impulses of metaphysics1, artworks, therefore, disclose ways in which 
various groups and individuals have tacitly made sense of their worlds and, as a 
result, assist us, as interpreters, with making sense of the world from which the 
artwork emerges as a result of what Gadamer called a ‘fusion of horizons’ between 
the work and our own world. 
This last point is crucial. As we shall see in detail in the following chapter, if 
we consider the musical work to be an objective correlate of aesthetic experience, 
which only exists in a moment of mediation between some inherently meaningful 
sonic configuration and the interpreting individual, then, as Heidegger claimed, the 
artwork gives ‘to men their outlook on themselves’ (Heidegger 2003, 28). An artwork 
‘gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, 
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disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire for the 
human being the shape of its destiny’ (ibid.) Artworks articulate a world, contribute 
to the style of that world, glamorise that world and produce a shared understanding of 
that world for those who happen to occupy it. For example, with reference to the 
subcultural movement of ‘Oi!’, which had its heyday during the late 1970s and early 
‘80s, and which, musically at least, appropriated many of the innovations opened up 
by punk rock, Matthew Worley argues that ‘an analysis of its bands, audience, and 
ephemera reveals much about class identity in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
offering a snapshot of working-class youth in a period of significant socio-economic 
change’ (Worley 2013, 4). For Worley, ‘Oi! provided a contested site of critical 
engagement that allowed voices rarely heard in public debate to articulate a protest 
that cut across existing notions of “left”, “right”, and formal political organisation. 
More specifically, it revealed and articulated processes of political and socio-cultural 
realignment directly relevant to the advent of Thatcherism and collapse of the so-
called consensus that informed British politics from 1945’ (ibid., 3). Garry Bushell, 
the subculture’s most vocal advocate and one its most controversial figures, provides 
a trivial summary of Oi!’s socio-political position: Oi! ‘was about being young, 
working class and not taking shit from anybody. It was anti-police, anti-authority but 
pro-Britain too…The Oi poloi didn’t need Punk’s proletarian wrapping paper – 
invented backgrounds and adopted attitudes, accents and aggression – because they 
really were the cul-de-sac, council estate kids the first punk bands had largely only 
pretended to be’ (Bushell 2001).10 Oi!, like the music hall numbers that came before 
and to which its songs are lyrically often compared, manifested and articulated a 
predominantly white working-class culture – pubs, soccer, boxing and the dole were 
common themes along with incessant references to being anti-police and anti-
politicians – one that was primarily male, patriotic and localised.11 Indeed, Oi! can be 
                                                
10 Bushell presents an idealised and oversimplified account of the (anti)politics of Oi!. Indeed, 
Bushell’s links to the English Democrats call into question the innocent picture he paints for Oi!. 
11 In glamorising a primarily backstreet class-culture, Oi! also became a focal point for the projection 
of left and right ideologies, ideologies that, some of its practitioners claimed, did not coincide with 
their own concrete worldviews. The ‘Southall riot’ of July 1981 represented for the British mass media 
what Stephen Duncombe and Maxwell Tremblay refer to as ‘the symbolic dovetailing of music genre 
and subculture, violence and racism’ (Duncombe and Tremblay 2011, 128). As well as being 
disavowed by the left, who saw Oi!’s territorialism, patriotism and masculinity as a hindrance to 
radical socio-cultural change, Oi! now attracted a notable far-right contingent in the form of the 
National Front and British Movement, who sought to prey on those predominantly white, unemployed, 
male youths whose lives had been affected by monetarist economic policy, mass unemployment, 
widening social divisions and notable levels of immigration. According to Worley, ‘Oi!’s class-
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perceived as exemplifying the special function of art, which, according to Dreyfus, 
lets a ‘group of historical people see the [complex] style of their own [sub]culture by 
showing it in a glamorised exemplar’ (Dreyfus 2005, 413).12  
In ‘thematising’ particular styles of sense-making, that is to say, in rendering 
‘expressly visible’ the socio-cultural practices that constitute a particular style of a 
world, musical praxis also discloses those ideologies that are vital to such sense-
making. Ideology is, as Terry Eagleton (1991) observes, a highly controversial term 
because it generates diverse – and often conflicting – accounts of how it functions. 
Nevertheless, Eagleton articulates what he calls the ‘common answer’ to the question 
of ideology, which links the term to what John B. Thompson refers to as ‘relations of 
domination’ (Eagleton 1991, 5). Finance capital, technology, party politics, the media 
and mass culture, for example, all have the potential to determine, to a certain degree, 
the process of socio-historical change and can, as a result, be regarded as principal 
means of explaining particular socio-historical transformations. To say music can 
‘thematise’ or make visible a particular style of a world is to say nothing more than 
musical praxis also discloses those structures of power and domination that shape a 
world by sustaining or initiating the transformation of that world’s social, political 
                                                                                                                                      
cultural identity was equated with racism; its patriotism with nationalism; its masculinity with 
misogyny; its audience with the far right’ (Worley 2013, 17). What Worley sees as a distorting 
narrative that identifies Oi! with far-right ideology has been posited within recent musicological 
discourse. Recognising that ‘skin bands strenuously avoided explicit political affiliation’, David 
Schwarz (1997), however, appeals to Oi! as ‘right-wing skin music’ with ‘fascist ideologies’. The 
tension between Schwarz and Worley is that whereas Worley acknowledges the male-oriented, 
patriotic and localised aspects of the Oi! subculture, Schwarz, through his discussions of what such a 
worldview presents in terms of Oi!’s relationship to the Other, couches such aspects in fascist terms. 
Although it is undeniable that Oi!, like the skinhead movement in general, contained far-right elements 
and attitudes, to label the subculture as racist and fascist is to perhaps misread its content. There are 
potential phobic elements to Oi!, which we can see through its championing of masculinity, patriotism 
and working-class culture. However, as Worley observes, Oi! encompassed a range of perspectives 
that could not be neatly contained within the labels of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Nevertheless, what gave the 
movement the semblance of coherence was its reflection of and response to the socio-economic 
conditions of the time along with its focus on working-class culture, masculinity and patriotism, 
themes that Schwarz suggests are representative of a specifically fascist worldview. Indeed, Schwarz 
goes on to identify and discuss German Oi! bands that have made explicit racist and fascist references 
in their music. 
12 Although I am not going as far as to suggest that everything that counts for what Dreyfus calls a 
‘cultural paradigm’ counts as an artwork, for, as we have seen, there must be an element of aesthetic 
experience involved, the issue of whether punk and its subgenres such as Oi! should be classed as a 
form of art is, to me, not as problematic as cultural conservatives might wish to claim. Indeed, as 
Young claims in relation to Heidegger, the latter points out ‘that the Greeks had no concept 
corresponding to our notion of “fine art”. Both art and craft, along with all other modes of “truth”-
disclosure were, for them, just techne. If we return, then, to thinking in a Greek way, “we [will] 
understand the word “art” quite generally to mean every sort of capacity to “bring forth” truth, 
understand it, that is, so that it corresponds to the Greek concept of techne”’ (Young 2001,18). It 
follows that Young takes Heidegger’s conception of art to be ‘quite prescient, an anticipation of 
aspects of the current avant-garde’ (ibid., 19).      
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and cultural order. The more problematic issue, however, is to account for the idea 
that what we might construe as ideology actually, to a certain extent, determines our 
ways of doing and thinking, which, in turn, helps to reproduce that same ideology. 
Indeed, the notion that various relations of domination can assert themselves over our 
lives and over the manifestations of aesthetic praxis we come up with puts the 
transparency of liberal and neo-liberal conceptions of freedom qua self-determination 
into doubt. As Bowie observes, ‘self-determination can be an illusion born of the 
failure to understand how one is determined, which can be “natural” in the sense of 
what is given to us through biology…but can also be what determines us through the 
pressures of social existence in irrational and unjust circumstances’ (Bowie 2013, 
102). Similarly, Eagleton suggests that ‘those who oppose the idea of ideology as 
false consciousness are right that ideology is no baseless illusion but a solid reality, 
an active material force which must have at least enough cognitive content to help 
organize the practical lives of human beings’ (Eagleton 1991, 26).  
Under current political and economic circumstances, especially in the West, it 
is becoming increasingly clear that communal practices and the freedom of specific 
communities are often both shaped by different structures of power and sustained by 
those subsumed beneath such structures. A particularly pertinent example is the 
‘sovereign debt crisis’ that continues to grip various world economies. The current 
pursuit of austerity has resulted in unequal, unhealthy and unjust living conditions for 
a large section of the world’s population. As Mark Blyth (2013) argues, the road to 
these present economic and social conditions began when a ‘too big to fail’ banking 
crisis in the United States became a ‘too big to bail’ banking crisis in the Eurozone in 
2008. However, although it appears more and more likely that, as Blyth suggests, the 
current debt crisis and the negative social conditions that have resulted ‘started with 
the banks and will end with the banks’, the narrative that sustains austerity places the 
blame for the crisis at the feet of those fiscally ‘irresponsible’ governments and 
citizens that ‘spent too much’. From an ideology point of view, therefore, what is 
interesting is the relationship between those structures of power that promote the 
current austerity climate – despite the fact that austerity seems to be exacerbating 
social problems rather than solving them and despite the fact that it doesn’t seem to 
be reducing debt and promoting growth – and those affected in the negative sense by 
austerity. In many cases, the ideologically motivated concerns of pro-austerity 
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governments end up being reproduced by their citizens despite the fact that austerity 
limits the latter’s freedom. As Blyth suggests:  
 
John Quiggin usefully terms economic ideas that will not die despite huge logical 
inconsistencies and massive empirical failures as ‘zombie economics’. Austerity is a zombie 
economic idea because it has been disproven time and again, but it just keeps coming. Partly 
because the common-sense notion that ‘more debt doesn’t cure debt’ remains seductive in its 
simplicity, and partly because it enables conservatives to try (once again) to run the detested 
welfare state out of town, it never seems to die. In sum, austerity is a dangerous idea for three 
reasons: it doesn’t work in practice, it relies on the poor paying for the mistakes of the rich, and 
it rests upon the absence of a rather large fallacy of composition that is all too present in the 
modern world (Blyth 2013, 10). 
 
 
The reproduction of austerity ideology, therefore, seems to involve the internalisation 
of a dominant, ideologically motivated narrative that takes the form of what Blyth 
calls a ‘morality play’ between ‘good austerity’ and ‘bad spending’, which is used to 
justify a period of self-defeating budget cuts and welfare reforms. However, the story 
that we all took part in ‘bad spending’, which means that we all must contribute to 
reducing sovereign debt, just doesn’t seem to be true. Austerity is a particularly 
dangerous form of ideology precisely because it not only fails to do for the economy 
what those who advocate it say it will but it also deliberately masks ‘the impact of 
one person’s choices on another person’s choices’ and, instead, seems to make the 
current situation a problem that we all contributed to (ibid., 14). As Blyth suggests, 
‘there is politics of making it [the sovereign debt crisis] appear to be the states’ fault 
such that those who made the bust don’t have to pay for it. Austerity is not just the 
price of saving the banks. It’s the price that the banks want someone else to pay’ 
(ibid., 7). The fact is, however, and it is something, as John Lanchester (2010) 
observes, which those negatively affected are coming to realise, that one person’s 
choices do, indeed, impact on another person’s choices, but that doesn’t take away 
from the fact that those further down the income ladder are still being, 
simultaneously, hurt by the crisis and blamed for it despite the fault resting on those 
who we now understand to hold real economic and political power. In chapter five we 
will look at how musical practices have been used to call into question those 
structures of power that help perpetuate certain current social antagonisms. For now, 
however, once we accept that there are limitations and constraints placed upon our 
ability to determine our own ways of doing and thinking, then, due to music’s 
embeddedness in those socio-cultural practices that are affected by ‘another person’s 
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choices’, one could justifiably claim that musical production, circulation and 
reception can also be historically conditioned by the same socio-economic pressures 
and relations of domination.  
In the case of Oi!, in which musical praxis played a major role alongside the 
participants’ lifestyles, language, ideas and cultural symbols, the music emerged from 
and responded to the accumulated systemic socio-economic conditions that consisted 
of Thatcherism, a strongly defined ruling class and the decline of the British 
‘consensus’. As Worley observes, Oi! ‘stood opposed to Thatcher’s assault on the 
industrial and cultural cornerstones of British working-class life whilst 
simultaneously baulking at the stultifying bureaucracy of Labour social democracy 
and rarefied identity politics of the left’ (Worley 2013, 23). Similarly, the initial 
interpretations of Oi! and its music also articulate the realignments ongoing within 
British politics at that time, in terms of the disengagement of the youth from the 
sphere of ‘party politics’ and the growing post-war fascination with previously 
ignored social interest groups within the sphere of identity politics. Interpretations of 
Oi! in the media betrayed their roots in the socio-political structures of domination.  
As Worley argues, ‘for the mainstream media, Oi! became another in a series of 
“moral panics” linked to the emergence of youth culture as a recognisable component 
of contemporary society. In other words, it was seen to represent a threat to prevailing 
societal values and interests as defined by the media and the wider establishment.’ 
(ibid., 13-14). What the case of Oi! illustrates is that by manifesting particular 
communal styles of sense-making, musical praxis can be the means by which we, as 
interpreters, become critically aware of our own world by, for example, listening and 
being open to the ideological stains on the text. Yet, even though subcultural 
movements such as Oi! and the music that emerged from them can make visible the 
structures of power that shape the way we live our lives and think about the world, 
they can also be perceived to be vehicles for ideology, in that, as ‘meaningful 
symbolic phenomena’, they, as John B. Thompson claims, ‘serve, in particular social-
historical circumstances, to establish and sustain relations of domination’ (J. 
Thompson 1990, 56).  
Although critical of certain structures of power, including the political 
establishment, Oi! did not plead the case for social mobility or seek to bring to an end 
the injustices that maintain class divisions. As a subculture, it also acted as an 
obstacle both to the equal treatment of women and to democratic cross-cultural 
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understanding. Oi! was concerned with fashioning a specifically working-class 
rhetoric and with it a particular class-cultural identity based around the themes of 
political antagonism, nationalism and masculinity. Thus, even if the movement 
wished to portray itself as being anti-establishment, it is precisely because the 
participants of Oi! championed and glamorised a potentially phobic rhetoric based 
around the issues of class, gender and culture whilst attempting to isolate themselves 
within a subcultural zone of autonomy that the existing socio-economic, cultural and 
gender power-relations of a class-based society remained undisturbed. As David 
Schwarz suggests in relation to German Oi! in particular, ‘the essence of Oi[!] 
subjectivity is misrecognition; one both hates and needs the Other’ (Schwarz 1997, 
128).13 That is not to say, however, that we can read the ideological aspects of 
musical praxis off the music itself. Instead, as Thompson illustrates, ‘we can grasp 
symbolic phenomena as ideological, hence we can analyse ideology, only by situating 
symbolic phenomena in the socio-historical contexts within which these phenomena 
may, or may not, serve to establish and sustain relations of domination’ (J. Thompson 
1990, 56). 
If the work of art can be seen to be a form of metaphysics2 that ‘thematises’ or 
makes visible the ideologies that shape our being-in-the-world, then can it also be 
critical of ideology? Although ideology critique is something Heidegger did not 
explicitly deal with, he did attribute to art a revolutionary potential: ‘whenever art 
happens, whenever, that is, there is a beginning, a thrust enters history and history 
either begins or resumes’ (Heidegger 2003, 65). Dreyfus proposes that ‘founding 
works’ can bring about a reconfiguration of a culture’s style whereby dominant 
practices become marginalised whilst marginalised practices become central – ‘the 
‘setting-into-work of truth thrusts up the extra-ordinary [Ungeheure] while thrusting 
down the ordinary, and what one takes to be such’ (ibid., 63). It is the ability of some 
artworks to reconfigure cultural style that makes subcultural artistic movements so 
important as sites of potential resistance to the demands of the existing social, 
political or cultural order. That is not to say, however, that artistic materials must 
necessarily precede a change in overall cultural style – that artworks create worlds. 
As we have seen, artworks, along with human beings, already inhabit a world, a 
world that is what it is according to the socio-cultural ‘background’ practices that 
                                                
13 Despite his tendency to reify Oi! music as a specifically fascist phenomenon, Schwarz (1997) 
provides a detailed discussion of Oi!’s phobic stance towards the Other in general. 
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make it up. Works, therefore, are not necessarily ‘founding’ in the sense that they 
create new cultural styles from scratch. Indeed, as Jon Savage observes, for example, 
the DNA of both punk music and punk subculture existed in fragmentary form prior 
to 1976: Malcolm McClaren, Vivienne Westwood, John Lydon and Joe Strummer 
were all alive; and the lyrics, poems, vanguard manifestoes and pulp fictions had been 
or were being written. All that these punk pioneers, poetry and prose were waiting on, 
according to Jon Savage, was ‘the location, the vacant space where, like the buddleia 
on the still plentiful bombsites, these flowers can bloom’ (Savage 2005, 3).14 
However, along with the subculture of which artworks are a part, works of art can, as 
punk music demonstrates, propel history into a new phase, one in which a subcultural 
practice can be appropriated by and thus transform the dominant culture.  
As Savage observes in the midst of the story of late ‘70s punk; ‘as with any 
cluster of minorities, if you put them together, you make a majority: pop – a marginal 
industry in itself – is a place where many of them meet, as dreamers and misfits from 
all classes, to transform, if not the world, then their world’ (Savage 2005, 12). Punk 
was not merely a marginal practice but the marginal practice of recent times, which, 
                                                
14 As Dreyfus observes in Heidegger’s writings, prior to any sort of stabilisation of the new style, a 
culture must bestow the material for the new style. For Heidegger, ‘language, by naming beings for the 
first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. This naming nominates beings to their being 
and from out of that being’ (Heidegger 2003, 61). However, for Heidegger, language cannot be 
understood in the usual sense of the word as a ‘stock of individual terms [einen Bestand von Wörtern] 
and rules for linguistic construction’ (Wrathall 2011, 122). As Dreyfus observes, in ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’ Heidegger ‘generalises language to any form of “poetic projection”’ (Dreyfus 2005, 
416). The point to be aware of is that by declaring projective announcement to be poetic and by 
arguing that such an announcement is a projection ‘as to what beings will come into the open as’ 
[italics added] (Heidegger 2003, 61), Heidegger was deliberately making the link between language 
and poïesis, which we can broadly take to be ‘creation’. Therefore, when Heidegger declared 
‘projective saying to be poetry’ or, similarly, when he claimed that ‘language itself is poetry in the 
essential sense’ (ibid., 62), he was seeking to make the connection between language and poïesis in 
order to emphasise the fact that ‘what ultimately bestows the material for the new style is the style of 
people’s language’ (Dreyfus 2005, 416). Language, for Heidegger, in that ‘it brings beings as beings, 
for the first time, into the open’, is more than concepts and propositional contents; it fulfils an 
originary function by preparing a way for the artistic material that will ground and articulate the new 
cultural style. Such an account of language, however, is in danger of attributing to language world-
constituting powers, when precisely what language and music have in common is their world-
disclosive potential. This problem can be overcome by accepting Young’s rejection of the Promethean 
conception of artworks as also applying to that which we commonly think of as being a language. If, as 
Dreyfus observes, Heidegger generalises language to be whatever is poetically projected, then we do 
not necessarily have to assume that by ‘language’, Heidegger is referring to that which we use to 
communicate, assert, establish facts and give and ask for reasons in linguistic terms. As Young 
illustrates, ‘in Being and Time, “world” is the same as the “thrownness” which every human being 
(Dasein), as it grows to adulthood, finds itself “already” in. Being human means “already being-in (a 
world”… “Poetry, creative literature, is nothing but the elementary emergence into words, the 
becoming-uncovered, of existence as being-in-the-world”’ (Young 2001, 32). Therefore, according to 
Young, ‘language’, in the Heideggerian sense, ‘is, in a word, social practice, a complex integration of 
words, things, moods, feelings, actions and commentaries on actions which constitutes, in 
Wittgenstein’s phrase, a “form of life”’ (ibid., 35-36). 
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in similar ways to the anarchy that was 1950s rock’n’roll, encouraged post-punk 
misfits and malcontents, from goths to gays, to come out of the shadows and openly 
express their subcultural practices, thus increasingly transforming into the ordinary 
what had previously been considered to be extraordinary. As Simon Reynolds claims, 
punk opened up ‘a space of possibility’ (Reynolds 2009, 408) for what Savage calls 
‘the hidden positive to Punk’s much-flaunted negative, a practical decentralisation 
with infinite possibilities’ (Savage 2005, xv). Such an idea is reprised in Worley’s 
description of Oi! as ‘a forum for protest and a means by which those typically denied 
a public voice could engage with the world of which they were part’ (Worley 2013, 
22). Reynolds goes on to propose that through punk’s ‘breach in the wall of business-
as-usual, all sorts of obscure freaks broke through and grabbed an opportunity for a 
wider audience’ (Reynolds 2005, xxi). He argues that ‘punk created an audience with 
an appetite for more challenging music, extremes of all kinds. Punk shook up the 
major labels, making them more likely to risk signing edgy bands for fear of getting 
left behind. Finally, punk triggered the independent-label boom, which provided a 
distribution network for all kinds of weirdo music that would otherwise have to 
subsist on a mail-order level…’ (Reynolds 2009, 408). As the mythic site of unity, 
punk opened up a space of possibility by which other subcultural practices and genres 
could gain recognition and prominence in the public sphere, contributing to the 
reconfiguration of cultural style whilst, at the same time, bringing about the increased 
fragmentation of any holistic style.  
Once we acknowledge the vision of artworks as thematising or making visible 
the ways in which groups and individuals make sense of the world, then, as a result of 
interpretation and critique – in other words, as a result of what Wellmer calls the 
‘playful bewilderment of sense and the senses’ – artworks can disclose those 
practices and forms of identity that are excluded from dominant discourses, that are 
oppressed by the current order or are not open to being articulated within it. As 
Wellmer suggests, ‘this [critical potential of individual artworks] is not tantamount to 
broadcasting critical messages about an evil world, for a work of art is not a message’ 
(Wellmer 2004, 126). Instead, by allowing society to experience subcultural 
practices, by setting society’s perceptions, concepts, relationship to the subcultural 
world and, ultimately, society’s relation to its own world in motion, and thus lending 
a voice to those individuals who see themselves as part of a specific subculture, 
artworks can be world-opening whilst assisting in the transformation of minority 
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practices into the dominant ways of being-in-the-world. As Wellmer claims, ‘art does 
not practise critique by telling us how things really are, but rather by setting our 
thoughts in motion at the same time as opening our eyes and ears, and by 
occasionally heightening both reflection and complexity in allowing us to perceive 
and experience the ideological ossifications of the dominant discourses’ (ibid., 127). 
By appealing to the idea of musical works of art as manifestations of 
metaphysics2, which, through hermeneutical engagement, both allow us to make 
sense of how groups make sense of the world and provide us with the opportunity to 
scrutinise our ways of knowing how things hang together, we are able to come up 
with an alternative vision of musical engagement, a vision that allows us to resist 
subsuming manifestations of musical works under reifying descriptions. By drawing 
upon Adorno’s notion of reification qua identity-thinking as well as Braver’s ideas 
surrounding Rational Retrospective Reconstructions and relating them to 
metaphysical accounts of the world that reduce phenomena to decontextualised, 
unchanging entities, we have shed light upon the limitations of reifying accounts of 
music in analytic aesthetics that attempt to subsume musical works under theories of 
ontology, meaning and value. It has been suggested that if music has a world-opening 
function, that is, if the disclosive aspects of music are ontologically and logically 
prior to philosophy’s reflection on the nature of musical works, then the content of all 
that is notated in a musical text does not have any ‘being in itself’, as it were. Instead, 
adopting Wellmer’s idea that music has an internal negativity that makes the 
ontological status of the musical work unclear, one can say that the process of being 
interpreted is fundamental to music’s being. As Wellmer goes on to argue, ‘only 
through this connection of both music-making and musical listening to a space of 
lingual articulation, interpretation and critique can music become an object of 
genuine aesthetic experience in the first place, and only thus can such normative 
concepts as aesthetic success or failure gain a hold in the context of communication, 
and of arguments over musical works and our experience of them’ (Wellmer 2004, 
100). The musical text comes into being through a process of having to be constantly 
interpreted anew from within a particular historical horizon. At the same time, this 
means that the ‘being’ of musical works is a substantially historical one, and, as a 
result, open to the vagaries of cultural, social and political contingencies. We have 
seen in this chapter how such contingencies call into question purely descriptive 
accounts of music and musical works as put forward in philosophical theories of 
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musical ontology and value. In the chapter that follows we shall see how meaning can 
also be problematised by the historical nature of musical praxis. 
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2 
 
INTERPRETING WAGNER  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the true basis of the allegorical element in Wagner: the conjuring up of essences beyond recall. 
The technological intoxication is generated from the fear of a sobriety that is all too close at hand. 
Thus we see that the evolution of the opera, and in particular the emergence of the autonomous 
sovereignty of the artist, is intertwined with the origins of the culture industry. 
(Adorno GS 13 VUW, 102) 
 
The Second Vienna School, that of Arnold Schoenberg, which exercises a decisive influence on the 
most recent contemporary music, took Wagner as its immediate point of departure. 
(Adorno GS 16 WA, 546) 
 
These two statements do little to summarise Adorno’s thoughts on the artistic output 
of Richard Wagner. However, they are useful in drawing our attention to two distinct 
analyses of the latter’s art, analyses which, seemingly, contradict each other. The first 
statement is taken from Adorno’s Versuch über Wagner written between 1937 and 
1938, but not published until 1952. The second originates from Adorno’s speech, 
‘Wagners Aktualität’, presented at the Berlin Festival of 1963. The earlier and more 
substantial essay put forward the idea that the seeds of a future culture industry, an 
industry of Hollywood, radio, cinema, advertising, phantasmagoria and 
commodification, were to be located in Wagner’s art. Conversely, the 1963 speech 
stressed that Wagner’s works had fuelled the artistic advances of modern autonomous 
art, influenced the most ‘advanced’ Western art music of Adorno’s day and even 
contained techniques that pointed towards the latter’s conception of a musique 
informelle.1 It follows that Adorno interpreted Wagner as a site of convergence for 
                                                
1 Max Paddison provides a summary of Adorno’s account of musique informelle, which Paddison 
describes as ‘a kind of music that did not yet exist, but which would be in “no form”, in that it would 
refuse to accept pre-given solutions, including those emerging from Darmstadt (informelle Kunst does 
not, of course, mean “formless art”, given that, in order to exist at all, everything has a “form”, even if 
it goes directly against all previously known and familiar forms)’. See Paddison and Deliège ed. 2010, 
6. 
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what Andreas Huyssen (1988) has termed the ‘great divide’ between the culture 
industry and modernism. 
Bearing in mind Adorno’s inability to do justice to jazz and composers like 
Richard Strauss, Sibelius and Stravinsky, whose style and ways of composing cannot 
be understood in terms of those aspects of modernism that Adorno used to criticise 
them, one could be justified in claiming that his volte-face was merely a question of 
subjective judgement. Having said that, the subjectivisation of aesthetics was 
something Adorno sought to counteract. Indeed, the most salient point of Adorno’s 
argument against subjective judgments of value can be found in the following lines: 
 
But what has changed about Wagner…is not merely his impact on others, but his work itself, in 
itself. This is what forms the basis of his relevance; not some posthumous second triumph or the 
well-justified defeat of the neo-baroque. As spiritual entities, works of art are not complete in 
themselves. They create a magnetic field of all possible intentions and forces, of inner tendencies 
and countervailing ones, of successful and necessarily unsuccessful elements. Objectively, new 
layers are constantly detaching themselves, emerging from within; others grow irrelevant and die 
off. One relates to a work of art not merely, as is often said, by adapting it to fit a new situation, 
but rather by deciphering within it things to which one has a historically different reaction 
(Adorno GS 16 WA, 546). 
 
 
Adorno’s volte-face occurred because Wagner’s works had revealed themselves in an 
altogether different way. New significances had emerged from within the work whilst 
old ones had become irrelevant. With these claims, Adorno attempted to deflect the 
charge of subjectivism – he had deciphered within the works of Wagner ‘things to 
which one has a historically different reaction’.  
What Adorno’s later interpretation of Wagner’s works illustrates is a central 
idea of the early German Romantics that ‘we are neither simply imposing our own 
“form” on the world, nor simply taking in the raw data that the world offers us’ 
(Pinkard 2002, 135). For Adorno, the meanings of Wagner’s works are neither 
subjective constructions nor posited, abstract entities. The meanings of these works 
are derived in part from what Heidegger referred to as the ‘earthly’ aspects of what 
we would commonly call the work of art – those aspects of an artwork that we treat as 
tangible such as its material, colour, language and sound – and in part from our 
(sometimes) spontaneous ‘historically different reaction’ to these material aspects. 
However, the question of engagement with Wagner has never been as simple as 
merely confronting and interpreting the music dramas as they were presented on the 
Bayreuth stage. Indeed, what Bowie calls ‘The Wagner Problem’ began with 
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Wagner’s own theoretical writings as in the case of Oper und Drama (1851), 
whereby the composer appropriated the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach to support 
his conception of a ‘total artwork’ – an artistic corollary to his involvement with 
revolutionary politics. The problem involves the question of how to interpret 
Wagner’s explicit intentions for the Gesamtkunstwerk along with his other socio-
political reflections in the context of his music dramas. Just because Wagner 
appropriates Feuerbach’s philosophical ideas in order to lend theoretical support to 
his ‘revolutionary’ conception of the Gesamtkunstwerk, does that mean that the music 
represents these philosophical ideas? Similarly, even if Wagner was careful to avoid 
explicit anti-Semitism in his musical works, can we align the hate-filled reflections in 
both ‘Judaism in Music’ (orig. 1850) (‘Das Judenthum in der Musik’) and his 
subsequent correspondence with Franz Liszt, for example, with the interpretations of 
Beckmesser, Alberich and Mime as Jewish caricatures or with the interpretation of 
musical dissonance as denoting immorality and evil in general? In other words, is it 
possible to prove that certain music dramas harbour anti-Semitic messages or 
characterisations?2 Furthermore, if we are to accord Wagner’s ideas some level of 
authority in accounting for the meaning of his works, how are we to make sense of 
the fact that there are obvious contradictions in Wagner’s writings as his thoughts on 
the Ring and its musico-dramatic aspirations develop considerably between 1848 and 
1874? The latter part of this chapter will look at the relationship between Wagner’s 
theoretical writings on the Gesamtkunstwerk and actual responses to his music 
dramas. What follows this is an exploration of how the relationship between 
Wagner’s theoretical works and his artistic works have impacted on subsequent 
debates within Wagner scholarship, specifically, on the debate between Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Alain Badiou.  
In what follows it will not be my intention to resolve ‘The Wagner Problem’, 
an issue that involves long-standing and complex debates concerning Wagner’s 
intentions. As we saw in the previous chapter and as will become clear in what 
follows, the genesis of ‘The Wagner Problem’ can be located in the tensions 
surrounding the relationship between the ‘subject of knowledge’ and the ‘object of 
knowledge’ – a philosophical and musicological difficulty. To think that the work 
                                                
2 For the various debates on the anti-Semitic ‘content’ of the music dramas (or lack thereof), see, for 
example, Borchmeyer 1992, Katz 1986, Kőhler 1997, Lacoue-Labarthe 1994, Rose 1992, Weiner 1995 
and Zelinsky 1990. 
  72 
exists purely in some sort of causal relationship with a composer’s intentions is, as we 
saw in chapter one, to suggest that the work is an object with properties whose correct 
interpretation depends on us being able to marry up these properties with what the 
composer supposedly intended. As Bowie observes, ‘strictly applied, this would mean 
that all interpretations of Wagner that did not somehow instantiate a correspondence 
between the subjective and objective sides would be illegitimate’ (Bowie 2007, 213). 
Therefore, to attempt to definitively resolve the debates surrounding the meaning of 
Wagner’s works in terms of what Bowie calls the ‘inner ethical status of the 
individual’s practice’ would be nothing short of an attempt to resolve the question 
surrounding the location and character of musical meaning. The issue, as illustrated in 
chapter one with reference to a work as an objective correlate of aesthetic experience, 
is that to separate the object, ‘music’, from the interpreting subject in order to resolve 
‘The Wagner Problem’ once and for all by, presumably, locating some historical 
piece of evidence that suggests that Wagner had intended to make all his villains 
Jewish stereotypes, is to bring about the reification of music by shouldering out the 
far more important question of why Wagner’s works matter to us as more than just 
historical relics. Contrastingly, to consider the idea of aesthetic experience as a 
determining factor of the work is to already blur the line between subject and object. 
Interpretations do not just rely on what the composer said about their works but on 
bringing historically- and socially-mediated interpretive traditions to bear on images, 
texts, sounds and scores, which may or may not be a composer’s ‘definitive’ 
manifestation of their artistic intentions. Indeed, as we shall go on to see, not only 
does interpretation presuppose the existence of an inherently meaningful and 
mediated phenomenon, but it also involves complicated temporal relationships 
whereby neither the present nor the past is given definitive primacy over the other. As 
such, I will not be attempting to resolve ‘The Wagner Problem’ by definitively 
accounting for the location and characteristics of some ‘given’ meaning in Wagner’s 
music dramas. If anything, I will be looking to start the process of working through 
the problem by seeking to understand the reception of Wagner’s works through the 
exploration of the contingencies of musical interpretation. By becoming aware of 
how interpretation works, we are better suited to figure out a way of writing about 
and analysing music as well as locating the problems that have plagued certain 
philosophical approaches to music, which will be the main areas of focus for the 
chapters that follow. 
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Adorno’s Wagner as Culture Industry 
 
The main themes throughout the Versuch find their genesis in the contrast between 
leitmotif and developing variation in the chapter entitled ‘Gesture’. Adorno argued 
that the leitmotif – a ‘commentary on the stage’ that follows the curve of the 
linguistic flow – is in stark contrast to ‘genuinely constructed motifs’ (Adorno GS 13 
VUW, 29), which are linked to the notion of ‘developing variation’ whereby 
‘everything of a gestural nature’ is transformed into ‘intellectual development’ (ibid., 
34). As Bowie observes, ‘intellectual development’ can be explained by Hegel’s view 
of philosophy and dialectic (Bowie 2007, 231). Furthermore, this notion of 
‘intellectual development’ is seemingly present, in musical terms, in the opening 
movement of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony.  
Through the dialectical interaction of the initial four-note motif of the Fifth 
Symphony with the changing formal and structural contexts in which it finds itself – 
both within the first movement and in the context of all the other movements as well 
– Beethoven’s music is constantly varied. As Roger Kamien observes, ‘Beethoven’s 
thematic statements often grow out of their initial musical idea, which appears 
repeatedly in diverse melodic and rhythmic transformations and in changing 
harmonic contexts’ (Kamien 2000, 74). For Adorno, this developmental variation is a 
process of ‘becoming’ with the totality emerging from the dialectical interaction 
between subject and object (Adorno GS 13 VUW, 49). It is an ‘idealised image of 
creation out of nothing’ (Adorno 1998, 121). E. T. A. Hoffman prefigured Adorno’s 
comments on the Fifth Symphony when, with reference to Beethoven’s ‘simple’ 
themes, he claimed that ‘we might think that from such elements only something 
fragmented or incomprehensible could arise, but instead we receive from them a 
sense of the whole’ (Hoffman 1908, 1:55-64). As Adorno affirmed, ‘unless the 
nothing of the first bars is realised at once as the everything of the whole movement, 
the music has bypassed the movement’s idea before it has properly started’ (Adorno 
1998, 121). Indeed, we might argue that the process of what William Kinderman 
refers to as ‘symbolic transformation’ is not just confined to the first movement. With 
the supposed reoccurrence of the Fifth Symphony’s opening motif throughout the 
other movements – perhaps most emphatically at the start of the third movement and 
when the third movement’s opening theme returns prior to the recapitulation in the 
finale – there seems to be a remarkable coherence projected over the work as a whole. 
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This is most apparent if we also view the ‘symbolic transformation’ that occurs 
within the Fifth Symphony as, in part, derived from a sense of ‘directional tension’ 
progressing towards, culminating in and expelled by the triumphant C–major fanfare 
of the finale.3  
The dialectical interaction between subject and object, between particular and 
general, is linked to Lukács’ Hegelian notion of ‘the logic of totality’, whereby a 
dualistic relationship between subject and object is overcome in favour of a 
dialectical process that is enacted between them such that the individual particular 
moves within a self-created world, which, in turn, imposes itself on the particular. 
When the principle of the dialectic is applied to music, for example, in the case of the 
Fifth Symphony, we see how that musical element – the initial four-note motif – 
interacts with its surroundings – the musical forms, structures, styles, genres, tonality 
and harmonic progressions. It follows that the musical element is not merely repeated 
but changed by its surroundings, which, at the same time, are transformed through the 
same dialectical interaction. In contrast to Beethoven, however, Wagner’s sequential 
combination of leitmotifs, which, according to Adorno, function like an 
advertisement for recognisable semantic and visual aspects of the music drama, does 
not lend itself to the ‘logic of totality’ founded upon a dialectical process that sees the 
totality emerge from the smallest indeterminate elements of music in a process of 
‘becoming’. Such claims are in stark contrast to Carl Dahlhaus’ suggestion, with 
reference to Hegel, that, due to the dramaturgical function of the leitmotif, ‘each 
moment on stage appears to be a point within the system, a point that sheds a 
particular colour and perspective on the whole’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 198). What results 
for Adorno, however, is not the ‘epic totality, a rounded and complete whole of inner 
and outer’, but a ‘simulated’ ‘unity of the internal and external, of subject and object’ 
(Adorno GS 13 VUW, 35). What Wagner should have articulated, Adorno suggested, 
is the rupture that exists within these distinctions.  
For Adorno, as we saw in the previous chapter, a simulated unity between 
subject and object contributes to the pathology of reification by which individuals, 
particulars and heterogeneities are suppressed in the name of social, political and 
philosophical conformity – what Adorno referred to in response to Lukács’ socialist 
realism as an ‘extorted reconciliation’ between general and particular. Adorno 
                                                
3 See Kinderman 1995, 130. 
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proposed that a simulated unity was the outcome of the subject’s uncritical response 
to the object, a problem that he had worked out theoretically through his critique of 
Hegel’s ‘positive’ dialectics and had observed in material form in social pathologies 
such as fascism and the culture industry. Adorno was convinced that the composer 
was the archetype of the critical subject of negative dialectics that could demonstrate 
what the ‘opening up’ of the non-conceptual might look like for the rest of the world. 
Instead of accepting the various genres, formal types and tonal schema as objects to 
which the composer must conform, Adorno saw it as vital that the composer question 
these handed-down materials, thus putting the creator-subject in direct confrontation 
with the stylistic norms and conventions of history. Contrastingly, the problem with 
products of the culture industry, according to Adorno, is that they do not contain 
within them a critical subject and, as a result, their handed-down materials ‘remain 
unquestioned, unanalysed and undialectically presupposed’ (Adorno GS 10.1, 343). 
Adorno located the seeds of a future culture industry in Wagner’s works. Indeed, 
because he believed that Wagner was unable to present dialectical material, this 
simulated unity actually covered up an ‘underlying fragmentation’ (Adorno GS 13 
VUW, 99), a fragmentation which allowed for star numbers like the Fire Music and 
Wotan’s farewell, the Ride of the Valkyries, the Liebestod and the Good Friday music 
to be ripped from their original context in order to prepare the way for ‘Best of 
Wagner’ compilations. It follows that the charge levelled by Adorno against Wagner 
for this simulated unity is one of ‘formlessness’ brought about by ‘false identity’ – an 
absence of dialectical material (ibid., 39). Similarly, because Wagner had abandoned 
the ‘cosmos of bourgeois forms’ of music, his works could not be a ‘logically 
consistent totality, an immanent ordering of parts and whole’ (ibid., 46) Ultimately, 
for Adorno, the blame for the failure of the totality must fall on the ‘fundamental 
principle of composition’ – the leitmotif.4 
                                                
4 Elsewhere, Adorno highlighted the relationship between Wagner’s works and the culture industry by 
referring to these works as phantasmagorias. Adorno’s use of the term stemmed from Karl Marx’s 
account of commodity fetishism whereby, as a result of the effect of the commodity form on capitalist 
society, social relations between individuals assume ‘the phantasmagoric form of a relation between 
things’ (Marx 1976, 165). As phantasmagorias, Adorno argued that Wagner’s works tended towards 
‘magic delusion’ just like the aesthetic appearance of a commodity (Adorno GS 13 VUW, 82). Adorno 
claimed that the flaw of the whole conception of the music drama is most evident in the ‘concealment 
of the process of production, in Wagner’s hostility towards the division of labour on which it is agreed 
that the culture industry is based’ (ibid., 103). Wagner’s hostility towards the division of labour can be 
perceived in the idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk, which, rather than seeking to maintain the separation of 
the arts or subordinating one art-form to another, aims for a unity of gesture, poetry and music – to 
create a ‘single expression’ (Wagner 1893, 2, 335). In Oper und Drama (1851), Wagner argued that by 
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Adorno’s Wagner as Modernist 
   
If the basis of Adorno’s account of Wagner’s works revolves around the former’s 
assessment of the leitmotif and its formal consequences, then Adorno’s volte-face 
emerges from the ‘historically different reaction’ he has towards this specific stylistic 
feature of Wagner’s compositional technique. As shall be observed, Adorno’s revised 
treatment of the leitmotif stemmed not from a change of heart but from a changed 
response to Wagner’s works, a response entwined with his wider meta-philosophical 
ideas. In 1963 Adorno perceived the leitmotif to be disclosive of the works’ 
chromaticism. It is this focus on chromatic writing at the expense of, for example, 
developing variation that, according to Adorno, allowed Wagner to reject handed-
down formal norms of musical composition in order to articulate the particulars of the 
works. The idea that particulars and heterogeneities are given expression at the 
expense of musical generalisations is, as we saw in chapter one, a vital aspect of 
Adorno’s account of how to overcome the reifying impulses of identity-thinking. As 
was illustrated, if reification is to be understood as the subsumption of phenomenal 
individuals, particulars and heterogeneities – what Adorno referred to as the 
‘nonconceptual’ – under theoretical generalisations, then a counter to that is to allow 
our concepts to, as Adorno claimed, ‘open up’ [aufzutun] the nonconceptual without 
reducing it to those concepts we use to characterise the phenomenon through 
disengaged contemplation. As Honneth observes, ‘the demonstration of the 
                                                                                                                                      
gathering together all the connecting ties such as the leitmotiv, the verse-melody and that ‘total breadth 
of utterance’ commonly known as endless melody this allowed for a ‘single form’ which coincided 
with a ‘single substance’ (ibid.). This ‘single form’ was the result of the unity of the arts and was 
important for Wagner because ‘only through the possibility of this oneness of form, can the substance 
also shape itself as one’ (ibid.). What Wagner aimed for was a dialectical relationship between form 
and content with the ultimate goal of bringing about a ‘single expression’ through the artwork. For 
Adorno, however, the Gesamtkunstwerk was a ‘mythical unity’, which ended up ‘achieving a division 
of labour unprecedented in the history of music’ (Adorno GS 13 VUW, 103-104). Wagner’s insertion 
of the orchestral sketch in the compositional process between the stages of the composition sketch and 
the full score was, according to Adorno, an example of technical rationalisation just as, for Lukács, the 
increased fragmentation of the process of production into more and more special systems determined 
by mathematical calculation is the ‘rationalisation of the work-process’ (Lukács 1971, 88-89). For 
Adorno, the orchestral sketch demands that another person is needed to complete the full score, 
highlighting a pseudo-class division, while the existence of a distinct process of production for both 
the composition sketch and the orchestral sketch tends towards a ‘rationalisation of the work-process’. 
Adorno went on to state that the unity of arts was a ‘magical effect’ that achieves the status of 
phantasmagoria as a result of its occlusion of ‘the same rational process of production that it attempts 
to exorcize’ (Adorno GS 13 VUW, 105). For Adorno, ‘when Wagner attacked it [the division of 
labour] in the name of “real”, that is to say, a whole and free humanity, he was putting forward one of 
the demands of a true humanism. However, this demand turned into its opposite, into intoxication and 
delusion, instead of enlisting the rational control of the labour process in the cause of freedom’ (ibid.).  
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insufficiency of conceptual determination must be assessed not as a deficit that can be 
overcome but as a real result. In a certain way, thought should not seek to expel the 
finding of this disproportion; rather, it must try to fathom its consequences for its own 
position in the world’ (Honneth 2009, 78). As I shall go on to illustrate, ‘the idea of 
taking the individual object as infinitely more complex and heterogeneous than any of 
its potential concepts’ (ibid., 79) is, according to Adorno, a task undertaken by 
Wagner in relation to the ‘cosmos of  bourgeois forms’ of music. Wagner, rather than 
subsuming the music of his music dramas beneath a pre-established musical form, 
attempted to ‘open up’ the particulars of musical composition – melodic and 
harmonic chromaticism. In this way, Adorno sees Wagner as demonstrating the 
‘transformed relation to the “object” (ibid.) that the former was calling for in his 
account of negative dialectics. 
In the Versuch, Adorno charged Wagner with formlessness and sought to 
demonstrate how the leitmotif contributed to the downfall of developing variation. 
Conversely, in the Berlin speech, Adorno declared that the sequences of leitmotifs 
‘are already varied, frequently and with immense subtlety, in themselves’ (Adorno 
GS 16 WA, 552). Turning to the opening of the Vorspiel of Wagner’s Tristan und 
Isolde (Ex. 1), we see how the two motifs of the opening three bars, which move 
through the Tristan chord in bar two to E7 on the downbeat of bar three, are repeated 
up a minor third in bars five to seven. However, although we might expect another 
repetition of the cello-woodwind motifs up a minor third when the cellos commence a 
reprise on an upbeat D4 in bar 8, instead, we are treated to a Bb4 in bar 9 that is held 
for three times longer than the corresponding note in the two previous motifs before it 
descends chromatically to a seemingly time-wasting crotchet A4. If the arrival on the 
re-assembled Tristan chord in bar 10 seems long overdue as a result of the selfish 
cellos, then the addition of another semitone step in the top line of bar 10 is a further 
example of how Wagner varies the initial leitmotif to ensure that the B7 of bar 11 is 
reached as subtly as possible. 
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Example 1 
 
Richard Wagner, Tristan und Isolde, Vorspiel, mm. 1-17 
 
 
For Adorno, these subtle variations ensure that the leitmotif is no longer a ‘crutch’ 
(Adorno GS 16 WA, 552). Indeed, Adorno asserted that the leitmotif emerges – as we 
see in the opening of Tristan – from the work’s chromaticism, and is therefore, in his 
words, ‘much more connected to the problems and challenges of the internal 
organisation of Wagner’s music than I was able to appreciate thirty years ago’ (ibid.). 
Adorno argued that Wagner’s music contained a paradoxical technique of the 
differential and integral whereby ‘only infinitesimally small elements can be 
combined flawlessly into such [homogenous] wholes’ (ibid., 555). Adorno compared 
this technique with impressionism, which, in Wagner, operates at the level of tonality 
whereby the ‘unbroken tonal surface [is] based on the breaking down of tones’ (ibid.). 
Adorno went on to state that the ‘creation of totality’ emerges ‘by means of [the 
totality’s] reduction to minute models of the particular, which then, because they 
approach liminal value, can be combined continuously into one another; indeed, 
properly speaking, they actually generate the great dense tonal surface’ (ibid.). 
Despite his Hegelian interpretation of the leitmotif and the links he makes between 
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Beethoven and Wagner with regards to thematic manipulation, Dahlhaus, to a certain 
degree, agrees with Adorno’s ‘revised’ interpretation of the leitmotif and its formal 
consequences. Indeed, at times it seems as if Dahlhaus’ appraisal of Wagner’s 
compositional techniques contradicts itself by evoking important and seemingly 
irreconcilable aspects of Adorno’s two interpretations. Thus, although Dahlhaus 
observes that ‘the claim that a congery of – seemingly – heterogeneous elements can 
establish internal cohesion must have sounded paradoxical at first’, he also suggests 
that ‘by being derivable from each other, the leitmotivs fall into a configuration 
instead of merely accumulating, and are thus linked into a contextual system’ 
(Dahlhaus 1989, 200). He goes on to claim that ‘we can sense musical logic in these 
motivic groupings, a logic that knits together the otherwise disjointed, proselike 
texture of the music’, and it is because of this that Wagner is able, according to 
Dahlhaus, to construct a musico-dramatic ‘system’  (ibid., 201). 
We get the sense that Adorno’s accusation concerning Wagner’s tendency 
towards technical rationalisation actually assists in bringing about this integral tonal 
surface, which Adorno believed, had attained its full realisation in the Western art 
music of his day through what Schoenberg termed the ‘emancipation of the 
dissonance’ in free atonality and, subsequently, twelve-tone technique (Schoenberg 
1984, 84). With all twelve notes of the chromatic scale considered equally important, 
so that the music renounced any tonal centre, the integral nature of serial music 
emerged through the equal contribution of all twelve individual tones to the total 
musical structure in order to replace what Schoenberg saw as ‘those structural 
differentiations provided formerly by tonal harmonies’ (ibid., 218).  
Adorno went against his previous charge and stated that ‘the accusation of 
formlessness misses its mark, since it confuses everything that is not orientated 
toward traditional forms with a lack of organisation’ (Adorno GS 16 WA, 553-554). 
As we have seen, he claimed in his Versuch that the problems of form and of false 
identity arise partly from Wagner’s abandonment of ‘the cosmos of bourgeois forms’ 
of music. In 1963 Adorno now claimed that Wagner had, in fact, engaged with 
general, handed-down musical forms, but had also chosen to move beyond them, that 
is, according to Max Paddison, Wagner refused ‘to accept pre-given solutions’ 
(Paddison and Deliège ed. 2010, 6). Consequently, Wagner was able to shed light on 
the particulars of the artwork. Adorno proposed that Wagner ‘realised without 
reservation that the binding, truly general character of musical works of art is to be 
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found, if at all, only through the medium of their particularity and concretion, and not 
by recourse to any kind of general types’ (Adorno GS 16 WA, 548). In other words, 
the truth of the artwork comes from Wagner’s engagement with the musical 
particulars and yet is still dependent on the dialectical relationship that exists between 
general and particular. Unlike the products of the culture industry, in which, 
according to Adorno, the particular is made to conform to the general, Wagner does 
not allow the general musical forms to occlude the particularities of the music. It is 
precisely Wagner’s focus on the handed-down musical materials of history through 
his overcoming of the ‘cosmos of bourgeois forms’ that allows him to give primacy 
to melodic and harmonic chromaticism – the ‘infinitesimally small elements’ of the 
music. But why did Adorno reverse his charge of formlessness and simulated unity? 
Indeed, if Wagner’s work can be seen as a site of convergence for the divide between 
culture industry and aesthetic modernism, why did the assessment of Wagner as 
modernist not come out in Adorno’s account of 1938? Similarly, why, in 1963, had 
Adorno distanced himself from his previous assessment of Wagner’s art?  
 
Understanding Adorno’s Interpretations I: Situating the Versuch 
 
In the ‘Selbstanzeige des Essaybuches Versuch über Wagner’, written to coincide 
with the publication of the Versuch in 1952, Adorno claimed that ‘the Versuch über 
Wagner belongs to those works put out by the Institute for Social Research that set 
themselves the task of maintaining opposition to National Socialism, not by fruitless 
indignation, but by standing up to it by comprehending it’ (Adorno GS 13, 504). 
However, as Helmut Dubiel (1978) asserts, having investigated the continuity of 
certain key ‘points of enquiry’ within the early works of the Frankfurt School, it was 
not until the 1940s that the Institute for Social Research began to study fascism in 
Germany in a comprehensive and systematic way. Dubiel argues that up until the 
work entitled ‘Die Juden und Europa’ (1939), the Frankfurt School tended to view 
the last years of the Weimar Republic and the first ones of National Socialism as a 
continuum. As a result, Adorno’s 1952 comment on the relationship between fascism 
and his 1937/38 Wagner essay should not be taken at face value. Through Dubiel’s 
research into the work of the Frankfurt School between 1930 and 1945, one could be 
justified in claiming that we can only understand the Versuch as implicitly providing 
a polemic against Nazism in the light of the works of the 1940s, especially Dialektik 
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der Aufklärung. This idea is supported by the lack of any mention of National 
Socialism, only a single use of the word ‘Nazi’ (with reference to Neville 
Chamberlain) and less than a handful of variations on ‘fascism’ in the entire essay on 
Wagner. Instead, what is key to understanding Adorno’s essay on Wagner is that, as 
we have seen, it is, ultimately, a polemic against the culture industry. 
Huyssen perhaps oversimplifies things when he asserts that ‘whenever 
Adorno says fascism, he is also saying culture industry’ (Huyssen 1988, 35). Adorno 
never directly identified fascism with the culture industry, as Jay Bernstein has 
observed (Bernstein 1991, 4). However, in Dialektik der Aufklärung, Adorno and 
Horkheimer did perceive similarities between both social pathologies. In describing 
the consumers of products of the culture industry as recipients of the ‘gift system’, 
whereby the products of the industry are ‘represented as a bonus with undoubted 
private and social advantages’, Adorno and Horkheimer put forward the idea that 
fascism ‘hopes to use the training the culture industry has given these recipients of 
gifts, in order to organise them into its own forced battalions’ (Adorno GS 3, 185). 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, a process of societal organisation forced upon the 
public by a power above the public does not allow for individual deviation but 
demands that the individual conform to the instructions issued from above. If 
‘successfully’ carried out, it follows that the reifying process fulfils the repressive aim 
of the integration of society through the conformity of those individuals that make up 
society. In Dialektik der Aufklärung, both fascism and the culture industry are 
charged with initiating separate processes of reification from above which, 
nevertheless, result in similarly repressive ends. As Adorno and Horkheimer 
observed, ‘the wonder of integration, the permanent act of grace by the authority who 
receives the defenceless person – once he has swallowed his rebelliousness – means 
Fascism’ (ibid., 177).  
If we bear in mind Dubiel’s observation that the Frankfurt Circle did not start 
to focus on fascism as a social pathology until the 1940s, then when Nicholas 
Baragwanath claims that ‘Adorno sought to explain how Wagner, once the emblem of 
German culture, came to be espoused by Hitler and associated with acts of barbarism’ 
(Baragwanath 2006, 55), it would seem to be the case that the specific investigations 
being conducted by the Frankfurt School in the late 1930s have not been fully 
accounted for. Instead, one could be justified in claiming that Baragwanath, like 
Adorno in 1952, has projected the later writings on fascism onto the Versuch. The 
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fundamental problem with Baragwanath’s critique of the Versuch is that he sees it as 
imperative that we become aware of the ‘ideological foundations and premises’ of 
Adorno’s accounts of musical works in order to asses their insights and findings with 
a degree of accuracy (Baragwanath 2006, 53). He goes on to argue that the 
ideological foundations of Adorno’s interpretations are to be found in ‘general terms 
in the programme of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research during the 1930s, and 
also, more specifically, in an essay [Horkheimer’s ‘Egoism and the Movement for 
Emancipation: Towards an Anthropology of the Bourgeois Era’ (1936)] that Adorno 
himself cited in the preface to the first edition’ (ibid.). However, in contrast to 
Baragwanath’s claims that Adorno had a specific pre-formed ideological foundation 
for interpreting Wagner’s works, that is, in contrast to the idea that the Institute’s 
theoretical ideas solely determined Adorno’s interpretations of musical works – 
leading to possible charges of idealism and relativism – it would be better to conceive 
of a dynamic relationship being enacted between Wagner’s works and the wider 
Frankfurt School agenda of the late 1930s, which influenced Adorno’s fore-structures 
of understanding.  
As we have seen in chapter one in trying to account for the relationship 
between music and an interpreter as based on a subject-object model, such a model is 
inherently problematic. As Gadamer questioned, ‘is it not true that when a work of art 
has seized us it no longer leaves us the freedom to push it away from us once again 
and to accept or reject it on our own terms?’ (Gadamer 1977, 4). Bowie affirms 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic position that questions whether we can truly separate 
ourselves as subjects from artworks. For Bowie, ‘in the case of music one is 
inevitably forced to extend the scope of “intention” to include the kind of shared, but 
often unthematised, background knowledge that informs a musician’s practice at a 
particular time’ (Bowie 2007, 213). The issue here is that just as we cannot interpret 
the artwork without taking into account the material particulars of specific artworks 
or forms of musical praxis, we cannot also relinquish the power we have as 
interpreters to shape the manifestation of musical praxis. The crucial point that 
Gadamer and Bowie make in accounting for how we, as interpreters, determine the 
character of specific performances or interpretations is that we, as historically- and 
socially-mediated individuals, bring our shared practices, what Gadamer called our 
‘historical situatedness’ or, after Hegel, ‘substantiality’ (Gadamer 2004, 301), with us 
when we undergo aesthetic experiences; we interpret musical praxis against ‘shared, 
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but often unthematised, background knowledge’ – what Heidegger called a ‘pre-
understanding’ – and it is such a ‘background’ that, in part, ‘fore-structures’ what is 
disclosed during aesthetic experiences. As Gadamer claims, ‘all self-knowledge arises 
from what is historically pregiven, what with Hegel we call “substance”, because it 
underlies all subjective intentions and actions, and hence both prescribes and limits 
every possibility for understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity’ 
(Gadamer 2004, 301). But, as we shall see, that is not to suggest that it is just our 
‘shared, but often unthematised, background knowledge’ that determines, in the strict 
sense, how we interpret musical works. For, as Gadamer is aware, the task of 
‘appropriately’ interpreting works of art involves our ability to ‘disregard ourselves’ 
‘insofar as we must imagine the other situation’ (ibid., 304), that is, we must also be 
open to listening to what the artwork has to say with the possibility that what is said 
can potentially call into question our particular style of being-in-the-world. This is a 
point that, as Anthony Gritten (2006b) demonstrates, is key to understanding how 
musical performance works in concrete situations. Nevertheless, as Gritten is also 
aware with reference to the ‘double bind’ of the musical performer, we cannot fully 
discount the role our ‘fore-structures’ [Vor-Struktur] play in determining our aesthetic 
experiences and interpretations of such experiences. As Gadamer claimed, ‘into this 
other situation we must bring, precisely, ourselves’ (ibid., 304). In other words, 
‘transposing ourselves consists neither in the empathy of one individual for another 
nor in subordinating another person to our own standards; rather, it always involves 
rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also 
that of the other…understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly 
existing by themselves’ (ibid., 304-305).  
It follows that by tending to hermeneutic anticipations of meaning, we will be 
in a better position to understand Adorno’s discussion of his volte-face in the Berlin 
speech of 1963. The reason for concentrating on the Heideggerian tradition of 
hermeneutics in what follows is because, unlike some of their predecessors, both 
Heidegger and Gadamer were explicitly concerned with the subjectivisation of 
aesthetics, which we see Adorno attempting to counter in the Berlin speech. As 
Bowie observes, ‘the emergence of aesthetics as a distinct part of philosophy is also 
itself part of the process of subjectification: beauty becomes solely a matter of 
subjective feeling, of “taste”. Artworks are consequently reduced to the subjective 
contingencies of their reception, and an aesthetics based on subjectivity therefore has 
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no way of articulating the truth in works of art’ (Bowie 2003a, 9). Instead, for both 
Heidegger and Gadamer, ‘art…is seen in terms of a “happening” of tradition which 
transcends the contingent responses of individual subjects. Art’s truth emerges by its 
being transmitted in differing contexts and giving rise to ever new kinds of 
understanding that involve a “fusion of horizons” between the recipient and the work 
of art’ (Bowie 2003b, 253). 
 
Gadamer and the Artwork as Event 
 
Before we get to Gadamer, we should note that his hermeneutic approach to art and 
artworks involves appropriating many of Hegel’s ideas on the relation between art 
and meaning. Specifically, for Hegel, even though the artwork gives a sensuous 
expression to the freedom of Geist and, therefore, a sensuous expression of its 
meaning, this meaning is not independent of whatever interpretations may have taken 
place since the moment of the artwork’s conception. For Hegel, past meanings and 
interpretations were embraced when arriving at current meanings. Gadamer, to an 
extent, agreed with Hegel regarding the ‘objective’ nature of aesthetic meaning. 
However, a problem with Hegel’s aesthetics is that even though it embraces the idea 
that past meanings and interpretations are vital to understanding new meanings, he 
claimed that art brings into harmony ‘what is contaminated in other existents by 
chance and externality’ (Hegel 1975, 1:155). In other words, the artwork, according 
to Hegel, does not just give a sensuous expression to the freedom of Geist but it gives 
a sensuous expression of the ideal of freedom, which, as Gadamer recognised, once 
grasped, would mean that the whole of the artwork’s meaning would have been 
understood. Conversely, Gadamer argued that ‘all encounter with the language of art 
is an encounter with an unfinished event [Ereignis] and is itself part of this event’ 
(Gadamer 2004, 85). For Gadamer, ‘we must admit that the world of artistic tradition 
– the splendid contemporaneousness that we gain through art with so many human 
worlds – is more than a mere object of our free acceptance or rejection’ (Gadamer 
1977, 4). 
Understanding, for Gadamer, can be considered to be ‘an event of the 
disclosure of truth, an event which in true conversation is reached by the partners 
together’ (Gadamer 2001, 11). The concept of conversation, as well as highlighting 
the dialectical or dialogical nature of his philosophical hermeneutics, is also key to 
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understanding Gadmer’s main ideas, including the concepts of ‘play’ [Spiel], 
‘understanding’ [Verstehen], ‘tradition’ [Überlieferung] and the truth of art. For 
Gadamer, the work of art was its presentation [Darstellung], which required a 
dialectical interaction, a ‘fusion of horizons’, between the artwork and the individual 
as spectator. Ultimately, the artwork could not be ontologically distinguished from its 
presentation. Gadamer expresses this implication of the spectator in the presentation 
of a work with the help of the notion of mediation [Vermittlung]. For Gadamer, the 
experience of the work is the ‘non-differentiation of the mediation [Vermittlung] from 
the work itself’; the work is actualised as a work only through its presentation and in 
its presentation (Gadamer 2004, 118). As Jean Grondin observes, the ambiguity of 
Vermittlung lies in the term’s dialogical foundation in that understanding conveys 
both the transmission of the work, as well as the appropriation of the work by the 
spectator (Grondin 2003, 45). As a result, the artwork’s meanings can only come to 
the fore through its presentation. Indeed, the ‘meaning of the work is not to be sought 
anywhere but in its Vermittlung’ (ibid., 46). It follows that the understanding that 
comes via an artwork and the truth that belongs to that understanding is an event 
[Ereignis] that demands the appropriation of the interpreter to the so-called object of 
interpretation. As Gadamer claimed, ‘it [the artwork] jolts us, it knocks us over, and 
sets up a world of its own, into which we are drawn, as it were’ (Gadamer 2001, 71).5  
If the concept of the work is only realised in its presentation, and if the truth 
of the artwork is to be expressed in a dialogical event then, according to Gadamer, 
what is expressed, indeed, the meaning of the work is not independent of the event. 
Gadamer’s idea of truth stems from Heidegger, who, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, related truth to unconcealment [Unverborgenheit] based on the Greek word 
αληθεια, ‘the unconcealment of beings’ (Heidegger 2003, 38).6 Truth is a process of 
                                                
5 Gritten, with a study of Mikhail Bakhtin’s account of the event, has already demonstrated what a 
conception of the musical event could do for contemporary musicological work on performance and 
performance practice. See Gritten 2006b. 
6 According to Wrathall, whilst truth in the usual sense (im gewöhnlichen Sinne; im üblichen Sinne) or 
in the contemporary sense (im heutigen Sinne) has been understood by philosophers to be propositional 
truth as correspondence (Übereinstimmung) or correctness (Richtigkeit), as when a proposition is true 
when it corresponds with a state of affairs, it is a mistake to define propositional truth as 
unconcealment or to transfer features of propositional truth to the notion of unconcealment (Wrathall 
2011, 15). Instead, the three platforms for building up to Heidegger’s account of propositional truth as 
a sort of correspondence—the truth of entities, the truth of being, and truth as the clearing 
(Lichtung)—are different modes or ways of unconcealment (ibid., 11-15). Ultimately, as Wrathall 
explains, ‘all truths—propositional, the truth of being, the truth of entities—preserve and shelter a 
particular existential relationship between things in the world’ (ibid., 39). This relationship is one of 
unconcealment whereby we encounter entities as being what they are only through their prior 
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what Heidegger calls ‘becoming’ and ‘happening’ through which the world – ‘the 
always-nonobjectual to which we are subject’ as opposed to an ‘object that stands 
before us and can be looked at’ (ibid., 31) – ‘opens itself’. Although the term 
‘Ereignis’ is not mentioned by Heidegger in his series of lectures delivered in the 
early 1930s, he, nevertheless, hinted at the term, which would come to occupy his 
thought from the late 1930s onwards, when observing that ‘a work only actually is a 
work when we transport ourselves out of the habitual and into what is opened up by 
the work’ (ibid., 63). As Richard Bernstein has observed, the concept of truth as 
unconcealment is essential to Gadamer’s entire project of philosophical hermeneutics 
but it also turns out to be one of the most elusive concepts (Bernstein 1983, 151-52). 
Moreover, according to Bernstein, Gadamer employs ‘a concept of truth that he never 
makes fully explicit’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is clear that Gadamer appropriated 
Heidegger’s account of truth as Unverborgenheit, simply stating, at one point, that 
‘truth is unconcealedness’ (Gadamer 1986b, 36).7 Moreover, Gadamer fundamentally 
agreed with Heidegger’s idea that any revealing of truth is the same time a 
concealing. As he declared, Heidegger taught us ‘to think that truth is both revealing 
and concealing…What is expressed is not everything…This seems to me 
compellingly correct’ (Dostal 1994, 50).  
                                                                                                                                      
disclosure in a particular world. Thus, as Wrathall explains, ‘being itself must be understood not as 
something determinate and stable, but in terms of conditions for the emergence of entities and worlds 
out of concealment into unconcealment’ (ibid., 1). It follows that propositional truth, which, as 
Wrathall observes, ‘stabilises and secures particular ways of encountering entities’ (ibid., 39), is 
presupposed by unconcealment from the very beginning, ‘that unconcealment was an essential 
condition of there being truth’, in this narrower, philosophical sense (ibid., 6).  
The motivation for Wrathall’s defence of Heidegger’s account of unconcealment as the 
essence of truth seems to be Ernst Tugendhat’s 1967 book, The Concept of Truth in Husserl and 
Heidegger (Der Warheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger). Tugendhat, a Jewish exile who returned 
to Germany after the war in order to study with Heidegger, severely criticized his master’s conception 
of truth. Indeed, Tugendhat’s book is one of earliest examples of a work that, according to Wrathall, 
misconstrues Heidegger’s understanding of truth. Tugendhat responded to the ontological questions 
that Heidegger had rehabilitated; however, his criticisms of the latter’s conception of truth moved him 
toward contemporary philosophy of language. Tugendhat’s argument consisted of the following three 
claims: 1) Heidegger had redefined propositional truth; 2) Heidegger had extended the revised concept 
of propositional truth to uncovering entities and the disclosure of being; 3) the uncovering of entities 
and the disclosure of being lack the right to be called truth. As Wrathall demonstrates, Heidegger did 
not believe that only propositional truth has an inherent right to be called truth. Indeed, accounts that 
equate propositional truth with truth and leave no room for anything else fly in the face of ordinary 
linguistic practices. Wrathall argues that we can think of the ‘natural’ conception of truth in terms of 
unconcealment, without losing its specificity, by treating propositional truth as an example of 
unconcealment. In doing so, he seeks to defend Heidegger from all three of Tugenhadt’s charges. 
7 As Robert Dostal (1994) has observed, Gadamer’s understanding of truth was fundamentally 
Heideggerian but differed from Heidegger’s account in terms of the experience of truth. Dostal argues 
that for Heidegger the experience of truth was concerned with immediacy whilst for Gadamer, as we 
have seen, the experience of the work was based on mediation.  
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If truth involves unconcealment then, for Gadamer, the truth of a work 
includes both a revealing and a concealing, which takes place in the context of the 
event whereby the artwork is actualised as an artwork through its mediated 
presentation. The fact that Gadamer described all encounter with art as an encounter 
with an unfinished event is, therefore, based on this idea that the truth of the work is 
the simultaneous disclosure and concealing of aspects of the work’s meaning. 
Gadamer, thereby, rejected Hegel’s claim to absoluteness and systematic completion, 
insisting that the ‘experience of art acknowledges that it cannot present the full truth 
of what it experiences in terms of definitive knowledge. There is no absolute progress 
and no final exhaustion of what lies in a work of art’ (Gadamer 2004, 86). In other 
words, the meaning that is transmitted is never a pure meaning, one that is fully 
complete, but just one meaning of many resulting from the artwork as unfinished 
event. This explains why Adorno was able to re-visit Wagner’s works and find that 
the initial meaning described in the Versuch had been concealed only to allow another 
meaning to be disclosed. In addition, the fact that a work is only actualised as a work 
through its presentation means that, for Gadamer, the meaning of the work is to be 
found in the present, albeit a present that cannot be formed without the past; ‘what 
unfolds before us is so much lifted out of the ongoing course of the ordinary world so 
much enclosed in its own autonomous circle of meaning that no one is prompted to 
seek some other future or reality behind it’ (ibid., 124). On the topic of Beethoven’s 
Ninth Symphony, Gadamer observed that it ‘arose in a certain context in musical 
history and intellectual history and is only to be understood historically in this 
context. And yet what the Ninth Symphony signifies for our understanding is far 
more than a system of tasks in historical reconstruction…the work itself addresses us 
just as if we were its first hearers’ (Gadamer 2001, 65). For Gadamer, the experience 
of art is not concerned with a reconstruction of artistic intention but with being aware 
that the artwork has something to say to us, and what it has to say is a complex 
temporal mixture of both past and present as a result of the dialectical nature of 
mediation. The question we need to ask then is if the meaning of the work is, to a 
certain degree, of the present, why did Adorno interpret Wagner’s works the way he 
did? For example, why did he provide a particular account of Wagner as associated 
with the culture industry in 1938 and an account of Wagner as modernist in 1963, and 
not the other way around?  
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Understanding Adorno’s Interpretations II: Situating the Berlin Speech 
 
We have already seen how Adorno’s earlier account is ‘intimately bound up’ with the 
broader Frankfurt School agenda of uncovering the social causes of a pathology of 
human rationality. Indeed, the 1963 speech still seems bound up with that agenda. 
With regards to the question of why Adorno responded to Wagner’s works differently 
on two separate occasions, once again we see the influence of Heidegger on 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, specifically, the idea that all understanding of a particular 
event is based on a wider understanding that precedes the event. In other words, the 
understanding of an event occurs against the background of our prior experiences in 
the world. It follows that Gadamer connected the idea of understanding with history 
under the umbrella concept of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein, which is 
translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall as ‘historically effected 
consciousness’ (Gadamer 2004, xv). Like most of Gadamer’s terms, 
wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein assumes a dialogical character, at once a 
consciousness affected by history and also a consciousness brought into being – 
‘effected’ – by history, and conscious that it is so. In other words, understanding is 
open to the effects of history whilst remaining conscious that it is being effected by 
history. With regards to the artwork, Gadamer states that historically effected 
consciousness is ‘consciousness of the work itself, and hence itself has an effect’ 
(ibid., 336). The fact that an interpreter of the work is aware of their historically 
effected consciousness can be understood by the idea that understanding and 
interpretation occur within a particular ‘horizon’ [Horizont] that is determined by our 
historically determined situatedness.  
Simply put, our interpretation or understanding of a work is, in a certain 
sense, determined by the situation in which we find ourselves as historical beings. 
Within a particular horizon determined by our situatedness, historically effected 
consciousness ‘is already effectual in finding the right questions to ask’ of the work 
of art when we are caught up in the event (ibid., 301). Consequently, rather than 
being able to interpret the work in whatever way we choose, we are limited by our 
situation to interpret the work within ‘the range of vision that includes everything that 
can be seen from a particular vantage point’ (ibid.). The important point, however, is 
that, for Gadamer, our horizons are not fixed: ‘we speak of narrowness of horizon, of 
the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new horizons, and so forth’ 
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(ibid.). Elaborating, Gadamer suggested that to have a horizon ‘means not being 
limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it’ (ibid.). Gadamer, therefore, 
as we shall explore in detail in chapter five, refutes the idea that he supports a 
relativistic conception of truth. As he claimed, ‘just as the individual is never simply 
an individual because he is always in understanding with others, so too the closed 
horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction’ (ibid., 303). Indeed, 
Gadamer suggested that ‘the horizon is, rather, something into which we move and 
that moves us. Horizons change for a person that is moving’ (ibid.). Such a point is 
vital to understanding both the change in Adorno’s reading of Wagner’s works 
between the Versuch and the Berlin speech of 1963 as well as the value of norm-
transcending interpretations that seek to move beyond what can be seen from a 
particular vantage point. 
To put the speech in context, Adorno had already started work on his magnum 
opus on aesthetics by 1963 whilst Negative Dialectics, his other magnum opus on 
epistemology and metaphysics, was soon to be published in 1966. While Aesthetic 
Theory is considered to be a culmination of a lifetime’s reflection on aesthetics, 
especially the social character of modern art, Negative Dialectics, as Badiou observes 
(Badiou 2010, 28), is nothing short of a proposal, having consolidated theoretical, 
social and historical arguments developed and espoused at different stages throughout 
the course of Adorno’s life, for a new direction for philosophy – a proposal that 
stemmed from the idea that, after the failures of rationalised Idealism and the non-
occurrence of a distinctly Marxian social revolution, philosophy could no longer 
claim to contribute to the rationalisation of the world. Bearing in mind Honneth’s 
discussions of the legacy of Critical Theory, as a culmination of study in the area of 
philosophically inspired social and cultural criticism over the course of Adorno’s 
lifetime, these works consolidate and highlight Adorno’s vast contribution to the 
Frankfurt School’s investigations into the social pathologies of the modern era, and, 
thus, are intimately connected with his earlier investigations into the culture industry 
and fascism. Honneth, for example, highlights three isolable theses contained within 
the introduction to Negative Dialectics:  
 
First, Adorno claims that today it necessary to move from the Hegelian dialectic to a new form 
of dialectics he calls the “negative”. Second, he supposes that this new, historically necessary 
form of dialectics will better do justice to the “object of knowledge”, as well as the “subject of 
knowledge”. Third, he believes that only such a method of philosophical thinking can assume 
the function of critically transcending the social conditions of the present (Honneth 2009, 72).  
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It follows that several other works by Adorno composed during this period share 
affinities with a number of ideas and proposals raised in these two mammoth texts, 
specifically, the three theses Honneth derives from the introduction to Negative 
Dialectics. For example, the suggestions Adorno put forward concerning the new 
direction for western art music in ‘Vers une musique informelle’ could be conceived 
as a cultural variation on the philosophical necessity – and, thus, as Honneth 
observes, also a social necessity (Honneth 2009, 73) – for a transition to negative 
dialectics. In both cases, Adorno paid particular attention to the relationship between 
the ‘subject of knowledge’ and the ‘object of knowledge’, a relationship of such 
fundamental importance to Adorno that, as we have seen, he criticised both the 
culture industry and fascism for instigating separate but related processes of 
organisation whereby the individual subject became subsumed beneath the dictates of 
a higher institution – subject was subsumed beneath object, particular beneath the 
general. Consequently, Adorno’s later work involved his attempts to ascertain what 
particular form the relationship between subject and its object should take in order to 
allow for the possibility of both musique informelle and philosophy.8  
Adorno managed to posit some of his most important ideas regarding the 
relationship between the ‘subject of knowledge’ and the ‘object of knowledge’ in a 
short piece, first published in 1969 entitled ‘Zu Subjekt und Objekt’. He combined a 
socio-historical with a philosophical-historical narrative when he spoke of the 
transformed relation of subject and object in the present as way of understanding a 
revised conception of philosophy’s role in contemporary society. Adorno criticised 
those philosophical endeavours that aimed to force the separation of subject and 
object. For him, an epistemological attempt to separate the ‘subject of knowledge’ 
from the ‘object of knowledge’ can result in the positing of a ‘transcendental subject’, 
a subject that ‘will either construct the objective world with raw material along 
Kantian lines or, since Fichte, engender that world itself’ (Adorno GS 10.2, 744). For 
Adorno, such a conception of the subject has socio-political implications; mainly, ‘the 
more individuals are really degraded to functions of the social totality as it becomes 
more systematised, the more will man pure and simple, man as a principle with the 
attributes of creativity and absolute domination, be consoled by exaltation of his 
mind’ (ibid., 745). Consequently, the answer to his alternative subject-object model 
                                                
8 For comprehensive discussions of both Adorno’s meta-philosophy and his ‘positive’ contribution to 
philosophy in the form of negative dialectics, see Bowie 2013 and Freyenhagen 2013. 
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did not lie in idealism for he claimed that it creates a theory that ‘glorifies the subject 
in ideology, and slanders it in epistemological practice’ through the abstraction of 
subjectivity from a world in which it should be immersed (ibid., 747). Through its 
hypostatisation in idealist thought, the subject ‘founders on its confusion with 
something objective as inherently existent – the very thing it is not’ (ibid., 756). He 
went on to suggest that ‘this alleged origin of all objects is objectified in rigid 
timelessness, quite in keeping with Kant’s doctrine of the firm and immutable forms 
of transcendental consciousness’ (ibid., 745). It follows that having been 
hypostatised, the transcendental subject of idealism will constantly be called into 
question by material particulars, by what Adorno called the ‘datum, the irremovable 
skandalon of idealism’ (ibid., 746). As Honneth argues, ‘as soon as the dialectical 
method – namely, the proof of the “insufficiency” of a conceptual determination with 
regard to the object to be grasped – is practiced with the goal of demonstrating that 
the whole of reality is rationally constituted, it is compelled to exclude “everything 
qualitatively divergent” and becomes a closed system’ (Honneth 2009, 76-77). For 
Adorno, therefore, ‘Hegel’s system represents at once the zenith and turning point of 
the history of philosophical system building, since on the one hand it represents its 
immanent claim to conceptually penetrate the whole of reality in its clearest and most 
audacious form, while on the other it fails so dramatically that all subsequent 
approaches have to be understood as ways out of the “crisis of Idealism”’ (Honneth 
2009, 74). 
Furthermore, according to Adorno, the future of philosophy does not lie in 
‘naïve realism’, which upholds the separation of mind and world (Adorno GS 10.2, 
746). Although realism is, according to Adorno, ‘historically necessary’, so as to 
bring about the formation of the subject-object dichotomy, it, nevertheless, 
perpetuates a ‘piece of reification’ and thus limits the subject’s engagement with the 
object (ibid.). In other words, the ‘materialist’ turn in philosophy is, according to 
Adorno, still tainted with the charge of trying to rationally penetrate the world. It 
follows that, for Adorno, such a ‘piece of reification’ goes ‘frictionlessly with 
subjectivism’, which cannot ‘touch the substance of naïve realism’ (ibid., 748). 
Indeed, Adorno claimed that naïve realism, like idealism, because it aims ‘to look on 
the subject as nothing…and on the object as absolute’, is another ‘transcendental 
illusion’ (ibid., 756). Hence, it becomes clear why Adorno, whilst noting Marx’s 
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criticisms of Hegel, wanted to draw similar conclusions concerning the fate of Hegel 
and Marx’s respective enterprises. As Honneth notes, ‘Adorno does not see an 
alternative to the idealistic figure of dialectics in its “materialist” turn, since in both 
cases the attempt is made to rationally penetrate the world’ (Honneth 2009, 77). 
Ultimately, Honneth observes, ‘it seems to be the case that any use of the dialectical 
method that is not based on the insufficiency of conceptual determinations but, 
instead, takes it as the occasion for the alignment of concept and reality that presses 
ever further can be called positive’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, the problem with Adorno’s 
criticisms of traditional subject/object epistemology is that anyone who is not 
convinced that philosophy’s sole project is to attempt to align concept and reality 
will, arguably, not agree with Adorno’s conclusion that future philosophical 
endeavours should focus on a self-criticism of its previous presuppositions.9  
Adorno went on to offer a range of arguments for what he called the ‘primacy 
of the object’ (Adorno GS 10.2, 748).10 Indeed, Adorno proposed that the only way to 
give primacy to the object ‘is to reflect, at each historic and each cognitive step, on 
what is then presented as subject and object, as well as on the mediations’ (ibid., 751-
752). As Honneth observes, ‘the subject that no longer believes it is able to 
conceptually appropriate the world conversely knows itself to be codetermined by it 
and must therefore forfeit a part of its previously assumed sovereignty’ (Honneth 
2009, 80-81). Consequently, Honneth suggests, ‘we are to devote our cognitive 
attention, instead of to purposefully attaining results, as completely as possible to 
precisely apprehending all the qualitative properties that may otherwise still inhere in 
                                                
9 Honneth argues that the equation of a single philosophical project (left-Hegelianism) with the missed 
moment of Marxian social revolution in which society could be transformed into an domination-free 
ideal does not necessarily warrant Adorno’s imperative that philosophy as a whole restrict itself to 
continuous self-criticism (Honneth 2009, 74). Firstly, according to Honneth, not only does Adorno not 
let even a systematic gap appear between Hegel and Marx, and thus between Hegel’s attempt to 
conceptually grasp reality in thought and Marx’s critique of Hegel through the former’s renewed focus 
on material conditions, but one could also argue that Adorno places too much weight on the idea of a 
distinctly Marxian revolution as the fateful moment of all philosophical endeavours, which, following 
its non-occurrence, draws the final line under philosophical efforts to mould reality according to the 
dictates of reason. Secondly, Adorno seems to challenge or openly reject more practically- and 
hermeneutically-oriented traditions of modern philosophy according to which, as we have already 
seen, the separation of subject and object, of mind and world, was fundamentally questionable and 
needed to be dissolved without completely discounting the possibilities of reason. Honneth observes, 
‘he [Adorno] holds neither the postmetaphysical naturalisation of Hegel or Kant nor the reconstruction 
of a parsimonious concept of rationality but only the uncovering of the principled limits to all 
conceptual endeavours to still be philosophically possible after the failure of rational Idealism’ 
(Honneth 2009, 75-76). 
10 Bowie challenges this idea that Adorno reduced his dialectical conception to the primacy of the 
object (Bowie 2013, 122-129). 
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the object’ (ibid., 79). Such an account of the purpose of philosophy, as discussed in 
detail in chapter one, meshes with Adorno’s ideas on the future of musical 
composition in the case of musique informelle. For Adorno, ‘unrevised, unrestricted 
freedom’ (Adorno GS 16, 498) on the part of the composer is relinquished in order to 
focus on the primacy of the object, specifically, to reflect on and ‘open up’ the 
qualitative particulars of the handed-down musical materials of history. The aim of 
musique informelle was to shine a creative spotlight on, as we saw with Adorno’s 
comments on Wagner in the Berlin Speech, the musical particulars through a critique 
of the established, stylistic norms of composition. Such music would discard ‘all 
external, abstract, rigidly opposed forms’ but, nevertheless, through criticism of the 
handed-down musical materials of history, constitute itself in ‘an objectively 
compelling way’ (ibid., 496), that is, a music which still maintains internal 
comprehensibility and coherence. In calling for a musique informelle, Adorno, to a 
certain extent, was arguing both to save and yet revise a dialectical method of 
composition that he had seen in operation within the German tradition of Western art 
music since (late-) Beethoven in a similar way as his theory of negative dialectics 
articulated a revision of German idealism. On a fundamental level, the search for a 
formally new, informelle method of musical composition coincided with a demand 
for a new philosophy as a challenge to and, to some extent, a rejection of Kant and 
Hegel.  
In his 1961 speech to the Darmstadt School, Adorno illustrated how a 
dialectical method of composition during the twentieth century had led towards the 
development of a musique informelle. Although the proponents of the Second 
Viennese School were given the most credit for this development, Wagner was also 
considered as having paved the way for the most ‘advanced’ music of Adorno’s day. 
For example, in raising the issue of Schenker’s reproach to Wagner for having 
destroyed the Urlinie, Adorno claimed that Wagner’s act of defiling the ‘musical 
language of the age’ was the first time when the ‘form-creating function of musical 
idiom was being eroded by the process of evolution of the musical material’ (Adorno 
GS 16, 281). Adorno went on to develop this single observation on Wagner’s 
technique when, in the Berlin speech, he claimed that it was that Wagner – not 
Schoenberg – who had opened up the possibilities of musique informelle. As we can 
see, the 1963 speech at the Berlin Festival was again ‘intimately bound up’ with 
Adorno’s wider meta-philosophical framework. It should not be supposed, however, 
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that Adorno’s theoretical projects, such as his account of the culture industry or his 
focus on epistemology and metaphysics, determined his thoughts on music in any 
strict sense. As I have attempted to illustrate, fundamentally, the same fore-structures 
of understanding formed the backdrop for Adorno’s responses to Wagner’s works in 
both 1937/38 and 1963. Adorno was, in both sets of circumstances, concerned with 
the relationship between the ‘subject of knowledge’ and the ‘object of knowledge’, its 
manifestation in concrete situations, the distortion of this relationship at the hands of 
the culture industry, fascism and philosophy and the ‘new’ form that relationship 
should take in order to avoid social and philosophical reification. The important point 
to realise, therefore, is that the change in Adorno’s interpretation of Wagner, when it 
comes to hermeneutic questions of meaning, can be explained by the ‘historically 
different reaction’ to what Wagner’s works had to say at different points. What 
resulted in 1963 was not a new subjective reading of Wagner’s works, not, that is, 
what Adorno called an ‘adaptation to fit a new situation’, but a new ‘fusion of 
horizons’ between Adorno and the music dramas, one which called into question and 
transcended his previous appraisal of the composer. However, having stressed the 
affinities between Adorno’s philosophical project and his claims for the future of 
musical composition, we need to handle with care the tension between Wagner’s 
works disclosing different aspects of their truth to Adorno at different times and the 
idea that Adorno was incorrect in his interpretation of Wagner.  
 
Was Adorno wrong about Wagner’s works? 
 
This question may seem particularly pertinent in the context of critical musicology, 
which, historically, has had more than its fair share of debates over a work’s meaning 
or an artist’s intentions. However, we must be careful at this point because, as we 
shall explore in greater detail in the following chapter, to approach artworks on the 
basis of a definitive meaning that fully determines whether an interpretation is true or 
false is to miss the point. Hermeneutically speaking, because we are attempting to 
account for the work as an objective correlate of aesthetic experience, the focus 
should be on what shapes our experiences of artworks and how we respond to what 
they have to say. The fact that for Heidegger and Gadamer truth is a priori concerned 
with unconcealment thus ensures that the meaning of the artwork is never fully 
complete and never independent of the moment when truth is disclosed because, in 
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that moment, what was concealed may be unconcealed and what was previously 
disclosed may subsequently become hidden. Indeed, it might be better when 
discussing the term ‘meaning’ in the context of the event, to talk about the 
articulation of meaningfulness rather than the articulation of meaning. Not only does 
the phrase ‘articulation of meaning’ hint at an event-independent conception of 
meaning, bringing with it all the problems of meanings as context-independent, 
unchanging ‘givens’, but, when we encounter music, we do so on the basis that music 
is firstly meaningful, rather than being purely an object of perception to which we 
subsequently add an interpretation.11 By discussing interpretation as the ‘articulation 
of meaningfulness’ of a specific musical experience, we acknowledge that our 
experiences of music are, fundamentally, already meaningful experiences – 
experiences that happen immediately or tacitly, but, vitally, are mediated by the fore-
structures of our understanding. In other words, once we understand what Wrathall 
refers to as ‘the notion of the inherent meaningfulness of perception’, that is to say 
that there is nothing experienced in perception that is absolutely and fully given in the 
present, we start to realise that both perception and interpretation are ‘not in the game 
of being true or false’ (Wrathall 2011, 70). The point of interpreting Adorno’s 
interpretations of Wagner is to probe the meaningfulness of Adorno’s experience of 
these works. In this sense, Adorno’s two contrasting readings could be two of the 
many meanings of Wagner’s works.  
By undermining the classical conception of ‘knowing the meaning’ of a 
musical work through the consideration of specific musical experiences along with 
what shapes those experiences, the issue we now confront is that Adorno’s accounts 
of Wagner’s works seem to be founded on meaning-nihilism. ‘But’, as Wittgenstein 
stressed, ‘that is not to say we are in doubt’ (Wittgenstein 2009, 39e). As an ever-
increasing body of predominantly Anglo-American philosophers are coming to 
realise, Wittgenstein’s critique, après Kant,12 of the idea of rule-bound application of 
rules need not necessarily result in scepticism or meaning-nihilism.13 The main issue, 
as Paul Horwich surmises, is that ‘in order to follow a rule we must first interpret it – 
                                                
11 For comprehensive critiques of the two-step empiricist theory of perception whereby passive 
receptions of something like sense data are synthesized or interpreted as representations of external 
objects, see Braver 2012, 139-146 and Wrathall 2011, 57-71. 
12 See Kant CPR, A133/B172. 
13 See, for example, Braver 2012, Gascoigne and Thornton 2013, Glendinning 1998, Horwich 2012 
and McDowell 1998, 221-262. 
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that is, translate it into more basic, more immediately intelligible terms – but on the 
other hand, that assumption would lead to an infinite regress of reformulations – 
which would imply that no rule could ever determine our behaviour’ (Horwich 2012, 
136). Although the problem of infinite regress is cited as a way of challenging the 
notion of norm-governed behaviour, interpretations of a musical work’s 
meaningfulness need not entail an infinite regress if we conceive of our explicit 
interpretations as understandable within the context of our prior, implicit, that is to 
say, tacit making sense of the world. As we have seen throughout this chapter, the 
regress terminates in the response of the interpreter, whose horizons of enquiry are 
fore-structured but not entirely fixed by their situatedness in a certain ‘world’, to what 
the artwork presents. Indeed, the fore-structures of our understanding that form the 
basis for making sense of our responses to what artworks have to say and which are 
formed by our practice-based engagements inherent in ‘being-in-the-world’ are vital 
to understanding Wittgenstein’s claim that rather than know the meaning of a word 
through explicit rules, we are concerned, instead, with ‘what we call “obeying the 
rule” and “going against it” in actual cases’ (Wittgenstein 2009, 81e). 
What determines whether our articulation of the meaningfulness of the 
musical event ‘obeys the rule’ or not is, arguably, not down to some definitive entity 
with which all understanding terminates. With his idea of ‘obeying the rule’ and 
‘going against it’, what Wittgenstein seems to be emphasising is the normative basis 
of rules as well as the normative basis of truth in general. Such an idea is elucidated 
by Simon Glendinning, who observes that ‘there is nothing, no body of rules, no 
covenant in reason, which forces me to apply a word in the way I do, even though 
going on in this way “is something that I do without a smidgen of hesitation”’ 
(Glendinning 1998, 102). It is here that, for Glendinning, the supposed objectivity of 
rule-following can only be made sense of if we think outside of the idea of ‘what is 
natural for me’. According to Glendinning, ‘a way of behaving of my own can be 
conceived as ‘rule-governed’ only in so far as I can regard it as authoritative for 
actions other than my own’ (ibid., 103). As Bowie observes, ‘the key here is the need 
for social acknowledgement if ethical life is to have any substance at all: whatever 
happens “inside” me when I make a moral decision is only intelligible via norms 
which exist “outside” me’ (Bowie 2013, 100-101). The normativity of truth emerges 
in the context of communal practices – what Braver calls a ‘public ability’ (Braver 
2012, 136) or what Brandom calls ‘norms in practice’ (Brandom 1994, 30). In other 
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words, as Brandom claims, what it is to understand a rule is to have mastery of the 
‘background of practices permitting the distinguishing of correct from incorrect 
applications of those rules’ (ibid., 22).14 Indeed, Braver puts it simply that ‘instead of 
hermetically sealed selves bumping into others, we are first one of the crowd, doing 
what “one” (das Man) does or following what “They” say ought to be done’ [italics 
added] (Braver 2012, 164). What, at the root, inspires these thinkers to challenge the 
kind of disengaged, contemplative theorising that attempts to establish predictive 
laws for the workings of the world and those that dwell in it is the idea that we 
implicitly pick up society’s ways of doing things, its tacit norms, through what 
Wittgenstein refers to as ‘training’ (Wittgenstein 2009, 4e) – indeed, as Mark Johnson 
(2007) illustrates, we do this from a very young age before we become ‘little 
proposition-processing machines’. It is this kind of communal style of making sense 
of the world, which determines what should be done and what ought to be, that can 
change when new norms displace previous norms as a result of norm-transcending 
creative practices. 
 Understanding the musical event is, therefore, a question of making sense of 
how and to what extent our particular forms of know-how, our socially- and 
culturally-cultivated tacit norms and practices that make up the style of our world, 
and by which we come to make sense of the world, shape our responses to what the 
artwork has to say to us. A similar point is made, albeit problematically, by Brandom, 
who claims that ‘norms that are explicitly expressed…[are] intelligible only against a 
background that includes norms that are implicit in what is done, rather than explicit 
in what is said’ (Brandom 1994, 30).15 These norms, as Bowie observes, ‘bring into 
existence the ethical realm in which my action is an action at all, rather than 
something caused or something unintelligible’ (Bowie 2013, 101). This idea appeals 
to its Hegelian origins whereby the individual only gains any kind of meaningfulness 
through the development of mutual recognition that is enshrined in the social whole 
and the institutions that emerge out of it.  
                                                
14 The danger, as Gascoigne and Thornton observe (Gascoigne and Thornton 2013, 107-132), is that 
appealing to a hidden background of tacit knowing-how as, in some ways, distinct to the foreground 
knowing-that is to problematise those moments when what we think is a somehow explicit knowing-
that is, ultimately, derived from tacit norms. Such a problems renders an absolute separation between 
foreground and background impossible leading Gascoigne and Thornton to claim that ‘it is 
Foreground all the way’ (ibid., 119). 
15 For the problems surrounding Brandom’s wish to make our implicit structures explicit, see 
Gascoigne and Thornton 2013, 123-132. 
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That said, as well as ‘obeying the rule’, Wittgenstein also allows for the 
possibility for us to ‘go against it’. Indeed, as we have seen with Adorno’s distinct 
interpretations of Wagner and as we shall see in greater detail in chapter five, what 
the artwork has to say in the context of a dialogical event can also call into question 
and potentially transcend those cultural and historical norms that, to a degree, 
determine our horizons of enquiry for understanding art and artworks. The point is 
that, for Gadamer, the task of understanding is to acquire ‘the right horizon of 
enquiry’, which may be different to the norms and conventions that make up the style 
of our world. As he claimed with regards to the idea that our understanding is always 
‘fore-structured’, ‘all fore-structuring also makes visible that from which something 
is fore-structured’, thus ‘prejudices are brought into play’ (Gadamer 2004, 304). Of 
course, Gadamer recognises that ‘a hermeneutical situation is determined by the 
prejudices that we bring with us’: ‘they constitute, then, the horizon of a particular 
present’ (ibid. 304-305). However, ‘it is important to avoid the error of thinking that 
the horizon of the present consists of a fixed set of opinions and valuations, and that 
the otherness of the past can be fore-structured from it as from a fixed ground’ (ibid., 
305). Gadamer’s notion, which we will explore in greater detail in chapter five, of 
being ‘open to the other’ requires us, to a certain extent, to put aside our own 
prejudices and ways of knowing and doing in order to be open to the possibility that 
what the Other, in this instance, a musical work, has to say needs to be respected in 
order to develop the appropriate (fused) horizon. As Gadamer claimed, ‘by factoring 
the other person’s standpoint into what he is claiming to say, we are making our own 
standpoint safely unattainable’ (ibid., 302).16 Elaborating, ‘to acquire a horizon means 
that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order to look away from 
it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion’ (ibid., 304). 
Indeed, when we ‘guard against assimilating the past to our own expectations of 
meaning’ (ibid.), when we allow for the musical work to talk back to us, when we are 
open to fusing our horizons with that of the work, there lies the possibility for our 
                                                
16 This does not, as Gadamer was aware, demand a ‘positivistic’ approach to understanding historical 
works of art. We must not ‘transpose ourselves into the historical situation and try to reconstruct the 
historical horizon’ (Gadamer 2004, 302). Such an idea undermines the notion of the artwork as a 
dialogical event of mediation. By acknowledging the artwork has something that collapses the divide 
between subject and object, ‘we have given up the claim to find in the past any truth that is valid and 
intelligible for ourselves’. Gadamer went on to suggest that ‘acknowledging the otherness of the other 
in this way, making him the object of objective knowledge, involves the fundamental suspension of his 
claim to truth’ (ibid., 303). 
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own ‘substance’, those historical norms that make up our style of being-in-the-world, 
to be delimited, called into question and potentially transcended.  
It may appear that norms of aesthetic understanding can be called into 
question just by us being ‘open’ to what the Other has to say, that is, through what 
Wellmer calls an ‘internal’ or ‘immanent’ understanding whereby we surrender 
ourselves to the text allowing ‘the language of the text’ to ‘become our language’ 
(Wellmer 1995, 145). Having said that, ‘in any case where understanding is 
problematic’ (ibid., 148), which, I would claim, due to the structures of power that 
govern most of our interesting interpretive situations, is most of the time, there exists 
a tension, a ‘conflict of understanding’ (ibid., 149), between ‘internal’ understanding 
and ‘external’ or ‘productive’ understanding. According to Wellmer, ‘external’ 
understanding ‘is violent, defamiliarising, critical. Here too there is a “fusion of 
horizons”; but now the horizon of the text tends to vanish into the horizon of the 
interpreter’ (ibid., 145). As Wellmer suggests, with ‘external’ or ‘productive’ 
understanding, there is the possibility for calling into question or, indeed, 
transcending the norms of aesthetic understanding: ‘Here too we may speak of 
understanding, namely when the interpreter succeeds in transcending the text in terms 
of the text’s own truth-claim, that is, when the truth and untruth of the text appear in a 
new and sharper light within the horizon and within the language of the interpreter’ 
(ibid.). Such an idea, as we saw in chapter one, is vitally important for coming to 
terms with Adorno’s notion of the critical potential of aesthetic modernism. It is 
precisely because composers and interpreters can ‘open up’ the non-conceptual 
substance of aesthetic practice in new and innovative ways that makes art a 
paradigmatic model of what negative dialectics looks like in concrete situations. 
However, to think that criticism begins and ends with the ‘externally’ understanding 
subject is to forget that the subject’s interpretive norms can also be called into 
question when they, in part, relinquish ‘external’ control over the text or Other in 
question. Indeed, Wellmer is aware of this. He claims that ‘what our two moments of 
immanent and merely external understanding connote is simply the desiderata of 
hermeneutic openness (which means the readiness to question one’s own prejudices, 
one’s own language) on the one hand, and those of translation into one’s own 
language (which means the interpreter’s appropriation of an unfamiliar truth, or 
indeed untruth) on the other’ (ibid., 148). For Wellmer, ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
understanding are interdependent; ‘not only is the former the necessary first step to 
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the latter, it is often only the view from outside that makes the interior of the text 
accessible’ (ibid., 152). He accepts that ‘resolution’ ‘implies a fusion of horizons, as 
Gadamer rightly stressed. Some of this is inescapable if we are to be able to speak of 
“understanding” at all’ (ibid.). Ultimately, the interesting point that Wellmer seems to 
be making is that in real, concrete situations, the ‘standard case of understanding’ is 
not ‘a correct mean between merely “internal” understanding and “external” 
understanding’ (ibid., 146). Indeed, although this is at times overshadowed by 
Wellmer’s focus on the norm-transcending potential of ‘critical’ or ‘external’ 
understanding, real interpretive situations involve a complicated mixture of the two. 
Furthermore, when aesthetic norms are critiqued in real life situations, one would find 
it difficult to say whether the critique comes from one’s ‘external’ understanding or 
from one’s ‘openness to the other’. In the hermeneutic realm, the possibility for 
critique need not just lie with the ‘externally’ interpreting subject. Indeed, as Wellmer 
observes, ‘for even the “immanent” interpreter cannot help but apply his 
preconceptions in the act of interpretation; and even the “external” interpreter must 
take account of the “alien” text in terms of its own logic’ (ibid., 148-149). To 
acknowledge that norm transcendence takes place as a result of a complex mixture of 
both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ understanding, as will be demonstrated in greater detail 
in chapter five, is important when we realise that, in concrete situations, structures of 
power pull the ‘direction’ of the interpretive conversation in different directions, 
distorting the ‘correct mean’ and, therefore, bringing about new forms of 
understanding, new meanings and new ways of making sense on their own terms. 
Applying the notion of the interplay of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ understanding 
to musical performance, Gritten, like Wellmer, suggests that our engagement with 
music should perhaps ‘drift’ somewhere between the two in the context of the event:  
 
At all cognitive levels and over all durational spans, the movement of acquiring, assimilating, 
embodying and presenting musical judgements is essentially spiral: a turnaround movement 
from the incoming givens of, for instance, temporal constraints as determined by the score and 
by physiology or one’s historical knowledge and aural skills to the outgoing preparation of 
movement sequences for sound production or emotional-physiological changes in the body or 
sentences with propositional content. Drift is encouraged by this spiralling physiological 
interference between incoming and outgoing processes, between and within each and every 
musical gesture (Gritten 2006a, 111). 
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Gritten arrives at this conclusion by looking at the ‘two extremes in the way we 
usually relate to musical gestures’, noting how they attribute meaning to either the 
subjective or the objective side of the interpretive situation (ibid., 104). Firstly, 
Gritten observes how ‘quality assurance regulations describing how we relate to 
music allow us to feel that we possess it, that musical gestures are ours for the 
keeping and ours to manipulate and interpret as we see fit’ (ibid.). ‘Indeed’, he goes 
on, ‘the notion of the performer (and, further down the chain of command, the 
listener) “as” composer is a cipher for the notion of musical possession’ (ibid., 
105). Such a way of viewing the interpretive situation involves accepting the 
performer as someone who has ‘something to deliver and communicate’ that will not 
be hindered by anyone or anything, let alone anything arising from the ‘musical’ side 
of the interpretive binary. On the ‘flipside of the same, swiftly spinning coin’, ‘we 
might argue that we need an alienating understanding of music’ that rests on the 
notion of ‘insider knowledge’ and the idea that there is something there in the music 
which we should be listening and responding to, which means ‘training the mind to 
empty itself’ (ibid., 105-106). Ultimately, as Gritten observes, in musical 
performance the subject is not just ‘performed’ but also does and experiences the 
‘performing’ (albeit with a level of ‘resistance’ by the music) such that ‘it is not 
always obvious which side of the dualism – if either – should be given priority’ (ibid., 
106). Gritten, therefore, seeks to call into the question the centrality of a dualistic 
approach to thinking about musical performance in contemporary musicological 
thought, redrawing the ‘relations between the nominal poles of the dualism’ through 
the lens of the event (ibid., 107).  
What Gadamer, Wellmer and Gritten all fundamentally agree on is that 
explaining our ways of doing in terms of a reconciliation of individual impulses and 
motivations with ‘what the text says’ can, especially in the context of musical praxis, 
fail to account for how aesthetic practice functions in concrete situations. The practice 
of music making is full of paradigm-changing interpretations that open up spaces of 
possibility for the establishment of new norms – in virtually any canon of music one 
need not look too hard to find a Beethoven or a Debussy, a Gillespie or a Davis, a Bill 
Haley or a Chuck Berry, a Kidd Creole or a Grandmaster Flash, a Sex Pistols or a 
Kraftwerk, whose innovative compositional techniques and critical interpretations of 
the handed-down musical materials of history come to be seen as valuable and 
legitimate. Whether we think our interpretations of certain works are ‘true’ or ‘false’ 
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in the context of some ‘given’ meaning is, therefore, irrelevant. When we articulate 
the meaningfulness of musical experiences in the context of those fore-structures – 
those practice-based norms – that, to a degree, prepare us for what artworks have to 
say, interpretations, when we are open, can either affirm those norms or go against 
them. The point being that the kind of being-in-the-world that occurs in musical 
interpretation relies precisely on the way that acquired norms which are necessary to 
make sense of certain interpretations are sometimes transcended in concrete 
situations, leading to the creation of new sense.  
Returning to Adorno, it is the idea that norms can be transcended through 
criticism that, as we have seen, forms the basis for thinking about the principles and 
consequences of negative dialectics, its manifestation in musical terms in the works 
of Wagner as well its links to a non-reified engagement with musical practice.17 For 
Adorno, just as a composer should refuse to accept uncritically the handed-down 
musical conventions of history, it is imperative in the face of modern history that we 
refuse to completely accept what Bowie refers to as ‘the harmonisation of individual 
and the social’ (Bowie 2013, 128) that entails ‘obeying the rule’. Why? Because in 
the wake of Auschwitz such a reconciled vision of society is, according to Adorno, no 
longer possible except in the form of a false reconciliation whereby the individual is 
made to conform to the will of general. It follows, as Bowie observes, that ‘by 
adhering to the norms of a community, we may well help produce something which 
leads to gross inhumanity’ (ibid., 99). But, as Bowie goes on to argue, ‘it is not that 
this situation should lead us to abandon the role of normativity in any account of 
freedom, but it does remind us that an account of freedom without that which goes 
beyond the normative gives us too few resources to comprehend how modern norms 
have been used for appalling ends. It is hardly as if the Nazis lacked norms that were 
collectively assented to, and the likes of Eichmann invoked, however disreputably, a 
Kantian notion of duty in their self-justifications’ (ibid., 118-119). 
To reiterate, if we see our musical interpretations as not about being true to 
some ‘given’ meaning, then radical interpretations can be thought of as an important 
aspect of aesthetic practice in general. The point to be aware of, however, is that the 
critical appraisal of existing norms does not have a philosophical foundation from 
                                                
17 Bowie (2013) illustrates how norm-transcendence is at the heart of Adorno’s contributions to 
discussions in meta-philosophy, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics as well as the latter’s continued 
relevance to contemporary philosophical debates. 
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which to appraise them. Due to the regress that arises when we seek explicit rules for 
the application of rules for norm-appraisal, what can only legitimate my 
interpretations and my critical appraisal of certain musical norms is the validation that 
comes from debating aesthetic claims within a trans-cultural and trans-historical 
sphere of intersubjectivity.  
It is clear that although judgments emerge from out of specific socio-cultural 
practices, these judgments are not arbitrary. As Bowie observes, if someone was to 
accept the arbitrariness of judgments, ‘they would have no grounds ever to defend 
their evaluations at all, when much of social communication is precisely based around 
such evaluation’ (Bowie 2013, 35). Indeed, even if truth were to turn out to be what 
Huw Price calls a ‘convenient fiction’, it would be unlikely that this realisation would 
practically threaten normal linguistic practices because it seems impossible to stop 
caring about truth or to no longer feel bound by relevant norms (Price 2003, 187). 
Because judgments are not arbitrary then, as Price observes, ‘at each stage, the actual 
community needs to recognise that it may be wrong by the standards of some broader 
community’ (ibid., 175). As soon as judgments become claims to legitimacy, that is, 
as soon as interpretations, which may be considered ‘false’ by the wider community, 
become part of the sphere of Price’s ‘dialogue of mankind’, then we should no longer 
think in terms of the ‘Platonic distinction’ between absolutism and relativism. Indeed, 
we have become part of the political sphere of interacting worldviews where truth is 
no longer meaningless but something that people are willing to live and die for – that, 
as Price states, ‘speakers take there to be a norm of truth, not that there actually be 
such a norm, in some speaker-independent sense’ and that it is the admission that we 
are constrained by such a norm that is what matters. Bowie talks about, for example, 
belonging to a ‘culture of judgment’ that is ‘socially valuable’ (Bowie 2013, 171). 
The point being that ‘if culture were supposedly about what gives subjective pleasure 
to individual human organisms, and what gave pleasure to each organism was 
radically particular to that organism, there would be no such thing as culture anyway. 
Culture is constituted by shared, albeit often contested and conflicting, norms, which 
are evident in forms of expression and institutionally embodied evaluations’ (ibid., 
140). In this sense, truth, as Price observes, is ‘the expression of a norm’ (Price 2003, 
171), but not something definitive and objective that might necessitate scientific 
investigation in order to be uncovered. As Price argues, we need ‘to resist the 
pressure to identify truth with anything – in other words, simply to reject the 
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assumption that an adequate philosophical account of truth needs to answer the 
question “What is Truth?”’ (ibid., 175). Rather, this norm, as Bowie observes, is a 
‘contested’ norm that can be explained through its role in practice, that conflicts with 
other norms but which can also operate as the same ‘truth’ across different social and 
historical groups as a result of similar processes of normalisation.  
The normativity of musical meaning, which has been briefly highlighted here, 
will be taken up in greater detail in chapter five of the study. There I will discuss the 
ethical basis of any musicology that attempts to make claims to legitimacy within a 
shared space of competing worldviews. For the final section of this chapter, I want to 
look at how the notion of intersubjective legitimacy helps us make sense of Adorno’s 
two seemingly contrasting interpretations of Wagner’s works whilst demonstrating 
how the norm-transcending power of musical practice can call into question the 
dominant interpretive norms of Wagner scholarship. 
 
Wagner as Presentation 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I introduced the question of how to interpret 
Wagner’s intentions in the context of his music dramas. The crux of the problem is 
that although some of Wagner’s intentions for a Gesamtkunstwerk were painstakingly 
documented in theoretical writings about music, poetry and drama, and, if we care to 
believe, in essays such as ‘Judaism in Music’, it is a mistake to think that, in the 
hermeneutic realm, these theoretical writings actually result in a ‘true’ description of 
Wagner’s works. Indeed, even if evidence could be found which proved that 
Wagner’s intentions had, indeed, become manifest in his music dramas, who is to say, 
in the context of hermeneutic conceptions of the meaningfulness of aesthetic 
experiences, that such findings would actually matter to everyday engagements with 
these works? As Bowie observes, the musical work’s ‘performative status cannot be 
understood in terms of [its] descriptive claims’ (Bowie 2007, 218). Bowie’s 
suggestion follows Dahlhaus’ point that the Gesamtkunstwerk as a representation of 
the culmination and sublation of different artistic practices whereby each art is 
equipped with ‘equal rights and privileges’ is both a ‘questionable thesis’ and, indeed, 
a ‘historical myth’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 195). Badiou similarly raises the question of 
whether artistic endeavours can be reduced to the artist’s intentions before claiming 
that, with regards to Wagner’s ‘totalising ambition’, it is necessary to demonstrate in 
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what sense the works themselves are a totalisation because, for Badiou, ‘total 
artwork’ is just a slogan (Badiou 2010, 15). Ultimately, as Dahlhaus observes, the 
importance of the Gesamtkunstwerk as a concept resides in the fact that it is deployed 
in the context of what he calls an ‘aesthetic revolution’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 196). Not 
only, he argues, does Wagner, through theoretical contemplation of the nature, 
function and style of past, present and future art, impose the ‘revolution of aesthetic 
values’ on his age but, as a result of such theory, assists ‘in raising for opera the same 
lofty claims that Beethoven had achieved for the symphony’ (ibid., 195). Indeed, as 
Dahlhaus implies, it is with Wagner himself that the tension between theory and 
practice with regards to the music drama emerges (a tension he attempted to conceal 
in Mitteiung an meine Freunde (1852) by suggesting that his theoretical reflections 
on art were guided by his creative experiments as a composer), thus setting up ‘The 
Wagner Problem’ for future generations of interpreters to deal with. 
The tension between theory and practice, between disengaged contemplation 
of the Gesamtkunstwerk and actual, concrete experiences of the Gesamtkunstwerk, 
what one could reasonably perceive to be, at times, a contradiction between 
theoretical text and musical work, is compounded when we take into account 
Wagner’s reassessment of the ideas that underpinned his thinking about the music 
drama. Despite his claims that Oper und Drama was a correlate to his musico-
dramatic conception of Der Ring, Wagner’s appropriation of Feuerbach’s Schiller-
influenced perception of integration as affirmation for his multimedia conception of 
art gave way to the influence of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical conception of music, 
thus paralleling his supposedly increasing dissatisfaction with ‘revolutionary’ 
politics.18 Not only can the tension between theory and praxis in Wagner’s output not 
be resolved due to the incompatibility of hermeneutic conceptions of meaning and 
meanings as artistic intentions, but even if the problem could be resolved, the literary 
side of Wagner’s output would still be founded on a dynamic and, therefore, 
inconsistent theory of the Gesamtkunstwerk. For example, although Oper und Drama, 
as a ‘manual’ for what Wagner aimed to achieve in his music dramas, was influenced 
                                                
18 Mark Berry (2006) calls into question this seemingly reductive narrative concerning Wagner’s 
musical ‘enlightenment’. Indeed, he discerns in Wagner’s output ‘attempts to reconcile political 
commitment and “pessimism”’  (Berry 2006, 11). As Berry explains, ‘Schopenhauer never entirely 
replaces Young Hegelianism or socialism in Wagner's thought; nor does renunciation entirely supplant 
revolution’  (ibid., 241). A similar idea is put forward, albeit in a more polemical form, by Karnes 
(2013). 
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by the philosophy of Feuerbach, much of the music for Der Ring was written after 
Wagner’s engagement with Schopenhauer in 1854. Indeed, Das Rheingold 
problematizes the straightforward either-or approach to making sense of Der Ring by 
containing music that – like the libretti – pertains to Feuerbach’s Schiller-based 
thought.19 The situation is further complicated by the fact that the texts for the various 
parts of the cycle were written in the reverse order in which they appear whilst the 
music for the tetralogy was composed in accordance with the musico-dramatic events 
that we see on stage. It follows that Wagner’s theoretical influences are not consistent 
across all the art forms that are manifest within the music drama. Not only does this 
lead us to question interpretations of Wagner’s works that are derived from his 
theoretical texts but, characterising the dramas and romantic operas too exclusively in 
terms of their librettos or explanatory texts can fail to take account of the ways in 
which the music can alter how we understand the visual and literary aspects of the 
works. As Dahlhaus claims, ‘the practice of rigidly assigning identifying labels to 
Wagner’s leitmotivs is as questionable as it is unavoidable: questionable in that they 
change meaning, and sometimes even musical form, in their various appearances 
within a work, almost undergoing stories of their own; and unavoidable because it is 
an illusion to imagine that we can understand the emotions without recourse to 
language’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 202).20 Indeed, as demonstrated by the use of the Vorspiel 
to Lohengrin in Charlie Chaplin’s The Great Dictator (1940), whose musico-
dramatic critique of Adolf Hitler’s final speech in Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the 
Will (1935) should not be overlooked, Wagner’s music can even be heard as the 
means of liberation from that same ideology its composer had perhaps ‘intended’ to 
evoke through such music.21  
                                                
19 This idea is contested by Bryan Magee (1997), who claims that there exists a ‘Schopenhauerism’ to 
Wagner’s output even prior to the latter’s contact with the works of Schopenhauer. 
20 It should be noted that although Dahlhaus suggests that the practice of assigning meanings to 
leitmotivs is inevitable, there is a tendency for him to undermine his own generally plausible 
hermeneutic contentions when he suggests, for example, that, contra Der Ring, ‘the motives in Tristan, 
rather than “having their own story”, tend to circle around an obscure midpoint whose meaning, made 
perceivable by ever-changing combinations of longing for love and death, seems to be beyond the 
power of words to convey’ (Dahlhaus 1989, 203). The hidden ground of formalism that forms the basis 
for Dahlhaus’ claims regarding the particularly problematic musical moments in Wagner’s works is all 
too clear – ‘instead of undergoing an evolution in which their [the motives’] identity remains intact, no 
matter how modified they become in the process, they seem caught up in a maelstrom of meanings, 
which ultimately makes any verbally expressible distinctions between them futile and pointless’ 
(ibid.). 
21 Due to the aesthetic experiences of engaging with Wagner’s music dramas, which includes the 
music and not just the text, Bowie claims that Wagner ‘succeeds in addressing fundamental questions 
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The ability of music to evade the reification that would accord Wagner’s 
works a simple, straightforward interpretation is also acknowledged by Mark Berry, 
who illustrates that despite the relatively few changes to the poetic texts of each 
music drama once they had been written – the exception being the last scene in 
Götterdämmerung – the nature of the character of Wotan, for example, underwent 
significant changes (Berry 2006, 10). It is not implausible when considering how 
music plays an important world-disclosive role to suggest that what Berry calls 
Wagner’s ‘self-criticism’ and the resulting complexity of the compositional process 
of Der Ring was due to the numerous ways in which the music can be experienced or 
appropriated for certain ends. Wagner was renowned for re-interpreting his operas, 
perhaps even out of necessity bearing in mind the time lapse between the various 
creative acts that led to Der Ring, for example. Indeed, Berry articulates the idea that 
Wagner’s acts of re-interpreting his own works prior to, during and after the 
compositional process problematize, call into question and potentially transcend the 
either-or patterns of interpretation that have occupied Wagner scholarship for so long. 
Lawrence Kramer suggests something similar, namely that hermeneutic approaches 
to the question of musical meaning ‘enormously complicate both the vexed question 
of anti-Semitism in Wagner’s music and the wider, if less ethically pressing, question 
of the role that “original” contexts play in the determination of musical meaning’ (L. 
Kramer 2007, 43). As he goes on to suggest, ‘no particular meaning emerges as 
authoritative from this process; what does so emerge is a proliferating series of 
dialectical or dialogical relationships between the sonorous and semantic dimensions 
of the music’ (ibid.). In other words, there is not ‘some prepotent form or embodied 
intention in the work that causes or encourages later reception and provides the 
standard by which to evaluate it’ (ibid., 70).22 Indeed, by looking at Liszt’s and 
Wagner’s respective interpretations of Lohengrin, Kramer demonstrates how the 
                                                                                                                                      
in modernity, such as the relationship between desire and power, the fragility of the self in the face of 
collective historical forces, and the dangers and possibilities of secularized freedom. Much of his 
impact lies in the astonishing transitions of mood and atmosphere in his works’ (Bowie 2007, 241). 
Through discussions of Dahlhaus’ interpretations of Wagner’s music dramas, Bowie shows how music 
is able to evoke ‘possibilities of emotional fulfillment which the preceding dramatic action had 
progressively undermined’ (ibid., 244). The important point being that what the music is able to evoke 
in certain contexts might be precisely that which Wagner’s theoretical texts or librettos seek to deny. 
This leads Bowie to the conclusion that ‘Wagner’s “art of ambiguity” makes it clear that there is no 
single answer to the question of the relationship between musical and verbal meaning’ (ibid., 246).  
22 For discussions of Wagner’s influence on other artistic creative projects, see Huebner 1999, Karnes 
2013 and Kramer 2007, 107-127.  
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interpretive norms and, indeed, abnorms of Wagner scholarship can even precede the 
existence of the work ‘itself’. 
These claims point towards the tension within Wagner scholarship between 
meanings that are derived from an artist’s intentions and the meaningfulness of 
aesthetic experiences. In short, the tension between meaning as an artist’s intentions 
and the meaningfulness of aesthetic experience is nothing more than what Berry calls 
the ‘intertwining’ of ‘theory and practice’ (Berry 2006, 2). In Gadamer’s sense, 
‘Wagner as presentation’, whereby the theoretical writings are explored with a view 
to understanding the musical works, is both in tension and entwined with the 
hermeneutic concept of the ‘artwork as presentation’. Lacoue-Labarthe, for example, 
focuses exclusively on Wagner’s theoretical reflections, and, as a result, bases his 
study on the supposed meaning-determining nature of artistic intentions. The overall 
result is that Lacoue-Labarthe posits an argument for why he believes that the music 
dramas act as vehicles for the ‘aestheticisation of politics’. What is put forward is no 
less than a vision of Wagner as a proto-fascist, no doubt as a result of Wagner’s 
conceptual contradictions and his explicit anti-Semitism. However, from a 
hermeneutic point of view, the problem is that by not articulating the meaningfulness 
of his actual experiences with these works, Lacoue-Labarthe comes to conclusions 
based on Wagner’s own slogans and ‘intentions’ as posited in letters, diary entries 
and theoretical texts, thus exacerbating the fundamental tension between the 
theoretical text and musical praxis. None of this suggests, however, that Wagner’s 
slogans and theoretical texts play no part in helping us understand the historical 
reception of his works. I am not concerned with adopting Dieter Borchmeyer’s idea 
of sealing off the music dramas from the blatant anti-Semitism of Wagner’s so-called 
unrelated essays or with such overly sensationalist claims, despite evidence to the 
contrary, that ‘in all of Wagner’s innumerable commentaries on his works, there is no 
single statement which would entitle us to interpret any of the characters in the music 
dramas or any of the details of their plots in anti-Semitic terms, or even to interpret 
them as allusions to the Jews’ (Borchmeyer 1992, 183). In that sense, I am not 
demanding the separation of theory and practice when it comes to Wagner 
scholarship, thus affirming the patterns of binary logic, of either-or thinking, that 
seem to be the norms for making sense of his works. Wagner’s own interpretations of 
his works, as we know, have become an important part of the interpretive history of 
these music dramas, and their ‘background’ influence on how we experience 
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performances of these works cannot be ignored if we are to adopt a hermeneutic 
approach to musical meaning. As Kramer explains, ‘once a sufficient number of 
interpretations have made a certain connection, say to anti-Semitism, once those 
interpretations have been made and heeded, repeated and disputed, once the process 
of understanding has multiplied links between the operas, their composer’s ideology, 
and the anti-Semitic discourse of his era, the operas become inextricable from the 
question of anti-Semitism’ (L. Kramer 2007, 72). The point being that ‘anti-Semitism 
must eventually be remembered even if it is not perceived’ in the music dramas 
themselves (ibid., 73). As Berry suggests, the same could be said about Der Ring’s 
relationship to the contradictions of bourgeois capitalism bearing in mind the 
composer’s reflections on revolutionary politics.23 
Badiou seeks to rescue Wagner from the tentacles of Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
hermeneutically-flawed methodology and, in doing so, recognises the problems that 
arise when the artwork is seen as existing in a causal relationship with artistic 
intentions and nothing else. Badiou is so vehemently anti-Lacoue-Labarthe that he 
interprets Wagner’s art as being aligned to the principles of negative dialectics, and, 
as a result, comes to similar conclusions as those reached by Adorno in 1963. 
However, the difference between Badiou and Adorno is that, whereas Adorno’s 
comments in 1963 shed light on his ‘historically different reaction’ to Wagner’s 
artistic works, Badiou commences his rescue of Wagner by interpreting Adorno’s 
ideas in Negative Dialectics, and, subsequently, applying this interpretation to the 
works themselves. As a result, it is unclear whether Badiou agrees with the need for 
hermeneutic anticipations of the meaningfulness of aesthetic experiences or whether, 
as Bowie observes, he believes that ‘all interpretations – particularly of music – are 
indeed just projections of the interpreter onto the Romantic mirror’ (Bowie 2007, 
242). What is clear, however, is that Adorno, as illustrated by his remarks in 1963, 
was concerned with articulating his experiences of Wagner’s music dramas as 
opposed to constructing meaning from the latter’s theoretical writings, which is why 
the music dramas reveal themselves to Adorno differently at different times. The 
issue here is that although Adorno, in his two contrasting interpretations of Wagner’s 
works, articulates central tropes of what Bowie calls ‘The Wagner Problem’, 
including those of anti-Semitism, the culture industry, aesthetic modernism and their 
                                                
23 See Berry 2006, 79-110. 
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political aspects, he does not seek to resolve the problem by uncovering artistic 
intentions that definitively account for their meaning. In other words, Adorno does 
not look for those artistic intentions that would bring about a correspondence between 
the interpretation and the work. As we explored in chapter one, a search for such 
correspondence would presuppose an interpretive model of a subject encountering but 
ultimately separated from the object that is the artwork, whereby the correct 
interpretation depends on the interpreter producing a correspondence between the 
properties of the work and what the artist supposedly intended. As we have seen, such 
a model is dissolved when we realise that musical works are inherently meaningful as 
opposed to things onto which we project an interpretation. Once we acknowledge that 
there can be no way of understanding musical praxis if we, as interpreters, were not 
already partly disposed to respond to Wagner’s works in certain ways as a result of 
our tacit understanding of the world through shared practices, then the paradigm of 
the subject-object conception of musical meaning starts to look less stable. Instead, 
what should interest us – what answers the vital question of why art matters to us – 
are our experiences with this meaningful phenomenon and the way such experiences 
speak, simultaneously, about the ‘object’ we might refer to as music and the world in 
which such experiences take place.  
A fundamental ‘unconcealed’ truth about both Wagner’s theoretical writings 
and his artistic works is that historically different reactions to them continue to bring 
about conflicting interpretations, thus driving the debates into the twenty-first 
century. The significance of his works in terms of what they say to us today is 
exemplified by the vast array of binary categories that continue to surround them; 
categories such as archaic/modern, end of opera/unfulfilled potential of opera, 
myth/anti-myth, form/formless, diatonic/chromatic, temporal/timeless, 
immanent/immediate, Semite/anti-Semite, culture industry/aesthetic modernism. For 
example, the main thesis of Lacoue-Labarthe’s study is concerned with the idea that 
Wagner brought about a ‘aestheticisation of politics’ through what Lacoue-Labarthe 
refers to as art’s ambition to be political (Lacoue-Labarthe 1994, xxii). However, 
there are also a number of subsidiary observations which aim to show that, in 
Wagner, ‘the first mass art had just been born, through music (through technology)’ 
(ibid., xx). From the outset, Lacoue-Labarthe resurrects Adorno’s original 
interpretation of Wagner as the grandfather of the culture industry. It follows that 
Lacoue-Labarthe, without directly referencing Adorno’s culture industry theory, 
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reprises several familiar themes encountered within the Versuch. For example, 
Lacoue-Labarthe repeats the idea that integration is a kind of artistic equivalent to the 
repressive effect of the unification of society which takes place under the power of 
the culture industry (ibid., 7). However, this time, the role of the culture industry is 
given over to music, described as being ‘the signifying art par excellence’ and as 
having ‘the greatest power’ (ibid.). It follows that, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, 
music’s power brings about the ‘musical sublation of all the arts’ in Wagner (ibid.). 
‘The dialectical confrontation of the individual arts in the “total work of art”’, he goes 
on to claim, ‘is consequently a means of containing excess’ (ibid., 12). This sublation 
of the arts emphasises the importance of conformity within Lacoue-Labarthe’s 
assessment of Wagner, thus, once more, highlighting the similarities between 
Adorno’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s respective appraisals. Indeed, Lacoue-Labarthe, as 
Adorno did with the Versuch, attributes the failure of the music drama to music. 
Lacoue-Labarthe asserts that because there is too much music in Wagner’s works, to 
the point of saturation, this leads to their ‘false character’ through their ‘false 
totalisation’ (ibid., 118). In other words, just as Adorno provided a polemic against 
the culture industry, Lacoue-Labarthe provides a critique against music as the artistic 
equivalent of mass production for what he sees as music’s ability to destroy the 
particularity and individuality of the other forms of art in the name of a false identity.  
 In seeking to save Wagner from Lacoue-Labarthe, Badiou proceeds from a 
summary and interpretation of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics together with a 
discussion of how the principles of Adorno’s meta-philosophy could be applied to 
music. Badiou then takes Lacoue-Labarthe’s accusations against Wagner, along with 
the most repeated criticisms by other major figures including Nietzsche, Heidegger 
and Adorno, and seeks to answer these criticisms by subsuming Wagner’s artworks 
under the principle ideas of negative dialectics. It follows, bearing in mind Adorno’s 
comments regarding Wagner’s music as dispensing with external or abstract forms, 
that Badiou claims that ‘Wagner’s connecting of leitmotif and totality, of leitmotif 
and “endless melody”…is nevertheless a step in the direction of totality-free 
greatness’ (ibid., 133). Indeed, on a handful of occasions, Badiou suggests that 
Wagner anticipates musique informelle. The conclusion reached by Badiou is similar 
to the one put forward by Adorno in 1963; mainly that ‘in Wagner’s case there was 
something like the invention of a new style that was abandoned’ (Badiou 2010, 132). 
It is obvious that the claims made by Badiou and Adorno with regards to Wagner’s 
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works are analogous if we recall the affinities between Negative Dialectics, ‘Vers une 
musique informelle’ and the 1963 Berlin Speech.  
The point of briefly laying out the debate between Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Badiou is to illustrate that when it comes to the reception of Wagner’s works, the 
same themes continue to emerge. Ultimately, Adorno’s two contrasting 
interpretations from 1938 and 1963 are repeated today by opposing scholars. The fact 
that scholars pick up on the tropes of culture industry and modernism having 
encountered Wagner’s art suggests that these themes are more than just chance 
encounters in our current stage of history. These themes continue to resonate with 
interpreters as what Gadamer referred to as Sache selbst, which we can broadly 
translate as ‘thing itself’. This is a difficult concept to understand especially as 
Gadamer insisted that art is presentation [Darstellung], whereas the idea of the ‘thing 
itself’ hints at a conception of meaning as some ‘given’ that resists the vagaries of 
interpretation. However, in contrast to the pictures that ‘thing itself’ might conjure up 
in the context of subject/object epistemology, for Gadamer, Sache selbst suggests a 
moment of recognition, as opposed to cognition, of repetition and return. For, 
Gadamer, ‘when something is recognised it has liberated itself from the uniqueness 
and contingency of the circumstances in which it was encountered’ (Gadamer 1986a, 
120). Therefore, as that something is evermore recognised, it becomes increasingly 
‘detached from anything like a chance encounter’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, the ‘thing 
itself’ is, for Gadamer, never just repeated and seen exactly as it was before. Such an 
idea would contradict his whole hermeneutical project. The principle of something 
rising above the contingency and uniqueness of aesthetic experience to become more 
permanent and, indeed, more developed and transformed through further encounters 
is a principle that affirms the return or recognition of familiar themes and theoretical 
tropes in Wagner scholarship. The supposed binary categories of Wagner reception 
are, at this moment in time, more than chance encounters; they are the Sache selbst; 
the norms of Wagner scholarship, norms which, après Wittgenstein, we can either 
obey or go against.  
Indeed, it is with the idea of challenging dominant norms in mind that recent 
scholars have begun to call into question the, what Lawrence Kramer calls, ‘pattern of 
debunking and defence, either/or and both/and’ that surrounds Wagner scholarship 
(L. Kramer 2007, 72). When Dahlhaus is at his best he addresses Tristan und Isolde 
as an ‘ambiguous’ work and indicates how Die Meistersinger might call into question 
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the notion of what it is to be musically ‘modern’ by casting doubt on the divide 
between diatonicism and chromaticism (unfortunately, it is likely that Dahlhaus’ 
reference to ‘modern chromaticism’ as a ‘tacit prerequisite’ for the musical style of 
Meistersinger is more a theoretical device to protect the ‘modernist’ status of this 
‘abnormal’ work rather than the means to take up a critical position to musical 
modernism). Berry, however, explicitly champions a critical approach to the binary 
logic that surrounds Wagner scholarship. For example, he explains that ‘classical 
interpretations have tended to opt either for an “optimistic” view of the Ring, centred 
upon the influence of Feuerbach’s philosophy and Wagner’s concomitant 
revolutionary politics, or for the aforementioned “pessimistic” option, which removes 
the disillusioned Wagner-in-Swiss-exile from the political sphere and stresses the 
undoubtedly important role of Schopenhauer’ (Berry 2006, 10). For Berry, ‘such an 
“either-or” approach seriously misrepresents not only Wagner’s compositional 
method but also his intellectual method. It also sidelines inconvenient aspects of the 
dramas that fail to “fit” whichever interpretation is selected’ (ibid.). In Berry’s view, 
‘the Ring affords an extraordinary opportunity to grasp the richness and complexity 
of nineteenth-century thought and its underlying historical forces’ (ibid., 11); 
‘characteristic is the mix of politics and metaphysics, of Young Hegelianism and 
(proto-)Schopenhauer’ (ibid., 257). Kramer also suggests that to attempt to read 
Wagner’s output in terms of the oppositions between normal and abnormal, high and 
low, supremacy and debasement is to ignore the fact that these works are based on a 
‘relentless push-pull force’ (ibid., 9) – a ‘perennially transitional space’ (ibid., 111) – 
that calls into question the rigidity of the divides between some of previously 
mentioned dominant terms of Wagner scholarship. Thus, he argues, ‘so powerful is 
this incarnation of the inner logic of norm and abnorm alike that Wagner becomes 
both central and radically extrinsic to the institution of Opera, both its primary model 
and its primary antagonist, its authentic self, beyond emulation, and its monstrous 
Other’ (L. Kramer 2007, 9).  
In this chapter we have attempted to investigate what the consequences of a 
non-reified engagement with music might be for conceptions of musical meaning. By 
exploring Adorno’s claim in 1963 that he had a ‘historically different reaction’ to 
Wagner’s works since composing his Versuch über Wagner, and by coming to 
understand the fore-structures that provided the horizon of Adorno’s enquiries into 
the meaningfulness of Wagner’s music dramas at different points, we have seen that 
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interpretations of aesthetic experiences, as a ‘fusion of horizons’, can affirm or call 
into question what Bowie calls the ‘shared, but often unthematised, background 
knowledge’ that makes up a style of being-in-the-world. With reference to 
Wittgenstein’s claim that we either ‘obey the rule’ or ‘go against it’, we note that 
such a claim, in the absence of metaphysical anchors with which rule-following can 
terminate, can only make sense in terms of the normative basis of truth, norms 
developed through shared practices, which we can obey or look to transcend, but 
which are constantly debated and called into question within a sphere of 
intersubjective legitimacy. Ultimately, aesthetic practice, when it really matters, seeks 
to transcend the norms, and this is what we see, to a degree, in Adorno’s 
interpretations of Wagner’s works. Indeed, the fact that Adorno’s contrasting 
interpretations of Wagner’s music dramas have since become recurring themes in the 
context of the debates on Wagner illustrates how norm-transcending practices can 
themselves become normalised through the historical changes to ways of being that 
they helped initiate.  
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3 
 
BEYOND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The very spirit of philosophical inquiry itself robs the imagination of one promise after another, and 
the frontiers of art are narrowed, in proportion as the limits of science are enlarged. 
(Schiller 2000, 10) 
 
 
As we have seen in chapters one and two, and as will be made clearer in the 
following two chapters, the subject-object model as the basis for thinking about the 
nature of our relationship to works of art is both a philosophical and musicological 
problem. If we force the separation of interpreters and the object ‘music’, we are in 
danger of bringing about the reification of musical praxis, that is, we allow for theory 
construction and the characterisation of music in terms of detached, speculative 
contemplation. For example, there is a tendency, as we observed with regards to 
practices of Dodd, Kivy, Levinson, Scruton and Zangwill in chapter one, that by 
turning music into what Ridley calls an ‘object of enquiry’, its entwinement with 
concrete human experiences is ignored in favour of disengaged contemplation that 
reduces musical works to what Bowie refers to as ‘objects with properties’ or what 
Braver, après Heidegger, calls ‘present-at-hand objects’ – unchanging entities that 
are, by definition, removed from extraneous influence. As a result of a form of 
musical engagement that prizes theoretical contemplation of music’s characteristics 
above articulations of the meaningfulness of actual musical praxis, music is isolated 
from the rich and meaningful world from which it emerges. Detached contemplation 
of the object ‘music’ ignores the fact that our tacit understanding of what constitutes a 
musical work results from its and our entwinement in socio-cultural practices, 
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without which encountering these objects as musically significant would be highly 
problematic if not impossible.  
What is ignored when music is reified by looking at it through a theoretical 
lens are precisely what Adorno called those ‘ephemeral, transitory and historical’ 
aspects of specific manifestations of musical praxis that allow us to explain why 
music matters to us in everyday practices. Furthermore, as we saw in chapter one, if 
music is conceived as an object of metaphysical enquiry, we are in danger of 
producing a theory of ontology, meaning or value that excludes much of what has 
been produced within the twentieth- and twenty-first-century avant-garde scenes 
where the relationships between ‘work’, ‘composer’, ‘performer’ and ‘audience’ have 
changed in comparison to the ‘standard’ nineteenth-century paradigm. Related to this 
problem is the issue that theories of musical ontology, meaning and value limit the 
power music has to transcend various stylistic, interpretive and performative norms 
because they appeal to the idea that musical works contain properties that 
interpretations must, in turn, contain or articulate in order to deliver ‘proper’ 
performances or analyses. Such a problem, as we saw in the previous chapter, is also 
apparent if we reduce musical meaning to what an artist intended to be meant. Some 
of the most inspiring and influential interpretations, including Adorno’s 
interpretations of Wagner’s music dramas, which we explored in chapter two, have 
been those ‘improper’ readings that have eventually become normalised through 
historical changes in musical performance and reception that they introduced.  
Once we take the norm-transcending power of music seriously, there is no 
reason to think of it as an object with properties or as something that must be isolated 
from the world in order to be investigated in what Ridley calls its ‘pure state’. As we 
have observed in both chapters one and two, what leads us to believe that something 
is music can come from both object and subject, such that new creative and 
interpretive contexts can give rise to new things that we previously may not have 
been able to classify as music and new meanings which may not have come to mind 
when we were interpreting from out of a different series of contexts. Because the 
stance we take towards the subject-object model determines how we approach the 
issue of meaning, if, like Adorno and the early German Romantics, we do not treat 
the subject/object divide as a dualism but as a relationship whereby individuals 
cannot be truly separated from everyday socio-cultural practices, we allow for the 
possibility of changes to a work’s meaning as well as variations of meaning. Having 
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explored the consequences of analytical approaches to music ontology in chapter one, 
and having articulated a hermeneutic approach to music’s ‘meaningfulness’ in 
chapter two, I will now attempt to illustrate what happens with musical meaning if we 
force the separation of subjective judgement from objective meaning. Our attention 
will be turned towards perhaps one of the most important and long-standing issues in 
all of Anglo-American philosophy – the issue of a theory of meaning, specifically a 
theory that attempts to account for meaning as some sort of unchanging property that 
determines the supposed ‘identity’ of the work. In contrast, the final part of this 
chapter will attempt a critique of some of the underlying principles of the so-called 
philosophy of music, which, as we shall see, takes its cue from methods and problems 
developed within analytic aesthetics in general. 
 
Stephen Davies’ Conception of the Artwork 
 
In his book on the philosophy of art, Stephen Davies, a proponent of the analytic 
philosophy of music in its current guise, argues that an artwork has an identity fixed 
at creation with a meaning that is inseparable from it.1 He claims that ‘the work takes 
its identity from, among other things, the meanings words had at the time it was 
written, the genres and conventions it presupposes, the body of works to which it 
makes explicit or implicit reference, and so on’ (Davies 2007, 14). The important 
point to mention is that, for Davies, ‘the work as authored has a special status as the 
object of interpretation’, and it is on the basis of the work’s identity as bound up with 
the notion of an author’s creation that the fixed nature of the work plays a pivotal role 
for Davies’ contemplation of the questions of art and artworks (ibid., 13). Thus, 
Davies declares, ‘I am an intentionalist on the ontology of literary works [and musical 
works]. In others words, I think the author’s intentions play a crucial role in 
determining what kind of work she has created and in fixing its identifying content or 
meaning’ [italics added] (ibid., 15). In other words, ‘attention to works as of their 
authors must lie at the core of the practice of literary interpretation’ (and we might 
also add musical interpretation to that list) (ibid., 14). He goes on to say that when it 
comes to questioning whether the identity of the work evolves through time or is 
something with a single, fixed meaning, ‘I favour the view that the identity of the 
                                                
1 See Stephen Davies 2006, 96-98. 
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work derives in part from relations holding between its direct content and the art-
historical context in which it is produced’ (ibid., 14). Thus, his characterisation ‘of 
the work as of its author automatically binds the work’s identity, if not to that of its 
author, at least to that of the art-historical and social setting that made it possible for 
its author to create it’ (ibid., 14).  
Davies argues that to see the work as ‘of the author’ is to provide a 
‘foundational’ yardstick by which we can judge whether an interpretation is, as he 
claims, ‘true or false’. That is not to say that Davies does not acknowledge that an 
artwork cannot be open to multiple interpretations. Indeed, the ‘significance [of 
artworks] can alter markedly, but this does not change the meanings and other 
features that are responsible for their identity’ [italics added] (Davies 2006, 128). 
Davies claims that the act of interpretation does not affect the object interpreted. So, 
he argues, ‘the properties uncovered or stressed by the interpretation are not affected 
in their existence or character by the interpretive process. Either they were there all 
along or they were absent, and the claims of the interpretation, in so far as these are 
about the existence and nature of these properties, are true or false’ [italics added] 
(ibid., 129). He goes on to say that ‘where there is an ambiguity among versions or 
uncertainty between various possible completion dates, there would be a 
corresponding lack of clarity about the work’s identity’ (ibid., 98). Aligning the 
work’s ‘content or meaning’ with its being ‘of the author’ allows Davies to explain 
what arises from the plurality of interpretive and evaluative styles of description and 
explanation as follows: 
 
Different strategies of reply are appropriate to different examples. In some cases, we 
can say the work is misidentified and thereby misinterpreted. In others, we can point out 
that the interpreter is not in fact making claims about the work’s content but, instead, is 
playing with the text; for example by considering what it might mean. And Freudian and 
Marxist interpretations may not be anachronistic if all that is implied is that earlier 
artists, who could be astute observers of human nature and social relations, recognised 
the outward signs of the syndromes and power structures that Sigmund Freud and Karl 
Marx later analysed (ibid., 98). 
 
 
In order for Davies to claim that art has some fixed meaning or content, art’s essential 
and unchanging character must be internal to the concept ‘artwork’. As Robert 
Stecker observes, essentialist conceptions of art are based upon the idea ‘that the sort 
of properties that make something an artwork and give it value as art are unchanging 
ones that can be read off the concept of art itself’ (Stecker 2005, 9). For Davies, 
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therefore, a work’s meaning, bound up as it is with the author and the art-historical 
context of its creation, is independent of the varying contexts in which that work is 
received.  
By sheltering the work’s meaning from the contexts in which it is performed 
and received, Davies is concerned, in part, with engaging with music in what Ridley 
calls its ‘pure state’. In doing so, Davies neglects the importance of the interpretive 
acts that take place after the work’s conception, something that is vital to 
understanding why musical praxis matters to our everyday lives and not just as a 
historical relic. It follows that for Davies and others like him, Frege’s notion of sense 
[Sinn] is vitally important. For Frege, sense is both objective and mind–independent. 
A sense is expressed by a name or sentence rather than referring to some name–
bearer, object or truth–value. He compared the relationship of sense, reference and 
idea to the practice of looking at the moon through a telescope, proposing that ‘the 
optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependant on the standpoint of 
observation; but it is still objective, as much as it can be used by several observers’ 
(Frege 1892, 40). Frege went to claim that when a ‘sentence contains a thought’ it is 
the ‘objective content’ of ‘thinking’, ‘capable of being common property of several 
thinkers’ (ibid., 41). Samuel C. Wheeler III argues that Frege’s theory of sense is a 
‘presence model’. As Wheeler observes, a ‘presence’ conception of meaning is 
entwined with the notion of meaning realism whereby the meaning that is present to 
us ‘forces us to take it in exactly one way, and which means itself’ – ‘a direct and 
unmediated presence of sense’ (Wheeler 2000, 16). Similarly, Wellmer (1995) 
suggests that a ‘presence model’ of meaning is based on what is ‘objectively present’ 
[objektiv ‘Vorhandenes’] – meaning that is ‘already there’ [‘fertig da’]. According to 
Wellmer, acts of interpretation, comprehension or translation that are based on a 
‘presence’ conception of meaning do nothing to the ‘being’ of meaning that is already 
present. Thus, he argues, such ‘objectivistic’ accounts of meaning tend to conceive 
the ‘being’ of meaning in the same way as the ‘being-in-itself’ of the objects of the 
natural sciences, that is, that an analogy is made between the ‘being’ of meaning and 
the objective ‘being’ or, what he calls, ‘giveness’ of natural objects ‘in themselves’. 
Ultimately, Wheeler and Wellmer’s respective accounts of the ‘presence’ model of 
meaning encompass such ideas as meaning determinacy and completed meaning, 
realist conceptions of necessity, objecthood, essentialism and the idea of intrinsic, 
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isolable and semantic characteristics behind linguistic signs.2 Many of these features 
of the ‘presence’ model play a vital role in understanding the meaning of ‘meaning’ 
in relation to the philosophy of music. It is to this relationship that we now turn. 
 
Meaning and the Philosophy of Music 
 
As we observed in the introduction, Kivy proposes that music is made up of ‘precepts 
and propositions’ which need to be ‘made explicit’ in order to cast light on the 
practice for which they are unspoken foundations. The problem is that when it comes 
to understanding music, to be concerned with theories of meaning developed within 
Anglo-American philosophy of language is unhelpful, especially when the results are, 
as Kivy claims, that although the precepts and propositions that ground music are 
meaningful, music is not. He argues that music, due to its classification as ‘pure 
sound structure’ (Kivy 2002, 67), is meaningless because linguistic meaning is the 
only type of meaning that can be meaningful. Kivy, as a result of his formalist 
conception of music, claims that music cannot possess semantic or representational 
content – it is language-like but not a language. Similarly, although Davies claims 
that music does refer beyond itself, he states that music is not a semantic system nor 
does it constitute a non-linguistic symbol system (Davies 2003, 129). How is it that 
the unspoken foundations of music can be meaningful yet, at the same time, music 
can be meaningless? How is it that Kivy can say that music is ‘concept-laden’ yet still 
claim that it is ‘content-less’ (Kivy 2007, 225)? Ridley has observed that when 
philosophers of music discard the idea of music as being representational, it is usually 
because they either see music in terms of what is purely internal to the concept or 
they fixate on their idea that music is removed from language and thus cannot refer.3 
Such positions, despite stressing music’s separation from language, actually rely on 
the philosophy of language for a theory of meaning on which to base discussions of 
the meaningfulness (or, indeed, meaninglessness) of music.  
Davies later went back on his original claim regarding musical representation 
when, with Constantijn Koopman, he argued that ‘many compositions do not refer 
beyond themselves. Music’s capacities for representation are limited’ (Koopman and 
Davies 2001, 261). However, both Koopman and Davies also deny that the notion of 
                                                
2 See Wheeler 2000, 15-35. 
3 See Ridley 2004, 47-51. 
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meaning should be restricted to the linguistic model. ‘Most people agree’, they argue, 
‘that (good) music makes sense and can be said to have meaning’ (ibid.). By 
discussing ideas such as ‘formal meaning’, ‘experiential formal meaning’, ‘meaning-
for-the-subject’ and ‘meaning-for-us’, Koopman and Davies illustrate how music can 
be said to be meaningful without relying on an explicit theory of meaning developed 
in the philosophy of language. Kivy, responding to Koopman and Davies, wants 
nothing to do with meaning-for-the-subject, and concentrates his discussions on the 
notion of formal meaning, a meaning that ‘comes from the specific properties of 
musical form’ (ibid.). Kivy, we find, becomes tangled up in the meaning of meaning 
to such a degree that formal meaning is decried as meaningless (Kivy 2007, 143). He 
thinks that the word ‘meaning’ can be replaced just as easily by the words ‘function’ 
or ‘doing’ in questions such as ‘what is the meaning of this chord?’ Similarly, when 
Koopman and Davies state that ‘one understands a piece’s formal musical meaning 
when one appreciates the internal connectedness of its parts’ (Koopman and Davies 
2001, 264), Kivy argues that meaning is the wrong word in this context.  
Why is it that David Cooper can propose that when the word ‘function’ 
replaces the word ‘meaning’ we are still very much engaging with an account of 
meaning in terms of meaning qua purpose (Cooper 2003, 10-15), yet Kivy contends 
that the two words should be kept separate? Kivy answers by suggesting that ‘non-
semantic meanings of the kind Koopman and Davies talk about (or any other kinds I 
am familiar with) will assuredly not provide the pleasures and consolations of 
semantic meaning, which are just the pleasures and consolations that the musical 
analysts and musicologists are seeking when they seek musical “meaning” in the first 
place’ (Kivy 2007, 148). It is not that Kivy thinks that there are no non-semantic 
meanings, but, when it comes to discussions of musical meaning, ‘other senses of 
“meaning” won’t do the job’ (ibid., 149). The problem with Kivy’s account of 
musical meaning is that he rejects the idea of meaningful music rather than discard a 
semantic conception of meaning for its failure to account for music. The fact that 
Kivy bases his understanding of meaning on a narrow, propositional model of 
meaning is enough to ensure that the concept ‘meaning’ and the object ‘music’ will 
never match up.  
Although other philosophers of music do not champion the semantic 
conception of meaning to the same extent as Kivy, many, like Davies, advocate the 
determinacy of meaning, completed meaning, meanings as what W. V. O. Quine 
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called ‘obscure intermediary entities’ (Quine 1980, 22), realist conceptions of 
necessity and essentialism, all of which, as Wheeler argues, contribute to a ‘presence’ 
model of meaning. It follows that the question of ‘what is meaning in music?’ is 
similar to the question asked by essentialists, ‘what is art?’ The essentialist, as we 
have seen, sees art’s essential character as internal to the concept, such that there is 
something ‘given’, some sort of non–contingent and non–inferential foundation of 
‘presence’ that is intrinsic to art. Similarly, as we saw with Davies, musical works are 
thought to contain intrinsic and unchanging meanings by virtue of being ‘of the 
author’.4 Stecker also sees intentions as important, claiming that intentions can be 
transferred from people to things thus making the latter ‘ontologically dependant on 
those intentions’ (Stecker 2005, 130). Although Stecker does not affirm the account 
of intentionalism whereby the meaning of the work is solely what the artist intended 
it to be, he does argue that there are intentions which contribute to the meaning of the 
work, intentions that are tied to operative, contextual conventions. Kivy is also an 
intentionalist (Kivy 2002, 148), although, as we have seen, he would deny that 
intentions determine meaning, purely because, in his opinion, music is meaningless.  
The case of R. A. Sharpe is slightly more complex. Although he claims that 
‘interpretations cannot be circumscribed by what the composer could have intended 
to be understood by it [the musical work]’ (Sharpe 2004, 117), he nonetheless 
proposes that ‘music can clearly have a meaning and the meaning is suggested by the 
context in which it was produced and by its history in very much the way that “the 
meaning” of King Lear is determined by history and context’ (ibid., 112). Sharpe 
went on to look at Davies’ problem of distinguishing between what can be read off 
the music itself and the composer’s intentions conveyed by independent information. 
He argues that the critic should step outside what can be directly read off the artwork, 
and so use biographical information ‘to construct a meaning that goes beyond the 
obvious and this information is extraneous to both poem and music’ (ibid., 113). 
Sharpe proposes the separation of expression and meaning such that, when it comes 
to deciding on the meaning of music, ‘a way in which interpretations might be kept 
on the straight and narrow is to restrict acceptable interpretations to those that the 
composer intended to be possible interpretations’ (ibid., 116). To consider ‘acceptable 
interpretations’ of a work to be ones which align themselves with the composer’s 
                                                
4 Wellmer (1995) also demonstrates how accounts that reduce meaning to subjective intentions are 
bound up with what he calls ‘objectivistic’ conceptions of meaning. 
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intentions is, as we have seen in the two previous chapters, to suggest that the work is 
an object with properties that exists in some sort of causal relationship with a creator-
subject. It follows that Sharpe, who criticises other philosophers of music for their 
obsession with philosophical analysis and with uncovering general patterns, was, 
himself, attempting to discern what Wellmer calls ‘objectivistic’ or ‘presence’ 
properties that are ‘already there’ in the music.  
This talk of musical properties also extends to Sharpe’s account of musical 
expression, specifically, his theory of arousalism, whereby the ‘character’ of a piece 
of music is determined by its effect on the listener. Sharpe claims that ‘the normative 
element introduced requires the notion of a match between the descriptions of music 
and the description of its effect upon us. That requires that the character of the music 
be something independent of and prior to the response’ [italics added] (ibid., 99). 
Sharpe’s claim suggests that we must know the ‘expressive character’ of the music 
independently of our experience of it in order to discern whether reactions are correct 
or not. For Sharpe, we ‘ascribe meaning to music by interpreting the sequence of 
characters that the music possesses’ [italics added] (ibid., 90). Indeed, for Sharpe, 
expressive pluralism renders ‘the work of art internally inconsistent’ because ‘a work 
of art cannot possess contradictory properties. There cannot be inconsistencies 
within it’ [italics added] (ibid., 74). As we have seen in the previous two chapters, 
and as Bowie illustrates, the notion of musical properties is empty because there is no 
reason not to think that what the meaningfulness of a work depends on the 
interpreting individual within a specific historical, cultural, social and political 
context as much as on its so-called properties (Bowie 2007, 22). Furthermore, the 
notion of an ‘expressive character’ of music ‘does little to account for the intensity 
that can go into the development and reception of new forms of expression in the 
history of music’ (ibid., 27). In other words, as Bowie proposes, and as we observed 
with regards to Adorno’s distinct interpretations of Wagner’s works, ‘a particular 
piece of expression can give rise to new forms of emotion’ as a result of a socially- 
and culturally-mediated subject responding to the effects of their relationship to the 
object. 5  ‘This possibility’, Bowie claims, ‘would be excluded if one perceives 
emotion as a property: how in that case would one do anything but register an already 
familiar emotion as embodied in music?’ (ibid.). 
                                                
5 See Bowie 2007, 20-29. 
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Having looked at how the philosophy of music deals with the issue of musical 
meaning, it seems clear that in order to engage with the meaningfulness of musical 
praxis, that is, to understand how and why music matters to us in everyday 
circumstances, we need to challenge and potentially transcend the ‘presence’ model 
of meaning that continues to fuel theories of meaning within the philosophy of music. 
 
Beyond Presence, Beyond the Philosophy of Music 
 
The first step in moving beyond the presence model that dominates the philosophy of 
music is to tackle the issue of analyticity. Quine argued that ‘once the theory of 
meaning is sharply separated from the theory of reference, it is a short step to 
recognising as the primary business of the theory of meaning simply the synonymy of 
linguistic forms and the analyticity of statements; meanings themselves, as obscure 
intermediary entities, may well be abandoned’ (Quine 1980, 22). Quine’s sequence of 
attacks on the analytic/synthetic divide not only challenged the existence of meanings 
as ‘obscure intermediary entities’ – ‘what essence becomes when it is divorced from 
the object of reference and wedded to the word’ (ibid.) – but also the foundations of 
essentialist approaches to items and language. In effect, what is called into question 
by Quine is what James O’Shea calls the ‘look-for-an-entity approach’, which aims 
‘to posit a so-called “third world” of abstract entities’ (O’Shea 2007, 53), entities 
that, as Wheeler observes, ‘have their own theory-independent natures’ and which 
terminate analysis and interpretation (Wheeler 2000, 40).  
For Quine, analyticity was to lean on a notion of synonymy so that analytic 
statements could be turned into logical truths by putting synonyms for synonyms. The 
issue is that any attempt to explain analyticity in terms of definition, that bachelor is 
defined as unmarried male, owes its explicative function to pre-existing synonymies. 
Further, the idea that analyticity can be explained through the idea of 
interchangeability is also problematic because there is no assurance that both bachelor 
and unmarried male as referring to the same thing ‘rests on meaning rather than 
merely on accidental matters of fact’ (Quine 1980, 31). So, Quine argued, ‘definition 
turned out to be a will-o’-the-wisp, and synonymy turned out to be best understood 
only by a dint of a prior appeal to analyticity itself’ (ibid., 32). The point Quine is 
making is that we do not, in fact, understand what is meant by analyticity. Similarly, 
the term ‘analytic’ cannot, in Quine’s opinion, be adequately clarified. ‘Quine’, as 
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Gary Gutting observes, ‘discusses a number of ways of clarifying “analytic”, showing 
that they are either strictly circular or at best define “analytic” via terms such as “self-
contradictory” or “necessary”, which we understand no better than we do “true in 
virtue of meaning”’ (Gutting 2009, 21).6 The problem of being able to draw a clear 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements has a knock-on effect in terms 
of the second dogma – reductionism. For Quine, as Gutting observes, the issue is not 
really one of reductionism but of holism. As Quine argued, ‘our statements about the 
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not only individually but only as 
a corporate body’ (Quine 1980, 41).7  
 One could be justified in claiming that despite the criticisms that are levelled 
at Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic divide,8 post-Quinean, Anglo-American 
philosophy has either withdrawn from discussing the question of analyticity or joined 
Quine in the refutation of the distinction. As Gutting observes, ‘although this picture 
[of epistemological holism] provides no compelling reason for giving up the analytic-
                                                
6 The problem, however, as Gutting sees it with Quine’s attack of analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas’ is that 
it ‘either offers no reason for its demand that the “circle” of terms surrounding “true in virtue of 
meaning” (“necessity”, “synonymy”, “self-contradictory”, etc.) be defined in other terms; or it 
(implicitly) offers a highly controversial behaviorist reason’ (Gutting 2009, 22). 
7 According to Gutting, who cites Tyler Burge, Quine’s holism is not argued anywhere in depth and his 
criticisms against the second dogma, criticisms that take Quine into the regions of the indeterminacy of 
translation, the inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, are, citing Burge, ‘no better 
grounded than the grandiose metaphysics of Whitehead or Bradley’ (Gutting 2009, 29). The point to 
raise against Burge and Gutting is that both Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty believed that 
something like these ideas could be ‘philosophically’ defended, as Davidson demonstrates, for 
example, in relation to his idea that ‘there is no such thing as a language’ (Davidson 2006, 265). The 
point being that, for Davidson, language is not some sort of ‘thing-in-itself’ that constrains what can be 
understood. In this sense, knowing a language is not prior to interpretation and does not make 
communication possible. Instead, Davidson looks to argue almost the opposite point; specifically, that 
‘radical interpretation’ determines the possibility of linguistic communication in the first place. With 
Davidson, we move from the extensional model of language, one which sees language as an organising 
tool based on predicates, quantifiers, variables and singular terms, to a theory of truth for a language 
based on whole sentences. According to Davidson, ‘it is sentences that predict (or are used to predict), 
sentences that cope or deal with things, that fit our sensory promptings, that can be compared or 
confronted with evidence’ (ibid., 204). In this single move, we turn from an account of conceptual 
scheme as organising experience or reality to a theory of language that '‘fits our sensory promptings’. 
As Davidson claims, ‘a sentence or theory fits our sensory promptings, successfully faces the tribunal 
of experience, predicts future experience, or copes with the pattern of our surface irritations, provided 
it is borne out by the experience’ (ibid.). In effect, when Davidson states that language ‘copes or deals 
with things’, that it ‘fits our sensory promptings’ or that ‘familiar objects…make our sentences and 
opinions true or false’ (ibid., 208), one could, justifiably, draw similarities between Davidson’s views 
of language and a Heideggerian position which upholds the importance of our pre-conceptual 
involvements in an interactive world as a determining factor in linguistic practice. In other words, 
Davidson looks like he is pointing towards a ‘world-disclosive’ conception of language as opposed to a 
‘world-constituting’ account. Others, however, including Wheeler, have drawn a more radical 
conclusion, arguing for analogies between Davidson’s ideas and meaning nihilism in general. 
According Wheeler, there is no presence behind language, ‘what is behind language is inseparable 
from further language’ (Wheeler 2000, 30). 
8 See, for example, Burge 2003, 199-249. 
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synthetic distinction, it does give a sense of what it might be like to do so. Reflecting 
on this possibility led many philosophers to suspect that there might be little price to 
pay for dropping the distinction’ (Gutting 2009, 74). It follows that whatever we 
think of Quine’s specific criticisms, his offer of a possibly fruitful alternative to 
tinkering with the old positivist theses and the en-masse negation of the divide in 
post-positivistic philosophy, in effect, normatively brought to an end the grip that 
objective necessities – a ‘hidden realism built into the kind of present meaning-
content that will make the necessary the a priori’ (Wheeler 2000, 43) – held over 
philosophy. Because the notion of analyticity presupposes a termination in analysis, 
then, with analyticity discarded, there can be no magic anchors to which analysis can 
attach itself. As Wheeler claims, ‘there is no meaning or meaning bearer behind 
language that is not itself a languagelike phenomenon’ (Wheeler 2000, 44).9  
Overcoming the so-called dogmas of empiricism has important implications 
for a theory of meaning that bases itself purely upon a causal relationship between the 
created artwork and an artist’s intentions. Such a theory is supported by the idea that 
meaning can be separated from fact. However, with regards to Quine’s attack on 
reductionism, his critique challenges the idea that a statement is a unit of meaning and 
hence capable of confirmation by experience. Specifically, Quine sought to challenge 
the notion that each such statement has both an ‘empirical component’ and a 
‘linguistic component’. Indeed, he denied that such a separation is possible. A theory 
that reduces meaning to the intentions of some creator-subject survives on the idea 
that something purely linguistic is present to us, capable of being grasped in order to 
give meaning to an utterance. If intentions are found to either contain empirical 
                                                
9 Wheeler shows that Davidson, Derrida and Sellars all agreed with Quine’s rejection of the idea of 
meanings as ‘obscure intermediary entities’. As Sellars observed, the real test for theories of language 
had been to posit an ‘account of “thinking in presence” – that is to say, its account of those occasions 
on which the fundamental connection of language with nonlinguistic fact is exhibited’ (Sellars 1997, 
65). This approach, based on the assumption ‘that meaning is a relation between a word and a 
nonverbal entity’, was rejected by Sellars (ibid., 67). Indeed, Sellars’s attack on the myth of the given, 
an attack on the idea that ‘empirical knowledge rests on a “foundation” of non-inferential knowledge 
of matter of fact’ (ibid., 15), is another fundamental attack on the presence model. Rorty, subsequently, 
argued that Sellars’ and Quine’s ‘holism is a product of their commitment to the thesis that 
justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but of 
conversation, of social practice’ (Rorty 1979, 170). What Rorty illustrates in constructing his 
epistemological behaviourism is that Sellars and Quine are effectively making the same argument, 
which bears equally against the myth of the given and the analytic/synthetic divide. Rorty’s 
epistemological behaviourism, however, took the arguments of Sellars and Quine one step further, so 
that knowledge, rather than attempt to mirror nature, is ‘what society lets us say’ (ibid., 174). What 
Quine, Sellars and Rorty all presented, as the latter claimed, are ‘forms of holism’, ‘a conception of 
philosophy which has nothing to do with the quest for certainty’ (ibid., 170-171). 
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content, or, if we take Davidson’s line, fit the totality of possible sensory evidence, 
then they will suffer from the same problems as languages do, mainly that without 
something present to act as an anchor, the ‘presence’ meaning of an intention, as a 
meaning bearer or meaning determiner in the ways we have discussed, is nothing but 
a chimera. If we look to interpret artworks by way of intentions, we will, 
consequently, according to Wheeler, continue to regress into more and more text that 
lies behind the text of the intention. 
 To deny presence, certainty and essentialism is to concede, as Wheeler 
observes, to the indeterminacy of interpretation (Wheeler 2000, 27). So, he argues, 
‘on a theory that denies presence (i.e., a theory without the myth of the given), no 
level of meaning escapes indeterminacy problems. All the way down there is just 
more language. All significant items are signlike, non-self-interpreting, and thus defer 
something’ (ibid., 28). However, the problem we ultimately encounter regarding 
discussions of indeterminacy is that, as Cooper observes, arguments for 
indeterminacy at most show that we can’t be sure of what is meant, not that there was 
nothing meant (Cooper 2003, 64). Nevertheless, Cooper demonstrates that many 
meaning sceptics are also meaning nihilists, that is, rather than state that they aren’t 
sure whether a meaning is true, they argue that there is nothing to know or hold 
reasonable beliefs about. Cooper claims that meaning sceptics should really complain 
not against those who claim that there are meanings but against a certain conception 
of meaning, ‘an “objectivist” or “realist” one according to which a judgement could 
only be true by corresponding with states of affairs that obtain quite independently of 
human perspective, sentiment, concern and the like’ (Cooper 2003, 76). Regarding 
the case of moral truths, Cooper proposes that once the sceptic agrees that moral 
truths are of a different ilk from scientific ones, then, ‘there is no need to indulge in 
sceptical or nihilist rhetoric’ (ibid.). For Cooper, ‘anything at all may, in an 
appropriate context, be spoken of as having meaning’ (ibid., 21), but, in this instance, 
meaning is not some ‘obscure intermediary entity’.  
 Meaning, for Cooper, is related to the articulative and disclosive dimension 
of the world. This is in stark contrast to the assertive and fact-establishing account of 
language that, Charles Taylor claims, has occupied the majority of approaches to 
language in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. 10  ‘Reason-alone’ thinking, 
                                                
10 See Taylor 2011, 39-55. 
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encouraged by the natural sciences and which aims to tackle human problems on its 
own, has, as Taylor illustrates, aided the focus on the purely assertive, fact-
establishing dimension of language in analytic philosophy. Having been ontologised 
and applied universally, this narrowed conception of reason has no need for the 
disclosive-articulative-dimension of human language until, that is, it is acknowledged 
that this narrowed reason is, in fact, ill-equipped to tackle all the inescapable issues of 
life. Indeed, as Taylor argues, ‘the articulative/disclosive is the essential background 
to our most immediately “practical” discourse’ (Taylor 2011, 51). Taylor is 
convinced that the articulative and disclosive dimension of language cannot be peeled 
off from the public giving of and asking for reasons. It is with this focus on the 
ontological and logical primacy of the disclosive aspects of language that Cooper 
argues that ‘to provide explanations of meaning, I suggest, is to respond to actual or 
potential questions about the relationship of items (utterances, gestures, rituals or 
whatever) to Life’ (Cooper 2003, 31). According to Cooper, ‘Life’ is both the 
permanent subject and permanent background of meaning, and it is the failure to 
attend to this background that has been responsible for what we have seen in this 
chapter as some pretty narrow conceptions of meaning in the philosophy of music. In 
Cooper’s words, meaning-explanations give an indication of something’s 
‘appropriateness to Life’ (ibid., 57), whether it is the appropriateness of Adorno’s 
interpretations of Wagner’s works to the respective worlds of 1937/38 and 1963, 
which we discussed in detail in chapter two, or the appropriateness of Oi! and punk 
rock to Thatcherism, neoliberalism and the collapse of the British consensus as 
discussed in chapter one. More importantly, having positioned ourselves towards 
meaning in such a way that meaning is no longer an ‘obscure intermediary entity’, 
meaning can be detached from essence in order to accommodate a conception of 
musical meaningfulness based upon aesthetic experiences, experiences that are, in 
part, fore-structured by our particular situatedness in the everyday practices of social 
and cultural ‘Life’. Furthermore, as we shall now see, if we separate essence from 
meaning, we can still work with essence within a framework of disclosure rather than 
accede to relativism or meaning nihilism. 
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There and Back Again 
 
When it comes to music, if we deny meanings as ‘obscure intermediary entities’, 
which include meanings as artistic intentions, we are faced with non-text, an absence 
of any explicit and objective text behind the music. Understanding music without 
realism’s final say of a meaning as an unchanging, ‘present’ entity is, as Wheeler 
argues, an ‘in-principle uncompletable explication, elucidation, and discussion’ of the 
music (Wheeler 2000, 52). For Cooper, artworks are sites of world-disclosure, or, as 
Heidegger claimed, it is through art that the world opens itself. An artwork ‘may 
display the meaningful relations of appropriateness in which the things they present 
stand to Life’ (Cooper 2003, 111). Coming back to our investigations of Adorno’s 
interpretations of Wagner in chapter two, what was the meaningfulness of Wagner’s 
works for Adorno in 1938? It was that they disclosed a culture industry of 
Hollywood, the radio, cinema, advertising, phantasmagoria and commodification. 
What was the meaningfulness of Wagner’s music dramas for the Adorno in 1963? It 
was that they disclosed the same truths about the world as those unconcealed by 
practitioners of modern autonomous art. Adorno even made a point of discussing 
Wagner’s ‘appropriateness to Life’ when he titled his 1963 speech at the Berlin 
Festival ‘Wagners Aktualität’.  
Meaning-explanations as indications of appropriateness to Life ultimately 
come down to questions of truth. As Heidegger argued, ‘if we consider the old, 
traditional definition of truth from this perspective – the definition veritas est 
adaequatio intellectus ad rem, homoiôsis, conformity, assimilation of thinking to the 
thing that is thought – then we can see that this old definition of truth is indeed 
correct in its approach’ (Heidegger 1992a, 497). In other words, to see how and 
whether what an artwork presents conforms or corresponds to what Wittgenstein calls 
the ‘form of life’ from which it emerges is to engage with truth. Indeed, the content of 
truth was a central concern for Heidegger. Steven Crowell observes that if, for 
Heidegger, ‘truth…is a normative notion’ (Crowell 2013, 239), then an account of 
why we can and must act in the light of norms is not as a result of Dasein’s ability to 
reflect on itself qua rational animal as might be case with certain metaphysical 
readings of Kant and Hegel, but as a result of a tripartite ‘care’ [Sorge] structure – ‘to 
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understand myself as suspended between success and failure – to exist in a normative 
space – is possible only because my being is care’ (ibid., 288).11  
The first two parts of this three-part structure illustrate the importance that 
pre-propositional practices play in determining the success or failure of claims to 
truth. Firstly, ‘it is because we are always affectively disposed towards the world in 
certain ways that things can matter to us; and we are disposed towards the world in 
certain ways because we are exposed to it – “thrown”, in Heidegger’s language’ 
(ibid., 240-241). It should be noted here that the concept of ‘world’ in Heidegger is, 
as Crowell observes, ‘a space of intelligibility or meaning’ (ibid., 285). Indeed, it is 
because we are ‘thrown’ into an inherently meaningful world that – secondly – ‘the 
care structure involves our practical skills and abilities, which Heidegger calls 
“understanding” (Verstehen), in the sense of know-how’ (ibid., 241). According to 
Heidegger, Dasein is not a theoretician but something that first learns to make sense 
of the world practically. It is because we, as individuals, are born into, raised within 
and inseparable from socio-cultural practices, which include pre-linguistic, tacit 
practices, that things can show up as this or that or as being for this or for that. So, 
Crowell explains, ‘things show up as “equipment” (Zeug), that is, in light of what 
they are good for. What they are good for is what they are used for. Thus, to grasp a 
pen as a pen is not to predicate something of it but to use it to write’ (ibid., 286). 
Indeed, our practical skills and abilities have a normative aspect. For example, 
Crowell suggests that ‘the pen is “appropriate for…”; the hammer is “suitable for…”; 
the nails are “serviceable for…”. Such norms – that is, the standards of 
appropriateness, suitability and serviceability – are relative to the work to be done’ 
(ibid., 286). It follows that Heidegger’s is a hermeneutic, pre-linguistic account of 
what makes us comport ourselves in particular ways in the world so that propositions 
conform or correspond to the way the world is. As Wrathall illustrates, Heidegger’s 
pre-propositional account of truth is required in order to fill the gap between a 
primitive, causal account of human behaviour in the world and an intentional account 
of propositional states that leaves out the stage where intentional content—that which 
                                                
11 Crowell argues that ‘the predicate “true” properly applies to propositions because they can be 
assessed in terms of a distinction between correct and incorrect, measured against the entity as it is in 
itself’ (Crowell 2013, 193). According to Crowell, ‘Heidegger argues that for an entity to serve as such 
a measure or norm, it must show up in a holistic context of significance (“world”) that has been 
disclosed in advance, a disclosedness he terms “ontological truth”. Such truth does not stand in 
normative relation to falsity but to “closed-off-ness”’ (ibid.). 
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is intended in an assertion—becomes fixed.12 For Wrathall, it is Heidegger’s account 
of discovery within a practical – not linguistic – context that explains the fixing of 
intentional content in propositional states.  
Johnson goes even further in his discussions of embodied meaning, arguing 
that even prior to conscious experience, our bodies interact meaningfully with the 
world around us beneath the level of conscious awareness. He suggests that at a 
nonconscious level, our bodily movements form the basis both for the meaning of our 
movements and, at once, the meaning of the world we move within. In short, Johnson 
claims that ‘meaning is not just what is consciously entertained in acts of feeling and 
thought; instead, meaning reaches deep down into our corporeal encounter with our 
environment’ (Johnson 2007, 25). Meanings, therefore, are grounded in our bodily 
connections with things, and, as cognitive science illustrates, must be constantly 
made and re-made via our sensorimotor engagements. If we follow Johnson’s 
arguments based on phenomenology, pragmatism and discoveries in the 
neurosciences, then one could be justified in claiming that it is the practical totality of 
involvement that brings with it the possibility of rightness and wrongness in our way 
of relating to things, such as when we realise that a hammer is for driving nails as 
opposed to chopping wood. Such practical involvements are, according to Crowell, 
the grounds of ‘care’ – the conditions of truth – that make linguistic interaction 
possible. 
 An account of the conditions of truth based upon the ontological and logical 
primacy of our practical engagements in a world has, as we have seen in the previous 
two chapters, important ramifications for how we account for the meaningfulness of 
musical praxis. Music as an embedded practice protests against the reification that 
would turn it into purely an object of perception, that is, what Bowie calls an ‘object 
with properties’ or what Braver refers to as a ‘present-at-hand object’. If the 
experience of art is an experience of meaning, then musical meaningfulness, as 
Gadamer proposed, is already socially and culturally mediated. To be sure, the 
disclosure of being relies on entities having an essence. However, as Heidegger 
argued, by essence we do not mean a kind of presence model of essence, a conception 
of essence which Heidegger called des unwesentliche Wesen, what Wrathall translates 
as ‘the unessential essence’ and what I prefer to call ‘the unessence-like essence’. As 
                                                
12 See Wrathall 2011, 49-52. 
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Wrathall claims, ‘the point is simply that…the essence is fixed not by a property that 
an entity now possesses or an abstract type that it presently instantiates, but by that in 
the view of which we take it as that thing it is’ (Wrathall 2011, 28).  
Authentic essence is changeable. The reason for this, as we explored in 
chapter two, is because when we engage with actual works of music, we are bringing 
with us our socially- and culturally-cultivated tacit norms and practices that make up 
the particular style of our world, and by which we come to make sense of the world. 
Our experience of music and the articulation of that experience are, in part, fore-
structured by our situatedness within the world of everyday practices. As Wrathall 
explains, ‘we disclose the essences that we do, according to Heidegger, because the 
way we are moved by or disposed to things allows a particular style of being “to be 
ascendant”’ (ibid., 32). So, Crowell argues, the norms that give shape to my skills and 
know-how ‘belong first of all to the social context in which I find myself. My 
“abilities-to-be” are not instincts but roles and socially recognised practices into 
which I have been born and according to the norms of which I must act if I am to be 
recognised as acting at all’ (Crowell 2013, 245). Indeed, in terms of the tripartite 
‘care’ structure that Crowell puts forward, if we are disposed towards the world in the 
ways we are and if we are able to measure our approaches to the world against certain 
standards because of our practical skills and abilities then this understanding 
[Verstehen], this tacit know-how, can be articulated in the form of ‘discourse’ [Rede] 
– ‘a shared, publically articulated space of meaning’ as opposed to a ‘forum 
internum’ (ibid., 241). In other words, just as we are accountable to others through 
our practical engagement with the world, we are also still part of the same structure of 
‘care’ when we come to articulate what Christine Korsgaard (1996) refers to as our 
‘practical identities’ in the inferential sphere of intersubjective legitimacy.13 As 
Crowell explains, for Heidegger, ‘because Dasein is Mitsein, agency also entails the 
unconditional – that is, moral – obligation to be accountable to others’ (ibid., 284), 
                                                
13 Korsgaard defines ‘practical identity’ as ‘a description under which you value yourself’ (Korsgaard 
1996, 101). Although I agree with the principle of individuals as partly determined by their place in 
specific socio-cultural practices, I think Korsgaard’s definition is too narrow, constricting our identities 
to professional titles and socially-cultivated roles such as being a ‘friend’ or a ‘father’. What I would 
suggest is that, as Dasein, we do not have a specific practical identity that can be narrowed down to the 
particular roles we play in a world but one which is constituted by the particular style of the whole 
world, which includes other ‘practical identities’, in Korsgaard’s sense, that we may not describe 
ourselves as having. Indeed, some may choose to shun self-descriptions and labels entirely for fear of 
self-reification or of alienating oneself from other worlds of diverse and capacious groups and 
individuals. 
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specifically, ‘to be responsible is equally to be answerable to others’ (ibid., 302). 14 
Authentic essence, therefore, insomuch as it is entwined with ‘socially recognised 
practices’, including what Crowell calls the ‘meta-practice’ of ‘discourse’, is itself a 
norm in that it is only in the sphere of public legitimacy, a trans-cultural and trans-
historical space of truth, that, after the end of meanings as ‘obscure intermediary 
entities’, we can even speak of essence as somehow related to truth and 
meaningfulness. For those looking for a naturalistic explanation of normativity, this 
may seem like a particularly bitter pill to swallow. Indeed, it is the transience of 
essence that, in the context of creative practices such as music, makes it extremely 
difficult to produce a naturalistic or metaphysical account of the grounds of 
normativity. Creative practices like music have shown themselves to be constantly in 
the business of norm-appraisal and norm-transcendence. It seems more obvious and 
intelligible, therefore, that the normalisation of norm-transcending practices such as 
musical interpretation can be made sense of through the historical and social changes 
to ways of being that they helped initiate and not by some paradigm-shifting change 
that takes place within nature. 
When it comes to asking why a particular interpretation of a musical work 
prevails over any other or why, say, two understandings of a piece seem to be equally 
authoritative so as to produce a debate, Heidegger was less thorough in his 
hermeneutical account than his student Gadamer. Heidegger argued for the existence 
of a clearing [Lichtung] that allows particular ways of being disposed to the world by 
concealing others – ‘the clearing maintains a world by keeping back (concealing) 
possibilities that are incompatible with the essence that is currently operative’ 
(Wrathall 2011, 34). As we saw in chapter two, Gadamer went some way to 
disclosing the structure of the clearing through his ideas of historically effected 
consciousness and horizon. Here, understanding and interpretation are partly 
determined by our historically determined situatedness providing us with the right 
horizon of enquiry, so that we are effected in finding the right questions to ask of the 
work of art when we are caught up in the event. No particular meaning of a piece of 
music will be true a priori because the ‘objectivity’ of a specific meaning terminates 
in the ‘fusion of horizons’ between the interpreter and the work of art. Essence and 
meanings are, therefore, historically contingent, and, as we saw in the previous 
                                                
14 The relationships between discourse, accountability and our practical engagements with the world 
will form the basis of our discussions regarding the future of critical musicology in chapter five. 
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chapter, have the propensity to change with the world. Musical works, indeed, all 
artworks, when it comes to interpretation, are, therefore, nothing more than 
unfinished events. 
If we move beyond the paradigm of philosophy that has taken for its starting 
point the assertive, fact-establishing dimension of language-games and acknowledge 
that artworks are unfinished events, we come to realise that the philosophy of music, 
in its current guise, is in need of an upgrade. The philosophy of music thinks it can 
disclose the secrets of music, its identity, its ontology, its meaning, its expressivity 
and its profundity, all of which, it is supposed, can be grasped either through 
disengaged contemplation of Kivy’s ‘precepts and propositions’ that act as the 
unspoken foundations of music or through the creation of what Zangwill, as we saw 
in chapter one, refers to as ‘rational explanatory stories’. By revealing that such 
beliefs and ways of thinking about music are chimerical, and, instead, taking as our 
starting point music’s fundamental embeddedness in creation, performance and 
reception, music as historically, socially and culturally mediated, music as anti-
presence and music as disclosive and articulative, we start to realise that the 
philosophy of music is ill-equipped to provide definitive answers to the problems of 
music. Indeed, as we have seen, when it comes to music, such problems are nothing 
more than Wittgensteinian pseudo-problems.  
As explored in the previous two chapters, in order to avoid reifying music, the 
current practices of fashioning or analysing concepts must, arguably, be replaced with 
engagement with actual manifestations of musical praxis - its creation, performance 
and reception. Discussion must, if there is to be a non-reified engagement with music, 
now revolve around musical events and the contexts in which they are embedded. So 
what is the place of philosophy when it comes to music? Rather than attempt to come 
up with all the answers, philosophy could support the work of critical musicologists 
and musical practitioners by bringing certain issues regarding musical praxis to light. 
Rorty once said that the task of the intellectual, with regards to social justice, is not to 
provide refinements of social theory but to sensitise us to the suffering of others and 
to help us in becoming more other-minded. Similarly, when it comes to a 
philosopher’s interaction with music, their task is not necessarily to do with grasping 
answers to aesthetic questions – partly because, as discussed, such answers may not 
exist in graspable form – but to suggest how lessons learnt from philosophical 
speculation on music can be useful for assisting performers, composers, musical 
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spaces, musical institutions and critical musicologists in their task of innovative 
exploration of musical praxis. In other words, certain ‘philosophical’ ideas could be 
required not to explain and describe but to phenomenologically remind us of our 
experiences of music in everyday practices and also to articulate the meaningfulness 
of those experiences. And this is what I will aim to do in the next chapter. We will 
now take our leave of philosophy and see how what has been discovered in the past 
three chapters could potentially impact upon current practices and future ways of 
doing in critical musicology. 
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MUSICOLOGICAL ANALYTICITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the start of the previous chapter, I put forward the idea that using the subject-
object model to account for the nature of our relationship, as interpreters, to works of 
art is both a philosophical and musicological problem. More importantly, in the 
context of a thesis that aims to discuss the relationship between music and reification, 
to base our engagement with artworks on a model that consists of a reflective subject 
separated from and aiming to enquire after an object with properties is to set up a 
situation that can allow for the reification of aesthetic praxis. This is not to suggest 
that reification can merely be equated with objectification because, as discussed, 
certain objectifications are needed to make music, to make it comprehensible and to 
debate interpretations. The issue is that the act of detached contemplation of the 
nature of music, in order to make it into an object of philosophical enquiry, rigidly 
severs all links with our everyday interactions with musical phenomena. In other 
words, disengaged contemplation of the nature of music ignores the particulars of 
musical experience that help to explain why music matters to us and why it forms 
such an important part of our socio-cultural practices, practices that can be 
transformed by music and that can also bring about a change in the status and 
meaning of music as well as a transformation of what is thought to be its ‘nature’. For 
Adorno, the result of reification is that objects are reduced to concepts of ‘pure 
speculation’; for Bowie, philosophical contemplation gives rise to objects with 
properties; for Braver, inherently meaningful phenomena are relegated to 
decontextualized, unchanging entities. Thus, we see that the subject-object model for 
understanding art and artworks both allows for and is, simultaneously, affirmed by 
the reification of aesthetic praxis. If, however, music is not to be thought of as an 
object of philosophical enquiry but as a phenomenon that we, as historically- and 
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culturally-mediated subjects, respond to differently at different times then it is these 
responses that matter when it comes to making sense of musical praxis. Indeed, it is 
our aesthetic experiences that call into question the dogmatic separation of the 
‘subject of knowledge’ from the ‘object of knowledge’. With regards to the inherent 
meaningfulness of aesthetic experiences, I have been arguing for a non-reified 
engagement with musical praxis based upon the interpretation of concrete musical 
situations, whereby our concepts are used to ‘open up the nonconceptual’, that is, to 
conceptualise our aesthetic experiences, which cannot be inferred purely from the 
sonic configuration and stylistic norms of the music. Indeed, to consider musical 
works as what Wellmer calls ‘objective correlates of aesthetic experience’ is, as was 
discussed in chapter one, to acknowledge that music cannot be isolated from acts of 
interpretation, criticism and analysis. To make music ontologically reliant upon acts 
of interpretation is, therefore, to trade in contemplative, ‘objective’ accounts of the 
nature of music for a conception of music as world-disclosive, as thematising how 
individuals and groups come to make sense of the world and each other. It follows 
that to think of works of music as ‘disclosive’ is nonsense if we maintain the 
distinction between what comes from the subjective side of the interpretation and 
what comes from the objective side.  
 But how is the subject-object model a problem for musicology? It would be 
obvious to most musicologists that their main ways of doing do not involve reifying 
attempts to provide explanatory theories for music’s ontology, meaning and value. 
Indeed, many would now affirm something like the non-reified approach to 
understanding musical praxis that emphasises music’s world-disclosive potential. For 
example, many might share Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist’s view that music is 
now open ‘to the multiplicity of possible interpretations and a studied avoidance of 
value judgement’ (Cook and Everist 2001, x).1 They may feel an affinity with those 
musicologists Cook and Everist describe as assuming ‘neither music’s self-
sufficiency (as early proponents of formalism did) nor its lack thereof (in the manner 
of much of the New Musicology)’, thus wishing to problematise the issue of musical 
autonomy (ibid., xii). They may also empathise with recent commentators who have 
                                                
1 I stress that music may now be open to multiple methods of enquiry. This, as musicologists will 
contend, has not always been the case. In fact, the crude, reductionist ‘story’ of the New Musicology, 
is, generally, one of a discipline’s overcoming of its former self, a self that, like the philosophy of 
music, based its techniques of musical engagement on the premise of musical autonomy. Such a ‘story’ 
is hinted at if not explicitly narrated by, for example, Agawu 1997, Cook and Everist 2001, Hooper 
2006, Kerman 1985, L. Kramer 1992, Samson 2001, Tomlinson 1993 and Williams 2000 and 2001. 
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attempted ‘to “ground music”…[to] embrace social cause, but...also to what we may 
call “social trace” (the imprint of the social world on musical materials themselves) 
and to the social production of musical meanings (the subject-matter of a reception 
history)’ (Samson 2001, 50). They might also agree with Lydia Goehr’s argument for 
the dependant, culturally emergent nature of musical works and the discourse about 
them.2 
 The point of this chapter is not to propose a new way forward for musicology. 
Instead, I want to offer some suggestions for how the previous investigations into a 
non-reifying engagement with music could help us to better understand the current 
climate of musicology and its future possibilities. How does musicology fare when it 
comes to engaging with music without attempting to provide explanatory theories for 
its ontology, meaning and value? Does musicology treat the musical work as an 
‘objective correlate of aesthetic experience’, thus allowing for a conception of 
musical praxis as an unfinished event? Do musicologists respect the particularity of 
aesthetic experiences and how do they go about articulating those experiences?  
Cook and Everist argue that there seems to be a ‘widespread loss of 
confidence’ in what musicologists thought they knew (Cook and Everist 2001, v).3 
This loss of confidence does not just apply to a particular method of analysis, a 
specific argument in the debate about performance practice or some long-standing, 
generally accepted theme that has become entwined with the history of a particular 
composition or composer. When Cook and Everist claim that the musicological 
community has lost confidence in what it thought it knew, they argue that the 
community is no longer sure about the ‘object’ of its enquiry. In short, Cook and 
Everist claim that musicology has lost confidence in its knowledge of music. Philip 
V. Bohlman provides a summary of the dilemma facing musicology: ‘music may be 
what we think it is; it may not be’ (Bohlman 2001, 17).  
Rob C. Wegman affirms Cook and Everist’s notion that there appears to be a 
loss of confidence in what musicologists took to be a transparent, objective and 
                                                
2 See Goehr 1992. 
3 Cook and Everist put this loss of confidence down to the decline of musical autonomy. Richard 
Middleton goes further and argues that it was a disdain for post-Enlightenment conception of culture 
‘and the political thrust of its usages in late modernity, which, within music studies, has generated a 
whole range of characteristic impulses: attacks on “the canon”, on “great composer history”, and on 
“transcendental” aesthetics; critiques of “positivistic” historiographies and analytical methods; 
deconstructions of patriarchal, ethnocentric, and other “ideological” interpretations; valorization of 
popular music cultures; the relativising of differences between musical systems; and so on’. (Clayton, 
Herbert and Middleton 2012, 4-5). 
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‘given’ point of enquiry, the consequence of which ‘throws into doubt the 
comfortable distinction of objective description of fact and the subjective judgement 
of value’ (Cook and Everist 2001, v). Indeed, Wegman takes this narrative one-step 
further, claiming that current musicology is enamoured with the past and suffers from 
‘a profound and despairing sense of melancholia’ as a result of this lost confidence 
(Wegman 2012, 45). ‘Like Narcissus’, Wegman proposes, ‘or so critics remind us, we 
have gazed into a fountain, and have become enamoured of the image reflected in its 
surface’ (ibid., 43). What musicologists long for, so he claims, is for their view of the 
past ‘to be real, objective, autonomous, authentic, other’ (ibid.). Recognising that 
such a vision of the past does not exist, Wegman states that musicologists either 
question whether musicology is possible at all or repudiate the past entirely. In asking 
whether historical musicology is possible, ‘musicologists have become engaged in a 
desperate search for legitimation’, a search that is, ultimately ‘doomed to fail’ (ibid., 
46). Whether or not we agree with Wegman’s representation of the discipline, what it 
illustrates, going back to our discussions at the beginning of chapter one, is that when 
it comes to treading the path of supposed uncertainty within a disciplinary context of 
‘lost confidence’, musicology will potentially encounter the foundationalist threats of 
either realism or idealism. These threats, according to Wegman, are what keep the 
debates in musicology going round in circles.  
The ‘third’ way between realism and idealism, as we saw in chapter two with 
regards to Adorno’s ‘historically different reaction’ to the works of Richard Wagner, 
is the idea that musicologists are neither simply reflecting the world in their 
descriptions of it nor merely imposing their own descriptions on the world without 
taking into account the way the world really is. For musicologists, what Putnam has 
referred to as a ‘God’s–Eye View’, whereby the world as it is in itself matches up 
with our descriptions of it, is unavailable. 4  As such, there is no authoritarian 
standpoint beyond those of historically-mediated human beings located in contexts 
responding to the specific issues that arise within them. We are responding – 
sometimes spontaneously – to the way the world is even though that response cannot 
be definitively encapsulated within a philosophical theory. 5  With these claims 
regarding the inseparability of mind and world, one could suggest that musicology 
                                                
4 See Putnam 1992. 
5 For commentaries on receptivity and spontaneity in the works of the early German Romantics see 
Bowie 2003a, 183-220 and Pinkard 2002, 131-171. 
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has entered a realm where the mind is no longer thought of as mirroring nature, but 
where objectivity is a matter of social agreement or what Rorty calls ‘solidarity’ 
among inquirers – this idea will be explained in chapter five.  
As we saw in chapter three, Kivy and Davies’ respective theoretical positions 
are illustrative of a form of musical engagement that aims to separate the ‘subject of 
enquiry’ from the ‘object of enquiry’ (Kivy 2002, 67). When Davies considers the 
artwork to be ‘of the author’ with a meaning that is causally related to the creator-
subject or when Kivy considers musical practice to be illuminated by ‘precepts and 
propositions’ there is danger that what the culturally- and historically-mediated 
interpreter brings to their engagement with musical praxis will go unacknowledged, 
leaving music to be reducible to the properties, propositions and precepts that 
supposedly govern it. However, in defending the idea that we, as historically- and 
culturally-mediated individuals, are responding to musical praxis, I do not wish to 
condone idealism. Music is physically instantiated, bringing with it an interpretive 
history, interpretive norms and formative and stylistic conventions. Music without 
some sort of sonic configuration based upon certain historical and cultural stylistic 
norms would be incomprehensible.6 Nevertheless, my understanding of what music is 
cannot be solely determined by inferring from its presence as sound because it relies 
on my ability to recognise music in a world that is full of diversity and constant 
change. Kivy’s conception of music according to its precepts and propositions or 
Dodd and Zangwill’s respective accounts of music’s so-called properties cannot 
explain why I am able to recognise new pieces of music that I have never heard 
before as music as well as understand such diverse works as a chant by Leonin, 
Scarlatti’s K. 141 sonata, Miles Davis’ All Blues, The Smiths’ ‘Girlfriend in a Coma’, 
Karlheinz Stockhausen’s Kontakte and John Cage’s 4’33” as all being music. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that with musicology’s loss of confidence in the objectivity of 
music, some musicologists have begun to advocate a hermeneutic approach to 
aesthetic praxis.7 
 Against the background of disciplinary ‘lost confidence’ this chapter will seek 
to discuss an approximation of the current state of play of critical musicology in 
relation to the non-reified critique of music offered earlier in this study. The first 
section will attempt to take a snapshot of current musicology using the ideas of some 
                                                
6 See Samson 2001. 
7 See L. Kramer 2011. 
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of its leading proponents, whilst, at the same time, attempting to situate this snapshot 
within a ‘story’ of twentieth-century musicology. This familiar, albeit reductive, story 
concerns the emancipation of musicology and music analysis from the bonds of text-
based, ‘positivistic’ research and ‘formalist’ analysis, the rise of the ‘New 
Musicology’ followed by its overdue confrontation with an alienated sibling – music 
analysis. Indeed, it is the role played by music analysis in this story that helps shed 
light on the current state of musicology with regards to the relationship between 
music and reification. Music analysis – at times considered to be ‘a discipline 
predicated on the blithe assumption of music’s separateness from the rest of the 
universe’ (Cook and Everist 2001, xii) – has been discussed and questioned by a 
number of commentators since Joseph Kerman’s call for critical interpretation in the 
mid-1980s. However, as Cook and Everist seek to demonstrate, it has only been fairly 
recently that the discipline has accepted that the rumours of the ‘death of analysis’ are 
unhelpful. The second section of this chapter looks at the arguments of a number of 
recent commentators who have discussed how analysis could be or has already been 
incorporated into the framework of critical musicology.  
 
On Critical Musicology 
 
In 1992, Lawrence Kramer encouraged the acceptance of what he called 
‘postmodernist thinking’ in musicology. According to Kofi Agawu, Kramer’s 
rallying call meant that: 
 
We should now accept that there are no nuggets of identity, no positivisms, no irreducible 
essences. There are no invariant first principles, no God or universal reason, no single grand 
narratives by which human history can be conceptualised. Our epistemologies are constructed 
and situated. Everything is fragmented and discontinuous; all truths are partial and provisional. 
Nothing is ever objective, nothing is ever “new”, and nothing can be taken for granted (Agawu 
1997, 301). 
 
 
Although, as Giles Hooper observes and as was discussed in the introduction to this 
study, certain aspects of ‘postmodern’ musicology were influenced and partially 
determined by some flagrantly anti-postmodern ideas,8 Kramer believed that what set 
‘postmodernist thinking’ apart from what we could presumably refer to as ‘modernist 
thinking’ is the desire to overcome the fear of harming the music itself through 
                                                
8 See Hooper 2006, 5-40. 
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language. For ‘modernist’ musicology, Kramer explains, ‘language is denied access 
to music, it cannot represent musical reality; music is the very means by which the 
epistemological limits of language, that would-be omnivore, are set’ (L. Kramer 
1992, 8). In short, for those Kramer is criticising, music’s autonomy was something 
real that warranted protection from linguistic imperialism.9  
Kramer was not the first musicologist to attempt to rid musicology of what 
Ridley refers to in the context of twentieth-century analytic aesthetics as 
‘autonomania’.10 Kerman, seven years before Kramer’s article, called for music 
criticism to replace both ‘positivistic’ research into musical facts and ‘formalistic’ 
music analysis; although, as Agawu observes, the ideological baggage and complex 
histories of both these terms were suppressed in Kerman’s call to end or, at least, 
limit ‘old’ and outmoded theory-based analysis.11 Indeed, it is questionable whether 
musicology, as a whole, was ever quite so coherent or quite so determined by a single 
over-arching ‘modernist’ paradigm as is sometimes implied. Nevertheless, as Samson 
observes, Kerman’s call to overcome a specifically ‘modernist’ musicology did 
‘signal the end of a particular project, one of those mysterious caesuras which 
punctuate intellectual history and which no amount of context can fully explain’ 
(Samson 2001, 54).  
Kerman’s major criticisms of ‘old’ and outmoded musicology can be found in 
his discussion of Iain Fenlon and Anthony Newcomb’s contrasting approaches to 
sixteenth-century Italian music. Whereas, according to Kerman, Newcomb engages 
with the music itself, Fenlon is interested with the issue of patronage as well as the 
broader socio-political context that grounds the music. As Kerman explains, ‘by 
Fenlon’s standards, Newcomb deals with music in too purely “internalist” a fashion, 
paying insufficient attention to the socio-political conditions that produced it. By 
Newcomb’s standards, such “relationships between music and society” as Fenlon is 
able to address without getting into the music itself must necessarily be superficial’ 
(Kerman 1985, 119). For Kerman, the fundamental issue is that ‘musicology is 
perceived as dealing essentially with the factual, the documentary, the verifiable, the 
analysable, the positivistic’ (ibid., 12) – ‘the emphasis was heavily on fact. New 
manuscripts were discovered and described, archives were reported on, dates were 
                                                
9 See L. Kramer 1995, 13-19 for a development of these initial ideas. 
10 See Ridley 2004. 
11 See Agawu 1997, 299. 
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established, cantus firmi traced from one work and one composer to another. 
Musicologists dealt mainly in the verifiable, the objective, the uncontroversial and the 
positive’ (ibid., 42). Kerman saw such an approach to musicology as synonymous 
with the formalistic enterprise of music analysis – ‘It is a historical fact about the 
present that theoretical speculation about music…is dominated by theories of form’ 
(ibid., 62). He challenged the idea that musicological research should be governed by 
‘the presentation of the texts of early music and of facts and figures about it, not their 
interpretation’ (ibid., 42). Equally, when it came to music analysis, Kerman implicitly 
called for reform when he asked, ‘why should analysts concentrate solely on the 
internal structure of the individual work of art as an autonomous entity, and take no 
account of such considerable matters as history, communication, affect, texts and 
programmes, the existence of other works of art, and so much else?’ (ibid., 18).12 
 Is musicology still occupied with a Kermanian positivism and is music 
analysis still committed to a Kermanian formalism?13 In terms of ‘positivistic’ 
musicology, critical musicologists acknowledge, at least at what Hooper calls ‘the 
more subterranean level of the disciplinary sub-conscious’ (Hooper 2006, 5), that the 
discipline evolved into a predominantly US-initiated New Musicology, an institution 
which, according to Alastair Williams, licensed ‘unbridled relativism and pluralism’ 
and operated with ‘a set of postmodernist beliefs that are sometimes as dogmatic as 
their purportedly outmoded predecessors’ (Williams 2000, 386). Indeed, Judy 
Lochhead (2002) illustrates how the terms ‘postmodern musicology’ and ‘New 
Musicology’ are, in some quarters, considered to be interchangeable.  
Parts of New Musicology, in all its diversity, then went on to become what is 
known as ‘critical musicology’, or what Williams refers to as ‘current musicology’, a 
discipline that no longer renounced its ‘modernist’ – that is to say its ‘positivist’ and 
‘formalist’ – past, yet continued to draw upon wider theoretical enterprises in one 
                                                
12 Although commentators have refuted Kerman’s ‘cruel caricature of analysis’, ‘there was’, Cook and 
Everist claim, ‘enough truth in the charge for at least some of the mud to stick’ (Cook and Everist 
2001, xi). Alastair Williams (2001) illustrates how Kerman’s study is regarded as a watershed. 
13 Williams (2001) provides an overview of the problems confronting the discipline. He also explains 
the intellectual currents involved and attempts to chart the transformation of the various sub-disciplines 
throughout the twentieth century. Hooper (2006) goes even further, charting how senses of terms like 
‘critical’, ‘positivism’, ‘modern’, ‘postmodern’ and ‘formalism’ differ between the disciplines, leading 
to a gradual obfuscation of what such terms mean in the context of meta-musicological discourse. It 
follows that when such terms are discussed here, it is what Hooper would refer to as the crude, 
reductive (musicological) sense that is being referred to. However, that does not mean that I do not 
agree with Hooper that ‘far greater care should be exercised in delineating their various applications 
and appropriations in the context of contemporary musicology’ (Hooper 2006, 17). 
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form or another.14 In general terms, the notions of ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ are, 
perhaps unhelpfully, owing to the genealogical complexity and inconsistent 
application of both terms, used to demarcate Kermanian conceptions of ‘positivistic’ 
musicology and ‘formalist’ music analysis from a ‘New’ and ‘critical’ engagement 
with music that aimed to rid itself of the perceived failures of the past and ‘to displace 
notions such as integration, depth, teleology and grand narrative that at one time, we 
are told, were accepted unquestioningly’ (Williams 2000, 386).15 Jonathan D. Kramer 
also articulates some of the characteristics of what he sees as postmodern music, 
which could equally be applied to the way music is appreciated by ‘postmodern’ 
musicologists; mainly that music ‘shows disdain for the often unquestioned value of 
structural unity’, is considered ‘not as autonomous but as relevant to cultural, social, 
and political contexts’, that it ‘embraces contradictions’, ‘distrusts binary 
oppositions’, ‘includes fragmentations and discontinuities’, ‘encompasses pluralism 
and eclecticism’, ‘presents multiple meanings and multiple temporalities’ and ‘locates 
meaning and even structure in listeners, more than in scores, performances, or 
composers’ (J. Kramer 2002, 16-17).   
Musicologists, in writing the history of twentieth-century musicology, 
generally, albeit crudely, distinguish an ‘old’, ‘modern’, fact-governed musicology 
and subject-determined music analysis from what was to be a ‘new’, ‘postmodern’ 
New Musicology, which Kramer, Cook and Everist suggest commenced in the early 
1990s, but, as Hooper observes, any ‘attempt to identify a “prima causa” for any 
historical development inevitably risks sliding toward an untenable determinism or 
                                                
14 The generalisations made here with regards to the historiography of musicology are done so in order 
illustrate how the current situation in critical musicology involves a discipline working through its past 
in the wake of so-called postmodern developments. As Hooper observes, ‘of course few, if any, 
scholars would actually adhere to such a simplistic account of recent disciplinary developments; 
indeed, pointing up the clichéd nature of such accounts has become a kind of second-order cliché in 
itself’ (Hooper 2006, 5). For example, Kofi Agawu’s article, ‘Analysing Music Under the New 
Musicological Regime’, illustrates how the spirit of critical musicology still existed despite the 
‘unbridled relativism and pluralism’ of the New Musicology. Furthermore, Cook’s A Guide to Musical 
Analysis demonstrates how a will to dissolve the postmodernist/modernist binary in musicology even 
pre-dated the birth of the New Musicological regime.  
15 It should be noted that the cultural turn in musicology was, as Richard Middleton observes, not just 
confined to the New Musicology. Ethnomusicology, popular music studies and the New Musicology, 
according to Middleton, all followed concurrent narratives through the final three decades of the 
twentieth century having taken quite distinct routes (Clayton, Herbert and Middleton 2012, 4). Trevor 
Herbert (2012), similarly, argues that the changes to musicology throughout the twentieth century 
coincide in many respects with the development of the social history discipline. Williams provides an 
analysis of how the intellectual movements of structuralism and poststructuralism map onto 
musicology and music analysis throughout the various stages of their transformation (Williams 2001, 
21-47). 
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over-simplification’ (Hooper 2006, 6). 16  Indeed, if ‘postmodern’ musicology is 
anything like the postmodern music characterised by Jonathan D. Kramer (2002), 
then no sharp distinction can be drawn between ‘modernist’ and ‘postmodern’ ways 
of doing musicology as the latter is deemed to operate, simultaneously, as a break 
from, a response and extension to the former. Wellmer, similarly, suggests that if we 
look at the postmodern movement ‘from the right angle, it is possible to discern in it 
also the contours of a radicalised modernism, of an Enlightenment that has acquired a 
higher consciousness of itself, and of a post-rationalist concept of reason. Looked at 
this way, postmodernism takes on the appearance of a de-mythologised Marxism, a 
continuation of aesthetic avant-gardism, or a radicalisation of language philosophy’ 
(Wellmer 1985, 48). Thus, for Wellmer, in one sense, it would be wrong for us to 
merely equate postmodernism with cynicism, irrationality and particularism. 
Ultimately, as he demonstrates, postmodernism can, to a certain degree, also be seen 
as a ‘critique of modernity’ just as Nietzsche, Adorno, Heidegger and Lacan’s 
respective projects face up to the social, cultural, political and philosophical problems 
posed by Western modernity. However, even though, as Wellmer is aware, the 
concept of postmodernism can only be made sense of in terms of its (critical) 
relationship to modernism, ultimately, as shall be demonstrated in greater detail in 
chapter five, there are significant differences between a ‘radicalised’ or ‘critical’ 
modernism and ‘postmodernism’, differences that can no longer be ignored if the 
discipline of musicology is to avoid ‘postmodernising’ itself out of existence. 
As shall be explored in chapter five, the terms ‘New Musicology’ and 
‘postmodernism’ are, arguably, out-dated and disparaging. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Lawrence Kramer stresses that what used to be known as the New 
Musicology should now be called ‘critical musicology’ (L. Kramer 2011, 64). Re-
labelling the discipline does more than address the negative connotations that had 
become attached to the New Musicology. In doing away with the term ‘New 
Musicology’, the musicological community is, in effect, doing away with the 
                                                
16 Despite an ability to locate the emergence of the New Musicology at the American Musicological 
Society’s annual meeting in Oakland in 1990, as Cook and Everist observe, opinions vary as to how 
the term ‘New Musicology’ came about (Cook and Everist 2001, viii). Furthermore, while some of that 
which came to be called ‘New Musicology’ was certainly influenced by ‘postmodern’ theory, it is also 
clear, as Hooper (2006) observes, that the opportunities for ‘postmodern’ theory have not been 
completely exhausted by a localised and transient New Musicology. This leads to Hooper to claim that 
although the term ‘New Musicology’ has become rather ‘old’, ‘the label “postmodern”…has lost none 
of its actuality, even though it is more often than not closely associated, if not directly identified, with 
the ‘new’ musicology’ (Hooper 2006, 8). 
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negative connotations of a New Musicology that, due to certain misconceptions,17 
failed to acknowledge its reliance upon the handed-down materials of ‘modernist’ 
musicology, and, instead, tried to claim an outright rejection of those materials.18 
Although Hooper articulates the confusions and contradictions surrounding the term 
‘critical musicology’ as well as its links to both Critical Theory and critical theory 
qua theory per se, one of the most exciting developments that sets critical musicology 
apart from its predecessor is that, as Williams notes, it ‘critically transforms 
modernism, valuing its achievements and jettisoning its failures’ (Williams 2000, 
386). Critical musicology, at least the British strand, aims to collapse the divide 
between what can be construed from a musicological perspective as ‘postmodern’ and 
what can thought of as the ‘modern’, incorporating aspects of pre-Kermanian or pre-
Kramerian musicology into the achievements of the New Musicology, achievements 
that opened up a space for the critical interpretation of music, a pluralistic approach to 
musical works, a respect for cultural, social, political, sexual and gender difference 
and a re-enchantment of musical meaning and ontology. One would be justified in 
claiming that the title of Cook and Everist’s edition – Rethinking Music – emphasises 
the modus operandi of the critical musicology: having realised the traps of 
dogmatism and subjective value judgements, critical musicology aims to constantly 
rethink what it thought it knew about music in order to avoid the objectively-given 
and subjectively-determined orthodoxies of the past whilst, nevertheless, 
incorporating the gains made by both ‘old’ and ‘new’ musicologies.  
 One of the most exciting innovations of critical musicology, which we will look 
at in depth in the following section, is its attempt to use music analysis to assist us in 
the process of interpreting the meaningfulness of specific manifestations of musical 
                                                
17 See Hooper 2006, 5-40.  
18 Hooper has highlighted the self-contradictions of the New Musicology. For example, ‘there is a 
tendency, in at least some “new” or “critical” musicological writing, to imply that positivism is simply 
and inherently a “bad thing”…Yet it is clear that the weak(er) version of “positivism” can actually 
incorporate a strikingly diverse range of research activities. For example, it might include: establishing 
the provenance of a given work, the biographical details for a given composer, or the financial 
transactions of a seventeenth-century opera-house; collating data on the educational arrangements at a 
medieval cathedral or the sales figures for a particular genre of popular music; or investigating, at an 
empirical level, the emotional or cognitive reaction of listeners to a particular piece of music. Although 
such undertakings might be categorized as historical musicology and the sociology or psychology of 
music respectively, they all embody a common set of methodological and epistemological 
assumptions. They also account for a very significant proportion of contemporary musicological 
research; in fact, it is difficult to envisage any research project that does not in some way, at some 
level, in relation to some of its material, rely upon a weak positivism in establishing its basic terms of 
reference’ (Hooper 2006, 19). 
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praxis. However, no less important is the idea that ‘no final, universally applicable 
decision on the matter is possible or even desirable’ (Cook and Everist 1999, xi). 
Cook, writing in 1987 on the ideology of a theory of the Tristan chord, a theory 
which aims to settle the debate on the structural significance of the opening chord of 
Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde, claims that the century of controversy surrounding the 
chord highlights the fact that no single interpretation ‘has a monopoly of the truth’ 
(Cook 1987, 232). Cook’s fundamental criticism is that both historical musicology 
and music analysis have attempted to speak with authority – a ‘scientific’ and 
‘theoretical’ authority – on matters relating to music and musical works. However, 
what Robert Gjerdingen refers to as the ‘eternal verities’ of musicology – those 
concepts of music analysis and musicology which are treated as concrete, 
metaphysical facts, and, in some sense, grant musicologists and music analysts the 
authority to disenchant music – are no longer conceived as such (Gjerdingen 2001, 
162). For Kerman, no single individual in his dealings with music – whether critic, 
musicologist, ethnomusicologist, music theorist, music analyst, performer or 
composer – will be able to account for music in its entirety or even for a specific form 
of musical praxis through a definitive theory or interpretation.  
 In coming to realise that any attempts to account for the totality of music or 
musical praxis will result in a failure to appreciate the uniqueness and capaciousness 
of either what we think is (and are yet to call) music or a particular composition or 
performance, musicology, in certain quarters, manages to avoid the perils of 
reification as identity-thinking, which, as we have seen, reduces qualitative 
‘individuals’, ‘particulars’ and ‘heterogeneities’ to what is identical with the ‘form’ of 
disengaged contemplation. The major theme of what follows is to explore the ways in 
which musicology has responded to the repressive effects of certain manifestations of 
identity-thinking. However, as already discussed, that is not to say that all forms of 
identity have negative effects. It is not necessarily the case that by identifying 
something as music, we have restricted the capaciousness of the object; we have 
merely brought that particular piece of music into the inferential sphere of the giving 
of and asking for reasons. Furthermore, no concept or set of concepts has the ultimate 
role in determining the constitution of the object; one of the great benefits of seeing 
language as disclosive as opposed to being merely assertive and fact-establishing, and 
the fact that we can come up with new metaphors to solve cognitive problems, is that 
there will always be additional concepts we can use to account for the object ad 
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infinitum. As was observed in the previous chapter, by engaging with music in a 
world full of change and diversity, there will be no final say in what we think about 
or take from a particular piece of music.  
In addition, as was explored in chapter one, although general assertions about 
particular pieces of music can distort their particularity, to focus purely on the 
particulars would result in a failure to see how such particulars fit in with the general 
situation. In other words, we would fail to account for music as what Wellmer calls a 
‘hidden totality’ that invites contextually-formative interpretation, analysis and 
criticism but, at the same time, resists it. Such a failure could not only lead to an 
inability to identify music as music in the first place, but it could also ignore the ways 
in which specific works, performances and interpretations are, in part, determined by 
their general surroundings. The failure to connect particular pieces of music to the 
wider context of their creation, performance and reception also takes place when 
works are subsumed under an autonomanic conception of music. Lawrence Kramer’s 
way out of positivist and formalist mind-sets was to ‘situate musical experience 
within the densely compacted, concretely situated worlds of those who compose, 
perform and listen’ (L. Kramer 1992, 10). Williams echoes Kramer when he declares 
that ‘social [and we should add historical, cultural and political] and musical aspects 
are not…easily separated…in fact all music is social’ (Williams 2000, 402). 
Similarly, Karol Berger problematizes the distinction between musical and non-
musical facts. He claims that ‘individual actions can make sense only within a 
broader context of premises and constraints established by social practices, shared 
activities with relatively stable and continuous, though not unchanging, aims, means 
by which these aims are realised, and the institutions that support the activities of all 
those engaged in the practice’ (Berger 2005, 492). The crux of the matter for these 
musicologists is that when music is considered to be more than just pure, sound 
structure, a sonic configuration that language cannot penetrate, but something by 
which individuals and groups articulate how they make sense of the world, we are not 
able to clearly distinguish the so-called musical aspects of works and performances 
from the world in which these events emerge.  
When we engage with performances of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony, we 
can, of course, marvel at either the unfolding of Heinrich Schenker’s Ursatz, how the 
Urlinie of the first movement moves within a space of a third, or the organic 
development of Fritz Cassirer’s motifs, but to look at these issues as eternal verities 
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of the autonomous Third Symphony is to ignore the fact that issues of style and of 
compositional technique are derived and inseparable from the world in which 
Beethoven was composing. Indeed, the fact that the Eroica fits Schenkerian analysis 
so well is no mystery of some transcendental, absolute object, but a consequence of a 
moment of congruity between a culturally-derived style and a theory that aims to 
show how that style – tonal music of the early nineteenth century – functions. 
Similarly, the fact that Schenkerian analysis takes up the form that it does during the 
early twentieth century, when it aims to affirm the German art of composition from J. 
S. Bach to Johannes Brahms, is because Schenker’s theory is entwined with his deep-
rooted nationalism, a psychological concern with hearing music ‘properly’, a desire to 
uncover authorial intention and a long-standing organicist polemic against Wagner 
and Hector Berlioz for their betrayal of the ‘immutable laws’ of German composition. 
The fact that the analysis of the Eroica in Das Meisterwerk der Musik 3 (1930) 
follows an article, ‘Rameau oder Beethoven? Erstarrung oder geistiges Leben in der 
Musik?’, in which Schenker provides a polemic against Rameau and French theory in 
general, illustrates that Schenkerian analysis can be understood as an aesthetic project 
that emerged with – amongst other things – nationalist ideology and nineteenth-
century organicist aesthetics.   
 
Embedding Music 
 
The question of how to deal with music’s embeddedness within socio-cultural 
practices has been a concern for both New Musicology and critical musicology. In a 
now infamous disciplinary debate between Lawrence Kramer and Gary Tomlinson, 
the latter accused Kramer, who, as we have already seen, was calling for a particular 
brand of ‘postmodern’ thinking in musicology, of ‘linger[ing] over old viewpoints 
more than suggest[ing] new ones’ (Tomlinson 1993, 18). Although Tomlinson agrees 
with Kramer’s call for musicologists to abandon ‘the myth of music’s autonomy’ by 
‘welcoming the complex situatedness of musical utterances in webs of extramusical 
forces’, he believes that Kramer clings to too much modernist ideology. Specifically, 
Tomlinson accuses Kramer of appealing to ahistorical and formalist conceptions of 
music, of being too ‘internalist’. According to Tomlinson, Kramer ‘locates the 
context of music…in the music itself’ (ibid., 19). Tomlinson is concerned that ‘an 
internalist engagement of the critic with the work’ – a close reading of notes – will 
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‘sweep away in a single stroke the epistemological and phenomenological quandaries 
attendant on the contextualisation Kramer has just finished advocating’ (ibid., 20). 
Tomlinson then summarises his aims:  
 
[My] contextualism will not circle back narrowly to the notes but instead will resolutely 
historicise musical utterance, exploding it outwards through an imaginative building of 
contexts out of as wealthy a concatenation of past traces as the historian can manage. Such 
contextualism will aim to describe a local set of meanings in as full a volume as possible. It 
will not pose as a reconstruction of some putative and unitary “original” situation the music 
inhabited but will recognise the myriad situations we as historians might construct around a 
musical utterance and the plurality of meanings the music might thus engage (ibid., 22). 
 
 
Despite the shadows of positivism and relativism lingering over Tomlinson’s claims, 
his proposals touch upon some important themes that we have considered throughout 
this thesis. If we are to attend to the musical work as an ‘objective correlate of 
aesthetic experience’, then the experience of music and the articulation of what that 
experience discloses cannot be confined to the study of works in the common, score-
derived sense of the term. Firstly, to purely analyse and discuss works as notes on a 
page, with no concern for what lies outside the edges of the score, would turn 
musical works into what Goehr refers to as ‘concrete physical objects’ that have a 
‘self-sufficiently formed unity, expressive in its synthesised form and [the] content of 
a genius’s idea’ (Goehr 1992, 242). Secondly, by calling into question the 
autonomanic conception of music, Tomlinson, like Goehr, argues that musicologists 
must recognise that the category of the ‘work’, is a ‘cultural construction’, not a 
‘given’ that can only be understood through disengaged contemplation (Tomlinson 
1993, 23). The diversity and ever-changing nature of the world ensures that the 
question of the ontology of the musical work will generate as many answers as the 
meanings that are attributed to these works. Indeed, as we observed in chapter one, 
once we understand that the work only emerges in act of mediation between the 
interpreter and the sounds that we tacitly grasp as being music, this makes the 
ontological status of the work unclear. For Tomlinson, it is because of cultural 
diversity and change that we cannot habitually and tacitly deploy musicological 
concepts as ‘given’, monolithic truths.  
Furthermore, as Cook and Everist observe, by calling into question what were 
thought to be the objective truths of music’s ontology and autonomy, musical 
subjectivity is also destabilised. As Tomlinson proposes, ‘we cannot successfully 
  151 
challenge these myths [the myths of genius and individualism] while we remain 
bound to models of culture that see it as made exclusively through the conscious and 
subconscious intents of historical actors. Neither can we do so while we adhere 
single-mindedly to conceptions of subjectivity that grant it unrivalled culture-making 
powers’ (ibid., 22). For those who are suspicious of the subject’s role in determining 
value, who do not wish to derive meaning purely from subjective judgements and 
who question the identity of any would-be subject that attempts to determine value, 
disciplinary authority suffers a loss of confidence.  
If we move away from a score-based conception of the musical work and all 
the formalist and autonomanic baggage associated with it, and consider works as 
events, whereby, as was observed in chapter two, the work does not exist outside of 
its presentation [Darstellung], then the articulation of what is disclosed will not be 
confined to the analysis of notes on a page or to certain acoustic phenomena. For 
Gadamer, the experience of the work is the ‘non-differentiation of the mediation 
[Vermittlung] from the work itself’; the work is actualised as a work only through its 
presentation and in its presentation (Gadamer 2004, 118). When we consider the 
musical work as that which only has its being through mediation, then the 
meaningfulness of aesthetic experience will be drawn from the entire context of 
presentation, including, but not restricted to, the bodily movements of the 
performers, the context of the performance, the medium through which a 
performance is transmitted, the constitution of the audience, the work’s reception, the 
instruments used, the economic, cultural, social and political background to the event 
as well as the sounds we understand to be music. Furthermore, if we acknowledge 
that our understanding of a piece of music does not occur in a vacuum, isolated from 
all other experiences in and of the world, then all understanding of a particular event 
will be based on (but not completely determined by) the background of our prior 
involvement in the world.  
For example, the question of the meaning of the so-called ‘invasion theme’ in 
the first movement of Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony has been a long-standing 
bone of contention for those engaged in the ‘Shostakovich debate’ over the 
composer’s life, intentions and works. Is the theme an expression of the Nazi war-
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machine bursting into life of the Leningrad people?19 Alternatively, as Solomon 
Volkov claims, was the composer thinking about other enemies of humanity when he 
composed the theme?20 These questions demonstrate how the Shostakovich debate 
between revisionists/Volkovists and anti-revisionists/Taruskinites is still tainted by 
too much ‘modernist’ ideology in its pursuit for facts surrounding the political views 
of the ‘real’ Shostakovich. For those concerned with biography, Shostakovich’s 
views concerning the Stalinist regime may still prove to be fruitful, especially as 
such views are, as the debate illustrates, so difficult to pin down. The problem with 
coming to read Shostakovich’s political views off the music itself is that, as we saw 
with Adorno’s contrasting interpretations of Wagner’s works in chapter two, the 
works themselves can change with the world. To understand meaning as determined 
by a causal relationship between an artwork and the creator-subject is to fail to 
understand why music, rather than just being a historical relic or a tool of the 
biographer, continues to play such an important role in our everyday practices. As we 
have seen, with the change in the event’s situatedness, the meaningfulness of 
aesthetic experience will change as we respond to musical praxis from out of a 
different series of contexts. Therefore, rather than ask whether the ‘invasion theme’ 
is an expression of the Nazi war-machine or an expression of the Stalinist regime, 
perhaps a better question to ask in the age of lost confidence is ‘do we interpret the 
theme as programmatically representing such and such?’ Even Richard Taruskin, 
who argues that the programmatic elements of the Seventh Symphony cannot be read 
out of the context of the immediate, overriding urgencies of the war, observes, 
through the ideas of Leo Mazel, that if focus is taken away from what the author 
intended, ‘wartime listeners [due to their particular historical situatedness and 
through their specific horizons of enquiry] were justified in hearing a representation 
of Nazis, and we [for the same hermeneutic reasons] are justified now, if we are still 
interested in anti-Soviet revisionism, in hearing a representation of Bolsheviks’ 
(Taruskin 1997, 488). Ultimately, in acknowledging the world in all its change and 
diversity, then different horizons of enquiry will generate different meanings, 
satisfying Tomlinson’s call for the recognition of a ‘plurality of meanings’ that 
surround a musical utterance. As Taruskin claims, ‘the putative original 
                                                
19 See Shostakovich’s explications for the programmatic nature of the first three movements of the 
symphony in Fay 2000, 129. 
20 See Volkov 1981. 
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identification of the invasion theme with Stalin does not preclude its later use as a 
symbol for the Nazi aggression’ (ibid., 489). The danger with such hermeneutic 
approaches to the question of music’s meaningfulness is that there is a tendency to 
suggest that ‘anything goes’. This, as we shall discuss in detail later in the chapter 
and in chapter five, raises certain ethical and political questions that cannot be 
ignored if musicology, as an institution, is to be seen as a legitimate enterprise.  
What divides Tomlinson and Kramer is the question of the place of music 
analysis in the New Musicology. For Kramer, the crux of the matter is that ‘we 
cannot understand music “in context” thick or otherwise, if we have no means of 
representing concretely what the music does as utterance’ (L. Kramer 1993, 31). The 
problem is a familiar one. How are we to understand the context within which music 
is created, performed and received if we do not understand a particular performance 
or piece of music? For Kramer, there can be moral and political problems in using 
certain aesthetic tools to engage with a particular manifestation of musical praxis. 
We can question the motivations behind the use of set theory as opposed to 
Schenkerian analysis or the deployment of Derrida as opposed to Adorno. However, 
for Kramer, rather than rule out any of what he calls ‘aesthetic ideologies’ for fear 
that this might damage the ‘myriad situations we as historians might construct 
around a musical utterance and the plurality of meanings the music might thus 
engage’, we need ways of analysing particular pieces of music in order to show how 
such pieces are meaningful. To ‘resolutely historicise musical utterance’ without 
reference to the ‘utterance’ itself could not only lead to general assertions being 
made about music without a care for the qualitative differences between works and 
performances (something Tomlinson would not wish to condone) but it could also 
make it difficult to distinguish musical praxis from any other sort of world-disclosive 
phenomenon, be it artistic or otherwise. 
Whether or not one agrees with Agawu, who, in 1997, claimed that ‘note-by-
note analysis has so far not played a central role in the new musicology’ (Agawu 
1997, 302), the contributions made to Cook and Everist’s edited volume illustrate 
that the question of the New Musicology’s engagement (or lack thereof) with music 
analysis has been a matter of debate for the past decade. Although the idea of 
musical autonomy has suffered a decline, we cannot doubt music’s specificity. Music 
analysis has been shown to be an appropriate method for engaging with music 
precisely because, as a specialist method of analysis with its own concepts and 
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techniques, it affirms music’s irreducibility. However, there is also a danger that 
music analysis, precisely because it cannot be reduced to the analysis of any other 
thing in the world, becomes, as Wegman states, ‘self-serving, self-centered and self-
indulgent’ and attempts to speak with authority on the totality of music with little or 
no concern for the other discourses capable of accessing music (Wegman 2012, 45). 
As shall be discussed, Wegman’s concerns emerge by linking music analysis to the 
aesthetic project of formalism, which, once we acknowledge that musical praxis is an 
‘objective correlate of aesthetic experience’, no longer presents us with a problem. 
 
On Music Analysis 
 
Kerman chided music analysis for being a formalistic enterprise that concentrates 
‘solely on the internal structure of the individual work of art as an autonomous entity’ 
(Kerman 1985, 18).21 However, unlike Tomlinson, Kerman imagined a future for 
music analysis ‘if it [could] only be taken out of the hothouse of theory and brought 
out into the real world’ (ibid.). Debates over Kerman’s representation of music 
analysis as a caricature of the discipline are ongoing.22 In the main, these debates 
focus on Kerman’s equation of formalism in music analysis with positivism in 
historical musicology as well as the equation of music theory with analysis. For 
example, Kerman claims that ‘the appeal of systematic analysis was that it provided 
for a positivistic approach to art, for a criticism that could draw on precisely defined, 
seemingly objective operations and shun subjective criteria’ (ibid., 73). As Williams 
observes, while historical musicology mainly involves the preparation of manuscripts 
and the study of sources with a focus on authorial intention, thus sacrificing the 
contingencies that occur in performance, formalist analysis seeks internal structure 
with little concern for historical details (Williams 2001, 5). The underlying coherence 
valued by formalist analysis is, therefore, according to Williams, incompatible with 
the historical data sought by positivism. For Cook and Everist, Kerman’s association 
                                                
21 As Williams observes, the suggestion that music can somehow be removed from the discourses in 
which it is embedded is also a problem for the intellectual movement of structuralism (Williams 2001, 
21-27). 
22 For example, as Berger observes with regards to the work of Heinrich Besseler, there was plenty of 
interpretation going on before Kerman’s call for an emancipation of musicology and music analysis 
from the grips of positivism and formalism (Berger 2005, 492). Similarly, as Herbert argues, when it 
came to the study of history, there were those historians who anticipated the so-called ‘cultural turn’ in 
the discipline claiming, like Croce, that all history is contemporary history determined by the cultural 
and ideological baggage of those that interpret history (Herbert 2012, 50) 
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of positivism in musicology with formalism in music analysis is problematised by the 
fact that although formalist music theory asserts ‘that music is what we make it’ 
(Cook and Everist 2001, vi), musicological positivism demands the complete 
separation of researcher and music – ‘for the musicological positivist (as indeed for 
some of Kerman’s earlier “formalists”, like Schenker), the music is there, regardless 
of what we think it is, and it will coincide with what we think it is only to the extent 
that we happen to be right’ (ibid.). So, Cook and Everist observe, formalism and 
positivism ‘are similar, in that each embodies a stance of unproblematical authority; 
the difference is that in the one case authority is invested in the musical thinker, while 
in the other it is invested in the music that is thought of’ (Cook and Everist 2001, vi).  
A ‘formalist music theorist’ as described by Kerman might agree with 
Hanslick, in that, if music is to be a language, it is a purely musical language 
incapable of representation or conceptualisation. The spectre of formalism, for 
example, seems to haunt Murray Perahia’s claim that the reason he values 
Schenkerian analysis is for its ability to demonstrate ‘why each note is essential to the 
coherence of the whole, and why each note is inevitable even though they each seem 
to be a surprise’ (Gaussin 2012), Indeed, he goes on to associate the ‘essence of a 
composition’ or the ‘secret of a piece’ with the ‘complex [harmonic and melodic] 
relationships that tie them together’ (Gaussin 2012). By discounting the music’s 
emergence from socio-cultural practices and its inherent meaningfulness as a result of 
such practices, the retreat into an inner realm of musical ‘secrets’ and ‘essences’ 
creates the illusion that Schenkerian analysis merely affirms an autonomanic 
conception of music. However, as William Rothstein observes, the separation of 
Schenkerian analysis from religion, nationalism and metaphysics was predominantly 
a mid-twentieth-century American college phenomenon, clearly distinguished from 
Schenker’s original conception.23 Samson suggests that what allowed for this mid-
twentieth-century ‘aesthetic’ project was ‘an inherent (energetic) organicism, purged 
of context’ that ‘enshrines the work concept’ (Samson 2001, 39). Williams takes 
Samson’s argument a step further, proposing that the search for ‘abstract logic’ that 
occupied the twentieth-century structuralists could also be located in formalist music 
analysis whereby detail, discourses and context are sacrificed to a vision of internal 
unity and internal logic – ‘a willingness to bypass the subject and a reluctance to 
                                                
23 See Rothstein 1990, 193-203.  
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reflect on the historical location of its own discourses are structuralist problems that 
remain endemic to poststructuralism’ (Williams 2001, 29).  
The institutionalisation of analysis at the turn of the twentieth century, 
Samson argues, emerged as a consequence of the aesthetic project of autonomy, the 
nineteenth-century fetishisation of organicism and the construction of the work 
concept. Music analysis, he argues, ‘both grew from and served to validate aesthetic 
autonomy, that essentialist Enlightenment project which carved out a space for art in 
the precarious middle ground between sensory perception and intellectual cognition, 
between sensus and ratio’ (Samson 2001, 39). Although acknowledging that this was 
not a single shift of paradigm, Samson claims that it is at the stage where organicism 
becomes an aesthetic project ‘which enshrines the work concept and marks the 
transition to an analytical philosophy of art in general and to music analysis in 
particular’ (ibid.). The point Samson wishes to stress is that Kerman’s criticisms of 
music analysis as a ‘formalistic’ enterprise ignore the fact that the institution of 
analysis emerged from a specific series of contexts. Thus, Samson claims, ‘the 
unified musical work, celebrated by the institution of analysis, was a necessary, 
valuable, and glorious myth, but it was a myth shaped in all essentials by a particular 
set of social and historical circumstances’ (ibid., 42).  
As a result of the Kerman’s misrepresentation of what Samson shows to be a 
complex initiative, the call to escape formalism is, as Agawu observes, more 
problematic than it first seems (Agawu 1997, 299). Even if we, like Scott Burnham, 
approach music analysis as a form of hermeneutic interpretation, suggesting that ‘it 
involves a back-and-forth motion between the world of the work and the experience 
and tendencies of the analyst’, thus blurring Kerman’s divide between hard-line 
formalism and hermeneutic and historically aware criticism, the divide itself cannot 
be dissolved. As Burnham demonstrates, music analysis qua hermeneutic 
interpretation is still different to what he calls ‘truly hermeneutic interpretations’ 
(Burnham 2001, 198). For ‘truly hermeneutic interpretations’, the work is open and 
prone to change. Burnham, therefore, merely shifts the focus of his critique from the 
formal analyst to the dichotomy ‘between surveyors of the open work and purveyors 
of the closed work’ (ibid.). Again, we are presented with two distinct groups; those 
that perceive music as ‘in and for itself’, removed from the effects of extraneous 
influence; and those that treat music as open, prone to change and contingent upon 
the contexts in which it is created, performed and commented upon. No matter how 
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we label the purveyors of the closed work, we still are not able to escape the clutches 
of formalism, which, as Samson, observes, is committed ‘to the closure that separates 
the work of art from the world’ (Samson 2001, 40). But it is not altogether obvious 
that we should need to ‘get out of’ music analysis, in the sense of score-based 
enquiry, as Kerman suggests. As we shall now go on to see, where a score is present, 
and where certain aspects of it can be legitimately be regarded as relatively fixed, 
music analysis, as Samson observes, can still play a vital role in assisting with the 
articulation of musical meaning, although what is meant does require a ‘truly 
hermeneutic’ approach as Burnham sees it. 
 
Music Analysis and the Internal Negativity of Music 
 
If we think of the musical work as an ‘objective correlate of aesthetic experience’ 
then we can claim that studies of music cannot be derived from ‘positivistic’ study of 
contexts or ‘formalistic’ music analysis alone without taking into account 
hermeneutic anticipations of meaning. Leo Treitler, however, adopts the opposite 
view, fearing that an over-intellectualised, over-conceptualised and over-
contextualised musical work will cause music to lose its value as an ‘aesthetic object’ 
(Treitler 2001, 358). The problem of how to overcome the issue of autonomy without 
devaluing the irreducibility of music is not just confined to musicology. Wellmer, for 
example, argues that the relationship between language and music can be viewed 
from several different perspectives.24 If we discuss music as the language of the 
emotions or as, in some sense, representational of the world, in short, as an analogy to 
‘lingually-articulated semantic contexts’, it is difficult to explain how a specifically 
musical context can be brought forth with the aid of historically contingent and 
technical acoustic material. Wellmer explains that the question of how specifically 
musical contexts can be articulated can no more be answered by reference to music as 
representation than a reference to language as the representational-fixing of the world 
can provide an answer to the question as to how literature can constitute a form of art 
(Wellmer 2004, 83). Similarly, even if we engage with what Wellmer calls the 
‘context-forming’ aspects of music – such as the technical means which generate the 
idea of a ‘tonal’ language of music – as projections of syntactical, grammatical and 
                                                
24 See Wellmer 2004. 
  158 
rhetorical terms of verbal language, he argues that ‘the constitutive difference 
between specifically musical context-formations and those of everyday (that is, non-
literary) verbal language is lost from view’ (ibid., 89).  
 As was observed in chapter one, conceptual identification or what Wellmer 
refers to as ‘Versprachlichung’ brings about the equivalence of qualitatively distinct 
things so that, as Adorno claimed, ‘if I subsume a series of characteristics, a series of 
elements, under a concept, what normally happens is that I abstract a particular 
characteristic from these elements, one that that they have in common: and this 
characteristic will then be the concept, it will represent the unity of all the elements 
that possess this characteristic’ (Adorno 2008, 7). In terms of reification, Adorno 
aimed to offer a counteraction to reified thought through the notion of non-identity, 
‘namely the divergence of concept and thing, subject and object, and their 
unreconciled state’ (ibid., 6). Although, as Bowie observes, the issue of non-identity 
can be applied to the Leibnizian idea that no two entities are completely identical, the 
issue we have specifically been concerned with is the Hegelian notion ‘that, because 
the determinacy of things depends on their relations to other things, they can never be 
definitively subsumed into a timeless classificatory concept which expresses their 
essential identity’ (Bowie 2013, 25). In the case of what Bowie refers to as the 
‘trivial’ sense of non-identity, Adorno claimed that ‘by saying that A is everything 
that is comprehended in this unity [between concept and object], I necessarily include 
countless characteristics that are not integrated into the individual elements subsumed 
under it. The concept is always less than what is subsumed under it’ (Adorno 2008, 
7). Indeed, for Adorno, there is a link between the negative effects of identification, 
which reach their zenith in the dehumanising objectifications of the Holocaust, and a 
certain type of thinking that renders two things identical mainly because, as he 
illustrated, ‘when a B is defined as an A, it is always also different from and more 
than the A, the concept under which it is subsumed by way of a predicative 
judgment’ (ibid.). But, as we have seen, not all forms of conceptual identification 
have negative effects. We need, for example, to make identifications in order to bring 
things in the world into the inferential sphere, to read music from a score or to 
communicate with others in general. Bowie also raises the notion of the ‘emphatic 
concept’ in Adorno’s account of non-identity, according to which, taking the concept 
‘freedom’ as an example, ‘every concept is not simply the unity of the characteristics 
of all the individuals who can be defined as free on the basis of a formal freedom 
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within a given constitution. Rather, in a situation in which people are guaranteed the 
freedom to exercise a profession or to enjoy their basic rights or whatever, the 
concept of freedom contains a pointer to something that goes well beyond those 
specific freedoms’ (ibid.). Thus, as Bowie claims, ‘concepts can cut off dimensions of 
the object that do not accord with a dominant ideology, but they can also keep alive 
what is missing in a given state of understanding of the object’ (Bowie 2013, 67).  
 As was illustrated in chapters one and two, Adorno was no ‘naïve realist’ who 
maintained the complete separation of mind and reality. Negative dialectics does not 
do away with conceptuality altogether. Indeed, as Adorno claimed, ‘negativity ‘is 
made concrete and goes beyond mere standpoint philosophy by confronting concepts 
with their objects and, conversely, objects with their concepts’ (Adorno 2008, 25). In 
other words, ‘the idea at the heart of philosophy is to use the concept to reach beyond 
the concept’ (ibid., 95) – ‘to open up the non-conceptual’ (Adorno GS 6, 21). When it 
comes to musicology, we can still engage with the particulars of musical praxis, 
specify what we are referring to and offer justifications for those specifications 
without the fear of being accused of identity-thinking. Indeed, Adorno discussed the 
analysis of works of art to be representative of the kind of approach to the world that 
would satisfy his conditions for a negative dialectics. Thus, Adorno hinted at 
Wellmer’s proposal that artworks exist only as ‘objective correlates of aesthetic 
experience’ when he claimed that ‘there is a sense in which works of art have their 
life’ in the process of analysis, ‘a process made possible only by an aesthetic 
philosophy which includes analysis and, in particular, a micrological analysis’ 
(Adorno 2008, 84) For Adorno, ‘analysis can be very helpful in articulating the 
infinite meanings contained within works of art’ (ibid.). Preceding Wellmer’s 
comments regarding the need to articulate an artwork’s ‘spirit’ or ‘content’ through 
interpretation, analysis and criticism, Adorno suggested that ‘works of art live 
because the advance of analysis gradually increases our knowledge of their objective 
intellectual meanings’ (ibid.). This may sound trivial, but how we make 
identifications without Treitler’s fears of over-conceptualising, over-intellectualising 
and over-contextualising music is a problem for contemporary musicology, inviting 
debate over the place of music analysis within musical understanding. The debate can 
be summarised through recent comments made by Treitler and Lawrence Kramer, for 
example. For Treitler, we need to maintain a ‘provisionally autonomous status for the 
musical work’ in order not to reduce it to cultural meanings whose explication will 
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become the ultimate aim of musicology (Treitler 2001, 358). However, Kramer has 
observed that despite music being ‘now widely conceded to embody cultural 
meanings through and through’, such meanings can only be expressed through 
analytic and semiotic means, which, for Kramer, causes musicology to lapse into the 
‘new-style assumption…that even if musical meaning is an actual, effective, intrinsic 
phenomenon, it must still be based on the bedrock of musical form’, an assumption 
that has its roots in the ‘old-style assumption…that musical form (the object of 
analytic-technical description) is self-sufficient, the substantial musical reality to 
which any external meaning is at best a flimsy supplement, at worst an illusory one’ 
(L. Kramer 2011, 148-149).  
 With regards to Treitler’s comments on musical autonomy and Tomlinson’s 
criticisms of ‘internalist’ engagements with musical works, we can see how the 
musicological exploration of musical praxis has been problematised by two extreme 
positions. The first stresses music’s autonomous or ‘provisionally autonomous’ 
status, thereby extolling the virtues of music analysis as a method of enquiry that 
preserves the ideology of music’s self-sufficiency. The second demands a 
‘contextualist’ approach that will, as we have already observed, ‘resolutely historicise 
musical utterance’ but with an apparent lack of engagement with the music itself. But 
the hackneyed debates that circle the questions of music’s ‘formalisms’ and 
‘positivisms’ will continue to be espoused so long as a contextual approach such as 
Tomlinson’s and an analytic engagement such as Treitler’s are thought to be mutually 
exclusive. Through philosophical hermeneutics, which relies on the interplay of part 
and whole, of phenomenon and context, the distinction between music as the object 
of analytical enquiry and the context in which it is created, performed and receive is 
disabled. To see musical autonomy as in conflict with the world in which music is 
located is to create a pseudo-problem, one which does not exist when we consider 
music’s place in everyday practices. For if we are to separate music’s autonomy from 
its worldliness, we will need a theory by which we can consistently draw a line 
between the two. What are the criteria for making such a distinction? How do we 
come up with a theory for the separation without presupposing the distinction that we 
wish to establish?  
 The issue for Heidegger, as was discussed in chapter one, is that to disassociate 
artworks from world-disclosure in order to treat them, ontically, as formed matter or 
as substances with properties is to deploy a conceptual scheme characteristic of 
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traditional approaches to aesthetics, one that is still prevalent in the work of analytic 
aestheticians. 25  As Bowie claims, Heidegger’s response is to avoid those 
‘objectifying’ accounts ‘which could be construed as being part of Western 
metaphysics, as that which makes the world into what can be technologically 
manipulated’ (Bowie 2007, 302). From a Heideggerian perspective, the problem is 
that to make a distinction between Treitlerian ‘form’ and Tomlinsonian ‘content’ – 
the ‘metaphysics of modernity’ (Heidegger 2003, 15) – is to presuppose a subject-
object divide that, as we have seen throughout this thesis, calls into question our 
common-sense understanding of the importance of music in our daily practices. So, 
Heidegger argued, ‘if one correlates form with the rational and matter with the 
irrational, if, moreover, one takes the rational to be logical and the irrational the 
illogical, and if, finally, one couples the conceptual duality between form and matter 
into the subject-object relation, then one has at one’s disposal a conceptual 
mechanism that nothing can resist’ (ibid., 12). Nevertheless, the artwork’s ‘being-in-
the-world’ ‘is not first and foremost the relationship between subject and object, but 
is instead that which has already made such a relationship possible in advance’ 
(Heidegger 1998, 235). The issue revolves around the idea that in order to enquire 
after music in what Ridley calls its ‘pure state’ or as Braver, après Heidegger, calls 
‘present-at-hand objects’, that is, in order to consider music as autonomous or 
‘provisionally autonomous’, we first have to know that what we are engaged with is, 
in fact, music. This understanding is, for Heidegger, a ‘pre-conceptual’ understanding 
that takes place in the context of our ‘everydayness’ and only as a result of which 
music is intelligible qua music. Thus, we can interpret Heidegger’s reference to 
Dasein in the following claim as also applying to musical praxis: ‘All 
understanding…is thrown, i.e., it is determined by the dependency of Dasein on the 
being already in the totality, a dependency over which Dasein itself does not have 
control’ (ibid.). To acknowledge that artworks ‘set up a world’, one which ‘is never 
an object that stands before us and can be looked at’ (Heidegger 2003, 31), is not to 
deny what Heidegger calls the ‘object-being’ of the work (ibid., 20), but to suggest 
that the objective features of an artwork are objective of an artwork and not of 
anything else because such a work is firstly meaningful qua work as a result of its 
emergence from background practices on the basis of which anything at all shows up 
                                                
25 See Heidegger 2003, 1-74. 
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as intelligible. According to Heidegger, therefore, the ‘object-being’ aspects of a 
work only show up as being objective of a work on account of the artwork’s 
worldliness. Indeed, Wellmer reaches a similar conclusion, claiming that the ‘object 
quality’ of the artwork, including its form and material, can only be understood as an 
‘objective correlate’ of inherently meaningful aesthetic experiences.  
  
A Hermeneutic Approach to Music Analysis 
 
If we understand music’s irreducibility as being in conflict with its entwinement with 
socio-cultural practices then, as already mentioned, we will continue to circle the 
same worn-out debates concerning music’s ‘formalisms’ and ‘positivisms’, between 
analytic description and contextualism. Treitler affirms the presence of such a tension 
when the analysis of the interior of works leads interpreters to ‘entertain the very 
conceptions that they programmatically reject’ (Treitler 2001, 370). In other words, to 
carry out an internal analysis of works is, so Treitler believes, to accede to an 
autonomanic conception of music, which ‘postmodern’ musicologists wish to 
denounce. To accept Treitler’s claims regarding the problems of music analysis is to 
accept that, as Carolyn Abbate claims, music ‘is at once ineffable and sticky; that is 
its fundamental incongruity’ (Abbate 2004, 523). To conceive of music as, in a sense, 
bipolar, leads us to apologise for the fact that when music is regarded as autonomous 
or ‘provisionally autonomous’ the meaning of music ‘can only be paraphrased, 
reiterated, cited, and, in the process, reconfigured’ (L. Kramer 2011, 8). For Kramer, 
the fact that ‘the discussion cannot replicate the phenomenon it discusses is obvious 
and irrelevant’ (ibid., 14). As a result, he calls for a ‘hermeneutics released from the 
anxieties that have traditionally hemmed it in’ (ibid., 11).  
Cook observes that one way in which analytic techniques can be made more 
useful ‘is through their being employed in combination with one another’, ‘becoming 
part of the taken-for-granted professional equipment of the historical musicologist 
and the ethnomusicologist’ (Cook 1987, 3). Indeed, Treitler reaches a similar 
conclusion despite his initial reservations.26 The crux of the matter is that, as Kramer 
claims, analytic description need not be clearly distinguished from hermeneutic 
                                                
26 See Treitler 2001, 372. 
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intervention.27 Wellmer also affirms such a notion. On the one hand, he argues that in 
order to avoid considering music as analogous to speech, we need to acknowledge 
music’s ‘formative potencies’ ‘of a play of repetition and variation, identity and 
difference with a particular sonic material and hence formative potencies of a kind 
not geared towards semantic context’ (Wellmer 2004, 84). Yet, as he goes on to 
illustrate, technical – that is specifically musical – vocabulary already contains what 
he refers to as a ‘sedimentation of extra-musical connotations’ (ibid., 105). Terms 
such as ‘motive’, ‘theme’, ‘exposition’, ‘transition’, ‘development’ and 
‘recapitulation’, along with formal, motoric or expressive terms and descriptions that 
seek to account for the movement of the musical material (‘high’, ‘low’, ‘tension’, 
‘resolution’ and ‘flowing’ etc.), ‘contain a metaphorical element which 
simultaneously relates the music to something extra-musical; in all of them one finds 
an echo, as it were, of music’s world-relation’ (ibid.). In other words, with regards to 
Tomlinson’s criticisms of ‘internalist’ approaches to music, music’s presence as 
stylistic and formal norms can be regarded as important world-disclosive features of 
the music itself, thus contradicting the notion of music’s self-sufficiency. 
Nevertheless, by implication, due to the ‘world-relation’ of analytical vocabulary, 
such vocabulary can also change with the world, becoming out-dated in the process. 
Terms which held for tonal music, such as ‘theme’, ‘exposition’, ‘development’, 
‘recapitulation’, ‘melody’ and ‘motivic-thematic development’ or certain methods of 
analysis such as Schenkerian analysis or Cassirer’s motivic analysis, have little 
application in the context of the most structurally- and stylistically-complex music of 
the past sixty years due to a more pronounced focus on, for example, compositional 
indeterminacy and ‘chance’ elements, improvisation, open and flexible forms and the 
serialisation of dynamics, timbre and articulatory techniques. This idea can be found 
as the basis for Wellmer’s discussion of the relationship between music and language. 
For Wellmer, the end of what could be considered ‘speech-like’ in music through the 
transcendence of the norms of tonality in favour of ‘parametric’ modes of thinking is 
entwined with stylistic developments in ‘New Music’, ‘concrete’ music and ‘electro-
                                                
27 See L. Kramer 2011, 151. 
  164 
acoustic sound production’. The development of the speech-like aspects of music is 
nothing more than the result of a ‘historical change in music’ [italics added].28  
 The starting point for Kramer is to ask the question of ‘how analytic 
description can be reconciled or integrated with worldly knowledge’ (L. Kramer 
2011, 144). The problem with Kramer’s ideas surrounding the integration of music 
analysis and music’s world-disclosive aspects is that he confines music analysis to the 
analysis of musical scores. A purely score-based analysis cannot account for those 
aspects of performance that move beyond the notes on the page. In short, a score-
based analysis is unable to account for variations in tempo, interval classes, timbre, 
dynamics, phrasing, instrumentation, bodily movements, gesture, performance 
contexts and overall sound qualities that emerge from the work as event. As Cook 
observes, each system of notation, and the analysis that takes place based on that 
notation, ‘involves its own pattern of emphasis and omission’ (Cook 1987, 227). 
Different music-making cultures will have their own forms of notation that contribute 
in different ways to the performance of the music of that culture. What Cook refers to 
as a ‘strictly “scientific” analysis of a score’ in western notation not only stifles 
cultural difference if used as the sole means of interpretation, it also ignores the fact 
that there is more to the musical event than what is contained within the score. 
Indeed, as Cook observes, ‘the more strictly deductive your analysis of the score is, 
the more directly will it be conditioned by the particular cultural and pragmatic 
assumptions built into the notation and the less bearing it will have upon the music 
you actually wanted to find out about’ (ibid., 228). 
 Once music’s irreducibility is seen as being part of the world, music analysis 
has no choice but to progress beyond the abstract, score-based conception of the 
musical work towards what Abbate calls the ‘material, present event’ (Abbate 2004, 
506). Abbate argues for a drastic – as opposed to gnostic – approach to musical 
engagement, an engagement that focuses on ‘actual performances’ and ‘musical 
experience’. But such labels involve more than what can be thought of as the 
opposition between music in practice and music in theory. So, Abbate argues, ‘drastic 
connotes physicality, but also desperation and peril, involving a category of 
knowledge that flows from drastic actions or experiences and not from verbally 
                                                
28 See Wellmer 2004. It should be noted that Wellmer, despite what he states at the start of his essay, 
does believe that the language-topos has sustained itself, in a syntactical, form-based sense, beyond the 
end of tonal music. 
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mediated reasoning’ (ibid., 510). It follows that ‘gnostic as its antithesis implies not 
just knowledge per se but making the opaque transparent, knowledge based on 
semiosis and disclosed secrets, reserved for the elite and hidden from others’ (ibid.). 
In other words, musical performance is thought to be ‘a “site of resistance to text” or 
as something so contingent upon present human bodies that it remains opaque’ 
(ibid.). Therefore, to bring music analysis to bear on the live performance would 
undermine her whole project. The crux, for Abbate, is that ‘performances with all 
their allure need not become just another object awaiting decipherment, a recordable 
text subject to some analytical method yet to come. To treat them this way would be 
to transfer the professional deformations proper to hermeneutics to a phenomenon or 
event where those habits become alien and perhaps useless’ (ibid., 513). The 
problem, however, with Abbate’s call to move beyond the disembodied abstraction 
that is the work is that, by appealing to the drastic-gnostic binary, by declaring music 
to be both ‘ineffable and sticky’ and by referring to the drastic state as ‘unintellectual 
and common’ in contrast to the gnostic state that is, according to Berger, ‘intellectual, 
supra-audible, mediated (that is, interpreted) meaning’ (Berger 2005, 495), she, too, 
wishes to separate out the sensuous and intellectual aspects of music.  
Abbate’s call for a drastic musicology allows her to denounce the ‘clandestine 
mysticism’ involved in musical hermeneutics. Although she believes that musical 
hermeneutics has merit for exposing music’s ‘social contingency and nonautonomous 
messiness’, it is clear that she shares with Tomlinson a disdain for those aspects of 
musical hermeneutics that look for the trace of the world on the music by 
investigating musical works and describing their configurations either in technical 
terms or as signs. In other words, she disagrees with those approaches that, in part, 
engage with music in an internalist fashion. For Abbate, musical hermeneutics, which 
she describes as a wanna-be ‘growth hormone’ for the classical music industry, is a 
form of nostalgia ‘that would bring back, in some new form, the lost delights of a 
bourgeois era when this now-ossified and marginal repertory was still alive and 
nearer the centre’ (Abbate 2004, 515-516). The ultimate failure of hermeneutical 
approaches to music is that they are gnostic – they aim to make ‘the opaque 
transparent’, discovering meanings within the music itself and thus granting music 
‘certain grandiose powers’ to give aura to and make monumental cultural values, 
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biographical facts and social truths.29 ‘Conjuring authority out of beautiful noise’, 
Abbate argues, ‘involves a ruse, and giving music the capacity to convey the best 
truth remains a romantic cliché and need not be accepted at face value’ (ibid., 522). 
While the work is, for Abbate, the site of intellectual activity for bourgeois 
musicologists, actual performances are ‘viscerally powerful and ephemeral, so 
personal, contingent, [and] fugitive to understanding’ (ibid., 529). Therefore, it is 
clear that Abbate does not condone approaches to music that, in one sense, seek to 
prioritise the analysis of musical works over and above ‘a category of knowledge that 
flows from drastic actions or experiences’. The issue is, however, that in criticising 
hermeneutics for its concern with form, structures and the meaningfulness of 
aesthetic experience and by separating the drastic, performative realm from the 
gnostic, internal realm of textual secrets awaiting decipherment she, in effect, ends up 
replacing the formalist conception of the autonomous musical work with the idea of 
the autonomous musical performance. Here, an unintellectual, sensuous and 
immediate conception of music emerges which cannot be reconciled to ‘verbally 
mediated reasoning’ – Abbate warns against turning performances and performers 
into ‘yet another captured text’ and argues for ‘unmediated musical experience’.30 As 
we have observed, when music is no longer open to conceptual identifications, there 
lies the possibility for autonomania. Therefore, the major problem with Abbate’s call 
for a drastic approach to music engagement is that, by believing the work to be 
something distinct from live performances, and, thus, by confining hermeneutics and 
analysis to the realm of the work, she ends up articulating central formalist ideas in a 
new guise – the musical performance. 
 What this thesis has sought to illustrate is the difficulty in separating the 
object-quality of music from its world-disclosive aspects. How would we draw a line 
between the drastic and the gnostic without presupposing the distinctions we wish to 
make? Ultimately, as Berger observes, the hermeneutic element that Abbate seeks to 
criticise cannot be banished entirely from the arena of performance. ‘There is no such 
thing as pure experience, uncontaminated by interpretation’, Berger argues (Berger 
                                                
29 See Abbate 2004, 517-523. 
30 Abbate’s arguments for a drastic approach to musical engagement parallel, in many ways, Lyotard’s 
call for an avant-garde art that replaces ‘semiotics’ with ‘energetics’. For a thorough and enlightening 
discussion of this aspect of Lyotard’s work, see Wellmer 1985, 62-70. 
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2005, 497).31 As Wellmer claims, ‘aesthetic effect and aesthetic understanding are 
mutually interdependent; the one cannot exist without the other’ (Wellmer 1985, 65). 
The fact of the matter is that in demanding an ‘unmediated musical experience’, 
Abbate must, when engaged in such an experience, already have interpreted the event 
in order to state that it is a musical event she is experiencing as opposed to any other 
sort of event. Music does not exist without interpretation because it is only through a 
tacit understanding of what music is, an understanding that takes place with musical 
praxis forming a part of our socio-cultural practices, that music is intelligible as 
music in the first place. Due to the fact that music is both context- and interpretation-
dependant, we cannot separate a drastic engagement with music from a gnostic 
engagement because an element of the ‘gnostic’ – of understanding – is an inherent 
part of our so-called drastic aesthetic experiences.  
 Once we sever the unhelpful ties between music analysis and formalism, then 
analysis can become part of the hermeneutic enterprise by which the event is 
articulated. Once we see the work as that which only exists during the event through 
presentation and mediation, then, as Adorno observed, analysis, like translation, 
criticism and commentary and, indeed, ‘positivistic’ enterprises that were 
theoretically (but not practically) shunned by the New Musicology can become ‘one 
of those media through which the very work unfolds’ (Adorno 1982, 176). The point 
is that once we recognise music as interpretation-dependant, as an ‘objective correlate 
of aesthetic experience’, then the work is no longer some mysterious, abstract ideal 
that we try and isolate from the world and investigate through the lens of scientific 
objectivity. Instead, the work, as we observed in chapter two, emerges as an event 
whereby the event itself is dependant upon interpretation and what Gadamer referred 
to as ‘mediation’ [Vermittlung]. The event can, as Abbate argues, involve actual 
performances of music, thus taking us away from the score-based work concept. 
However, once we acknowledge that performances are events, then music analysis 
can be one of the many discourses involved in the interpretive process upon which 
the event depends. Analysis, like all the other discourses that aim to make sense of 
                                                
31 Mark Johnson (2007) provides an account of how the cognition/emotion distinction has become 
ingrained in the western philosophical tradition through the Cartesian emphasis on the mind-body 
distinction. Johnson, calling on central ideas in phenomenology and pragmatism as well as recent 
research in the cognitive neurosciences, goes on to criticise accounts of meaning that would look to 
separate cognitive meaning from the visceral and aesthetic states of emotion, feeling and bodily 
processes. Ultimately, for Johnson, all meaning is embodied meaning. 
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the event, is vitally important, because it is a means by which we articulate meaning, 
and, thus, as Adorno observed, ‘is no mere stopgap, but is an essential element of art 
itself’ (Adorno 1982, 177). However, music analysis cannot bypass the event by 
lapsing into analysis for the sake of analysis, a crime which Kerman and Cook 
accused it of in the 1980s.32 Although Cook and Everist believe that formalist music 
analysis based on an autonomanic conception of music is no longer a disciplinary 
problem, there is a danger that ‘necessary component[s] of any adequate reading of 
musical meaning’ (Cook and Everist 2001, 8) can become valorised as the means of 
uncovering the whole truth or rejected outright for their irreconcilability with other 
discourses. The turn towards self-sufficiency can only come about when the context- 
and interpretation-dependant nature of music is forgotten and music is isolated as an 
ineffable, autonomous entity.  
A non-formalist music analysis was, according to Agawu (1997), missing 
from youthful New Musicology. However, as we have seen, with a move towards a 
critical musicology, the idea that music analysis can have a part to play is now largely 
accepted. Samson argues that by (re)defining the boundaries of analytical knowledge 
through exposure of the false identity of concepts and objects and by underlining the 
mediated character of analysis, then analysis is able to mix ‘freely with other 
categories of knowledge, openly embracing the metaphorical status of all discourses 
on music, and in the process accessing expanding realms of meaning’ (Samson, 2001, 
50). Burnham, similarly, shares Samson’s view that music analysis can enhance other 
forms of musical discourse as well as articulate the determinacy of music that recedes 
to an interpreter’s horizon of enquiry.33 Viewing music from different horizons of 
enquiry, based upon differing historical and cultural situatedness, and using different 
forms of engagement will generate a plurality of interpretations. Some may argue that 
meaning pluralism is a good thing because it upholds the principles of cultural, 
gender, racial and political difference. Others may claim that interpretive difference 
distracts from scientific rigour and objectivity. Ultimately, meaning pluralism is not 
ethical in itself – meaning is not concerned with what is right or wrong. One 
interpretation may satisfy the appetite of a particular community of individuals who 
                                                
32 See Cook 1987, 2-3 and Kerman 1985, 168. 
33 See Burnham 2001, 215. John Rink shows how indispensable music analysis is both for performers 
and for interpreters whose job it is to articulate meaning. However, it seems that Rink becomes too 
embroiled in the problems of Werktreue, musical authenticity and ahistorical presence as a result of his 
appeals to music’s ‘spirit’ and its ‘essential qualities’. See Rink 2001, 217-238. 
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all share the same historical, cultural and political situatedness, and who look upon 
the event with the same horizons of enquiry. But such an interpretation will not 
satisfy everyone. Thus, what contributes to the knowledge base of musical 
understanding is a body of contrasting interpretations. However, as discussed in both 
the introduction to this study and chapter two and as will be the focus of chapter five, 
meaning pluralism should and cannot be seen as an end in itself. 
  ‘Postmodern’, ‘New’ and ‘critical’ musicologies affirm, in certain quarters, 
the indeterminacy of musical meaning, the plurality of interpretive acts and the 
irreducibility of locally developed norms. Yet, one can articulate indeterminacy of 
interpretive acts only up until a certain point before such assertions undermine the 
validity of the institution that articulates them. As Williams knowingly asks, ‘what is 
the point of showing that the institutions of the canon are elitist and patriarchal if, at 
the same time, one supports a relativism that would grant elitist, patriarchal readings 
as much validity as decentred critique?’ (Williams 2000, 386). In order to avoid 
‘postmodernising’ itself out of existence, critical musicology, if it is to continue to 
give the institutional go-ahead to the interactions between ‘modernisms’ and 
‘postmodernisms’, must face up to the political questions of legitimacy which 
maintain it as an institution and which presuppose its very existence. At first sight 
this point may seem trivial. However, it acquires rather more significance when 
contrasted with certain theoretical assumptions that typically inform a ‘postmodern’ 
engagement with music, ones which seek to emphasise the incommensurable plurality 
of musical meanings. In those quarters where ‘postmodern’ thinkers stress the 
insoluble separation of interpretive positions, their claims to legitimacy, as we shall 
see in chapter five, performatively contradict their own theoretical convictions.  
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5	  
 
REIFICATION AND RELATIVISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissonance is the truth about harmony. 
(Adorno 2004, 144). 
 
 
 
Looking back at the previous chapter, what was explored was the idea that critical 
musicology has become distanced from its ‘old’, outmoded and ‘modern’ self, one 
that was concerned with upholding, at least in certain quarters, the principles of 
musical autonomy and formalism. In addition, I attempted to demonstrate that a 
‘new’, ‘postmodern’ shared inclination to affirm a plurality of interpretive and 
evaluative styles of description and explanation has allowed musicology to call into 
question dogmatic, explanatory approaches to musical ontology and musical 
meaning. In the sense that critical musicology is concerned with interpreting actual 
forms of musical praxis, it can be distinguished from analytic aesthetics and its 
attempts, through reifying theory construction, to account for the nature of music, its 
meaning and its value. In terms of reification, to subsume the meaningfulness of 
specific manifestations of musical praxis under disengaged contemplation of the 
object ‘music’, to inflate the particular to the general, is to ignore those aspects of the 
object that cannot be subsumed under the ‘form’ of what Adorno called ‘pure 
speculation’ because such aspects are dependant upon a degree of human interaction 
that can be understood only within concrete situations. Detached contemplation of 
musical works, in a sense, deaestheticises music, yielding ‘things’ or ‘present-at-hand 
objects’ stripped of their particularity, individuality and heterogeneity – their non-
conceptuality. This non-conceptual substance of the concept of music cannot, by 
definition, be captured by detached contemplation of the object ‘music’. As Marx 
claimed in the second of his Theses on Feuerbach: 
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The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of 
theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-
sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that 
is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question (Marx 1970, 121). 
 
The questions that occupy disengaged and contemplative thought – pseudo-problems 
or pseudo-issues in Wittgenstein’s critique of picture-based, philosophical 
contemplation – are, according to Marx, purely scholastic questions which, through 
the creation of abstract formulae that reify the open-ended and endlessly adaptive and 
critical nature of real-life practice, ignore the fact that the truth they aim to uncover, 
as we have seen throughout this dissertation, comes down to the historical norms of 
socio-cultural practices, norms which, importantly, can be transcended precisely as a 
result of creative practices such as music making and interpretation. 
Wellmer, whose ideas, along with those of Gadamer, Heidegger and Adorno, 
have been utilised to derive my understanding of what a non-reified approach to 
music might look like, refers to musical works as ‘objective correlates of aesthetic 
experience’. For Wellmer, it is necessary for us to bring about the mediation of 
music’s ‘object quality’ – its form, stylistic features and overall presence in sound – 
in order to bring the work into existence. Gadamer, as we saw in chapter two, reached 
a similar conclusion. For Gadamer, the work of art is its presentation [Darstellung], 
an event [Ereignis] that involves the appropriation of the interpreter to the sensuous, 
material aspects of the work. Indeed, Gadamer claimed that the experience of the 
work is the ‘non-differentiation of the mediation [Vermittlung] from the work itself’ – 
the work exists only insofar as it is mediated in the context of some ‘dialogical’ 
event. Without this mediation, there is no music as we understand it in the context of 
our everyday practices. Similarly, for Wellmer, music possesses an ‘internal 
negativity’, whereby it is considered to be both an object of perception and, at the 
same time, more than the sum total of what is presented to the senses. To accept 
music as internally negative is to suggest that there are limits to music’s objectivity. 
Indeed, such way of understanding music and musical works brings about a crisis in a 
certain type of philosophy that aims to search for absolutely determinate definitions 
and answers through generalising identifications or what Wittgenstein called 
‘pictures’.  
It is in this context where the limits of music’s objectivity are exposed that, as 
we observed in the introduction with regards to Rorty’s critique of traditional, Anglo-
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American philosophical praxis, the possibility of relativism emerges. Rorty observes 
three separate views that are commonly referred to by the name ‘relativism’: 
 
The first is the view that every belief is as good as every other. The second is the view that 
“true” is an equivocal term, having as many meanings as there are procedures of justification. 
The third is the view that there is nothing to be said about either truth or rationality apart from 
descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society – ours – uses in 
one or another area of inquiry (Rorty 1991b, 23) 
 
Whereas the third view is a negative thesis, and, as a result, defended by Rorty as an 
explicitly ‘pragmatist’ worldview as opposed to a relativist one, the first and second 
views can be considered to be the foundations for what Rorty calls ‘positive theories’ 
of truth and meaning that impact upon current musicological practice. As shall be 
explored, after we bring to an end that sort of explicit, disengaged thinking about 
music that places music as an object in the foreground, shouldering out the far more 
common mode of being around and interacting with music in concrete situations, 
there is a tendency to suggest that our interpretations of musical events are not true in 
any absolute sense, but only in the context of specific cultural and historical ways of 
being-in-the-world. Such a claim seems to affirm Rorty’s second view of relativism. 
But this view, in turn, seems to shelter and support the self-refuting first kind. Indeed, 
the relationship is made explicit by the musicologist, Judy Lochhead, when she 
claims that ‘if all knowledge reflects the cultural and historical place and time of the 
one who knows, then no single perspectival knowledge is privileged and hence no 
particular way of understanding the world is true in any absolute sense’ (Lochhead 
2002, 6). As will be shown, such self-refuting claims, along with notion that meaning 
and truth can only be justified by local procedures, only make sense, as we observed 
in the introduction, in the context of the Platonic and Kantian distinctions and, more 
importantly, in light of what empiricist theories of meaning rely on, specifically what 
Wheeler and Wellmer call the ‘presence’ of truth or what Quine referred to as 
‘obscure intermediary entities’.  
As demonstrated in previous chapters, the traditional philosophical 
distinctions between, for example, ‘subject’ and ‘object’, ‘rationality’ and 
‘irrationality’, ‘means’ and ‘ends’, ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’, ‘reality’ and 
‘appearance’ and ‘nature’ and ‘convention’ are called into question by actual musical 
practices through our transformed and transforming relationships to music. 
Consequently, once we start to loosen the grip that the Kantian and Platonic 
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frameworks have traditionally held over both philosophical and musicological praxis, 
and once we, as Rorty suggests, realise that the debates between realists and 
relativists presuppose that the things we are attempting to understand are thought to 
contain ‘real essences’, what Heidegger called des unwesentliche Wesen, then we see 
that relativism, as Marx implies, is nothing more than a ‘scholastic question’. 
Relativism, as a theoretical means of accounting for or, indeed, questioning the truth 
of our interpretations, does not take sufficient account of the diverse ways in which 
individuals and communities come to make sense of the world and each other in 
concrete situations. For Rorty, the terms ‘relativism’ and ‘postmodernism’, entwined 
as they often are, ‘are words which never had any clear sense, and…both should be 
dropped from our philosophical vocabulary’ (Rorty 1999, xiv). As he went on to 
claim, ‘insofar as “postmodern” philosophical thinking is identified with a mindless 
and stupid cultural relativism – with the idea that any fool thing that calls itself 
culture is worthy of respect – then I have no use for such thinking’ (ibid., 276). 
Nevertheless, although Rorty’s characterisation of postmodernism, as shall be 
observed, holds for a certain amount of thought that falls within the postmodern 
movement, postmodernism, taken as a whole, as Wellmer observes, is full of 
ambiguities and contradictory ideas about what counts as ‘postmodern’.1 Having said 
that, when taken from a certain perspective, Wellmer, like Pippin, as we observed in 
the introduction, discerns certain themes that are significantly representative of the 
plethora of ideas that are put forward in the name of postmodernism. So, according to 
Wellmer, ‘the moment of postmodernism is a kind of explosion of the modern 
épistème in which reason and its subject – as guarantors of “unity” and the “whole” – 
are blown to pieces’ (Wellmer 1985, 50). However, as he is also aware, 
postmodernism turns out to be a movement towards the destruction of not just the 
cogito in Western philosophy but of totalisation in all its forms. Thus, in ways which 
will prove useful to the discussions about the current state of musicology, Wellmer 
states that ‘the movement against totalising reason and its subject is at the same time 
a movement against the autonomous work of art and its pretensions to unity and 
fullness of meaning’ (ibid., 51). The ‘unmaking’ of totalities that becomes 
postmodernism’s ultimate aim, thus finds its way into other ‘postist’ concepts, 
including, as Wellmer notes, ‘post-industrialism’, ‘post-structuralism’, ‘post-histoire’, 
                                                
1 See Wellmer 1985, 48-114. 
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‘post-empiricism’ and ‘post-rationalism’. For Wellmer, ‘from this point of view the 
“revolution of postmodernism”, as Jean Baudrillard has termed it, can then be 
presented as “the gigantic process of loss of meaning” which has led to “the 
destruction of all histories, references and finalities”’ (ibid., 53). Quoting parts of 
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, Wellmer elaborates, claiming that 
‘postmodernism would thus be a modernism without regret, without the illusion of a 
potential “reconciliation between language games”, without the nostalgia for “the 
whole and the one”, for “the reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the 
transparent and the communicable experience”, in brief, a modernism which would 
cheerfully accept the loss of meaning, values, reality – postmodernism as a 
Nietzschean “gay science”’ (ibid., 55). As we shall go on to see, the break with 
totalising reason and practices perhaps, when it comes to making sense of current 
musicological praxis, assumes its most important form in Lyotard’s notions of the 
abandonment of “grand narratives” and the irreducibly ‘local’ character of all 
discourse, agreements and justifications. Ultimately, it is these kinds of 
‘delegitimation’ movements that are fuelling much of what counts for both 
musicological and philosophical practice, and it is these ‘delegitimising’ approaches 
that this chapter seeks to call into question. Having said that, postmodernism, as what 
Wellmer calls a ‘critique of modernity’, is still vitally important for making sense of 
social, cultural and political problems posed by Western modernity – an issue we will 
explore in detail throughout this chapter. 
For Rorty, an alternative to the ‘mindless irresponsibility’ of relativism and 
postmodernism is ‘pluralism’ based upon ‘pragmatically justified tolerance’ (Rorty 
1999, 276). According to this alternative, ‘only in the context of general agreement 
does doubt about either truth or goodness have sense’ [italics added] (Rorty 1979, 
309). For Rorty, the concept of truth is neither an ‘Idea of Pure Reason’, which 
‘precisely stand[s] for the Unconditioned – that which escapes the context within 
which discourse is conducted and inquiry pursued’, nor is it something that we can 
say is confined to local and isolated cultures. Rorty, instead, suggests that truth is 
entwined with the notion of ‘warranted assertibility’ (ibid., 308-309). As he claimed, 
‘for pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of 
one’s community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as 
possible, the desire to extend the reference of “us” as far as we can’ (Rorty 1991b, 
23). For Rorty, ‘to say that what is rational for us now to believe may not be true, is 
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simply to say that somebody may come up with a better idea’ (ibid.). Therefore, just 
as, for Rorty, truth and objectivity are entwined with solidarity, that is, with 
‘warranted assertibility’, so, in the same pragmatic universe, our interpretations of 
musical praxis are true if recognised as legitimate within an intersubjective sphere of 
appreciation and debate, a sphere that transcends cultural, historical and geographical 
borders. In this sense, the concept ‘true’ is, as Price (2003) claims, a norm, as 
opposed to what Rorty calls ‘correspondence to reality’ or the ‘intrinsic nature of 
things’ (Rorty 1991b, 22). Indeed, it is the idea that there is a normative basis to the 
meaningfulness of musical practice that I have been arguing for in all previous 
chapters. Nonetheless, as Rorty demonstrates, none of this is to say, as will be shown, 
that what we consider to be legitimate cannot be called into question and, indeed, 
transcended by additional processes of normalisation which norm-transcending 
practices such as music making may initiate.  
Just as, for Rorty, truth has neither a ‘deep, hidden, metaphysically significant 
nature’ (Rorty 1979, 373) nor ‘as many meanings as there are procedures of 
justification’, Wellmer and Gadamer claim, in their own respective ways, that 
interpretations of artworks neither affirm the indeterminacy of aesthetic meaning nor 
do they terminate in ‘obscure intermediary entities’. An alternative, one that will be 
explored in detail, is to suggest that interpretation operates within the sphere of 
norms, norms that, in some cases, may appear to be relative to a specific culture 
situated at a particular point in history but, in others, have, on account of being 
debated or practiced in a public sphere of intersubjective legitimacy, crossed cultural, 
social and historical boundaries and have become legitimate ways of understanding 
the world for different groups, thus tending towards the ideals of truth. For example, 
in terms of trans-cultural norms, Pippin, as Bowie observes, suggests that ‘there can 
be real moral development. This is evident in those things which were once 
acceptable but have come to be inherently unjustifiable, such as slavery, the 
oppression of women, and racism. All these still exist, but a legitimation of them, of 
the kind which was possible in the terms of some pre-modern societies, has become 
impossible, and this testifies to the development of free self-determination that 
transcends the horrors within which that development takes place’ (Bowie 2013, 
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121).2 But, and this is the key issue where music is concerned, one that will be 
discussed later, where certain ways of making sense of the world have become 
legitimated for seemingly different communities and societies, it is also the case that 
such norms can bring about other forms of domination. So, Bowie argues, ‘the 
concrete development of modernity involves some of the most brutal events of human 
history, even as moral awareness seems to progress in key aspects’ (ibid.). 
With regards to music, when we interpret manifestations of musical praxis we 
do so from out of our situatedness in a particular ‘world’ of historical socio-cultural 
practices with our interpretations either articulating certain norms that have become 
associated with a piece of music or going against them. This way of viewing musical 
interpretation might seem to affirm the idea that the truthfulness of our interpretations 
is relative to some particular culture, place or history, that is, that every ‘world’ 
contains its own locally developed, isolated and irreducible norms. But such a view 
undermines the power of a ‘world’ as a space of intelligibility to embrace and account 
for interactions between different cultural, social and historical groups. In chapter one 
I illustrated how musical praxis can only be understood as being irreducibly musical 
as a result of aesthetic experiences and their connection to a shared space of 
interpretation, analysis and criticism. Because such aesthetic experiences bring the 
life experiences of socially, historically and culturally mediated groups and 
individuals to bear on the sounds we commonly construe as music, then music can be 
considered to be a form of ‘world disclosure’. In other words, music is what Bowie 
refers to as a form of ‘metaphysics2’, a phenomenon that allows us to scrutinise our 
ways of knowing how things hang together, to make sense of how people make sense 
of the world and, most importantly when it comes to aesthetic practice, to create new 
sense. As Gadamer was aware, however, and as shall be explored in greater detail in 
what follows, the possibility exists for a worldview to contain every other worldview 
within it as different worldviews meet and interact within actual political and cultural 
spaces. The point to acknowledge is that a ‘world’ is not fixed and isolated by some 
discernable geographical, historical or cultural boundary; it is not something that can 
only ever apply to a specific cultural, social, political or historical community. A 
‘world’ can embrace multiple worldviews as different cultures, societies and 
                                                
2 Jürgen Habermas makes a similar claim, arguing that ‘once the corresponding prejudices against 
people of colour, homosexuals, or women are overcome, no components of “otherness” remain to 
which a justified rejection that was generally recognised as legitimate could refer’ (Habermas 2008, 
259). 
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historical groups come into contact with and try and understand one another with the 
possibility of bringing about new, shared practices. As John McDowell claims, ‘this 
talk of different “worlds” is only vivid imagery for the undisputed idea of striking 
differences between mutually accessible views of the one and only world’ (McDowell 
2009, 140). Nevertheless, as Charles Taylor observes, that is not to say that 
something like alternative horizons or conceptual schemes exist by which we are able 
to pick out the systematic differences between two different cultures that act as partial 
barriers to our understanding.3 Ultimately, as I shall go on to demonstrate, to claim 
that music is world-disclosive is not to affirm cultural relativism but to suggest that 
real musical praxis operates by showing us how different worldviews come into 
contact with each other, how they understand one another, how new contexts of 
shared practices arise and the challenges different groups face in coming to an 
understanding. In addition, by allowing society to engage with worldviews other than 
their own, that is, by setting society’s perceptions, concepts, and its relationship to 
different worldviews in motion, musical praxis can, as well as being world-opening, 
play a prominent role in the transformation of socio-cultural norms.  
We first need to understand that the argument for music as world-disclosive is 
grounded on the notion that experiences of music are, fundamentally, meaningful 
experiences – experiences that happen immediately or tacitly, but, vitally, are 
mediated by the fore-structures of our understanding. It follows that by destabilising 
the classical conception of ‘knowing the meaning’ of a musical work, the regress of 
our musical interpretations terminates not in ‘obscure intermediary entities’ but in the 
response of the interpreter, whose horizons of enquiry are fore-structured but not 
entirely fixed by their situatedness in a certain ‘world’, to what the artwork presents. 
As demonstrated in chapter two, what we bring to our aesthetic experiences are the 
social and cultural practices that make up the style of one’s world, and it is what 
Braver refers to as these ‘spade-turning moment(s) of non-interpreting reaction’ that, 
in the absence of ‘presence’ forms of musical meaning, determine the normative basis 
of the meaningfulness of musical praxis. As we observed in chapter two with regards 
to Bowie’s comments on ethical life, there is a need for social acknowledgement if 
musical meaning is to have any substance at all. Thus, how we interpret a particular 
manifestation of musical praxis is only intelligible in the light of public norms that 
                                                
3 See Taylor 2002. 
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are developed in everyday, communal practices. It is this kind of social style of 
making sense of the world, which determines what should be done and what ought to 
be, that can change – sense can literally be made anew – when new norms displace 
previous norms as a result of norm-transcending practices such as music making and 
interpretation.  
When it comes to musicology, the end of a reified engagement with music and 
the ‘turn’ towards interpretation suggests, for some, that we foster what Lawrence 
Kramer refers to as ‘fragmentation and intellectual razzle-dazzle for their own sakes’ 
(L. Kramer 1995, 6). The danger is that musicology is seen as advocating a cultural 
relativism that places the whole discipline in jeopardy. In other words, to believe that 
the knowledge base of the profession should merely consist of a body of contrasting 
interpretations resulting from multiple horizons of understanding is to call into 
question the legitimacy of that discipline. Hooper, for example, claims that ‘the 
characteristic “postmodern” belief in the indeterminacy or ultimate plurality of 
interpretation poses real problems in so far as the purpose and legitimacy of an 
institutionalized discourse is concerned’ (Hooper 2006, 66). He goes on to argue that 
‘it is indisputable that music will have multiple meanings and significances, not only 
for each individual, but also for any one individual. However, this is not, in and of 
itself, a justification for one’s simply proffering, on the basis of one’s particular 
reaction to a musical work or utterance, an interpretation that is “equally valid as any 
other”’ (ibid.). The critique of postmodernity that Hooper offers is a familiar one, one 
that arises when critics of modernity seemingly proclaim a retreat from the modern 
world altogether; when, as Wellmer explains, ‘the critique of technocratic rationalism 
turns into irrationalism, contextualism becomes particularism, the cult of local 
tradition becomes mere fashion (or worse, it becomes regression), and the rediscovery 
of the symbolic function of architecture becomes an ideological or authoritarian 
gesture’ (Wellmer 1985, 128). Hooper goes on to demonstrate how the theoretical 
affirmation of pluralism, contingency and cultural relativism in the New Musicology 
is performatively undermined when statements are made within the discipline 
claiming third-person assent. As Hooper shows in respect to three separate claims 
made by Kramer, Samson and Susan McClary (not all of whom would class 
themselves as ‘postmodern’ or ‘New’ musicologists), their references to certain 
norms of meaning and value, which are only intelligible in so far as there exists a set 
of conventions or criteria in accordance with which such judgments can justifiably be 
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made in the first place, undermine postmodernism’s distrust of or open hostility to the 
notion of authority and justifiable legitimacy.4 For Hooper, claims to legitimacy are 
not compatible with a ‘postmodern’ musicology in which ‘no mode of knowledge is 
ever to be privileged over any other’ (Hooper 2006, 39).  
Writing on the relationship between postmodernism and music, Derek B. 
Scott argues that what characterises ‘postmodern’ musicology is ‘a readiness to 
engage with, rather than marginalise, issues of class, generation, gender, sexuality 
and ethnicity in music, and to address matters such as production, reception and 
subject position, while questioning notions of genius, canons, universality, aesthetic 
autonomy and textual immanence’ (Scott 2001, 145). Kenneth Gloag (2012) affirms 
Scott’s characterisation, demonstrating that such musically specific matters arise out 
of broader issues to do with what could be construed as the postmodern movement. 
Thus, as we observed in the introduction, Gloag makes a common-sense, albeit 
reductive, link between the ‘turn’ in 1980s/1990s musicology and the ideas of 
Lyotard, specifically the definition of postmodern as an ‘incredulity towards 
metanarratives’. What Scott sees as a readiness to accept and engage with a plurality 
of musical meanings through the exploration of music’s production and reception in 
different societies, cultures and histories and its meaningfulness for diverse social 
classes, historical communities, ethnicities, sexual and gender groups is supported by 
Gloag: ‘multiple stories [as opposed to metanarratives], now suggest a culture made 
up of many different things: a plural and fragmented cultural, social and political 
landscape, with each fragmentary “little narrative” potentially claiming its own 
identity and value without at any point coalescing into a larger totality’ (Gloag 2012, 
6). Kramer anticipates both Scott’s and Gloag’s respective discussions, arguing that 
‘postmodern strategies’ seek a ‘localised generality’ (L. Kramer 1995, 9). Following 
in the wake of Lyotard and Haraway, Kramer argues that ‘postmodern’ discourses 
‘operate by assuming that any formulation of or within a master narrative can be read 
as responsive to a set of more local interests – local that is with respect to the general 
terms of the master narrative but still general with respect to the phenomena that the 
narrative seeks to cover’ (ibid.). Ultimately, for Kramer, ‘postmodernist strategies of 
understanding are incorrigibly interdisciplinary and irreducibly plural’ [italics added] 
(ibid., 5). Although Gloag notes that the interpretation of musical praxis does not 
                                                
4 See Hooper 2006, 53-59. 
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‘necessarily mean that such work automatically forms a postmodern musicology’, he 
does claim that ‘the sense of plurality, the openness of interpretation, and the 
importance of context, all provide certain convergences between such work and wider 
conceptions of postmodernism’ (Gloag 2012, 19). The problem is that many of these 
‘postmodern’ aspects of musicology are, as we have seen, the results of any 
hermeneutic enterprise that seeks to interpret actual manifestations of worldly 
phenomena rather than theoretically account for the nature of such phenomena. Not 
wishing to become bogged down in the debates as to what does or does not constitute 
‘postmodern’ musicology or even if such a thing exists, what I suggest is of greater 
importance is the question of how we can account for the validity of our musical 
interpretations once we have taken the disciplinary ‘turn’ towards the interpretation of 
specific aesthetic experiences. The danger is that with postmodernity’s distrust of 
totalising conceptions of truth, anything that would repress the plurality of different 
subject positions and their respective claims to truth and knowledge would be seen as 
aligning itself with the more ethically problematic aspects of modernity. It is on this 
either-or basis, that is, the opposition between postmodernism and the ‘modern’ 
concepts of legitimacy and validity, that Rorty describes both postmodernism and 
relativism as ‘mindless irresponsibility’ (Rorty 1999, 276). 
As Scott, Gloag and Kramer’s respective characterisations of New 
Musicology illustrate, the discipline’s ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ appears 
when we acknowledge that music emerges from, is embedded in and is disclosive of 
the worldly contexts in which it is created, performed and received. Indeed, in 
appealing to the idea of music as fundamentally world-disclosive, a conception of the 
musical work as an ‘objective correlate of aesthetic experience’ does not rest upon the 
disclosure of the world of the individuated, substantive self. A hermeneutic 
engagement with musical praxis presupposes that we are always among others from 
the start; our being with others is a feature of our nature rather than due to the 
accidental fact of exposure to humans. Dasein’s Mitsein is primordial. Along with the 
world, an essential relatedness to others fundamentally belongs to our way of being. 
As Braver explains by drawing together two principle figures in seemingly 
contrasting philosophical traditions, ‘just as Wittgenstein’s form of life with its 
agreement with others grounds the training which endows us with reason, so 
Heidegger’s being-with opens Dasein to the meaningful shared world, and the world 
to Dasein’ (Braver 2012, 164). In other words, what Braver is claiming with regards 
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to Wittgenstein and Heidegger is that all individuals are engaged in roles and 
articulating a reason that are derived from their communities and that largely define 
them. Indeed, in order to be a self at all, we need a community to provide a repertoire 
of practices, reason and language, as well as the equipment and institutions necessary 
for their practice.  
Pippin wishes to suggest something even stronger, mainly that ‘for the action 
to count as mine, it must make a certain kind of sense to the agent, and that means it 
must fit in intelligibly within a whole complex of practices, and institutions within 
which doing this now could have a coherent meaning’ (Pippin 2008, 5). Against 
metaphysical interpretations of Hegel, Pippin, developing his conception of freedom 
based on a revised view of agency, claims that ‘spirit is a self-imposed norm, a self-
legislated realm that we institute and sustain, that exists only by being instituted and 
sustained’ (ibid., 112). In other words, ‘practical reasoning is a norm-bound activity 
(one wants to get the right answer about what one ought to do), and the norms in 
question are not themselves simply “up to me”; they reflect social proprieties, already 
widely shared, proprieties functioning as individually inherited standards for such 
deliberation’ (ibid., 149). Therefore, for Pippin, agency is ‘as much, if not more, a 
matter of retrospective justification and understanding and mutual recognition than a 
matter of prior deliberation and the power to choose’ (ibid., 146). The idea that 
practical reasoning always involves a responsiveness to social norms, that one 
deliberates ‘qua “ethical being” (sittliches Wesen), not qua rational agent’ is vitally 
important for understanding the position of critical musicology with respect to both 
reification and relativism.  
Lawrence Kramer, in taking up the baton of musicology’s ‘ethical being’, 
asserts that the ‘epistemic shift [to postmodernism]…is practical as well as 
theoretical; it has substantial moral and political implications’ (L. Kramer 1995, 33). 
One doesn’t have to dig too deep into the meta-musicological literature of the last 
twenty years to see that the ethical implications of the ‘New’ and ‘critical’ 
musicologies have been widely acknowledged. There now seems to be general 
institutional acceptance of, for example, feminist, postcolonial, gender and queer 
ways of doing and thinking. But with what Kramer sees as the ‘ethical’ turn in 
musicology, that is, the turn from what Lochhead (2002) calls ‘absolute’ knowledge 
and ‘grand narratives’ to the ‘situatedness’ of knowledge claims and ‘local stories of 
understanding’, we are presented with a problem; with the idea that interpretations of 
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musical practices are ‘irreducibly plural’, ‘with each fragmentary “little narrative” 
potentially claiming its own identity and value without at any point coalescing into a 
larger totality’, musicology is faced with a situation whereby any notion of a 
legitimate interpretive claim is severely undermined. In other words, with a focus on 
plurality, fragmentation, localisation, heterogeneity, difference and the ‘self-
contained legitimacy’ of ‘little narratives’, the ideal of truth in human affairs, what 
Price calls ‘the dialogue of mankind’, is in danger of being reduced to ‘the chatter of 
disengaged monologues’, that is, the chatter of isolated, locally developed and 
irreducible norms (Price 2003, 170). Scott illustrates the problem in musicological 
terms when he suggests that even though ‘values and meanings relate to particular 
historical, political and cultural contexts’, different cultures have ‘their own specific 
cultural values, so that a cultural arbitrary is not misrecognised as an objective 
truth’ [italics added] (Scott 2001, 145). Similarly, the problem arises when Kramer 
suggests that ‘postmodern strategies’ ‘focus on diverse, culturally constructed 
subjectivities and objectivities’ (L. Kramer 1995, 5-6)5 and when Gloag claims that 
‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ causes ‘each “little narrative”’ to construct ‘its 
own sense of a self-contained legitimacy and place within a broad spectrum’ (Gloag 
2012, 6). In short, the problem, as Price hints at, is that with the turn towards an 
appreciation and preservation of difference, what is ignored is the fact that, in real life 
situations, cultures are not isolated from one another. For better or worse, as we shall 
see, what is always at work is the ‘dialogue of mankind’. Indeed, it is on the basis that 
priority is given to the notion of ‘self-contained legitimacy’ of ‘little narratives’ that, 
according to Rorty, ‘any fool thing that calls itself culture is worthy of respect’ (Rorty 
1999, 276). Ultimately, in view of Price’s account of truth as the ‘dialogue of 
mankind’, what we witness with postmodernism, including ‘postmodern’ New 
Musicology, is the theoretical devaluing of truth for fear of becoming entwined with 
                                                
5 Kramer explains his relativising hopes for his particular brand of ‘postmodern’ musicology, claiming 
that ‘postmodern strategies’ ‘insist on the relativity of all knowledge, including self-knowledge, to the 
disciplines – not just the conceptual presuppositions but the material, discursive, and social practices – 
that produce and circulate knowledge’ (L. Kramer 1995, 6). The problem with such a claim is that 
Kramer also seeks to criticise theoretical enterprises that affirm the idea of cultural relativism. So, he 
cites Donna Haraway: the challenge is ‘to have simultaneously an account of radical historical 
contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own 
“semiotic technologies” for making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of 
the “real” world, one that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide projects of finite freedom, 
adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness’ (L. Kramer 1995, 
7-8). Relativism is, hereby, potentially undermined by Kramer’s vague call for ‘fluctuation and 
negotiation among different standpoints’ (ibid., 8). 
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modernity’s metanarrative of legitimacy. Therefore, even though, as Rorty illustrates, 
relativism exists in tension with absolute conceptions of truth, that is, in tension with 
what, according to Wellmer, is ‘objectively present’ [objektiv ‘Vorhandenes’], those 
who uphold the irreducibility and self-contained legitimacy of each ‘little narrative’ 
also treat any claims to legitimacy that are made in the here and now with suspicion. 
Ultimately, as Rorty observes, such distrust of norms and the notion of legitimacy in 
general stems from the idea that when we say that norms exist, this ‘is only to say, 
with Foucault, that knowledge is never separable from power – that one is likely to 
suffer if one does not hold certain beliefs at certain times and places’ (Rorty 1991b, 
26). As Ihab Hassan claims, the postmodern movement, as a movement of 
‘unmaking’, refuses ‘the tyranny of wholes; totalisation in any human endeavour is 
potentially totalitarian’ (Hassan 1977, 19). Postmodernism, in other words, tends to 
focus on the destruction of not just the cogito in Western philosophy, but also all 
claims to totalisation no matter which sphere of life they are made in. The issue is, 
however, that even though truth claims and their corresponding arguments and 
justifications may be – in the here and now – bound up with power structures that 
might dictate what we take to be legitimate or acceptable, in practice even 
postmodernists cannot isolate themselves indefinitely from the ‘dialogue of 
mankind’. To face up to this dialogue and the questions of power that surround it, is, I 
will argue, one of critical musicology’s most pressing issues.  
The degradation of truth in musicological affairs seems to stem from the 
discipline’s over-reliance on postmodern theory, specifically, the ideas put forward 
by Lyotard. In setting up an imaginary dialogue between Lyotard and Habermas, 
Manfred Frank makes the key point that Lyotard’s ideas, specifically his notion of the 
différend, suffer from a ‘performative contradiction’ (Frank 1988, 19), one that is 
similar to the contradiction Hooper observes in Samson, Kramer and McClary’s 
respective claims to legitimacy. Lyotard’s notion of the différend is a hindrance to 
mutual comprehensibility because it is based on the idea that arguments are 
irreconcilable due to the heterogeneous ‘rules’ of interlocutors’ ‘phrase regimens’. 
Specifically, for Frank, the différend is based on the idea that different types of 
discourse cannot result in a meta-discourse of agreement (ibid., 32). Ultimately, for 
Lyotard, the goal of discourse is not consensus (Verständigung), the possibility of 
which, according to Frank, every communicative act should presuppose (ibid., 73), 
but dissent. Although Habermas has discussed his aversion to the totalising effects of 
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agreement, an issue Frank draws our attention to with regards to the ‘conflicting 
aspects’ of consensus theory (ibid.), the problem with Lyotard, according to Frank, is 
that the argument concerning the différend is self-refuting because it depends on a set 
of conventions or criteria in accordance with which it can justifiably be made in the 
first place. Which subject position and which ‘phrase regimens’ can make the 
universalising claim regarding the différend? Without the possibility of shared norms, 
Lyotard’s argument regarding the impossibility of meta-discourse cannot hope to 
attain validity. To espouse the idea that all discourse is merely what Price calls ‘the 
chatter of disengaged monologues’, that is, to make the claim that one type of 
discourse or subject position is so radically unintelligible to another that it precludes 
the possibility of consensus, is to presuppose something like the ideal of truth or the 
‘dialogue of mankind’ in the first place. It is not surprising, therefore, that general 
‘postmodern’ judgments regarding irresolvable differences, judgments that, according 
to Rorty’s first view of relativism, would, ultimately, allow supremacist readings of 
musical works as much validity as gender, queer, postcolonial and feminist 
interpretations, have resulted in many musicologists explicitly disavowing 
postmodernism and its influence on musicological praxis without, that is, giving up 
on its valuable ethical achievements. Nevertheless, the threat of the degradation of 
truth through hermeneutic intervention is not just a problem for New Musicology, 
but, as a result of its continued focus on understanding the meaningfulness of specific 
manifestations of musical praxis, impacts upon what Kramer refers to as ‘critical 
musicology’, a musicology that no longer upholds the separation of ‘old’ and 
‘modern’ ways of musicological doing and thinking from ‘new’ and ‘postmodern’ 
methods and sensibilities.6  
Björn Heile, in advocating what he calls a ‘critical modernism’, claims that 
‘postmodernism has lost momentum’ (Heile 2009, 1) leading to a ‘resurgence of 
interest’ in modernism (ibid., 2). Heile accounts for this shift by suggesting that 
                                                
6 A distinction should be made between what Kramer calls ‘critical musicology’ and what Scott refers 
to by the same term. Although the former is used to denote such musicological ways of doing and 
thinking that call into question the divide between modern and postmodern, for Scott, critical 
musicology still maintains unhelpful links to the ineffective concept of New Musicology. So, Scott 
claims, ‘critical musicologists in the UK are generally agreed that the biggest problem facing current 
musicology is the collapse of the binary divide between pop and classical; it is the fundamental 
importance accorded to this perception that sets them apart from the “new musicologists” of the USA, 
who tend (with few exceptions) to concentrate on canonic works’ (Scott 2001. 145). Such a 
characterisation of critical musicology is, in the light of Kramer’s revised account of the term, no 
longer adequate. 
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musicology has established enough reflective distance from modernism in order to 
treat it as a ‘more multifaceted phenomenon than it was given credit for’ (ibid.). He 
also suggests that the age in which we live calls into question the applicability of the 
term ‘postmodern’ to our current ways of doing and thinking. So, he states, we are 
living ‘in an era of disorientation, musically speaking as well as culturally, 
ideologically and, indeed, politically’ (ibid.). Heile invokes 9/11, the second Iraq war, 
the developing world and global warming as examples of the disorientating socio-
cultural events of our age. Furthermore, we could also suggest, as Gloag does, that 
the applicability of the term ‘postmodern’ to our present socio-cultural situation has 
been undermined by the creation of one big story about its many little narratives. 
Gloag claims that ‘rather than being incredulous towards metanarratives, as Lyotard 
asserts, we have now begun to witness the construction of postmodernism’s own 
metanarrative: the repeated storytelling of how postmodernism plays with fragments 
of the past, how different music may be intertextual in different ways but the actual 
process remains similar, if not the same’ (Gloag 2012, 159). None of this suggests, 
however, that Heile and others like him, so-called critical musicologists in Kramer’s 
sense, are concerned with reviving purely ‘positivistic’ and ‘formalistic’ approaches 
to music nor do they (at least explicitly) advocate those questionable aspects of 
‘modern’ ways of doing and thinking that have been accused of affirming, for 
example, the role of instrumental reason in human affairs, the notion of the centred 
subject, the authority of the natural sciences in the demystification of life, cultural 
elitism and the disregard of questions of difference and the ethical treatment of 
others. 
Despite Heile’s (critical) engagement with the links between new music and a 
revised, multifaceted approach to the question of modernism, he and the rest of the 
authors that contribute to the edited volume, The Modernist Legacy: Essays on New 
Music, cannot give up on the gains made by New Musicology. Heile claims that there 
is still a need for a ‘considerable variety of viewpoints’ from which to make sense of 
musical praxis (Heile 2009, 3). The focus is still very much on plurality and 
difference, if not completely on fragmentation, as Heile demonstrates through his 
study of the globalisation of new music.7 Ultimately, Heile’s demand for a critical 
treatment of both modernism and new music rests upon hermeneutic anticipations of 
                                                
7 See Heile 2009, 101-121. 
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meaning – interpretation of musical praxis is key, as he illustrates through his claim 
that ‘readings of individual composers or works’ complement broader historical and 
aesthetic discussions (ibid., 9). As was discussed in previous chapters, from a 
hermeneutic perspective, interpretations bring the life experiences of a culturally- and 
historically-mediated individual to bear on musical praxis. With it, meanings as 
‘obscure intermediate entities’ are replaced with articulations of specific, particular, 
individual and heterogeneous experiences, ones which, nevertheless, have, in part, 
been fore-structured by one’s place in a shared world. The distinction, as I have 
sought to explain in previous chapters, rests upon the difference between what Taylor 
refers to as ‘knowing an object’ through reifying theory construction – that there is 
‘some finally adequate explanatory language, which can make sense of the object, 
and will exclude all future surprises’ – and ‘coming to an understanding with an 
interlocutor’ (Taylor 2002, 127), a – what Gadamer calls – ‘dialogical’ event 
[Ereignis] of presentation [Darstellung] that involves the mediation [Vermittlung] and 
play [Spiel] – a conversation, if you will – between music as some sort of sonic 
presence and the interpreter. The issue, as Taylor puts it, is that ‘experience is that 
wherein our previous sense of reality is undone, refuted, and shows itself as needing 
to be reconstituted. It occurs precisely in those moments where the object “talks 
back”’ (ibid., 128). By contrast, ‘the aim of science, following the model above, is 
thus to take us beyond experience. This latter is merely the path to science, whose 
successful completion would take it beyond this vulnerability to further such 
refutation’ (ibid., 128-129) Indeed, in such a climate, the charges of postmodernism 
and relativism seem inescapable; as Taylor explains: 
 
The days are long gone when Europeans and other “Westerners” could consider their 
experience and culture as the norm toward which the whole of humanity was headed, so that 
the other could be understood as an earlier stage on the same road that we had trodden. Now 
we sense the full presumption involved in the idea that we already possess the key to 
understanding other cultures and times. 
But the recovery of the necessary modesty here seems always to threaten to veer into 
relativism, or a questioning of the very ideal of truth in human affairs. The very ideas of 
objectivity, which underpinned our social science, seemed hard to combine with that of 
fundamental conceptual differences between cultures, so that real cultural openness seemed to 
threaten the very norms of validity on which social science rested (ibid., 126). 
 
The issue remains, however, that the charge of relativism only seems to makes sense 
within the context of certain binary oppositions – the Platonic and Kantian 
distinctions. This is clear when Taylor, for example, makes the Rorty-esque 
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distinction between ‘objectivity’ and ‘relativism’. Wellmer, too, suggests that 
relativism or ‘hermeneutic anarchism’ can only make sense when contrasted with 
‘foundationalism’ or what he also refers to as ‘metaphysical objectivism’, a tradition, 
he suggests, in which empiricism remains trapped (Wellmer 1993, 222). Scott goes a 
step further when he attempts to align the distinction between objectivity and 
relativism with the divide between ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’. So, Scott 
claims, ‘modernism, an attempt to defend one universalist culture, was often forced to 
attack regionalism as parochialism, nationalism as chauvinism, popular music as 
entertainment not art, and ethnic music as primitivism or “ghetto culture”’ (Scott 
2001, 139). Conversely, ‘the postmodern alternative is to accept that we are living in 
an age of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism, a perspective taken from 
anthropology, was the key to socio-musicological interpretation in the 1980s. The 
argument that cultural values could be historically located was already familiar and 
was expanded by the recognition that significance could also be socially located’ 
(ibid., 139-140).  
 Heile claims (or hopes) that what he calls ‘binary logic’ is now all but 
meaningless for the younger generation of musicologists (Heile 2009, 3). On the 
contrary, when we consider the distinctions between ‘postmodernism’ and 
‘modernism’, ‘musical autonomy’ and ‘cultural contingency’, ‘formalist-analytical 
and cultural-historical’ in the context of the broader Platonic and Kantian distinctions 
between, for example, ‘subject’ and ‘object’, ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality’, ‘means’ 
and ‘ends’, ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’, ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’ and ‘nature’ and 
‘convention’, these concepts still seem to be the principal means of making sense of 
the world in mainstream musicological and, indeed, philosophical praxis. Thus, in the 
context of the Platonic and Kantian conceptual distinctions, relativism, when 
contrasted broadly, as Rorty claims, with objectivity, and, more specifically, with the 
idea that we can accept ‘the Greek distinction between the way things are in 
themselves and the relations which they have to other things, and in particular to 
human needs and interests’ (Rorty 1999, xvi), still seems like an attractive option. 
The problem is that how we function in concrete situations tends to involve ways of 
doing that operate outside of such clear Kantian and Platonic distinctions. Indeed, 
even if we take into account more pragmatic approaches to making sense of what 
counts for ‘objectivity’ in normal, everyday circumstances, we see that Rorty’s 
conception of objectivity as ‘solidarity’ or Frank’s idea of Verständigung are also 
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treated with suspicion by the advocates of cultural relativism, specifically, as was 
observed with Frank’s critique of Lyotard, by those who suggest that irreducible 
differences at the level of discourse preclude a meta-discourse of agreement. But 
before we get to that, we need to ascertain why relativism might be considered to be 
an attractive option for those who insist on working within a distinctly Kantian or 
Platonic conceptual framework?  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the shift towards postmodernism in 
general is entwined with what Lawrence Kramer sees as important ‘ethical’ changes 
in musicological praxis. Thus, as Scott observes, the calling into question of formalist 
conceptions of music in New Musicology opened up a space of possibility to 
understand music as something ‘that satisfied widespread social needs’ thereby 
‘uncovering the complicity between art and entertainment rather than drawing a 
contrast between these two terms’ (Scott 2001, 135). Similarly, ‘the related issue of 
the evolution of musical style was now questioned’ (ibid., 134). As Scott goes on to 
argue:  
 
The dominant grand narrative for musical modernism was that of the evolution and dissolution 
of tonality. Schoenberg claimed that serialism grew out of necessity, yet this necessity was 
itself born of a set of particular cultural assumptions. Empirical data can be used to 
demonstrate that the change from extended tonality to atonality was an evolution, but it can 
equally well show that this was a qualitative leap. A belief in the historical necessity of 
atonality led to the neglect of many areas of twentieth-century music history, such as the 
importance of Vienna to Hollywood (Korngold) or of Puccini to “The Generation of the 1880s” 
in Italy. Worst of all, perhaps, was the almost complete disregard of jazz (ibid., 137). 
 
The ‘old’ and ‘modern’ interpretations of music history emphasised formal and 
technical values based on a conception of music as autonomous, as something free 
from the vagaries and contingencies of everyday life. As Scott observes, such a 
conception of music together with the notion of autonomous cultural development, of 
evolution and dissolution, marginalised those who failed to participate in that 
particular development, or who sought alternatives. Thus, Scott argues, ‘the linear 
paradigm is a means of defending a single authentic culture, but that requires a 
common practice and modernism failed to establish one’ (ibid., 138). By bringing to 
an end the universal aspirations for Western art music, the idea that music could be 
socially and culturally situated, thus lending a voice to those individuals and groups 
that had been marginalised by an overpowering ‘modernist’ aesthetic, gained new 
ground. In this context, relativism seems like an attractive option because it 
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emphasises the idea that, according to Scott, ‘musical meanings are not labels 
arbitrarily thrust upon abstract sounds; these sounds and their meanings originate in a 
social process and achieve their significance within a particular social context’ (ibid., 
140). As already mentioned, in the context of the Platonic and Kantian distinctions, 
the end of reified conceptions of musical meaning as ‘obscure intermediate entities’ 
and the calling into question of universalist narratives surrounding music history, 
seem to leave little room for anything other than the subjectivisation of meaning and 
the ‘little narratives’ of irreducibly different cultures.  
The degradation of truth as the ‘dialogue of mankind’ in musicological affairs 
as a result of its ‘postmodern’ turn is an issue that Stanley Cavell indirectly hits upon 
in articulating the similarities he sees between aesthetic claims, both evaluative and 
interpretive, and the logic peculiar to ordinary language philosophy. For Cavell, ‘the 
familiar lack of conclusiveness in aesthetic argument, rather than showing up an 
irrationality, shows the kind of rationality it has, and needs’ (Cavell 2002, 86). 
Elaborating, Cavell suggests that the arguments which support aesthetic claims ‘are 
not conclusive the way arguments in logic are, nor rational the way arguments in 
science are. Indeed they are not, and if they were there would be no such subject as 
art (or morality) and no such art as criticism. It does not follow, however, that such 
judgments are not conclusive and rational’ (ibid., 88). Turning to Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment, Cavell notes that one kind of aesthetic judgment, what Kant called 
judgments of taste, are reflective assertions that lay claim to intersubjective 
legitimacy. This attempt to overcome or at least call into question the traditional 
Platonic and Kantian distinctions that support relativism is not, Cavell notes, an 
‘empirical problem’ but ‘an a priori requirement setting the (transcendental) 
conditions under which such judgments as we call aesthetic could be made 
überhaupt’, that is, broadly, in the first place (ibid.). Unlike ‘the taste of sense’, 
which encompasses what we, as subjects, find pleasant, ‘the taste of reflection’ and 
the judgments that go with it, Cavell argues, ‘demand’, ‘impute’ or ‘claim’ ‘general 
validity, universal agreement with them; and when we make such judgments we go 
on claiming this agreement even though we know from experience that they will not 
receive it’ (ibid., 89). In other words, aesthetic claims of the reflective kind demand 
that we ‘ought’ to agree with the interpretation – there is a normative impulse to such 
judgments. However, the norms of aesthetic judgments, as we have seen throughout 
this study, are neither what Cavell calls ‘a matter of factual rectitude’ nor ‘of formal 
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indiscretion’. They are not subjective and ‘psychological’ nor are they ‘logical’ 
necessities. As Jay Bernstein summarises, aesthetic claims of the reflective kind 
‘claim objectivity, they aim to speak with a “universal voice”, for everyone, and thus 
demand that others see things in the same way. Yet there is no matter of fact or 
reason (no concept or principle that my judgment comes under) that grounds any such 
judgment and thus empirically or logically necessitates that others judge the same’ 
(Bernstein 2003, 113). The most we can say is that what aesthetic claims terminate 
with – even though Cavell admits that he cannot describe what it is, instead 
suggesting that Wittgenstein calls it ‘grammar’ and others might call it 
‘phenomenology’ (Cavell 2002, 93) – are the horizons of enquiry of both the 
interpreter and the artwork to be interpreted that are historically formed by their 
belonging to a particular world of socio-cultural practices. As we have seen in this 
study, therefore, rather than ‘retreating’, as Cavell calls it, into the realm of purely 
subjective, personal or ‘psychological’ judgments due to the vulnerable ‘objectivity’ 
of our aesthetic claims, we can continue to debate interpretations with one another 
within the potentially trans-historical sphere of norms on which the necessity of 
aesthetic judgments rests.  
If the musicologist does not recognise that he is making judgments about 
musical praxis that claim third-person assent, that is, that operate outside the remit of 
the object/subject binary, then, if he ‘retreat[s] to personal taste’, ‘there is a price he 
will have to pay in our estimate of him’ (Cavell 2002, 92). As Wellmer indicates: 
 
Understanding should not be confused with the feeling that we have understood, rather it can 
only be grasped in its manifestations. And these are located in an arena of public 
communication – which is what makes it possible to have a dispute, with arguments, about 
aesthetic understanding or failure to understand, or (what amounts to much the same thing) 
about the success or failure of works of art or performances. The existence of literary and art 
criticism bears witness to this (Wellmer 1985, 65).   
 
 
In order to avoid ‘postmodernising’ itself out of existence, critical musicology, if it is 
to continue to give the institutional go-ahead to the interactions between 
‘modernisms’ and ‘postmodernisms’, between ‘old’ and ‘new’ musicologies, must 
face up to the ‘arena of public communication’ which maintains it as an institution 
and which presupposes its very existence. The point to realise here is that critical 
musicology, which attempts to use the formalisms and positivisms of ‘modern’ 
musicology within a hermeneutic framework based on the interpretation, analysis and 
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criticism of actual musical events, cannot allow difference, contingency and meaning 
pluralism to become ends in themselves. The point that Cavell makes in direct 
contrast with someone like Lyotard is that our interpretive claims are constantly being 
judged legitimate or illegitimate within a trans-cultural and trans-historical 
intersubjective sphere of norms. Claims regarding the incommensurability of subject 
positions, the indeterminacy of musical meaning and the ultimate contingency of 
interpretations can only be made up to a point before they begin to offer a parody of 
how the discipline actually operates in concrete situations. As Wellmer demonstrates, 
it goes without saying that truth is ‘pluralistic’, in that there are as many truths as 
there are ways of making sense of the world. But if this were all, there would only be 
‘truths’, not ‘the truth’. If this were the case, as Wellmer claims, truth would be 
devalued. The key point that Wellmer makes is that all thought on the relativity of 
truth presupposes the ideal of truth in the first place.8 Lyotard’s claims, as we have 
seen, regarding the irreconcilability of each and every discursive conflict can only be 
understood if there exist shared conventions by which we can judge his remarks to be 
valid or not; precisely the kinds of shared understanding of the truth that Lyotard is 
looking to refute through the concept of the différend. Without such norms, Lyotard’s 
Geltungsanspruch is unintelligible. Furthermore, without some shared awareness of 
what is going on in a discursive situation, one would not be able to claim, in the first 
place, that what one was partaking in was, in fact, discourse. Indeed, in the case of 
Lyotard, ‘dissent’ would be impossible if there were the kind of total 
incommensurability that he is aiming to articulate in the différend; for the idea of 
dissent could only be made intelligible in the light of the kinds of agreement that 
Lyotard claims can never happen. Ultimately, the existence of shared norms, of a 
shared understanding of what is legitimate, is what both presupposes and maintains 
the discipline of musicology. Even if we disagree with the norms and conventions of 
a discipline that give it a semblance of identity, musicology can only operate as an 
institution if there exist (at the least the possibility for) norms and conventions against 
which one can determine the legitimacy of even the most self-refuting postmodernist 
claims and totalitarian, absolutist readings. By tending to the reasons why critical 
musicology should, in an age where the divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ continues to 
                                                
8 See Wellmer 1993, 204-223. 
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collapse, concern itself with intersubjective legitimacy, the following sections will 
attempt to illustrate a future for critical musicology after reification and relativism. 
 
Music as Critique of Relativism 
 
According to Taylor, ‘relativism is usually the notion that affirmations can be judged 
valid not unconditionally, but only from different points of view or perspectives. 
Proposition p could be true from perspective A, false from perspective B, 
indeterminate from C, and so forth, but there would be no such thing as its being true 
or false unconditionally’ (Taylor 2002, 134). Taylor, therefore, like Rorty, sets up his 
account of relativism on the basic principle that it is in tension with objectivity. The 
issue, however, as we have already mentioned, is that to make such a distinction 
presupposes the idea that there exists what Rorty refers to as neutral ground to what 
we are attempting to come to terms. In other words, to uphold the divide between 
objectivity and relativism is to presuppose that there is something to pick out – what 
Davidson calls ‘something neutral and common that lies outside all schemes’ 
(Davidson 2006, 202). Ultimately, it is this conceptual framework for making sense 
of relativism that both Davidson and Gadamer aim to criticise. So, Gadamer claims:  
 
The criterion for the continuing expansion of our world picture is not given by a “world in 
itself” that lies beyond all language. Rather, the infinite perfectability of the human experience 
of the world means that, whatever language we use, we never succeed in seeing anything but 
an ever more extended aspect, a “view” of the world. Those views of the world are not relative 
in the sense that one could oppose to the “world in itself”, as if the right view from some 
possible position outside the human, linguistic world could discover it in its being-in-itself 
(Gadamer 2004, 444).  
 
Taylor makes the same point; mainly that something like Gadamer’s critique needs to 
be ‘kept in mind in order to avoid certain easy pitfalls, such as thinking that one has a 
neutral, universal categorization of the structures or functions of all societies, e.g., 
political system, family, religion, which provide the ultimately correct description for 
what all the different fumbling, cultural languages are aiming at; as it were, the 
noumena to their phenomenal tongues’ (Taylor 2002, 139). The issue is that in the 
context of the Kantian or Platonic conceptual framework the real relativist challenge 
to the notion of objectivity, to the idea of the unconditional validity of propositions, is 
the idea that there are unbridgeable differences between different worldviews, and 
this is determined, Davidson argues, by what is thought to be the incommensurability 
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and untranslatability of different languages. As Davidson claims, ‘the failure of 
intertranslatability is a necessary condition for difference of conceptual schemes; the 
common relation to experience or the evidence is what is supposed to help us make 
sense of the claim that it is languages or schemes that are under consideration when 
translation fails’ (Davidson 2006, 202). Ultimately, the consequence of this 
(relativist) line of thought is that, as Taylor states, ‘all reasoning stops at the borders 
of conceptual schemes, which pose insurmountable limits to our understanding’ 
(Taylor 2002, 137). In other words, the concept of relativism here seems based on the 
idea of what McDowell calls ‘a repertoire that is meaning-involving, and so 
intelligible, but not intelligible to us’ (McDowell 2009, 136)  
This picture of radical incommensurability is not how musical praxis or 
language functions in real circumstances. As Davidson, McDowell and Taylor are all 
aware, it also doesn’t really make sense of why translation ‘fails’ in concrete 
situations. It goes without saying that music is unable to make propositional claims. 
However, as Taylor observes, just as language can only ever be a partial and 
temporary barrier to understanding cultures that appear different to our own, so 
musical practices of different communities cannot be considered to be so radically 
different as to be inaccessible to ‘foreign’ enquirers. Our understanding of a piece of 
musical praxis, in the same way that we understand a linguistic assertion made by a 
member of a different culture, doesn’t involve us encountering an isolated piece of 
information free from the general grasp of the wider performative context from which 
it emerges. Like music, the isolated bit of information that is asserted in a speech act 
cannot exist autonomously outside of the sphere of interpretation, which, as Gadamer 
illustrates, also means a sphere of conversation and exchange, and eventually what 
Wittgenstein calls a ‘form of life’. When something is claimed, what is claimed goes 
beyond what is purely asserted in terms of ‘propositional content’, that is, it makes 
manifest or discloses a particular style of ‘being-in-the-world’. Similarly, we 
understand musical events as part of a broader understanding of the whole, a 
dialogical event which includes the fore-structures of our understanding that we bring 
with us from our practice-based engagement with the world as well as what is 
presented to us by the sounds that we commonly think of as being music. If we think 
about music, therefore, as was demonstrated in chapter one, in explicitly disclosive 
terms, in the sense that music, like language, can make sense of the ‘worlds’ we 
occupy, that is, in Heidegger’s terms, in the sense that it can ‘thematise’ or render 
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‘expressly visible’ what characterises our practice-based making sense of a world, 
then, once musical practices transcend the borders of their own culture, history and 
geography through trans-cultural and trans-historical interpretive acts, music can be 
considered to be a means of coming to terms with how communities and individuals 
make sense of one another. Furthermore, music can show us how this making sense is 
based upon the interaction of potentially trans-cultural and trans-historical norms as 
well as demonstrating the problems posed by such encounters between different 
cultures.  
Geographical, cultural and historical barriers, as is evident following the 
globalisation and normalisation of various ‘minority’ musics during the second half 
of the twentieth century, cannot contain music. As Martin Stokes observes in terms of 
the globalisation of world music since the 1980s, and despite the questions of power 
that surround such claims, ‘connections have been made, ideas exchanged, pleasures 
gained, and everyday music making in local contexts changed in fundamental ways. 
Cultural creativity on the margins of our own societies, previously invisible and 
inaudible, has been recognised outside of those margins; we have started to hear our 
social environment more inclusively’ (Stokes 2012, 114). As different varieties of 
musical practice spread across the world, so those practices become re-interpreted 
within new horizons, appropriated by different worldviews and combined with 
foreign musical practices to create new forms and styles of music. All this 
appropriation and interpretation leaves behind a trail of evidence by which we can 
make sense of how cultures come into contact with one another, sometimes even 
across distant points in history. Music, therefore, does not just disclose a specific 
world and its supposedly irreducible norms and conventions, but, through its 
dissemination across different times and places, discloses what Bohlman calls the 
‘moment of encounter’ (Bohlman 2012, 30), the encounter between one world and 
another, two worlds which, in stark contrast with what Lyotard suggests, can come to 
make sense of each other. Music, therefore, like language – when we consider ways 
in which the latter really matters to us, which, as Bowie (2007) and Taylor (2011) 
illustrate, must take account of its ‘musical’ aspects – shows us how we are entitled to 
refuse the idea of a case of intelligibility that is radically inaccessible to us. 
In the case of Edgard Varèse’s Amériques (1922/1929), the ways in which the 
French-born composer comes to make sense of his emigration to New York is, to a 
certain extent, so obvious that it borders on the banal. Varèse’s self-professed tone 
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poem was written, according to composer, when ‘I was still under the spell of my first 
impressions of New York – not only New York seen but, more especially, heard’ 
(Rich 1995, 89). He explains, ‘for the first time with my physical ears I heard a sound 
that had kept recurring in my ears as a boy: a high whistling C sharp. It came to me as 
I worked in my West-side apartment where I could here all the river sounds – the 
lonely foghorns, the shrill peremptory whistles – the whole wonderful river 
symphony that moved me more than anything has before’ (ibid.). What is depicted in 
Amériques in truly remarkable detail, which we can appreciate owing to recordings 
made by New York’s Noise Abatement Commission in 1929, is not just the ‘river 
symphony’ of foghorns and whistles but the whole soundscape of the city during ‘the 
roaring twenties’.9 Included in Amériques are musical representations of the noises of 
automobiles, horns, cut-outs, exhausts, sirens, bells, doormen’s whistles, trains, 
pneumatic drills, birdsong, the wind and flowing water. Indeed, we also hear snippets 
of the sounds of different cultures occupying the various ethnic enclaves of the city; 
some hints at jazz and swing, at Tin Pan Alley, at Spanish rhythms and at Yiddish 
and Far-Eastern music as well as other musical styles that make blatant use of 
pentatonic part writing. All this, unlike the later Déserts (1950-54), which included 
manipulated interpolations of recordings of factory sounds at Westinghouse, Diston 
and Budd Manufacturers, is achieved through the ‘traditional’ means of an orchestra, 
albeit one that includes twenty-one separate brass parts, twenty distinct woodwind 
parts and nine percussionists. 
What is less obvious about Amériques is that it illustrates how when we 
encounter other cultures and seek to understand them, to interpret them, the 
possibility exists for our norms to be transcended, an issue we will look at shortly in 
terms of Gadamer’s notion of a ‘fusion of horizons’. In order to understand this, we 
need to realise that Varèse’s musical interpretation of his ‘impressions of New York’ 
did not impose the pre-established European worldview of the composer on an alien 
culture in any instrumental sense. Varèse’s understanding of New York City does not 
seem to be what Taylor calls a ‘sham’, that is, ‘the end of the operation is not 
control…designed to manipulate my partner while pretending to negotiate’ (Taylor 
2002, 128). There is a sense in which Varèse sought to function together with the 
culture he was trying to interpret, ‘by listening as well as talking’, thus inescapably 
                                                
9 Emily Thompson’s website, ‘The Roaring Twenties’, provides many such sound clips as well as 
other sources in order to represent the soundscape of New York in the late 1920s. 
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altering his understanding of himself (ibid., 141). Although Wellmer perhaps puts too 
much weight on what he calls ‘external’ or ‘productive’ understanding as the basis of 
any critique of the established norms, that is, a type of understanding that transcends 
‘the perspective of the other’ by ‘interpreting it from within its own language, its own 
understanding of the problems, its own present’, it seems to be the case that in really 
interesting and illuminating moments of aesthetic experience, external understanding 
when working in conjunction with this ‘openness to the Other’, ‘will appear as 
“violent” to the extent that it reconstructs the perspective, the self-understanding of a 
text, a conversation partner, a foreign culture in a de-familiarising way, as it were 
from a vantage point outside that perspective and that self-understanding’ [italics 
added] (Wellmer 1995, 147). Indeed, it is this, what Gadamer calls, ‘openness’ to the 
Other working in combination with what Wellmer calls an ‘external’, ‘productive’ or 
‘critical’ understanding on the part of the interpreting subject that allows Varèse to 
transcend certain stylistic norms of Western art music, thus opening up a space of 
possibility for a seemingly new, modernist compositional aesthetic, one that became 
manifest in ‘organised sound’, based around the notion of what Varèse, in his 
lectures, called ‘sound as living matter’ (Chou 1966, 1). It is this idea of ‘sound as 
living matter’ whose genesis we find in the ‘living sounds’ of Amériques.  
In terms of norm transcendence, Varèse realised as early as 1917 that ‘our 
musical alphabet is poor and illogical’ (Varèse 1966, 11). In addition to calling for 
new instruments as new mediums of expression, he famously passed over the 
‘progressive’ developments of twelve-tone technique – what he called a ‘hardening of 
the arteries’ (Schuller and Varèse 1965, 33) – making moves to transcend Western art 
music’s fascination with pitch and duration, something Chou Wen-chung, who 
revised and corrected the manuscript of Amériques in 1929, referred to as music’s 
‘mechanical limitations’ (Chou 1966, 3). Varèse, as a means to achieve ‘organised 
sound’, detached attack, decay, frequency, intensity, dynamics and timbre from their 
traditional association with pitch and duration in order to render them isolable 
features in their own right so that an individual ‘sound-mass’ could be considered as 
‘a body of sounds with certain specific attributes in interval content, register, contour, 
timbre, intensity, attack and decay’ (ibid.).10 With music becoming, according to 
Varèse in 1939, an ‘art-science’ through the development of new technologies, he 
                                                
10 See Erickson 1975, 47-57 
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hoped that these isolated aspects of music could then be taken beyond the boundaries 
that they previously operated within: 
 
Here are the advantages I anticipate from such a machine: liberation from the arbitrary, 
paralysing tempered system; the possibility of obtaining any number of cycles or, if still 
desired, subdivisions of the octave, and consequently the formation of any desired scale; 
unsuspected range in low and high registers; new harmonic splendours obtainable from the use 
of sub-harmonic combinations now impossible; the possibility of obtaining differentiation of 
timbre, of sound-combinations; new dynamics far beyond the present human-powered 
orchestra; a sense of sound-projection in space by means of emission of sound in any part or in 
many parts of the hall, as may be required by the score; cross-rhythms unrelated to each other, 
treated simultaneously, or, to use the old world, “contrapuntally”, since the machine could be 
able to beat any number of desired notes, any subdivision of them, omission or fraction of them 
(Varèse 1966, 12-14). 
 
Later, in 1962, Varèse suggested that the electronic medium had now ‘brought to 
composers almost endless possibilities of expression, and opened up for them the 
whole mysterious world of sound…Composers are now able, as never before, to 
satisfy the dictates of that inner ear of the imagination. They are also lucky so far in 
not being hampered by aesthetic codification – at least not yet!’ (ibid., 18). What I 
claim is that such transformations in the stylistic, notational and instrumental norms 
of Western art music were, to a degree, a result of Varèse’s encounter with and 
interpretation of the cultural Other that was New York City.11 
In a context where Varèse’s dissatisfaction with the norms of Western art 
music of the early twentieth century were entwined with his discovery of a new 
culture, the symbolism that surrounds the fire in a Berlin warehouse in 1918 which 
destroyed virtually all his work prior to his arrival in America is all the more 
pertinent. It should also be noted that the plural title, Amériques, indicated that this 
new ‘opus 1’ was meant to celebrate not merely Varèse’s discovery of America but, 
as the composer explained, it was ‘symbolic of discoveries – new worlds on earth, in 
the sky or in the minds of men’. Amériques was, by the composer’s own admission, a 
work intimately entwined with the notion of cultural discovery, of interpreting the 
Other, of new artistic horizons and of overcoming established norms. Jonathan Cross, 
for example, notes that having been ‘born under different auspices’, Amériques was 
                                                
11 It should be recognised that Varèse’s preoccupation with ‘blocks of sound’ did begin prior to his 
arrival in New York as he describes in an interview with Gunther Schuller (1965). In a sense, the 
works of the 1920s could be considered, therefore, as what Varèse called a ‘general refinement’ of his 
earlier compositions. However, it could also be argued that his specific focus on the soundscape of 
New York was what laid the grounds for his later ‘organised sound’ works and his conception of sound 
as ‘living matter’. It was this concentration on everyday, ‘living sounds’ as opposed to being 
concerned solely with what he called ‘architectonic form and structure’ that primarily distinguished the 
Varèse of the 1920s from his earlier self. See Schuller and Varèse 1965, 32-37. 
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able to confront Stravinsky’s compositional language and, subsequently, bring about 
a transformation of the norms associated with this particular musical tradition in 
European (if not specifically Russian) modernism: 
 
In its juxtaposition of blocks of material, in its overall structure, in its approach to melodic 
construction, rhythmic organisation and repetition, and in the assured way it deploys large 
orchestral forces, Amériques takes key aspects of Stravinsky’s language in The Rite and Les 
Noces and transforms it into something new – demonstrating “the capacity for metamorphosis 
of a powerful language born under different auspices” (Cross 1998, 42).12 
 
Furthermore, there is a sense in which the sound blocks of Amériques, quite literally, 
disclose the layout of New York City’s road design and, thus, the ethnic stratification 
and connectedness of its various neighbourhoods. In this very obvious sense, the 
various enclaves of the city are accounted for by what Taruskin calls ‘discretely 
conceived and executed “blocks”’ of sound (Taruskin 1996, 1421). Yet, what is 
interesting in terms of the way such blocks of sound are brought into contact with one 
another, that is, the way in which what would later be termed ‘sound-masses’ are 
‘discretely conceived and executed’ yet ‘interlock’, is that they seemingly disclose 
the tensions inherent in acts of cross-cultural engagement and interpretation on which 
these specific discussions of Amériques are based.  
Varèse, from a lecture in 1936, claims that when ‘sound-masses collide the 
phenomena of penetration or repulsion will seem to occur’ (Varèse 1966, 11). He 
goes on to suggest that ‘certain transmutations taking place on certain planes will 
seem to be projected onto other planes, moving at different speeds and at different 
angles. There will no longer be the old conception of melody or interplay of 
                                                
12 As Cross is aware, we do not find Varèse’s method of positing an anti-developmental musical 
structure made up of ‘blocks’ – what would later be termed ‘sound-masses’ – in the works of 
Stravinsky, in any obvious sense, until the Symphonies of Wind Instruments, which was not composed 
until the composition of Amériques was under way, and which Varèse would not have heard prior to 
the completion of his own composition. Stravinsky’s method of ‘interlocking, discretely conceived and 
executed “blocks”’ (Taruskin 1996, 1421), which brings about a sense of ‘global coherence’ and 
‘comprehensiveness’, is eschewed by Varèse leading to what Cross calls ‘the effect of a collage’ 
(Cross 1998, 45). Thus, although it is seemingly incontestable that Stravinsky in the Symphonies aims 
for a method of what Edward T. Cone calls ‘stratification, interlock and synthesis’ (Cone 1962, 19), 
whereby the ‘blocks’ are seemingly resolved in the Chorale finale, the synthesis can only be vaguely 
articulated, if at all, within Amériques. Even Jonathan D. Kramer, who, at one time, sought to 
denounce the pseudo-organicist interpretation of the Symphonies, has, subsequently, admitted that 
Stravinsky’s motivic, harmonic and voice-leading techniques along with a linear, step-wise 
progression in the background does bring about a sense of continuity to the work. See J. Kramer 1981, 
539-556. On the one hand, therefore, where one might argue that Stravinsky brings about the 
resolution of binary oppositions in the Symphonies, that is, the distinction between integration and 
disintegration and other related concepts, Varèse, on the other, leaves the nature of the resolution 
perhaps deliberately ambiguous.   
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melodies. The entire work will be a melodic totality. The entire work will flow as a 
river flows’ (ibid.). The question of how, like Varèse’s ‘organised sound’, 
worldviews ‘flow’ is a key issue when discussing how cross-cultural engagements 
take place. For Varèse, sound-masses can either penetrate or repel one another. It is 
this kind of dialectic that appears in acts of cultural colonisation or domination, in 
racism and xenophobia as well as in the seemingly democratic ‘fusion of horizons’ 
that Gadamer advocates. Before I explore how music discloses the ‘flow’ between 
different cultures, the important point to realise, initially, is that it is not possible to 
align the idea of total incommensurability of worldviews with real-life situations in 
which different cultures and their corresponding worldviews interact. In the 
interesting, concrete situations in which cross-cultural interactions occur, what we are 
faced with is the confrontation of partially overlapping worldviews and languages 
based on the notion that there exist some shared, practice-based norms. Indeed, as we 
have seen through the ideas of Rorty, Frank and Wellmer, any interesting situation in 
which discourse takes place must, in order for there to be a discussion in the first 
place, depend upon the existence or possibility of such shared conventions. That is 
not to say, however, that we need to possess a completely ‘common language’ or 
‘common worldview’ in order to have a discussion. It follows that ‘horizons’, what 
McDowell calls worldviews and what Taylor refers to as languages, ‘are thus often 
initially [and, I would add, partially] distinct. They divide us. But they are not 
unmovable; they can be changed, extended’ (Taylor 2002, 134). If this is true then 
claims made in a certain local or cultural context can, in a sense, transcend their own 
local or cultural borders leading us to suggest that, as Wellmer observes, ‘the idea of 
a self-contained language game is a myth’ (Wellmer 1993, 223). We would miss the 
point of everyday communication if we interpreted it in terms of a common system of 
fixed ‘rules’ and ‘criteria’ that is, as it were, semantically closed.  
According to Gadamer, ‘the multiplicity of these worldviews does not involve 
any relativisation of the “world”. Rather, the world is not different from the views in 
which it presents itself’ (Gadamer 2004, 444). This idea leads Gadamer to argue that 
‘in the case of verbal worldviews, each one potentially contains every other one 
within it – i.e., each worldview can be extended into every other’ (ibid., 445). The 
fact that each worldview ‘potentially contains every other’ is part of what leads 
Gadamer to argue for the notion of a ‘shared moral world’; that is, ‘in being devoted 
to common aims, in being absorbed in activity for the community, a person is freed 
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“from particularity and transience”’ (ibid., 229). This idea is, to a certain extent, 
elaborated by Habermas in his claims regarding multiculturalism: 
 
For multiculturalism that understands itself in the right way is not a one-way street to the 
cultural self-assertion of groups with their own collective identities. The equal coexistence of 
different forms of life must not lead to segmentation. It calls for the integration of all citizens 
and the mutual recognition of their subcultural memberships within the framework of a shared 
political culture. The citizens as members of society may legitimately cultivate their distinctive 
cultures only under the condition that they all understand themselves, across subcultural 
divides, as citizens of one and the same political community’ (Habermas 2008, 270). 
 
That is not to say, however, as Stokes observes, and as shall be discussed in what 
follows with regards to various power structures, that multiculturalism has not also 
‘reduced rich musical traditions to mute tokens of otherness, to be noticed 
administratively or exploited commercially, but not engaged in meaningful, or 
lasting, dialogue’ (Stokes 2012, 114). It is precisely the point that when 
‘multiculturalism understands itself in the right way’, ‘our world view’, as McDowell 
suggests, ‘includes its own receptiveness to the possibility of correction, not only by 
efforts at improvement that are internal to our practices of inquiry, but also through 
coming to appreciate insights of other world views in the course of coming to 
understand them’ (McDowell 2009, 138). It is this idea that one’s worldview can be 
‘corrected’ by coming to understand the Other, that the norms of a culture can 
possibly be transcended through interaction with another, that my discussion of 
Varèse has attempted to illustrate. Such an idea calls into question the relevance of 
certain forms of musicological practice that affirm the idea that difference and 
meaning pluralism should be ends in themselves, thus, in the process, devaluing the 
concept of truth as a norm. In concrete situations, what Wellmer calls the ‘truths’ of 
particular societies and cultures or what Price calls ‘the chatter of disengaged 
monologues’ presuppose the ideal of ‘truth’ in the first place. Indeed, it is music’s 
ability to question what is considered to be legitimate or conventional that, as we 
shall see, allows it, at times, to adopt critical positions to various structures of power 
that would seek to control musical practices on their own terms.  
 
Horizons and Norm Transcendence 
 
McDowell, in his reading of Gadamer, claims that ‘when we come to understand the 
other subject, that can involve a change in how we view the world. When horizons 
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fuse, the horizon within which we view the world is no longer in the same position’. 
(McDowell 2009, 141). Such a claim is predicated on a number of issues, not least 
the question of power and its ability to distort mutual comprehension – something 
musical praxis is able to thematise as I will discuss shortly. The idea that there can be 
such a thing as a fusion of horizons presupposes that, as Taylor claims, ‘we allow 
ourselves to be interpellated by the other; in which the difference escapes from its 
categorization as an error, a fault, or a lesser, undeveloped version of what we are, 
and challenges us to see it as a viable human alternative. It is this that unavoidably 
calls our own self-understanding into question. This is the stance Gadamer calls 
“openness”’ (Taylor 2002, 141). In other words, according to Gadamer, ‘openness to 
the other, then, involves recognising that I myself must accept some things that are 
against me, even though no one else forces me to do so’ (Gadamer 2004, 355). In 
Varèse’s terms, the act of a fusion of horizons, the ‘flow’ of worldviews, involves a 
‘penetration’ as opposed to a ‘repulsion’ whereby distinct cultures allow themselves 
to be challenged, interpellated by what is different in the other culture. The challenge 
the notion of a fusion of horizons poses, therefore, for ways of making sense of the 
world that rely on the reification of what it is they aim to study cannot be missed. 
According to Taylor, ‘this challenge will bring about two connected changes: we will 
see our peculiarity for the first time, as a formulated fact about us, and not simply a 
taken-for-granted feature of the human condition as such; and at the same time, we 
will perceive the corresponding feature of their life-form undistorted. These two 
changes are indissolubly linked; you cannot have one without the other’ (Taylor 
2002, 132). Thus, the coming-to-an-understanding model ‘is a language that bridges 
those of both knower and known. That is why Gadamer speaks of it as a “fusion of 
horizons.” The “horizons” here are at first distinct, they are the way that each has of 
understanding the human condition in their non-identity. The “fusion” comes about 
when one (or both) undergo a shift; the horizon is extended, so as to make room for 
the object that before did not fit within it’ (ibid., 133). The important point to 
recognise, as my discussion of Varèse illustrates, is that by being open to the Other, a 
fusion of horizons can sometimes lead to a change in one’s worldview, that is, in the 
norms and ways of doing that would have made up one’s socio-cultural practices 
prior to one’s contact with the Other. The critique, however, is not one-sided. Just as 
the hermeneutic situation can challenge the norms and conventions of the interpreting 
culture, so can the act of interpretation also challenge that which is being interpreted 
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to see its own culture in new and unfamiliar ways. Indeed, because coming-to-and-
understanding involves certain definite interlocutors, whose life situations or goals 
are susceptible to change, a certain understanding may always be called into question, 
which would require the process of fusion to start all over again with yet more 
possibilities for the transcendence of socio-cultural norms.  
 It is this idea that undistorted mutual comprehensibility or reciprocal 
recognition can involve the overcoming or at least calling into question of cultural 
norms that makes the relationship with both aesthetic experience and reification so 
interesting. Bowie, for example, claims that ‘the kind of relation to the objective 
world present, for example, in musical performance (particularly improvised 
performance) relies precisely on the way that acquired norms which are necessary to 
perform at all are, in the moments which really matter, transcended by impulses that 
occur in concrete situations and which are not governed by those norms’ [italics 
added] (Bowie 2013. 127-128). As we observed with Varèse, Bowie’s claim could 
equally be said to apply to discussions of cross-cultural interpretation that are based 
on the ‘coming-to-an-understanding’ model, one that presupposes an ‘openness to the 
other’ as well as a critically reflecting interpreter, and that leads to a fusion of 
horizons. Indeed, Bowie aligns the aesthetic moment of norm-transcendence with the 
idea that such a moment is reached by not taking part in what Taylor calls a ‘sham’, 
an act of communication whose goal is the manipulation and domination of the Other. 
Thus, Bowie argues, ‘the jazz player’s experiences of “being in the zone”, which only 
sporadically occur, involve a kind of freedom which precisely manifests itself in the 
disappearance of the conscious need for control and a following of impulse that 
creates new sense’ [italics added] (ibid.). Wellmer also, unsurprisingly owing to 
Adorno’s influence on both thinkers, claims that communicative understanding enters 
into an interminable tension with aesthetic experience. Wellmer, as Honneth 
demonstrates, hits upon the idea that ‘the truth that the work of art conveys does not 
easily align itself with the differentiations in everyday language that may be 
undertaken by way of the pragmatics of language among the three validity 
dimensions of empirical truth, normative rightness and subjective truthfulness’ 
(Honneth 2009, 172). Indeed, in a Heideggerian twist to a largely Habermasian 
approach to Critical Theory, Wellmer argues that the cognitive effect of a work of art 
cannot be adequately apprehended within the differentiated frames of rational 
understanding, for it relates to subjective attitudes or worldviews that in some 
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measure pre-exist rational opinion formation in discursive speech because they form 
syntheses of all three aspects of validity. This is precisely where the idea of theory 
construction, such as we encountered in analytic aesthetics, and its reifying approach 
to music and musical works is called into question. The point is, for Wellmer, that 
what art amounts to is ‘a disruption or negation of devitalised meaning’ (Wellmer 
1985, 69). This is what Wellmer refers to as ‘the subversive potential’ of aesthetic 
experience (ibid., 43). It is, ultimately, because our understanding of music can be 
challenged and, potentially, overcome through the normalisation of new 
interpretations that a theory which aims to definitively characterise music’s ontology, 
meaning and value cannot account for all that actual musical practices could present 
us with, both now and in the future. Indeed, for Wellmer, mutual comprehension and 
aesthetic experience are so intimately linked that the deaestheticization of society, 
which he argues took place through ‘the functionalistic modernisation of West 
German cities since the war’, was and still is a problem for civic freedom because 
‘what was largely lost in the process of this modernisation was the city as a public 
space where a multiplicity of functions and forms of communication interacted’ 
(ibid., 121-122). 
The entwinement of aesthetic experience with the notion of cross-cultural 
understanding, in Taylor’s sense, finds a certain amount of expression in Adorno’s 
reading of Beethoven’s late style, especially when contrasted with his interpretation 
of the middle style, which, as we saw in chapter two, can be interpreted as a 
harmonious reconciliation of musical particular and general form. In his reflections 
on late Beethoven, Adorno repeatedly emphasises the general withering of harmony 
as a characteristic trait: 
 
But even where the harmony is nakedly visible, it has nothing to do with fully worked-out 
tonality, with the aesthetic concept of harmony...the chord as allegory replaced key as process. 
The term “functionless harmony”, coined for atonality, applies in a certain way to the late 
Beethoven (Adorno 1998, 129).  
 
For Adorno, the harmony of the middle period, which withers in the light of the late 
style, symbolises the identity of subject and object, of means and ends. What emerges 
in the late style, however, is ‘criticism’, specifically, a ‘force of subjectivity’ that 
bursts the late works asunder, ‘not in order to express itself but, expressionlessly, to 
cast off the illusion of art’ (ibid., 125) – the illusion that the harmonious synthesis of 
subject and object within the artwork can be replicated within social reality. In this 
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way, ‘the compulsion of identity is broken and the conventions are its fragments’ 
[italics added] (ibid., 157), fragments ‘left standing’ ‘as splinters derelict and 
abandoned’ (ibid., 125). In claiming that ‘the fragmented landscape is objective, 
while the light in which it alone it glows is subjective’ (ibid., 126), Adorno contended 
that ‘all the categories of the late Beethoven are challenges to idealism’ (ibid., 157). 
In other words, the late works, in Adorno’s opinion, loosen the impulse towards the 
integration of the individual and thus express, in musical form, the ‘irreconcilability 
of reality’ (ibid., 152). ‘Harmony is avoided’, according to Adorno, ‘because it 
produces an illusion of the unity of many voices’ (ibid., 157). Such an account of 
musical harmony, ultimately, coincides with Adorno’s conception of ethical life. As 
Bowie observes, ‘Adorno does add the claim that the sedimented internal and external 
effects of instrumental reason are such that ethical transparency is effectively 
impossible. This is a kind of inverted image of Pippin’s Hegelianism, where 
sedimented norms are the very condition of possibility of ethical life’ (Bowie 2013, 
112). According to Bowie, Pippin’s Hegel, which, as we have seen, is based on an 
anti-metaphysical reading of Hegel’s works, ‘regards the core of practical philosophy 
as a harmonisation of the individual with the norms of a community which can tell a 
story of their development that legitimates them, there being no other form of 
legitimation which would not entail indefensible metaphysical or other dogmatic 
claims’ (Bowie 2013, 103). But, Bowie goes on to explain, and as I have attempted to 
demonstrate through Varèse’s encounter with America and the relevance of music to 
that encounter, ‘in the situations characteristic of modernity the subject’s 
harmonisation with communal norms cannot be as transparent or unproblematic as it 
seems to be for Pippin and Hegel’ (ibid.). 13  However, rather than discount 
normativity and its relevance for how we make sense of the world, which could also 
mean discounting the possibility of understanding someone or some culture whose 
worldview is seemingly different to our own, Pippin’s Hegelian position needs to 
bear in mind the challenge to one’s own norms that comes from any interpretive 
                                                
13 Wellmer argues that the tensions within a Hegelian account of freedom finds its genesis in Kant’s 
differentiation between morally right action and the legitimacy of norms (Wellmer 1991, 188-195). 
Wellmer is, thus, critical of Habermas’ formulation of discourse ethics in that it is dependent upon 
ideal conditions in consensus theory and, thus, through an exploration of ultimate grounding of being 
in agreement, appealed to a absolutist conception of ethics (ibid., 145-188). Arguably, this sort of 
ethical determinism involves absorbing individuals into a totalising ethical framework whereby 
‘ethically-good’ people resign themselves without trying to meddle. Suffice it to say that Habermas has 
been ‘open’ to Wellmer’s criticisms such that his account of the ‘ideal speech situation’ no longer 
plays a prominent role in his work. 
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situation in which an ‘openness to the Other’ is combined with the critical potential of 
the interpreting subject if it is not to be implausibly one-sided. 
 
Music and the Problem of Fusing Horizons 
 
The previous discussion of Varèse’s Amériques may appear to paint an idealised 
picture of the composer’s interpretation of New York City and the impact of that 
encounter on his own compositional norms. To a degree, Gadamer’s own account of 
what is at stake and what occurs when we seek to understand the Other suffers from a 
similar problem, mainly that it does not take account of the real issues facing attempts 
at mutual comprehensibility or reciprocal recognition. Gadamer, seemingly, falls into 
the trap of reifying the process of cultural engagement. His idea of what constitutes 
cross-cultural understanding fails to take account of what actually affects encounters 
with the Other in real life. This problem is not lost on Taylor, who claims that  ‘the 
road to understanding others passes through the patient identification and undoing of 
those facets of our implicit understanding that distort the reality of the other’ [italics 
added] (Taylor 2002, 132). Elaborating, he suggests ‘that we need to understand how 
we move from our language at the time of encounter, which can only distort them 
[the Other], to a richer language that has place for them; from making the “best 
sense” in our initial terms, which will usually be an alien imposition, to making the 
best sense within a fused horizon’ (ibid., 138). The issue is that in order for live 
interlocutors ‘to talk undistortively of each’, ‘we have to maintain a kind of openness 
to the text, allow ourselves to be interpellated by it, take seriously the way its 
formulations differ from ours – all things that a live interlocutor in a situation of 
equal power would force us to do’ [italics added] (Taylor 2002, 134). It is precisely 
because situations in which real interlocutors seek to understand one another are not, 
in terms of power relations, equal, that both Gadamer’s interpretation and my reading 
of Varèse perhaps paint an overly metaphysical picture of aesthetic experience and 
mutual comprehension. As Wellmer explains in relation to the dialectical relationship 
between interpreter and the interpreted in concrete hermeneutic situations, ‘there is a 
particular risk of nonunderstanding attached to either case, to immanent as well as to 
external understanding. The internal perspective may lose any sense of distance, and 
thus the possibility of activating that which is to be understood within the horizon of 
one’s own language, and one’s own present…The external perspective may lose sight 
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of that specific element in a text or what a speaker is saying that is different, foreign, 
incapable of integration into one’s own perspective’ (Wellmer 1995, 147-148). In 
other words, in situations where the power relations between interpreter and text are 
not equal, there is a real danger that what Wellmer calls the ‘correct mean between 
merely “internal” understanding and “external” understanding’, between ‘reception’ 
and ‘production’ – a ‘gesture’ that ‘can only ever be achieved partially’ (ibid., 149-
150) – will be distorted too far in either direction leading to ‘nonunderstanding’ 
[‘Nicht-Verstehen’] (ibid., 146-147). As Wellmer observes, ‘the inherent danger of 
immanent understanding is loss of critical distance; the inherent danger of external 
understanding is the dogmatism of an interpretation that is guided by prejudice’ 
(ibid., 148). Both kinds of understanding may result in the transcendence of pre-
established aesthetic norms, but how that happens is not through an act of mutual 
recognition based on the various interlocutors being ‘open’ to one another, but 
through either the imposition of the interpreter’s own prejudices on that which is to 
be interpreted or the interpreter’s uncritical acceptance of the Other’s norms and 
convictions. Again, we can turn to musical praxis as a way of understanding how 
power structures get in the way of democratic, cross-cultural processes of 
interpretation and legitimisation. 
 Heile, in accounting for new music as a ‘global phenomenon’, discusses the 
case of Weltmusik, ‘one of the most influential concepts among the European avant-
garde from the late 1960s to the early ’80s’ (Heile 2009, 103). As he claims, ‘many 
current arguments pro and contra forms of cross-cultural representation have already 
been foreshadowed during the Weltmusik debate’ (ibid.). Focussing on the 
composition Telemusik (1966) by Stockhausen, Heile notes that ‘in the piece he 
wanted to “get closer to realising an old and recurrent dream”, namely “not to write 
“my” music, but the music of the whole earth, of all countries and races”’ (ibid., 104). 
In terms of Stockhausen’s grand hopes for a ‘universal’ music, Heile thematises the 
crucial ethical issue facing the composer, one that calls into question the innocent 
picture Stockhausen paints for this ‘very open musical world’ (Stockhausen 1978). 
As Heile illustrates, ‘from an emphasis on “pluralist developments” and a “polyphony 
of styles, times and locales” in a “very open musical world” – however this can be 
achieved by the one person in control of the technology – Stockhausen has, within the 
same text but written at different times, shifted to emphasizing “higher unity” and 
“universality”’ (Heile 2009, 105). Demonstrating the influence of Marshall 
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McLuhan’s ideas of the incorporation of mankind through technology on 
Stockhausen’s homogenising approach to the issue of different cultures, Heile 
emphasises the main problem facing the latter’s project; McLuhan’s ‘mono-causal 
determinism makes him blind to the power relations, economic structures and other 
social and historical factors that drive technological change in the first place; 
consequently he never even asks who initiates, controls and benefits from 
technological developments’ (ibid., 107). Turning to Stockhausen’s 1973 article on 
Weltmusik, the composer lets us know on whose terms the ‘museum of global 
culture’, in which music will play an essential role, will come about (Stockhausen 
1978). In Adorno’s terms, the ‘compulsion of identity’, which he discussed in relation 
to Beethoven’s musical critique of idealism, comes from the West, specifically 
Europe. As Stockhausen claims, ‘the Europeans not only have the technology to 
produce something new, they also have the technology to conserve what has 
previously matured. Therefore, they have an obligation to do that as faithfully as 
possible’ (ibid.).  
Despite suggesting that ‘the highest responsibility of our time is to preserve as 
many musical forms and styles as possible’, Stockhausen claims that cultures are 
‘overripe and in that state of decay, destined to transform themselves into something 
new’ (ibid.). Ultimately, the problem with this call for a ‘rapid process of dissolution 
of individual cultures’ is that the direction of the ‘flow into one unified world culture’ 
is, out of necessity, due to the position accorded technology in Stockhausen’s plans 
for the harmonisation of cultures to the norms of one global culture, towards the 
European worldview. It also just so happens that this worldview is, according to 
Stockhausen, one of the two cultures – the other being Japan – whose musical 
traditions ‘have become so strongly crystallised’ displaying a ‘relative uniformity of 
instrumentation and compositional technique’ (ibid.). Ultimately, as Heile observes, 
Stockhausen ‘does not see that the process of integration he describes is not 
necessarily fully self-generating and voluntary, but that it is driven by specific 
political and economic interests’ (Heile 2009, 108). Indeed, with this in mind, it is 
telling, as Heile also notes, that Stockhausen states that his music, specifically 
Telemusik, Hymnen, Kurzwellen, Spiral, Mantra and Stimmung, gestures at what the 
‘universal’ music might look like – ‘in this sense, all local musics are to be 
understood as parts of that universal music and are accordingly incorporated in 
Stockhausen’s music’ (ibid.). 
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 If Stockhausen can be considered to be blind to the power structures that 
ensure the ‘flow’ of cultural change is towards his distinctly Eurocentric, unified 
‘world culture’, Lawrence Kramer is all too aware of the possibilities that exist for 
such structures to distort the fusion of horizons. As shall be explored, musical 
practice is one way by which we can become critically aware of the unjust ideas that 
continue to legitimise relations of domination. Indeed, as Bohlman claims, ‘music is 
the key to understanding and to the power that will turn initial encounter into 
prolonged dominance. To music, then, accrues the potential to articulate colonial 
power and chart empire’ (Bohlman 2012, 30). Kramer, for example, discusses the 
notion of ‘supremacism’, the late nineteenth-century separation of what was 
considered to be ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ in human nature and society, a Fin-de-siècle, 
northern-European cultural practice based on the ideas of Kantian autonomy and the 
discoveries in evolutionary science that allowed for the formation of dualistic and 
phobic contrasts between ‘cultural progress and cultural regression, evolution and 
degeneration’ (L. Kramer 2004, 191). Kramer suggests that ‘the origins of 
supremacist culture lie partly in the rise of economic and social stresses on the 
middle-class family central to the organisation of nineteenth-century life’, something, 
unfortunately, he does not discuss in any great detail, ‘and partly in the ideological 
impact of evolutionary science’. Consequently, drawing primarily upon Otto 
Weininger’s 1903 misogynist manifesto, Sex and Character, he illustrates how 
Richard Strauss’ Elektra (1909) discloses important themes in supremacist ideology 
in terms of the ‘primitive’ status of the female – a figure of degeneration and 
regression (L. Kramer 2004, 191).  
In terms reminiscent of Varèse’s account of sound-masses, Kramer considers 
the ‘protagonist’ to be both ‘repellent and compelling’ (ibid., 193) – although, 
ultimately, more repulsive than she is alluring. The issue is, according to Kramer, that 
although the supremacist wishes to distance himself from the ‘phobic personification 
of womanhood as brute bodily energy’, that same character also attracts the civilised, 
normative human type, which makes her even more dangerous in supremacist terms 
through her desire to assimilate her life to that of men – the ultimate act of 
degeneration. Despite this dialectic of revulsion and penetration that Kramer suggests 
surrounds Elektra, it is clear that there is no fusion of her horizons with those of the 
supremacist in any democratic sense. The initial dialectic does not lead to mutual 
comprehension or reciprocal recognition between the supremacist and the atavistic 
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‘protagonist’ of Strauss’ work. Indeed, in terms of the supremacist narrative, 
Elektra’s desire to assimilate herself to the world of men is thwarted by panicky 
revulsion, which, ultimately, leads to her death – in a less obvious sense than in the 
case of Klytämnestra – as ‘a sacrificial victim’ (ibid., 218). Furthermore, in terms of 
the associative role of keys in Strauss’ music, there is no cathartic moment whereby 
Elektra’s bitonal musical characterisation – first heard in bar 15 (Ex. 2) – is resolved 
in favour of either tonality. There is no musical resolution of the contradiction 
between E major, what Bryan Gilliam (1991) associates with Dionysian, passionate 
and sensual themes in Strauss’ works as a whole, and D-flat major, famously 
associated with The Countess – authoritative yet sentimental muse, who, with tongue 
firmly in cheek, repels the advances of her male admirers – in Capriccio. Elektra’s 
death, in complimentary opposition to her ‘positive’ representation in D flat major/E 
major, takes place in yet another bitonal context based on the alternation of E-flat 
minor – tonic minor of the key associated with Chrysothemis, the supremacist poster 
girl who explicitly demands a ‘woman’s fate’ – and C minor, the latter with 
repetitions of the work’s opening motif evoking the death of the murdered 
Agamemnon (Ex. 3). Indeed, the fact that the deathblow comes on an E-flat minor 
chord, which Thethys Carpenter (1989) associates with rejection and its ultimate 
entwinement with death, thus affirms her alienation not just from the realm of 
women, the Weiberschicksal, but from the domain of the living in general. Elektra’s 
passing is affirmed by the C-minor, truncated ‘Agamemnon’ fanfares that follow. 
Ultimately, there is no vengeance for Elektra but condemnation for her retributive 
acts and scheming. Dramatically and tonally, Elektra is repellent to all the main 
characters in the drama, including her own self. 
 
 
Example 2 
 
Richard Strauss, Elektra, mm. 14-18 
 
 
  210 
 
 
Example 3 
 
Richard Strauss, Elektra, Final bars after Elektra’s death 
 
 
 Musically and dramatically, according to Kramer, Elektra ‘encapsulates the 
relationship of supremacist man to his larger-than-life mate antagonist’ (L. Kramer 
2004, 194). Indeed, no better is the supremacist narrative evoked than in Elektra’s 
recognition monologue (‘Es rührt sich niemand’) following Orest’s return. In sight of 
her god-like brother, Elektra calls on Orest to abide with her (‘o bleib bei mir!’). 
Indeed, Orest almost succumbs to Elektra’s desire for assimilation. But Strauss does 
not let Orest embrace his sister. In response to her brother’s advance, Elektra, 
ashamed by her corpse-like appearance, urges him to keep his distance (‘Nein, du 
sollst mich nicht umarmen!’). We, simultaneously, witness an abrupt shift in tonality 
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with a move from A-flat major, which held unwaveringly during Elektra’s lyrical 
episode, to a harmonically unstable final section of the Recognition Scene, which, 
with an assertion of C minor and the Agamemnon motif at Fig. 157a (Ex. 4), is 
gradually pulled further towards C major – albeit hardly ever in root position – for the 
rhetorical climax to the duet between Elektra and Orest at Fig. 177a. Following her 
lyrical monologue, Elektra goes on to recall her metamorphosis from princess to 
unclean, despairing, frenzied and cursing ‘prophetess always of terror’, an ‘unkempt’ 
and ‘besmirch’d’ ‘horror’ from hell: 
 
Maiden shame e'en flung I far from me,  
The shame, that treasure that passeth all,  
Which like the silvery film, of moonlight,  
Unto every woman clinging,   
Doth from her body drive, and from her soul,   
All horror, all uncleanness. Hear'st thou, brother?   
All these thrills of sweetness did my father   
As expiation claim. Think'st thou not   
When in my beauty I rejoiced, his moans   
Resounded oft, his sighs resounded   
In my chamber? In very truth the dead   
Are jealous, and he sent to me from Hell   
Grim hate, hate hollow-eyed, my spouse to be.   
Thus was I made a prophetess always of terror,   
And nothing e'er came forth from me, but curses   
Without end, and fierce despair and frenzy  
 
 
When it comes to understanding the power relations that are in play when an 
attempt at cross-cultural understanding is made, Kramer recognises that music 
performs a significant role in disclosing how worldviews ‘flow’ between one another. 
It is hard when we see Elektra bring described as a savage, an animal, an unclean and 
an amoral outcast not to be reminded of Honneth’s (2008) book on reification 
whereby the concept of reification becomes entwined with social processes that 
would seek to deny ‘human’ status to different individuals and cultural groups. What 
the musical and dramatic representation of Elektra in Strauss’ opera discloses is 
precisely ‘the effect[s] of reifying stereotypes’ whereby ‘groups of individuals are 
retroactively deprived of the personal characteristics that have been accorded to them 
habitually and without question on the basis of antecedent social recognition’ 
(Honneth 2008, 81). The point is, for Honneth, that ‘it is impossible for us to perceive 
other people as “persons” once we have forgotten our antecedent recognition of them’ 
(ibid., 64). Thus, Honneth argues that reification is a process whereby we lose sight 
of our ‘antecedent recognition’ of other human beings, which is a precondition for 
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understanding other human beings as human beings, rather than mere ‘things’ lacking 
‘all human properties and capacities’ (ibid., 148). Nevertheless, Elektra demonstrates 
her ability to go against the grain of the supremacist narrative that would deny her 
recognition as a human. Elektra is, musically and dramatically, despite the 
supremacist interpretation of her, an agent with her own beliefs, desires, actions and 
relationships, and that is why, according to Kramer, Strauss’ opera has survived the 
supremacist culture and myths on which it rests. She is not merely dehumanised and, 
as a result, repelled from the outset but also, as a figure of tragedy, allowed to assert 
herself in order to threaten the divide between supremacist male and debased and 
dehumanised female. This Elektra does in her lyrical episode (‘Es rührt sich 
niemand’) in the key of A-flat major, which, for a brief moment in what Arnold 
Whittall suggests is an ‘an unreal atmosphere’ (Whittall 1989, 70), portrays the 
princess in her former glory. Indeed, it is this semblance of the past in musico-
dramatic terms that tempts the god-like Orest into a possible incestuous union (Ex. 5). 
According to supremacist ideology, Elektra’s agency and allure make her all the more 
dangerous; a ‘contagious matter’ that would seek to identify herself with what 
Kramer calls the ‘higher ethical consciousness’ (L. Kramer 2004, 202). As he claims, 
the supremacist, like Orest, risks ‘being absorbed by her and reproducing her 
regressive character’ (ibid., 194). Kramer refers to Elektra as a ‘polymorph’, a figure 
of ‘unlimited plasticity’ whose indeterminacy threatens the determinacy of men 
(ibid., 198-199). Supremacist culture is, therefore, ‘a culture of panic, the ideological 
mandate of which is to police its boundaries at all times and at all costs’ for fear that 
atavistic groups and individuals should, with their ‘promiscuously transgressive 
energy’ and ‘degenerative allure’, attack – with hopes of overcoming – the 
boundaries of the normative human type and its culture (ibid., 200-201). 
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Example 4 
 
Richard Strauss, Elektra, Immediately after Elektra’s lyrical monologue (‘Es rührt sich niemand’) 
 
 
 
Example 5 
 
Richard Strauss, Elektra, The beginning of Elektra’s monologue (‘Es rührt sich niemand’) 
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With the examples from Stockhausen and Strauss, we are able to see how 
certain structures of power, colonising Eurocentrism in the case of Stockhausen and 
dehumanising, misogynistic supremacism with Elektra, are able to appropriate 
musical practices on their own terms. In both cases, it is the notion of control that 
comes from the internalisation of culturally specific norms of recognition that 
undermines any democratic process of mutual comprehensibility, the likes of which 
Gadamer, Taylor and Wellmer see as the basis for a kind of ideal process of 
understanding. But that is not to say that the distortion of the hermeneutic situation 
needs to be thought of, in all cases, as a kind of moral misconduct because, as 
Honneth notes, in some cases ‘it lacks the element of subjective intent necessary to 
bring moral terminology into play’ (Honneth 2008, 25-26). As Honneth explains, 
what regulates ‘how subjects deal with each other legitimately in various social 
relationships’ are the internalised norms that embody specific values that prevail in a 
society (ibid., 153). In other words, violation of the principles of reciprocal 
recognition can initially represent a social fact, that is, by ‘a specific worldview or 
ideology’ – ‘a set of convictions’ that guides one’s actions – working with a ‘one-
dimensional praxis’ that aims to instrumentalise or control the Other (ibid., 79-81). 
As Honneth explains with regards to his reconstruction of a social etiology of 
reification, ‘the social practices of distanced observation and the instrumental 
treatment of other individuals are thus sustained to the same extent that these 
practices find cognitive reinforcement in reifying stereotypes, just as these typifying 
descriptions conversely receive motivational nourishment by serving as a suitable 
interpretive framework for a given kind of one-dimensional praxis’ (ibid., 81). 
Elaborating, he observes that ‘all this ultimately results from an orientation – one 
which we have come to take for granted – towards principles that determine 
institutionally the (evaluative) senses in which we recognise one another in 
accordance with the relationship existing between us’ (ibid., 153). Therefore, 
although acts of control might violate the norms of reciprocal recognition and, as a 
result, be deemed to have breached the principles of moral conduct, that doesn’t take 
away from the fact, as Bowie observes, that the internalisation and habitualisation of 
the set of convictions of one’s society together with the production and adoption of its 
practice-based norms, what Honneth suggests are representative of a society’s 
‘second nature’, might be down to ‘systemic social and economic pressures’ beyond 
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our control (Bowie 2013, 122), which ‘may be instilled in us in ways that involve 
unconscious compulsion’ (ibid., 118). 
Whether or not the distortion of the hermeneutic situation in the cases of 
Stockhausen and Strauss constitute instances of moral misconduct, the fact that the 
principles of mutual comprehensibility and reciprocal recognition have been defied 
by the ‘dogmatism of an interpretation that is guided by prejudice’, both examples are 
seemingly illustrative of what Wellmer calls ‘nonunderstanding’ [‘Nicht-Verstehen’]. 
In both cases, the ‘correct mean between merely “internal” understanding and 
“external” understanding’, the mean that would warrant a democratic ‘fusion of 
horizons’, has been distorted and pulled too far in the direction of what Wellmer 
considers to be ‘external’ understanding, one that relies on the interpreter’s own 
prejudices and convictions. At the same time, however, through the musical and 
dramatic representation of the character of Elektra, what can be observed is what 
Wellmer recognises as the ‘subversive potential’ of aesthetic understanding. Elektra, 
as we have seen, is considered to be a possible contagion, one that, in phobic terms at 
least, would call into question the normative framework of reifying supremacist 
ideology. Her ultimate repulsion in death is a distinctly phobic reaction, one that 
seeks to control the threat she poses to established social and cultural norms and 
convictions. Kramer also observes that a similar interpretation can be applied to the 
character of Klytämnestra. For Kramer, Klytämnestra ‘represents something 
incommensurate with the tonal and cultural order, a contaminated residue of 
otherness that can neither be contained nor banished’ (L. Kramer 2004, 204). He 
claims that this ‘otherness’ results from Klytämnestra’s jouissance as a mistress. It is 
this jouissance that, according to Kramer, bestows on Klytämnestra a ‘transgressive’ 
potential, which, once released, ‘can appear only as rancid and destructive, even to 
the mother herself’ (ibid.). For Kramer, therefore, jouissance is a degenerate feature 
of an, ultimately, unwanted Other, an Other which, precisely because of its 
jouissance, is able to call into question the norms and specific values of the dominant 
institutional order. 
This double reading of the concept of jouissance finds its way into Scott 
Wilson’s interpretation of ‘amusia’, that is, ‘the occasion of music as the experience 
of a tormenting noise that causes subjective fragmentation, even heralding death’ 
(Wilson 2012, 27). Amusia is not so much silence but ‘the presence of noise where 
there ought to be music’ (ibid., 26). Citing the Parisian psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain 
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Miller, Wilson suggests that, under the guise of amusia, musical practices of other 
cultures become entwined with stereotyping narratives. The music of Miller’s Islamic 
neighbours ‘perfectly evokes for him the jouissance of the Other that lies at the 
“extimate” core of a racism that no rational understanding or liberalism can erase’ 
(ibid., 27). Elaborating, ‘music may be perceived as an unbearable noise when it is 
experienced as the expression of the Other’s jouissance’ (ibid.). In short, the presence 
of noise as evoking the jouissance of the Other is indicative of a possible cross-
cultural relationship not derived from a fusion of horizons, but one that violates the 
norms of reciprocal recognition. As Varèse claimed, ‘noise is any sound one doesn't 
like’ (Varèse 1966, 18). As in the case of Elektra and Klytämnestra, the control that 
Miller exerts over the music of his Islamic neighbours leads to the suppression of the 
Other through an act of repulsion and reifying stereotyping. In other words, just as 
Elektra is, to a degree, repelled as something lacking in distinctly human 
characteristics, the Other’s music is rejected out of hand as noise – as something 
lacking in aesthetic significance. At the same time, through the stereotyping narrative 
that Miller imposes on the music of his Islamic neighbours, and in stark contrast to 
Strauss’ musical and dramatic representation of Elektra, the noise of the Other is not 
allowed to ‘talk back’. The interpretation of the Other’s music as noise can, therefore, 
be thought of as what Taylor calls a ‘sham’, an act that presupposes the control of 
what is to be understood. It is this question of noise’s relationship to cross-cultural 
and trans-historical understanding that the final section of this chapter will seek to 
explore. 
 
Noise, Power and the Problem of Fusing Horizons 
 
As part of our everyday soundscape, noise, as Michael Goddard, Benjamin Halligan 
and Paul Hegarty (2012) note, is considered to be intrusive, an irritant, unwanted and 
unpleasant, something that, nevertheless, transgresses and subverts established norms 
– ‘noise operates on the thresholds of normative social interaction as a potentially 
disruptive agency’ (Goddard et al. 2012, 2). As Jacques Attali observes, ‘long before 
it was given this theoretical expression, noise had always been experienced as 
destruction, disorder, dirt, pollution, an aggression against the code-structuring 
messages. In all cultures, it is associated with the idea of the weapon, blasphemy, 
plague’ (Attali 1985, 27). Similarly, Marie Thompson suggests that noise ‘threatens 
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“my” boundaries… the other’s breach of the peace. Noise is a force that dominates; it 
is beyond the grasp of my control’ (M. Thompson 2012, 208). The parallels between 
this double reading of noise and the supremacist interpretation of the character of 
Elektra can hardly be missed. Indeed, even outside the immediate context of 
planning, pollution and health, noise is thought to exist in a negative relation with 
music; ‘noise as a negative aesthetic judgment…which is other than the authentic, 
organic creation of music’ or ‘as the unwanted element for studio technicians, the 
evidence of the failings of technology, of dust on the tapehead, of the deterioration of 
reproductions, as denoting the technological limitations of yesteryear’ (Goddard et al. 
2013, 4). Noise, by definition, Rob Gawthrop claims, ‘is unlikely to be recognised as 
music’ – ‘noise is not intelligible but sensible’ [italics added] (Gawthrop 2012, 172). 
Indeed, as Wilson demonstrates, the concept of amusia is grounded on the idea that 
there exist some ‘noisy’ sonic occurrences that are seemingly unintelligible qua 
music for certain listeners. It follows that in contrast to the implausibly one-sided 
characterisation of music as ‘organised sound’, which was criticised in chapters one 
and three, noise is thought to lack organisation, it is considered to be ‘ugly and 
destructive of meaning’, a ‘disturbance or interference of a meaningful sonic system’. 
However, not so much devoid of meaning as organised in such a way as to be 
understood as ‘alien to the norms of a specific system’ (Goddard et al. 2012, 2-3). So, 
according to Attali’s thesis, noise ‘destroys orders to structure new orders’ (Attali 
1985, 20), that is, ‘a network can be destroyed by noises that attack and transform it, 
if the codes in place are unable to normalise or repress them…for despite the death it 
contains, noise carries order within itself; it carries new information’ (ibid., 33). 
Furthermore, due to its lack of normative sonic organisation, noise is also considered 
to be ‘the Other of information’; ‘a shadow of or resistance to a signal being passed 
between two points in a system’ (Goddard et al. 2012, 3), that is, something that 
‘obstruct[s] and interfere[s] with an intended message’ (ibid., 5). As the anonymous 
GegenSichKollectiv claims, by ‘being too much, too complex, too dense and difficult 
to decode, or too chaotic to be measured…by making us aware of our inability to 
decipher it, noise alienates us’ (GegenSichKollectiv 2012, 194). Noise as the Other to 
the norms of social etiquette, language and music; something that pollutes our 
personal and social spaces; that transgresses the established aesthetic and stylistic 
conventions of music and that hinders the smooth running of systems of 
communication.  
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 Like the character of Elektra according to supremacist interpretations, noise 
spoils attempts at mutual comprehension because, as an irritant, an intrusive, 
annoying and unwanted Other, it articulates the idea that there exist forms of life that 
appear to be radically different to our own. Indeed, bearing in mind Wilson’s 
comments on amusia, the ‘noise’ of rock n’ roll, punk, hip hop, rave, heavy metal, 
electronica, grime, jazz and avant-garde Western art music are all cultural Others that 
certain groups and individuals have at different times chosen to keep at a distance, to 
repel, thus affirming their characterisation as ‘noise’ as opposed to ‘music’ or ‘art’. 
Indeed, it is in no sense arbitrary that the characterisation of such musics as ‘noise’ 
has also coincided with the repulsion of those forms of life that are ‘thematised’ by 
these ‘noises’. The point to make, and it is one that is implied in Wellmer’s 
discussion of the links between the socially oppressed and the emancipatory potential 
of art, is that the conception of noise as a negative phenomenon, as something that 
repels us as ‘the “other” of music’ or as the music of the Other (Goddard et al. 2013, 
4), is closely bound up with the reification of the Other, an act that violates the norms 
of reciprocal recognition and that, according to Taylor and Gadamer, hinders cross-
cultural understanding.  
For example, writing on the history of reggae soundsystem culture in Britain 
since the 1950s, John Eden notes that, in the ‘50s and ’60s, soundsystems – powerful 
speakers that ensured huge bass lines – ‘became a symbol of righteous rebellion or 
abject nuisance depending on your proximity to them and your feeling about 
thumping basslines’ (Eden 2011, 13). The phobic reaction to Jamaican soundsystem 
culture and its characterisation as ‘noise’ became an important part of the wider 
stereotyping and racist narratives that were to surround Jamaican culture in general. 
As Eden explains, ‘the racist fears and stereotypes of the era revolved around 
Jamaican men playing loud music, smoking illegal substances, and dancing with 
white women’ (ibid.). Indeed, as Lloyd Bradley notes, phobic reactions to Jamaican 
culture even extended to the law with the regional revival of the ‘Sus Laws’, which 
were affiliated with the 1824 Vagrancy Act, allowing police officers to search, 
interrogate and arrest ‘suspected persons’ (Bradley 2001). But, as Eden also observes, 
Jamaicans and Jamaican ‘noise’ were not always considered in the negative sense of 
unwanted others. Indeed, Eden is aware of the norm-transcending possibilities that 
emerge through cross-cultural interaction, claiming that the ‘presence of these 
immigrants’ ‘provided some significant innovations to our culture along the way’ 
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(Eden 2011, 12). Starting with the social mingling of ‘black and white kids’ during 
the early 1980s, Eden suggests that ‘true integration worked itself out at street level 
with young men and women coming to produce “mixed race” offspring’ (ibid, 14). In 
musical terms, cross-cultural interaction at both social and biological levels ‘would 
fuse together in the cultural crucible of rave’ and, subsequently, jungle, garage, grime 
and dubstep, thus calling into question ossified perceptions of ‘British music’ as well 
as the meaning of what is to be ‘British’ (ibid).  
What Eden’s comments on the impact of Jamaican culture on British social 
and artistic life illustrate is that once ‘noise’ as the music of the Other or, indeed, the 
other of music has been appropriated into what Thompson calls normative 
‘performative and aesthetic contexts’, the characterisation of such noise as a ‘negative 
affect; an unwanted or excess flow of vibrations that invade “my” world, drowning 
out other sounds in the auditory or informational plane’ (M. Thompson 2012, 209), 
can be both transcended and transcending. As we observed in chapter one with 
regards to Jon Savage’s discussions on punk, there is a ‘hidden positive’ to noise’s 
‘much-flaunted negative’, especially when we consider noise as the other of music or, 
indeed, the music of the Other. Thompson claims, for example, that ‘while noise 
“proper” tends to be conceived of in terms of negative affect, as excess, the sonically 
abject or as impossible, incomprehensible chaos, noise music embraces this 
negativity as positive, productive and desirable; as a means of gaining new or 
alternative sensuous experiences’ (M. Thompson 2012, 210). Her idea is grounded on 
Attali’s thesis, specifically that ‘the presence of noise makes sense, makes meaning. It 
makes possible the creation of a new order on another level of organisation, of a new 
code in another network’ (Attali 1985, 33). As we saw in chapter one, something 
similar is claimed by Wellmer in relation to artworks in general, mainly that ‘art can 
be described as world-disclosing in so far as it opens new perceptual and experiential 
possibilities…allows in experiences of suffering, and anything excluded from 
established social discourses or not open to being thematised within it, lends a voice 
to those oppressed by society, in short: in so far as it articulates or thematises the 
socially negative, and thus at the same time articulates or evokes an impulse 
transcending this socially negative’ (Wellmer 2004, 126). Just as the supremacist 
ideology that leads to the reification of women in the early twentieth century can be 
called into question by the same ‘object’ it aims to control, so can the norms and 
conventions of musical praxis also be critiqued and potentially transcended as a result 
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of being ‘open’ to its other – noise. We see this, for example, when Schaeffer’s 
efforts at producing a Musique Concrète in the late 1940s and ‘50s called into 
question the ‘elementary definitions of music theory’ through a novel compositional 
aesthetic that relied on, in Schaeffer’s words, ‘sound fragments that exist in reality 
and that are considered as discrete and complete sound objects’ as opposed to the 
‘preconceived sound abstractions’ of ‘traditional’ Western art music (Schaeffer 2012, 
14).14 For Schaeffer, each stage in the development of Musique Concrète, with its aim 
of creating music from ‘concrete’ sounds, acted as a particular critique of the 
compositional, formal and stylistic norms of the day. 
Following his early attempts at working with ‘concrete’ sounds and turntables 
as well as his efforts at transforming customary orchestral methods by concrete 
procedures, the next stage, as we see in Symphonie pour un homme seul (1949-50), 
composed with Pierre Henry, was to return to noise, ‘tearing sound material away 
from any context, dramatic or musical, before giving it form’ (ibid., 38). Unlike his 
earlier efforts in 1948, the key to Schaeffer’s new approach was, with ‘patience and, 
of course, mechanical resources’, to manipulate the sound fragments at a ‘more 
refined, microscopic or infinitesimal, level’; to put to one side fascinations with 
solely ‘transforming’ form in order to focus on ‘transmutations’ of the ‘concrete’ 
material (ibid., 41) – something that, Schaeffer admits, was limited in the 
Symphonie.15 Elaborating on the concept of ‘transmutation’ and its applicability to 
‘concrete’ sounds, Schaeffer explained that ‘all analysis, followed by synthesis, 
which operates at this [atomic] level of division, has therefore every chance of acting 
on both matter and form, and in so radical a way that every original element will be 
unrecognisable. There will be neither noise nor musical sound, neither drama or 
symphony; there will be new materials for a new way of constructing sound’ (ibid., 
42). Such ‘new way[s] of constructing sound’ can be conceived as what Attali calls a 
‘subversion in musical production [that] opposes a new syntax to the existing syntax, 
from the point of view of which it is noise’ (Attali 1985, 34). Indeed, even though in 
Schaeffer’s case some of the ‘sound objects’ have their origin in the realm of noise 
                                                
14 According to Schaeffer, ‘the adjective “abstract” is applied to ordinary music because it is initially 
conceived in the mind, then notated theoretically, and finally executed in an instrumental performance. 
As for “concrete” music, it is made up of preexisting elements, taken from any sound material, noise, 
or musical sound, then composed experimentally by direct montage, the result of a series of 
approximations, which finally gives form to the will to compose contained in rough drafts, without the 
help of an ordinary music notation, which becomes impossible’ (Schaeffer 2012, 25). 
15 See Schaeffer 2012, 46-58. 
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proper, according to Attali, ‘transitions of this kind have been occurring in music 
since antiquity and have led to the creation of new codes within changing networks. 
Thus the transition from the Greek and medieval scales to the tempered and modern 
scales can be interpreted as aggression against the dominant code by noise destined to 
become a new dominant code’ (ibid.). In other words, ‘what is noise to the old order 
is harmony to the new: Monteverdi and Bach created noise for the polyphonic order. 
Webern for the tonal order. Lamont Young for the serial order’ (ibid., 35). Indeed, 
according to Varèse, ‘to stubbornly conditioned ears, anything new in music has 
always been called noise’ (Varèse 1966, 18). It is not surprising to see, therefore, as 
shall be discussed, that the ‘aestheticization’ of noise proper has had various ethical 
and political consequences. The challenge noise as music of the Other or the other of 
music presents to the normative framework of musical style and aesthetic experience 
in general has been key to understanding the attraction of noise for minority cultures 
that would seek to engage in critical practice in the wider socio-political sphere. 
 
Noise Networks and the Problem of Autonomy 
 
As opposed to noise proper, a reified phenomenon, which, as Thompson observes, 
tends to be considered in the negative sense as that which remains outside the various 
systems of socio-cultural etiquette, music and language, noise music, like punk, 
‘relies on an exploitation of the grey area of contradiction; it lies on the fault line 
between music and non-music, wanted and unwanted, the pleasurable and the 
grotesque, and so on, pulling in various, conflicting directions’ (M. Thompson 2012, 
215). For Thompson, noise music as potential ‘positive’ to noise-proper’s ‘much-
flaunted negative’ is a means by which we can achieve new or different sensuous 
experiences. Like Wellmer, she sees in noise works the potential for norm-
transcendence, for calling into question and possibly overcoming rigid and fossilised 
conventions, thus avoiding some of the pitfalls of reification that both Adorno and 
Honneth seek to discuss. For Thompson, the transcending power of noise music 
emerges from its relationship to the body: ‘noise music addresses me as matter, 
rendering the body porous. I can feel it in my lungs, my stomach, my throat; it can 
turn me inside out’ (ibid., 211). Recalling the supremacist reading of Strauss’ Elektra 
from earlier, Thompson confesses that in the presence of noise music her ‘boundaries 
are no longer stable’ – her body is a potential ‘vibrational mass’ (ibid., 213). She goes 
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on to suggest that ‘it is a dangerous eroticism; it can take (or at least, is imagined to 
take) “my” body, the bordered body, to its outer thresholds, its margins. I exist on my 
skin, at my innermost exteriority’ (ibid.). It follows that ‘the negativity of the sonic 
invasion that noise can encompass during its everyday existence thus becomes a 
positive dimension of noise music: take the force of torture and find a joyous, 
intensive existence in it’ (ibid.). What Thompson sees in noise music is, therefore, not 
so much a subversive potential but the means by which certain cultural conventions 
can be called in question and, as Gadamer suggests, potentially transcended as a 
result of a fusion of horizons between noise music and the ‘open’ interpreter. Thus, 
Thompson claims, ‘the aim of the game is not transgression, since transgressions 
reassert that which they seek to oppose, escape or overturn. What is needed, rather, is 
an exposure of the anomaly, the blurring of the binary, an entangling of the wires. 
Dealing with that which is at hand rather than seeking to step outside altogether’ 
(ibid., 217-218). 
 Of course, noise, like music, once appropriated into various performative and 
aesthetic contexts, is not free from what Honneth (2009) calls ‘social pathologies’. 
For all Luigi Russolo’s innovation with his famous intonarumori, the Italian Futurist 
community of which Russolo was a part proclaimed, as demonstrated by Filippo 
Tommaso Marinetti’s The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism of 1909, that ‘poetry 
must be conceived as violent attack on unknown forces, to reduce and prostrate them 
before man’; that it would ‘glorify war – the world’s only hygiene – militarism, 
patriotism, the destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying 
for, and scorn for woman’; and that it would ‘destroy museums, libraries, academies 
of every kind…fight moralism, feminism, every opportunistic or utilitarian 
cowardice’. Even today reifying supremacist worldviews tarnish the noise subculture, 
leading one of its proponents, Elizabeth Veldon, whose works include Would you 
please stop raping me? Parts 1 and 2, Kyrie Elision (Do Not Fear Death or Threats. 
The Lord Goes With You) and Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein as a Radical Puncturing of 
Male Idealism Part 2, to produce, together with her supporters, two ‘NOISE IN 
OPPOSITION’ compilations in response to the attempted misogynist and fascist 
appropriation of the extreme electronics scene.16 As Veldon states, ‘NOISE IN 
OPPOSITION is intended as a firm “fuck off” to the moribund far-right idiots 
                                                
16 See Veldon et al. 2013. 
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who’ve mistaken the international noise scene for some sandpit where they can freely 
abuse and intimidate others based on their race, gender or sexuality’. Indeed, the 
aestheticization of noise within today’s so-called noise communities or networks is 
often bound up with some explicitly political agenda. In recent times, the noise scene, 
as exemplified by the latest contributions to the Berlin-based publication, Datacide, 
has concerned itself with disclosing structures of power and their affects on socio-
cultural practices, including State censorship, the surveillance and repression of 
personal and social media, the rise of the American Right and the Tea Party 
movement, police brutality, the activities of extreme right wing groups in the UK and 
Russia and the demonization of minority forms of life by the media and the State.  
How noise networks call into question the ideas of various power structures is, 
however, much debated. Bruce Russell, for example, hopes the ‘noise underground’, 
with its ‘autonomous position in the field of restricted production’, will be ‘inherently 
antipathetic to dominant ideologies’ (Russell 2012, 245). Citing the Situationist 
movement as an influence, Russell argues for an appropriation of outmoded 
technologies for potentially emancipatory ends, to create a new and autonomous form 
of life, ‘one that “advances beyond”, rather than follows behind, changes in objective 
social structures’ (ibid., 255). With reference to the ‘noise underground’, Russell 
explains that ‘entire cadres of artists exploit terminally defunct modes of sound 
production, vintage equipment (yesterday’s junk) is fetishized and “inferior” modes 
of production such as the cassette are ubiquitous’ (ibid., 249). The hope is to create ‘a 
space “outside” the reified relations which surround technologies, [where] the 
possible shapes of other media are at least potentially open to contestation’ (ibid., 
252). Russell sets up the pop industry as his main opponent, whose ‘retromania’, a 
term coined by Simon Reynolds, is ‘set to enmesh popular music in a perpetual past 
nostalgia, pastiche and repetition; enmeshing both those artists who accept the 
potential blandishments of mass-market consecration, and those entering the cul-de-
sac of retro-hipsterism’ (ibid., 255-256). Russell’s Situationist hopes for the ‘noise 
underground’ places him in tension with Thompson’s idea of using noise in order to 
work with and potentially transcend ossified musical, political, social and cultural 
norms rather than reject them out of hand. Therefore, rather than aim to transform 
musical conventions by critiquing already available stylistic and formative norms, 
Russell suggests that we ‘reject all the rules of music’ (ibid., 256). In contrast with a 
process by which the power structures surrounding music’s production and 
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dissemination are challenged in a political sphere of mutual debate and 
intersubjective legitimacy, Russell demands that we ‘forgo the market support 
potentially on offer in the field of general production, and decline the poisoned 
chalice of digital audio production’ (ibid.). Ultimately, as Russell makes clear, the 
goal is to side-step ‘the mediatised habitus surrounding most popular and academic 
music’ (ibid.). 
Certainly noise networks are concerned with fashioning forms of life that are 
somehow outside of dominant social, cultural and political discourses and practices. 
As Christoph Fringeli of Datacide recalls, ‘in the 1990s, we at Datacide and others 
tried to theorise the techno rave scene as a possible proletarian counter 
culture…much more than any “straight” political direction, we saw in it the 
possibilities of self-organisation, collectivity and pursuit of pleasure in the counter 
culture around sound systems, anonymous white label records and illegal parties’ 
(Fringeli 2011, 7). The key issue is that noise networks, perceived as self-managed, 
autonomous collectives by members of those networks, are, in certain quarters, 
created with the view to existing outside of dominant culture and its norms. The use 
of the term ‘network’ as a way of characterising communities oriented around noise 
music is also deliberate, as it stresses the samizdat, DIY, collaborative culture that 
many networks seek to sustain in direct opposition to what they see as commercial 
and academic institutions that have professionalised various forms of music making 
and appreciation. Effort is spent on mitigating production costs, on sharing material 
as opposed to generating profit, on creating a culture of contribution as opposed to 
pure consumption and on producing works that can be aesthetically contrasted with 
the ‘glossy’, ‘photo-shopped’ and ‘airbrushed’ products of the culture industry.  
The focus on what could be perceived from the outside to be a distinctly 
amateur and antiquated approach to music making and appreciation is paralleled by 
the production and dissemination of material through outmoded means and in out-
dated forms that certain networkers are now calling ‘cassette communism’. Nigel 
Ayers, of lo-fi electronic/experimental/noise stalwarts, Nocturnal Emissions, has 
recently admitted his fondness for making records on cassette tape because the 
process is ‘quick, straightforward’ and allows him ‘control over the means of 
production and distribution’ (Eden and Ayers 2012, 3). Similarly, Libbe Matz Gang, 
creators of ‘primitive computer music’, recall that their wish to release a nine-track 7” 
EP in 2011 was thwarted by current production processes: ‘we had engineers telling 
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us, “you can’t press a 9-track, 33.3rpm EP, it’ll sound diabolical, we don’t want our 
business associated with this”. Or else, they’d “recommend” we cut it as a 12”, 
hoping they could take money off us. These are the supposed “expert sound 
technicians”’ (Eden and Libbe Matz Gang 2012, 7). It is perhaps telling that the 
Libbe Matz Gang’s EP was finally pressed by a German anarchist group. Ultimately, 
in a digital age of music production and dissemination, noise artists and audiences 
acknowledge that their penchant for antiquated reproductions is a form of critique, 
although such a critique is perhaps undermined when members of these noise 
networks use the internet and other digital media to disseminate material to a wider 
audience. This last point is vital to understanding the challenges that face a noise 
network which attempts to sustain itself as what Russell refers to as an autonomous, 
new habitus that ‘support[s] both new social structures within the practice of the 
community’ (Russell 2012, 257). 
To set up what Alexis Wolton refers to as a ‘zone of autonomy’ that explicitly 
rejects the social, political and aesthetic norms of the dominant culture, what Bowie 
(2013) refers to as a form of ‘either/or thinking’, has been considered by Reynolds to 
be a ‘subversive fallacy’. According to Reynolds, conferring ‘the status of value on 
excess and extremism is to bring these things back within the pale of decency. So the 
rhetoricians of noise actually destroy the power they strive to celebrate; they are the 
very start of the process by which subversion is turned into contributions, which is 
absorbed as a renewal for the system’ (Reynolds 1990, 58). Although Reynolds’ 
pessimistic critique perhaps downplays the norm-transcending possibilities of both 
noise music and the socio-political organisation and ideas of its networks for those 
that are ‘open’ enough to let noise culture ‘talk back’ on equal terms, he does hint at 
the problems with Russell’s utopian dream of an autonomous ‘noise underground’. If 
we recall the discussions of punk music in chapter one, Reynolds claims that punk 
‘proved a rejuvenating shot in the arm to the established record industry that the 
punks had hoped to overthrow’ (Reynolds 2005, xvii). The issue is that rather than 
taken seriously as a potential alternative to social pathologies, punk became 
domesticated as it, simultaneously, ‘opened’ itself up to the financial exploitation of 
its ‘street cred’ by the culture industry. Ultimately, punk’s assimilation into the 
dominant culture, notwithstanding its ‘positive affect’ of thematising, in Wellmer’s 
sense, those worldviews that had been excluded from established social discourses, 
served to support corporate power structures rather than topple them. The problem, 
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therefore, with Russell’s dream of noise networks as protected ‘zones of autonomy’ is 
that, as Wolton observes, the tapping of ‘unregulated zones’ is necessary to the 
survival of the culture industry as a ‘strategy of reinvigoration’ (Wolton 2011, 16). 
These processes of cultural renewal that sustain the culture industry leads Wolton to 
the conclusion that ‘zones of autonomy can appear to exist briefly, but what appears 
as autonomous development is in the end part of capital’s process of setting and 
breaking limits’ (ibid., 19). Punk was, at once, rejected or repelled by the State as a 
‘moral panic’ – an unwanted Other – but, at the same time, it became normalised 
through its appropriation by corporate capitalism. The contradictions in punk’s 
reception are, therefore, expressive of a truth about the workings of certain power 
structures, which can only emerge, so it seems, through such contradictions. The 
result? Reynolds goes on to suggest that ‘by summer 1977, punk had become a 
parody of itself. Many of the movement’s original participants felt that something 
open-ended and full of possibilities had degenerated into a commercial formula’ 
(Reynolds 2005, xvii). Indeed, despite, post-punk’s hippy-esque attempts to build a 
self-managed, ‘anti-corporate micro-capitalism’, which, as we shall see, continues, to 
a certain extent, to allow the contemporary noise scene to appear to exist as a counter-
cultural movement, it, ultimately, failed to sidestep or sabotage what Reynolds calls 
‘rock’s dream factory’, a ‘leisure industry that channelled youth’s energy and 
idealism into a cultural cul-de-sac, while generating huge amounts of revenue for 
corporate capitalism’ (ibid., xxvi).  
Subcultural movements that aim to set themselves up as self-determining 
communities which reject out of hand pre-established norms of society are in constant 
danger of being (unconsciously) distorted by power structures that, like the culture 
industry, could potentially appropriate them for their own renewal.17 Indeed, just as 
the individual’s actions can be conceived as meaningful only within the normative 
context of social and cultural practices, and just as those individual actions can be 
constrained by communal norms, so the mores and norms of the community can also 
be shaped and constrained (sometimes unconsciously such that individuals are 
unaware of the deceit) by larger trans-social and trans-cultural institutions and 
structures of power. As Bowie claims, ‘the notion of autonomy is necessarily infected 
with some measure of heteronomy’ (Bowie 2013, 110). Ultimately, in the hopes of 
                                                
17 See, for example, GegenSichKollectiv 2012, Reynolds 2005, Thompson 2012, Wilson 2012 and 
Wolton 2011. 
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escaping what they consider to be an already reified world, attempts to conceptualise 
an autonomous form of life for subcultural practices end up reifying a new world by 
failing to take account of the mediated nature of cultural groups in terms of their 
situatedness within a world in which worldviews can ‘flow’ from one to another. 
Indeed, as Adorno was aware, to theorise about a new form of life that is somehow 
outside of dominant ways of doing and thinking is, in itself, a double-edged sword, 
because what may appear as a more appealing form of life for one community can 
also be what drives a form of what Bowie calls ‘systematic inhumanity’ (ibid., 99).  
What is useful about both noise and the forms of life that sustain noise 
networks is not so much their aim to set themselves up as the self-determining Others 
to dominant practices but that which is expressed in their desire to conceptualise a 
new form of life outside of such practices, specifically, that the act of thinking about 
the creation of a new habitus itself discloses a critical stance towards dominant social, 
cultural and political norms. Taking into account Wellmer’s ideas concerning the 
emancipatory potential of aesthetic practice and the idea that we can become 
critically aware of relations of domination and what sustains them, the value of such 
movements lies in their ability to call into question and potentially transcend those 
concrete norms that continue to legitimise current relations of power within dominant 
social, political and historical discourses. In the case of soundsystem culture, once the 
phobic reaction to Jamaican culture in general had begun to ease, soundsystem 
‘noise’ proved to be a valuable resource for the reinvigoration of aesthetic norms, 
leading to, as Eden observes, innovations in rave, jungle, garage, grime and dubstep. 
But the innovations were not confined to the realm of culture; through everyday 
interactions between Jamaican immigrants and native Britons since the 1940s and 
‘50s, perceptions of what racial, cultural and social norms and values count as being 
distinctly ‘British’ have been set in motion. None of this is to say that social 
pathologies such as racism no longer exist. However, it is, arguably, the case that 
such paradigmatic instances of widespread cross-cultural interaction are what 
continue to ensure that racist convictions and worldviews cannot be justifiably 
legitimated without violating the norms of recognition that have been handed down 
through history.  
In the case of noise, we have seen how Goddard, Halligan and Hegarty 
interpret this abject acoustic phenomenon as a challenge to the norms and 
conventions of social etiquette, public health, linguistic communication and musical 
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praxis. In the sphere of noise networks, the aestheticization of what has been 
considered in the negative sense to be the other of music has also coincided with 
subversive projects whereby minority cultures have taken up critical positions 
towards, for example, far-right politics, the culture industry and finance capitalism. 
Through the creation of networks that aim to develop a distinctly amateur culture of 
collaborative music-making and political action, one that stresses, for example, the 
value of shared practices based on antiquated technologies rather than monetary 
exchange or financial profit, the critical stance the noise scene (in certain quarters) 
adopts towards the culture industry and finance capitalism works itself out at the level 
of subcultural praxis. But, as has been observed, the critical positions that noise 
networks adopt in the face of corporate structures of power does not mean that the 
subculture is safe from appropriation by corporate capitalism. As Goddard, Halligan 
and Hegarty observes, ‘noise necessarily opens up specific technical or meaningful 
systems to outside interferences, to systems and durations other than our own’ 
(Goddard et al. 2012, 5). The contradiction here is that not only does the possibility 
exist for outsiders to transcend their own worldviews and practices by fusing their 
horizons with those of a different community but these ‘specific technical or 
meaningful systems’ also, at the same time, become open to exploitation, to distortion 
and to rejection at the hands of bigger social, cultural and political power structures. 
Artworks, as we have seen in this chapter, can be appropriated for a variety of 
different ethical ends. The issue is that the emancipatory potential of art and artworks 
is not as ethically transparent as it seems. For just as relations of power can be 
considered unjust in certain circumstances, that is not to say that these institutions 
could not be considered emancipatory under changed social, political and historical 
conditions. As Bowie emphasises, ‘the same freedom which enables forms of self-
transcendence…can, in the wrong social, political, and economic conditions, lead to 
disaster’ (Bowie 2012, 128).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is clear from the discussions in chapter five regarding those power structures 
that distort the ideal fusion of horizons between two cultures, what Wellmer calls the 
‘correct mean between merely “internal” understanding and “external” 
understanding’, between ‘reception’ and ‘production’, is that what determines us – 
even possibly repressing or deceiving us – can itself lead to the possibility of 
overcoming the norms that continue to legitimise certain relations of domination. We 
can become critically aware of those power structures that have (unconsciously) 
determined our ways of being in the world. The example we have focussed on for the 
most part throughout the course of this study is the approach to ‘understanding’ music 
in analytic aesthetics. However, the forms of control that analytic aesthetics exerts 
over musical practices through detached contemplation are, as we saw in chapter five, 
overshadowed by wider social, cultural and political structures of power whose 
control of the Other brings about a violation of the norms of reciprocal recognition or 
mutual comprehension.  
Honneth refers to those structures that bring about a distortion of the ‘correct 
mean’ in a hermeneutic situation as ‘social pathologies’. For Honneth, the ideal 
fusion of horizons is interpreted in the light of a ‘historically effective reason’, which 
can be found in Hegel’s practical philosophy. Thus, ‘reason unfolds in the historical 
process by re-creating universal “ethical” institutions at each new stage; by taking 
these institutions into account, individuals are able to design their lives according to 
socially acknowledged aims and thus to experience life as meaningful’ (Honneth 
2009, 23). As we have seen, something like this idea and the normative framework it 
bestows upon the notions of meaning and truth is what gives rise to the normative 
basis of musical practices. The key point is that, for Honneth, norms are given to us 
by history, and, as a result, he sides with Pippin in suggesting that there seem to be 
‘higher’ and ‘lower’ manifestations of rationality as a result of a certain amount of 
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ethical and moral progress that we see, for example, in the legitimisation of anti-
racist, anti-homophobic and anti-sexist worldviews and convictions. It is this sort of 
institutional reason, that is, ‘the historically produced values present in social spheres 
of meaning’ (ibid., 33), which, according to Honneth, ensures ‘that each successful 
form of society is possible only through the maintenance of its most highly developed 
standard of rationality’ (ibid., 23). For Honneth, this idea of the ‘most highly 
developed standard of rationality’ is considered to be the nearest thing to a ‘rational 
universal’, which Wellmer argues can only ever be partially achieved, and it is the 
distortion of this rational universal that is linked to the distortions we see in those 
moments of cross-cultural understanding whereby, as Taylor suggests, we go from 
‘making the best sense within a fused horizon’ to ‘making the “best sense” in our 
initial terms, which will usually be an alien imposition’. So, Honneth argues, 
‘deviations from the ideal that would be achieved with the social actualisation of the 
rational universal can be described as social pathologies since they must accompany a 
regrettable loss of prospects for intersubjective self-actualisation’ (ibid., 25). But 
rather than leave it there, whereby any distortion of the ideal hermeneutic situation 
can be deemed to be a pathology of reason, Honneth goes on to claim that ‘any 
deviation from the ideal outlined here must lead to a social pathology insofar as 
subjects are recognisably suffering from a loss of universal, communal ends’ [italics 
added] (ibid., 24). Thus, social pathologies are considered to be ‘social form[s] of 
organisation in which practices and ways of thinking prevail that prevent the social 
utilisation of a rationality already made possible by history’ (ibid., 35). It is, in other 
words, a lack of social rationality that has been made available by historical processes 
that is characteristic of social pathologies. This has the effect, when it comes to the 
ideal of mutual comprehension or a fusion of horizons, of precluding ‘the possibility 
of orienting oneself in terms of a rational universal, the impetus to which could only 
come from a fully realised rationality’ (ibid.).  
Reification, based on what Wellmer calls the ‘logic of identity’, that is, ‘a 
reason which plans, controls, objectifies, systematises and unifies – in short, it is a 
“totalising” reason’ (Wellmer 1985, 101), is key to understanding wider issues 
concerning social forms of control, which develop historically, make use of the ‘logic 
of identity’ and, as a result, bring about a deformation of the norms of reciprocal 
recognition. The detached contemplation that seeks to provide a unitary explanatory 
story for the nature of, for example, meaning and truth in certain quarters of 
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contemporary analytic philosophy is, ultimately, part of a broader cultural problem 
whereby prejudices imposed upon that which is to be understood, be it another 
individual, a culture or a form of musical practice, does not allow it to, as Taylor 
suggests, ‘talk back’ to an ‘open’ and respectful interpreter. For Wellmer, social 
phenomena that depend on this ‘logic of identity’ include, for example, ‘capitalist 
economy, modern bureaucracy, technical progress and finally those ways of 
“disciplining” the body which are analysed by Foucault’ (ibid.). The difficulty here, 
however, is that the forms of identity that make such phenomena possible, especially 
when we attempt to account, for example, for scientific knowledge and medical 
practice, are precisely what can improve the quality of life for a vast amount of the 
world’s population. Indeed, as observed in the first chapter, certain identifications and 
objectifications are necessary for the world to be comprehensible in the first place, to 
take part in communication and to create, perform or talk about music. That said, as 
Bowie observes, the same sort of identity-thinking that can make life more tolerable 
is also what, under different historical circumstances, can lead to a pathology of 
reason.1 In this sense, the distortion of the rational universal or, as Wellmer puts it, 
the utilisation of one’s right ‘not to be fully rational’ can have both positive and 
negative social effects depending on the historical circumstances. So, according to 
Wellmer, under present circumstances in the West, ‘the practice of politics becomes 
reduced to the technique of retaining power, of manipulation and organisation; 
democracy becomes merely an efficient form of organising governmental control. 
Art, finally becomes absorbed into the culture industry of the capitalist economy, 
reduced to pseudo-autonomous pseudo-life’ (ibid.). We have seen how even those 
forms of musical practice that seek to challenge the norms and values of the State can 
be appropriated, on account of their exchange value, by the culture industry for its 
own renewal. Indeed, the ‘logic of identity’ that Wellmer sees as driving the growth 
of the culture industry has also become the means of controlling artistic practices by 
the largest funding body for the arts in the UK.  
For Arts Council England, their ‘targets and performance indicators’, as set by 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, are, for the main, based on the 
Council’s contribution to the government’s ‘Growth Agenda’ and the number of 
visitors to Arts Council and Arts-Council-funded events. In terms of what Wellmer 
                                                
1 See Bowie 2013, 96-134. 
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refers to as the ‘practice of politics’, it seems to be the case that the sort of – what 
Stefan Collini calls – ‘economistic philistinism’ of the various funding councils 
(Collini 2012, 90), which seemingly reduce the worth and usefulness of their 
investments to what they contribute to the economy, become part of a broader 
problem concerning the instrumentalisation and control of socio-cultural practices by 
populist governments in market democracies. Indeed, as we see with the current UK 
government, the prioritising of economic prosperity, sometimes above the basic needs 
of its citizens, takes place at the same time as stereotyping narratives bring about, for 
example, the demonization of the working-classes, the elderly, the disabled and other 
minority groups as well as what Collini calls a ‘hostile and instrumental disdain’ for 
Higher Education institutions and the National Health Service for what is seen as 
their failure to contribute adequately to the economy. The issue is, however, that 
despite the narrative of austerity economics being put forward as a single, unifying 
explanation for the instrumentalisation, bureaucratisation and privatisation of 
publically-funded institutions as well as the constraints placed on the most socially 
vulnerable, it is becoming increasingly apparent that there are separate agendas for 
these, arguably, distinct kinds of identification, with the demonization of the 
working-classes revealing long-standing prejudices accumulated during the history of 
neoliberal class politics. Whether we choose to see these as two different kinds of 
identification or not, both reifying stereotypes and the instrumental treatment of 
socio-cultural practices appeal to a distortion of the hermeneutic situation, the rational 
universal, through the imposition of prejudices on what should be understood. 
For Honneth, who interprets ‘social pathologies’ as emerging from ‘restricted, 
“reifying” rationality’, reification, as that which violates the norms of ‘antecedent 
recognition’, can be thought of as, to a certain degree, distinct from those forms of 
control that solely violate the norms of reciprocal recognition without seeking to deny 
the human status of those groups and individuals to be controlled. For Honneth, the 
types of control that bring about a violation of the norms of reciprocal recognition on 
which, for him, the idea of a rational universal is based include, with reference to his 
forebears at the Institute for Social Research,  ‘capitalist organisation of production’, 
‘the social privileging of rationally purposeful, utilitarian attitudes in capitalism’ and 
the ‘mechanisms of systematic management’ (Honneth 2009, 34-35). Other specific 
types of practices that are disclosive of and contribute to the pathological deformation 
of reason include the ‘hollowing-out of the legal substance of labour contracts’, the 
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treatment of ‘children’s potential talents’ ‘as an issue of generic measurement and 
manipulation’ and ‘reifying stereotypes (of women, Jews, etc.)’ (Honneth 2008, 80-
81). In the specific context of his discussions on reification, whereby reification 
occurs through a forgetfulness of ‘antecedent recognition’, the ‘elementary conditions 
that underlie all talk of morality’, the dehumanisation of individuals and groups that 
is characteristic of the concept can be found, for Honneth, in radical forms of racism, 
human-trafficking and slavery in general. 
None of this is to say, however, that we cannot become critically aware of 
those pathological objective conditions that we come to internalise and, thereby, 
sustain. The issue is that this critical awareness can often lead us to be not ‘fully 
rational’ according to the norms of recognition that pervade a certain rationally-
deformed society or culture at a given point in history. Indeed, as we have seen, 
music can play an important critical role when individuals and groups engage 
critically with those social pathologies that distort the fusion of horizons or the norms 
of reciprocal recognition. Firstly, music avoids being reified. As we have seen 
throughout this study, because our position in relation to particular works, styles, 
genres, forms, production processes and performative contexts is a transient one, 
music, its ontology, meaning and value, defies being subsumed under unifying 
explanatory theories through disengaged contemplation, that is, music offers a 
challenge to what Wellmer calls ‘a kind of unity which was only attainable at the 
price of suppressing and bracketing out anything that could not be integrated, 
anything that had been mentally repressed or otherwise excluded from general 
consciousness’ (Wellmer 1985, 103). For Wellmer, who considers the artwork to be 
an ‘internally negative’ ‘hidden totality’ that contradicts its supposedly objective 
existence, ‘no interpretation can do justice to this hidden totality by restricting the 
work of art as a meaningful whole to one meaning, one statement, one truth, by 
taking it as a symbolic whole which “shows” or “allows us to experience” something 
– in the same way that this hidden totality cannot be understood in terms of the 
intermittent moments of epiphany, of shock or intense experience’ (Wellmer 2004, 
115). By looking at a variety of different forms of musical practice, including punk, 
Oi!, Wagner’s music dramas, Beethoven’s symphonies and string quartets, Strauss’ 
Elektra, soundsystem culture and noise, it is clear that the subject’s relationship to the 
object, whether that ‘subject’ is an individual or a specific community of interpreters, 
can be affected by changes to the relationship at different times, thus calling into 
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question the idea of what Wellmer refers to as a ‘definitive insight’ into or ‘definitive 
form of understanding’ of a particular aesthetic experience. Concrete situations where 
music is present illustrate how the notional line between subject and object is not a 
fixed one – it changes with historical developments. Indeed, as Wellmer illustrates 
with some help from Heidegger, musical practices show us that the scheme of subject 
and object is a derivative mode of access to the world, one which can only develop 
after a prior (aesthetic) non-objectifying, practical stance to do with our ‘being-in-the-
world’ of socio-cultural and historically-developed norms. To see music as a world-
disclosive phenomenon, that is, a phenomenon that articulates how societies and 
cultures make sense of the world, music and each other differently at different times, 
is to call into question the rigid subject-object divide that forms the basis for reifying 
approaches to music, which bracket out the endlessly adaptive and critical nature of 
the world. Furthermore, due to our transforming and transformed relationships to 
musical practice, music qua world disclosure opens up spaces of possibility by which 
we can encounter or read the world differently. We can use music, therefore, to make 
sense of our world as well as bring about new, norm-transcending ways of making 
sense. None of this new, and it is an argument that fuels the five previous chapters of 
this study. 
We see throughout music’s history the critical act of musical composition or 
interpretation whereby manipulation of the stylistic, formative or interpretive norms 
generates new meaningful compositional, performative and interpretive contexts. As 
Wellmer claims: 
 
Every new work of art – if it truly is one – stands in a reflexive and critical relationship to a 
given world of aesthetic norms. It does not only have – and relate to – an extra-aesthetic 
context…but simultaneously also the context of an existing art-world, which – in music 
through a relation to existing compositional problems, solutions and materials – it transgresses 
and thus changes (Wellmer 2004, 114). 
 
The issue is that, when, as Bowie says, it really matters, established and popular 
musical practices and interpretations become transcended (but not completely 
rejected) in the name of something new that evokes a new kind of expression or 
sense. In other words, with regards to reification, to be fully receptive to what Adorno 
calls the non-identical in musical practice, that is, in Gadamer’s terms, to be ‘open to 
the other’ is to be open to exploring new sounds and sound-relationships. In chapter 
two, what was observed was how the norms of Wagner scholarship could be 
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transcended, with new interpretive ideas, subsequently, normalised. In chapter four 
we saw how the shared practices of the discipline of musicology have, in the past 
thirty years, changed as a result of a new and innovative ways of comporting 
ourselves towards musical praxis. Indeed, in chapter five, the music of Varèse, 
Strauss, Jamaican soundsystem culture, punk and noise was used used to show how 
artistic and cultural practices seek to develop normative material in abnormal, 
musically significant ways. 
After the end of reifying engagements with musical practice, Wellmer claims 
that we come to appreciate ‘that for modern art a more flexible and individualised 
mode of organisation becomes necessary in the same degree as it comes to 
incorporate what had previously been excluded as disparate, alien to the subject, and 
senseless’ (Wellmer 1985, 103). Read in two separate ways, Wellmer, firstly, 
suggests that the work of art, after the ‘traditional unity of the work of art’ is shown 
to be illusory, opens itself up to its ‘recipients’ for a plurality of interpretations and 
meanings. Secondly, from the point of view of ‘the producers of works’, the work of 
art brings about new senses through stylistic and formative means that perhaps would 
have been considered alien to the concept of art under reifying conditions. Thus, 
although deeply critical of certain aspects of postmodernity as we have seen, Wellmer 
suggests that what is justified about ‘postmodernism’s insistence on the end of the 
great meta-narratives…is the fact that the state of the material has been pluralised, 
and that aesthetic transgressions in many directions have become possible and indeed 
necessary’ (Wellmer 2004, 130). In other words, ‘art’s sting…lies in its breaking 
through clichés of perception and experience, or conspiring with them to question 
them playfully and change them, and in its opening of new perceptual and 
experiential possibilities’ (ibid., 125). What Wellmer calls ‘the subversive potential’ 
of aesthetic experience, therefore, is precisely this idea that with art and artworks, 
established aesthetic norms, as demonstrated throughout the history of Western 
music, can be called into question with new artistic materials subjected to 
investigation. ‘Artistic production does not occur in a normatively airtight space’ 
(ibid., 113). Instead, ‘a part of art’s independent logic’ is ‘the constant transgression 
of such rules and norms, of the respective established understanding of art, of the 
practices of its production, transmission and reception’ (ibid., 128).  
At the same time, art is a world-disclosive phenomenon by which, as we 
observed in chapter one, it is ‘entangled in social processes in such a manner that 
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works of art derive their existential content and their meaningfulness from the 
articulation of this entanglement, and from their reflection upon it’ (ibid., 124). With 
the world-disclosing aspects of art, the ‘opening-up of the work of art’ through ‘the 
dissolution of its boundaries’ (Wellmer 1985, 103) ‘can open a dimension through 
which this [extra-musical] field of meanings appears in an entirely new light, and 
seems charged with new complexity’ (Wellmer 2004, 82). The key here is ‘that the 
critical potential of accomplished works of art with respect to a given art-world also 
implies a potential for social critique’ (ibid., 125). If, in the sphere of musical 
composition, norm-transcendence is considered, in part, to be about bringing into 
play [Spiel] ‘the diffuse and the disparate’ (Wellmer 1985, 103), then ‘the negativity 
of art lies at the same time in its articulation of the socially negative as something 
negative’ (Wellmer 2004, 125). It is not surprising that in recent times, as a result of 
what Wellmer calls art’s ‘world-relation’, those musical practices that seek to call 
into question established stylistic, formative, performative and interpretive norms are 
also part of those ‘socially negative’ forms of life that take up a critical stance to 
existing social pathologies. Music, in political contexts where dominant norms are 
being challenged, becomes, as a result of its world-relation, one of the means by 
which minority groups and subcultures ‘talk back’ to those worldviews that bring 
about a distortion of the norms of reciprocal recognition. What we have seen with the 
subcultural movements of punk, Oi!, Jamaican soundsystem and noise is that the 
developments of ‘new’ forms of music making – not just at the level of form or style 
but also in terms of sound production, performance contexts, marketing, distribution 
and technological appropriation – have emerged out of critical projects that have 
sought to challenge dominant social, cultural and political norms. In this sense, as a 
world-disclosive phenomenon, music ‘holds a critical potential that affects frozen 
states of thinking, perceiving and experiencing with respect to both the self-relation 
of subjects and their social relations, and thus also…a socio-critical potential, not 
least in dark times’ (ibid., 125). In the cases of punk, Oi!, Jamaican soundsystem 
culture and noise networks, the existence of social pathologies distorts the norms of 
reciprocal recognition or mutual understanding leading to the creation of unequal 
power relationships whereby these cultures and subcultures come to be viewed, 
according to Wellmer’s terminology, as ‘socially negative’. In the sense that these 
movements open up perceptual and experiential possibilities that go against the grain 
of dominant social and cultural practices, the music of these forms of life articulates 
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or thematises the socially negative to those that are willing to listen, and, thereby, 
discloses or evokes the possibility of transcending what Wellmer calls the 
‘ideological ossifications of the dominant discourses’ (ibid., 127). Music is, therefore, 
world-disclosive and, at the same time, critical. 
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